Karnataka High Court
Jayanthi S. Shetty vs P. Shivaji Shetty And Anr. on 5 December, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003ACJ809, 2003(3)KARLJ333, 2003 AIR KANT HCR 886, 2003 A I H C 1554, 2003 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 886, 2003 AIHC 1554, (2003) 1 KCCR 524, (2003) 3 KANT LJ 333, (2003) 3 TAC 36, (2003) 2 ACJ 809, (2003) 3 ACC 586
Author: D.V. Shylendra Kumar
Bench: D.V. Shylendra Kumar
JUDGMENT D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J.
1. In this appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', for short), preferred by the claimant in M.V.C. No. 696 of 1996 before the Court of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Udupi, the correctness of the judgment and award dated 27-7-1998 passed in that M.V.C. awarding compensation in a sum of Rs. 50,000/- is challenged and enhancement of compensation to the extent of Rs. 8,20,000/- is sought for by the allowing of this appeal.
2. The brief facts, as claimed in the claim petition and leading to this appeal are as under.--
The son of the claimant-appellant by name Gautham Shetty, aged about 24 years, was driving a Maruthi car bearing registration No. KA-20-2000 owned by his father, the first respondent in the appeal as well as the MVC case, and accompanied by two of his doctor friends and was proceeding towards Udupi on the National Highway No. 17 on the midnight/early hours of 15-12-1995. At a spot called Balaipade near Kinnimulkey, the driver of the vehicle lost control of the vehicle which is attributed to the bad condition of the road and hit a tree on the right side of the road. The accident was gruesome enough to cause the instantaneous death of the driver Gautham Shetty, as also his two other friends in the car at that time. The claim petition inter alia pleaded that the deceased Gautham Shetty was the only son of the claimant; that he was a very dynamic, bright and promising youngster, who had just entered the legal profession and the premature death had snuffed out the aspirations of not only the deceased, but had caused untold misery and has brought gloom to the life of the claimant and her family etc.
3. The claimant brought the claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Mangalore by filing the petition under Section 166 of the Act, claiming compensation for the death of her son involving the motor vehicle referred to above and a sum of Rs. 20,000/- was claimed towards the cost of the journey that the claimant had to undertake due to the death of her son; in the accident a sum of Rs. 50,000/- was also claimed towards funeral expenses, religious functions, obsequies ceremonies and other incidental expenses. The owner of the vehicle was impleaded as the first respondent who incidentally is no other than the husband of the claimant and father of the deceased person. The Insurance Company with which the vehicle had been insured, was impleaded as the second respondent to the claim petition. The claim petition was resisted by both respondents. While the first respondent filed a statement admitting the ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident, he emphatically denied that he was liable to pay any compensation amount as claimed in the claim petition. However, this respondent averred that the vehicle having been insured with the second respondent, it is only the second respondent who is liable to pay any amount as was claimed in the claim petition and as such pleaded for rejection of the petition insofar as the first respondent was concerned.
4. The second respondent also filed an objection statement denying the averments put forth in the claim petition. The liability was also denied to the extent of claim sought for which was not admitted. It was also pointed out that as the claim petition itself indicated that the accident was due to the bad condition of the road, it was the Government which was liable to compensate the claimant if at all she was entitled for any compensation and that the claim petition was as such bad for nonjoinder of necessary party and also pleaded that the deceased being an unnamed passenger, there was no liability on the part of the insurer under the policy and without prejudice, averred that the liability of the second respondent was strictly in conformity with the terms of the policy that had been issued in respect of the vehicle in question.
5. In view of such rival pleadings, the Tribunal framed the following issues for consideration as on 11-7-1997.--
"1. Whether the petitioner proves that on 15-12-1995 at about 2.15 a.m., the deceased Gautham Shetty along with his two friends were travelling in Maruthi 1000 C.C. car bearing Regn. No. KA-20/2000 from Kaup to Udupi and when they reached near the place called Balaipade, near Kinnimulkey, National Highway No. 17, Udupi, the deceased met with an accident and died on the spot?
2. Whether the petitioner proves the age, occupation and monthly income of the deceased?
3. Whether the respondent 2 proves that since the Government is not made a party the claim is bad for non-joinder of necessary party as contended?
4. Whether the respondent 2 proves that deceased was an unnamed passenger and not 3rd party and he is not liable for any claim as contended?
5. Whether the petitioner is entitled to claim compensation?
6. If so, to what amount and from whom?
7. What order or award?"
6. During the pendency of the claim petition, an application under Section 140 of the Act came to be filed as I.A. I, praying for interim compensation of a sum of Rs. 50,000/-.
