Punjab-Haryana High Court
M/S Gagan Traders And Another vs Jaspreet Singh And Another on 25 January, 2010
Civil Revision No.81 of 2010 -1-
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
Civil Revision No.81 of 2010
Date of decision : 25.1.2010
M/s Gagan Traders and another ....Petitioners
Versus
Jaspreet Singh and another ...Respondents
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. D. ANAND
Present: Ms. Monika Goyal, Advocate for the petitioners.
Mr. M.L.Sarin, Senior Advocate with
Ms. Himani Sarin, Advocate for the respondents
S. D. ANAND, J.
The controversy requiring adjudication lies in a narrow compass.
The respondent-landlady Harminder kaur applied for the ejectment of petitioners herein from the tenanted premises on a plea of personal bonafide necessity. The plea was allowed by the learned Rent Controller, vide order dated 4.3.2008. The order was affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority, vide its judgment dated 8.9.2009. The respondent-landlady died during the pendency of the appeal. A plea was raised before the learned Appellate Authority to the effect that petition deserves dismissal on account of the death of the respondent-landlady because the only premise to obtain the order for ejectment was based upon her own necessity which ended with her death. The plea did not find favour with the learned Civil Revision No.81 of 2010 -2- **** Appellate Authority which held that "bonafide requirement of the landlord is to be seen on the date of application and the subsequent development during the pendency of the eviction petition due to slow process of litigation should not be permitted to be misused by the sitting tenant". The learned Appellate Authority, in obtaining that view, relied upon 2005 (1) RCR (Rent) 178, 2004 (2) RCR (Rent) 436 and 2004 (2) PLR 845.
In revision against that order, the only point raised by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is that the personal bonafide need of the respondent-landlady (presently represented by her legal representatives) having ceased to exist on her death, there was no alternative before the learned Appellate Authority but to dismiss the petition. In support of the averment, reliance was placed upon Mohd. Ismail Vs. Dinkar Vinayakrao Dorlikar 2009(4) R.C.R. (Civil) 890.
In an act of resistance, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents argued in favour of the line of reasoning adopted by the learned Appellate authority. In the plea raised to resist the arguments raised on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Senior Counsel relied upon Kamleshwar Prasad Vs. Pradumanju Aggarwal 1997(1) RCR 591 and Shakuntala Bai and others Vs. Narayan Dass and others 2004 (1) RCR 581.
Before proceeding to adjudicate upon the controversy, it may be noticed that it is beyond the pale of controversy that the Civil Revision No.81 of 2010 -3- **** respondent-landlady had applied for ejectment of the petitioner- tenant on a plea of her personal bonafide necessity.
The plea raised on behalf of the petitioner-tenant is denuded on merit. The reasons therefor are as under:-
In Shakuntala Bai and others and Kamleshwar Prasad's cases (supra), there was a categorical law laid down by the Apex Court that the need of the landlord is to be adjudicated upon in relation to the date on which the petition was filed. In Kamlehswar Prasad's case, the landlord had applied for ejectment of tenant from the tenanted premises in order to be able to start his own business. On a finding that the landlord had not been able to prove that he requires the premises for his own use, that petition under the relevant Rent Act came to be rejected. The Prescribed Authority also came to the conclusion that "tenant would be comparatively harassd if an order of eviction is passed." However, the Appellate Authority re-appreciated the entire evidence and recorded a finding of reversal. It was held by the Appellate Authority that "in the facts and circumstances to the case of the requirement of the landlord to start a cloth bushiness must be a bona fide requirement entitling him to get an order of eviction under Section 21 (1)(a) of the Act."
The tenant opted to file a writ petition before the High Court. The landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition and was substituted by his legal representatives i.e. his widow, two sons and a married daughter. A plea, raised on behalf of the tenant Civil Revision No.81 of 2010 -4- **** before the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction, was that the death of the landlord ended the plea qua personal requirement. The plea raised on behalf of the landlord is extracted hereunder:
"it was contended that the order of the appellate authority in the eviction proceeding, is a decree and the decree having become final, In a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will not be entitled to take into consideration any subsequent event that had occurred and no that score it would not be appropriate for the High Court to interfere with the decree passed by the appellate authority. It was also contended before the High Court that "the requirement in question must exist on the day the application for eviction was filed and the same requirement having been found to be established by the competent forum who was required to go into the said question, it is no longer open to the High Court to interfere with the said finding in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution." The High Court "came to the conclusion that the decree for eviction has become final and the said finality cannot be disturbed on the application under Article 226 of the Constitution by taking into account the facts that the original landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition."
The Apex Court declined interference by making the following observations:-
"Under the Act the order of the appellate authority is Civil Revision No.81 of 2010 -5- **** final and the said order is a decree of the civil court and decree to a competent Court having become final cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution by taking into account any subsequent event which might have happened. That apart, the fact that the landlord needed the premises is question for starting a business which fact has been found by the appellate authority. In eye of law, it must be that on the day of application for eviction which is the crucial date, the tenant incurred the liability of being evicted from the premises. Even if the landlord died during the pendency of the Writ petition in the High Court the bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the business in question can be carried on by his widow or any elder son."
In Shankutala Bai's case (supra) as well, the Apex Court held a similar view and held as under:-
"As the preamble shows the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 has been enacted for expeditious trial of eviction cases on the ground of bona fide requirement of landlords and generally to regulate and control eviction of tenants. If the subsequent event like the death of the landlord is to be taken note of at every stage till the decree attains finality, there will be no Civil Revision No.81 of 2010 -6- **** end to litigation. By the time a second appeal gets decided by the High Court, generally a long period elapses and on such a principle if during this period the landlord who instituted the proceedings dies, the suit will have to be dismissed without going into merits. The same thing may happen in a fresh suit filed by the heirs and it may become an unending process. Taking into consideration the subsequent events may, at times, lead to rendering the whole proceedings taken infructuous and colossal waste of public time. There is no warrant for interpreting a Rent Control legislation in such a manner the basic object of which is to save harassment of tenants from unscrupulous landlords. The object is not to deprive the owners of their properties for all times to come."
Insofar as the judgment of the Apex court in Mohd. Ismail's case (supra) is concerned, it is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. That was a case in which the landlord had applied for ejectment of the tenant from two shops on a plea he wanted to start Kiryana business, alongwith his two sons. During the pendency of the proceedings, one son died and the other was found to have been absconding for the last about 8-9 years. It was in the light of those facts and circumstances, that the matter was ordered to be remanded for a decision afresh in the light of the subsequent facts. On a point of fact, the ejectment plea filed by the Civil Revision No.81 of 2010 -7- **** landlord in that case had been allowed by the learned Rent Controller. The order was affirmed in appeal. It was thereafter that a writ petition was filed before the High Court for disposal afresh of the matter in the light of the subsequent events noticed above. It is apparent from the noticed facts and circumstances of that case that it has no applicability to the facts of the given case pending before this Court.
It is, thus, apparent from the above discussion that the plea of personal necessity raised by the landlord did not come to an end with his death as the validity or otherwise of the averred premise was to be tested on the basis of the scenario prevalent at the time of filing of the petition.
The petitioner did not raise any other contentious issue. The plea raised for invalidation of the finding recorded by the learned Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Authority deserves to be negatived and it is so ordered accordingly, The petition shall stand dismissed accordingly. The petitioner tenant is given one month time from today to vacate the tenanted premises.
January 25, 2010 (S. D. ANAND) Pka JUDGE