Punjab-Haryana High Court
Devinder Singh Puri vs B.N. Rampal on 17 February, 2005
Equivalent citations: (2005)140PLR124
Author: Hemant Gupta
Bench: Hemant Gupta
JUDGMENT Hemant Gupta, J.
1. The petitioner aggrieved against the order 24.1.2005 passed by the learned Executing Court whereby the objections filed by the petitioner to the execution of ejectment order passed by the learned Rent Controller and affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority as well as by this Court and Supreme Court were dismissed.
2. The respondent-landlord sought ejectment of the petitioner herein. The learned Rent Controller passed an order of ejectment on 19.2.1998. The appeal against such order was dismissed on 7.9.2000. Revision Petition No. 4295 of 2000 against that order was dismissed by this Court on 2.7.2004. Special Leave Petition filed against the order passed in revision petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 6.11.2004. The landlord sought execution of the ejectment order in which the petitioner submitted objections to the effect:-
(i) that the premises in dispute are not governed by the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter to be referred as "the Rent Act") in view of the notification dated 7.11.2002 and, therefore, the ejectment order passed under the Rent Act is not executable.
(ii) that the landlord has sought execution of ejectment order in the year 1998 as well as on 14.10.2000 and, thus, the present application for execution is not maintainable being barred under the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(iii) that the execution petition is maintainable before the Civil Court but the landlord has invoked the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and, therefore, the ejectment order cannot be executed; and
(iv) that the landlord-respondent has tampered with the execution file and, thus, not entitled to seek execution of the ejectment order.
3. The notification dated 7.11.2002 was relied upon by the petitioner in special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court (Refer to Para No. 57 of the grounds of Special Leave Petition filed before the Supreme Court). However, the said Special Leave Petition was dismissed. The petitioner has argued that operation of notification dated 7.11.2002 has been stayed by the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1804 of 2005 and, therefore, the applicability of the Rent Act is sub judice and, therefore, the petitioner cannot be ordered to be evicted in pursuance of the ejectment order passed under the Rent Act.
4. The argument raised by the petitioner is wholly misconceived. The order of ejectment passed under the Act has attained finality. Not only the objection raised by the petitioner has remained unsuccessful before the Court but the same is otherwise without any merit. Before the issuance of notification, the ejectment order was passed by the learned Rent Controller and affirmed in appeal by the learned Appellate Authority. This Court in Pioneer Timber Products and Anr. v. Om Parkash Aggarwal and Anr., (2003-3)135 Punjab Law Reporter 250, relying upon the decision of Supreme Court in Parripati Chandrasekharro & sons v. Alapati Jalaiah, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1781, considered the distinction between the rights which accrued to the landlord under the common law and the protection which is afforded to the tenant by such legislation. It has been held that in the case of a tenant, the protective shield extended to him runs only as long as the special legislation operates. Such protection does not create any vested right which can operate beyond the period of protection. In the case of a landlord, the normal right vested in him by the general law continue to exist till and so long as they are not abridged by a special protective legislation. In Ambalal Serabhi Enterprises v. Amrit Lal and Co., A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 3580, Hon'ble Supreme Court while examining the scope of Section 6 of the General. Clauses Act, held that repeal of a statute does not, prima facie, affect the pending proceedings which may be continued as if the repealed enactment was still in force. The repeal does not affect the pending cases which would continue to be concluded as if the enactment has not been repealed. Para Nos. 25 and 35 of the judgment read as under:-
"25. As a general rule, in view of Section 6, the repeal of a statute, which is not retrospective in operation, does not prima facie affect the pending proceedings which may be continued as if the repealed enactment were still in force. In other words, such repeal does not affect the pending cases which would continue to be concluded as if it the enactment has not been repealed. In fact, when a lis commences, all rights and obligations of the parties gets crystalised on that date. The mandate of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is simply to leave the pending proceedings unaffected which commenced under the unrepealed provisions unless contrary intention is expressed. We find Clause (c) of Section 6, refers the words "any right, privilege, obligation, acquired or accrued under the repealed statute would not be affected by the repealing statute. We may hasten to clarify here mere existence of a right not being acquired or accrued, on the date of repeal would not get protection of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.
26 to 34 xx xx xx xx
35. In view of the aforesaid legal principle emerging, we come to the conclusion since proceeding for the eviction of the tenant was pending when repealing Act came into operation, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would be applicable in the present case. As it is landlord's accrued right in terms of Section 6, Sub-section (c) of Section 6 refers to "any right" which may not be limited as a vested but is limited to be an accrued right. The words any right accrued in Section 6(c) is wide enough to include landlord's right to evict a tenant in case proceeding was pending when repeal came in. Thus, a pending proceeding before the Rent Controller for the eviction of a tenant on the date when the repealing Act came into force would not be affected by the repealing statute and will be continued and concluded in accordance with the law as existed under the repealed statute."
5. In view of the said judgment, the notification making inapplicable the provisions of the Rent Act to certain tenancies would not affect the right crystalised on the date when the landlord initiated eviction proceedings.
6. Assuming the notification has been stayed, the very argument raised by the petitioner that the provisions of the Rent Act are not applicable falls to the ground. Therefore, in either of the situations, the petitioner is only trying to delay the execution of the ejectment order.
7. The argument that the present application is barred by the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure is again devoid of merit. Earlier, the landlord filed execution of the ejectment order in the year 1998 after the decision of the learned Rent Controller. Similarly, the landlord again filed execution application to seek eviction of the petitioner after the decision of appeal by the learned Appellate Authority. However, both these execution applications were withdrawn in view of the pendency of revision petition before this Court. After the decision of Revision Petition and the Special Leave Petition, the landlord has sought execution of the ejectment order. Thus, the argument that the respondent is not entitled to seek execution of the ejectment order is wholly misconceived.
8. The petitioner further argued that the execution application is maintainable before the Civil Court and not before the learned Rent Controller. There cannot be any dispute with the argument raised but the fact is that the learned Rent Controller before whom the execution application was filed is also a civil Court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, mere title in the application would not affect the jurisdiction vested with the Civil Court before whom the application was filed to seek execution of the ejectment order. Thus, even the said argument is without any merit.
9. The argument that the landlord has tampered with the execution application is again devoid of any merit. The tampering is referred to in printed column No. 6 of application under Order 21 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It appears that there is some mistake in printed part of the first column which was corrected. There could not be any motive or any purpose for any correction in such column which is wholly inconsequential.
10. Therefore, I do not find any illegality or material irregularity in the impugned order passed by the learned Executing Court declining the objections filed by the petitioner.
11. Consequently, the revision petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.