7. The claimant examined herself in support of her claim and also another witness P.W. 2-P.B.R. Shenoy, Advocate and part-time lecturer at Udupi and got marked Exs. P. 1 to P. 18 comprising of a copy of the FIR, a copy of post-mortem report, copy of inquest, report, spot mahazar, local magazine, album books, driving licence of the deceased, report and certain certificates. The original insurance certificate was permitted to be produced by the insurer on an application filed by the claimant and as per the order of the Tribunal dated 17-4-1998.
8. In respect of the application filed under Section 140 of the Act, the same was allowed as per order dated 2-7-1997 and an interim compensation of a sum of Rs. 50,000/- was awarded on the application. The said amount with interest, appears to have been deposited by the respondent-Insurance Company before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Udupi, as on 17-1-1998. The claimant sought for withdrawal of this amount by filing an application dated 4-2-1998. It appears the application was ordered and the claimant in fact did withdraw the amount.
9. The Tribunal, by its judgment and award dated 27-7-1998, allowed the claim petition awarding a compensation of a sum of Rs. 50,000/- holding that respondents 1 and 2 are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation. The Tribunal answered the issue relating to the entitlement for compensation in favour of the claimant and the issue relating to the non-liability of the Insurance Company due to the fact that the deceased driver was an unnamed passenger and as such was not a third party against the Insurance Company and on the issue regarding quantum of compensation, held that the claimant having neither pleaded nor proved that the accident had taken place due to the negligence of either the driver or the owner of the vehicle and the liability being not based on fault liability, but by complying with the provisions of Section 140 of the Act, under which provision, compensation was payable in respect of no-fault liability, the claimant was entitled to claim the fixed compensation of Rs. 50,000/- only and no other compensation was awarded. It is aggrieved by this judgment and award of the Tribunal that the above appeal is preferred, contending that the Tribunal should not have restricted the compensation to the amount which was permitted only under Section 140 of the Act, but having based the decision for compensation to be on no fault liability, should have proceeded to quantify the compensation under the provisions of Section 163-A of the Act and as such the amount of compensation was required to be computed as on the basis of the structured formula indicated in Schedule II to the Act by complying with the provisions of Section 163-A of the Act and the compensation amount be enhanced to this extent.
10. The appellant has also filed an application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC during the pendency of the above appeal praying for amendment of the original claim petition to be under Section 163-A of the Act instead under Section 166 of the Act. The second respondent-Insurance Company has opposed this application for amendment and has prayed for rejecting the same.
11. We have heard at length Sri S.P. Shankar, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri O. Mahesh, learned Counsel appearing for respondent 2-Insurance Company. Learned Counsels have urged various legal contentions. We shall consider the relevancy of the same in the sequence of the submissions.
12. The appeal is essentially one for enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act. Sri S.P. Shankar, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that on a reading of the provisions of Sections 140, 163, 163-A and 160 of the Act and the development of law and the interpretation relating to the provisions, it is obvious that in the context of an application under Section 140 of the Act, no negligence need be proved for the purpose of claiming compensation in respect of a claim arising out of the use of a motor vehicle and due to the accident caused by the use of such a motor vehicle. It is the submission of the learned Counsel that in respect of the claims of third parties, the judicial trend is that it is not necessary nor incumbent on the part of the third party claimant to expressly prove nogligence on the part of the owner or driver of the vehicle to lay a claim for compensation. The learned Counsel in this regard brings to our notice the recent decision of the Supreme Court in S. Kaushnuma Begum and Ors. v. The New India Assurance Company Limited and Ors., wherein the Supreme Court had occasion to look into the nature of claim by a third party and the liability of the owner in the event of an accident caused by a vehicle owned by him giving raise to the claim of a third party. The theory of strict liability or vicarious liability as propounded in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, (1861-73) All ER 1 : (1868)3 HL 330 was called in aid for the purpose of sustaining a claim under the M.V. Act, 1988 and it was said 'no fault liability' envisaged in Section 140 is based on such theory of strict liability propounded in the case of Rylands supra. It is categorically laid down in this decision that even assuming that there was no negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the vehicle, when an accident occurs by the use of the vehicle on road, the owner of the vehicle is not exonerated applying the principle of strict liability and the owner is bound to compensate the claim. The moment the owner becomes liable, automatically the insurer is also roped in and the Insurance Company is bound to indemnify the owner not only in terms of the policy but also having regard to the statutory provisions of Sections 146, 147, 149 and 150 of the Act.
13. The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that even a person who is driving a vehicle if not the owner or the employee of the owner, is in the position of a gratuitous passenger being an occupant of the car and any claim arising out of the injury or death to such a person being a third party claim, the insurer has to satisfy the same. In this regard, the learned Counsel relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Amrit Lal Sood and Anr. v. Smt. Kaushalya Devi Thapar and Ors., : and New India Assurance Company Limited v. Satpal Singh and Ors., The learned Counsel submits that having regard to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 particularly Section 147 of the Act, the liability of the Insurance Company in respect of a gratuitous passenger is inevitable and in this regard relies upon a reported decision of a Division Bench of our High Court in New India Assurance Company Limited, Bangalore v. Rajendra Singh and Ors., 2000(2) Kar. L.J. 207 : ILR 2000 Kar, 886 Based on such decisions, the submission of the learned Counsel is that the question of proving negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the vehicle is of no consequence and the moment the factum of an accident resulting in injury or death of a person is established to be by the use of a motor vehicle and if such accident gives rise to a claim, the claim is to be satisfied by the owner and the insurer.
14. The learned Counsel submits that the application which was before the Claims Tribunal was one under Section 166 of the Act and during the pendency of the claim, an application under Section 140 of the Act had come to be filed and this had been ordered directing payment of an interim compensation of a sum of Rs. 50,000/-. It is not in dispute that this amount has been paid by the Insurance Company and received by the appellant. The learned Counsel submits that the Tribunal is in error in holding that the deceased was not in the position of a passenger and the claimant having not pleaded any negligence or liability on the part of the owner or the driver no compensation was awardable under the principle of fault liability. Nevertheless, the Tribunal held that on the principle of no fault liability under Section 140 of the Act, a sum of Rs. 50,000/- awarded can be sustained by holding it to be the compensation. Learned Counsel submits that this finding of the Tribunal is not sustainable in the light of the law that has developed as discussed above and having regard to the rulings of the Supreme Court. It is the submission of the learned Counsel that restricting the compensation to a sum of Rs. 50,000/- is on an erroneous understanding of the legal position and the view of the Tribunal that as compensation is awarded under Section 140 of the Act, no other amount can be awarded is erroneous.
15. The learned Counsels for the appellant submits that the application filed in this appeal seeking for amendment of the claim to be as one under Section 163-A of the Act instead of, as was originally filed under Section 166 of the Act is with the object of avoiding the matter being remanded to the Tribunal for the purpose of determining the quantum of compensation payable, by leading evidence on behalf of the claimant and that the claimant/appellant is satisfied if compensation as payable under the structured formula position referred to under Section 163-A of the Act is paid to the claimant/appellant and it is under such circumstances and for such purpose the application for amendment is filed. The learned Counsel further submits that even on a very modest estimation, the income of the deceased could be taken to be not less than Rs. 6,000/- per month and based on which the dependency could be worked out at Rs. 4,000/- per month and the quantum of compensation should be worked out on such basis. It is also contended that the Insurance Company has on its own contested the case, without seeking permission under the provisions of Section 170 of the Act and as such is not entitled to oppose the claim for enhanced compensation in this appeal.
16. Sri O. Mahesh, learned Counsel for the second respondent-Insurance Company, on the other hand submits that the Insurance Company has every right to put up a proper defence in the appeal seeking for enhancement of the compensation; that the application for amendment seeking for converting the application as originally, filed under Section 166 of the Act to be as one under Section 163-A of the Act, is objected to and opposed by the Insurance Company; that it cannot be allowed in law having regard to the present legal position namely, that as on date Section 163-A of the Act has been repealed in its entirety with effect from 3-9-2001 and the question of converting the claim application to be under a provision which does not remain on the statute book any more, cannot arise at all and as such submits that the application for amendment filed in this appeal has to be rejected. The application no doubt is filed as on 4-6-2001 when the provisions of Section 163-A of the Act were still on the statute book, but no order as such has been passed on the application. The learned Counsel for the Insurance Company also brings it to our notice that the provisions of Section 163-B of the Act which enjoins that a person is entitled to claim compensation either under Section 140 or under Section 163-A of the Act and he cannot claim compensation under both heads. In the instant case, it is a fact that though the claim petition itself was under Section 166 of the Act, the application under Section 140 of the Act also came to be filed during the pendency and the amount payable under this provision was in fact received by the claimant/appellant. If that is so, the embargo under Section 163-B clearly operates and the possibility of such a person claiming compensation under Section 163-A of the Act does not arise and consideration of the application for amendment to permit the original claim as one under Section 163-A of the Act instead of as one under Section 166 of the Act does not survive for consideration any more as the option has been exercised even before any compensation having been received, under Section 140 of the Act, the question of conversion by way of amendment in the appeal can neither be considered nor is it possible in law to allow such an application. One other very relevant aspect is that the first respondent-owner of the vehicle had filed objections to the claim petition before the Tribunal by way of written statement dated 27-3-1997. It is pleaded in para 1 of this statement as under.---
''The respondent while admitting that he is the R.C. owner of the vehicle in question and denies emphatically that he is liable to pay any compensation amount to the claimant as claimed in the petition".
17. The owner of the vehicle categorically denied any liability for payment of compensation. No evidence is let in on the part of the claimant either for indicating the quantum of compensation that could be claimed or for proving the liability on the part of the first respondent. It is significant to note that the liability on the part of the insurer is only by way of indemnity in respect of the liability on the part of the owner, Basically, the liability should be fastened on the owner of the vehicle and it is only such liability which the insurer is required to discharge for having issued the policy of indemnity. The question of the insurer being estopped from contending that the quantum of compensation payable to the claimant unless the insurer has obtained leave under Section 170 of the Act does not arise in a situation where the liability is not primarily fastened on the owner of the vehicle. Even assuming for argument's sake that the theory of no fault liability can be invoked and based on the theory of strict liability the owner can be made liable in respect of a claim arising out of the accident, on the question of quantum, it can be determined only based on evidence let in by the claimant to justify the claim.
18. Unfortunately, in the instant case, the claimant having opted to receive compensation under Section 140 of the Act, the possibility of claiming compensation under Section 163-A of the Act was foreclosed because of the provisions of Section 163-B. The resultant position is that in the present appeal arising out of a claim application filed under Section 166 of the Act, the claimant/appellant is not in a position to substantiate or justify the quantum of compensation based on any material on record, Enhancement of compensation could be allowed only based on material on record, particularly in an appeal. The incongruous situation is that if the application under Section 140 of the Act has to be ignored and the original claim is to be treated as one under Section 163-A of the Act, the appellant may lose even the compensation of Rs. 50,000/- that has been awarded by the Tribunal. In that event, the appellant becomes entitled for any compensation only if the award passed by the Tribunal is set aside in this appeal and the matter remanded to the Tribunal for letting in of the evidence on behalf of the claimant.
19. We have given our anxious consideration to these aspects of the matter. Insofar as the provisions of Sections 163-A and 163-B of the Act are concerned though these provisions were introduced by way of Section 51 of amending Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 14-11-1994 and the said amending Act came to be repealed, subsequently the amending provisions have been incorporated in the main Act by the very repealed Act and the repealing Act also states that all actions that had been taken earlier as per the amended provision are saved. Therefore, repeal of Section 163-A with effect from 3-9-2001 is of no consequence inasmuch as these provisions find a place in the main Act itself and continues to remain on the statute book. At the same time the provisions of Section 163-B also continue to operate and the embargo placed by Section 163-B also continues to apply in determining a claim application under the Act. But as noticed earlier, when the statute itself places an embargo in respect of a claim which is justified under Section 140 of the Act that no claim can be entertained under the provisions of Section 163-A, the only option to the claimants is to proceed under either of the two provisions and not one after another or simultaneously under both provisions. The compensation payable under Section 140 of the Act having been paid to the claimants and that option having been exhausted, the 2nd respondent-Insurance Company is justified in opposing the application for amendment to permit the appellant to convert the original claim petition to be as one under Section 163-A instead of Section 166 as had been filed and praying for rejection of the application.
20. In the light of our above discussion, the application for amendment seeking to convert the original application for compensation which had been filed under Section 166 of the Act to be one under Section 163-A of the Act has to be rejected and is accordingly rejected. Notwithstanding, the appellant, if she is in a position to satisfy the Court that she is entitled to compensation at a sum higher than the amount of Rs. 50,000/- which had been allowed on an application under Section 140 of the Act and which amount itself had been treated by the Tribunal as the entire compensation payable to the claimant, then to this extent the appellant is entitled for relief in this appeal.
21. The claimant in her evidence before the Tribunal has deposed that the death of her only son was due to the accident involving the car which he was driving and while he was driving and while on use of the highway. The claimant has also deposed that at the time of the accident she was at Jaipur in Rajasthan State in connection with a Rotary function there and had to rush back to Mangalore on hearing the tragic news. She has deposed that she had to incur a sum of Rs. 20,000/- towards expenses due to the preponement of her journey. She has also stated that expenses were incurred towards keeping the body at K.M.C. Hospital, Manipal in the mortuary and for transporting it and the funeral expenses and stated that a sum of Rs. 50,000/- has been spent in this regard. The claimant/mother has deposed that she had incurred an expenditure of Rs. 1,00,000/- for educating her son and that her son was a very bright student, had entered the legal profession just then, was a very promising and upcoming young Advocate and even in the limited period, had shown his ability and merit by arguing several important cases.
21-A. The claimant/mother has also deposed that her son was hale and healthy at the time of the accident and was of 25 years of age and the family background indicated that the boy had a very bright future. She has deposed that in her family, the elders had consistent longevity of life and her grandfather passing 100 and has lived upto 107 years. Her parents themselves had lived beyond 80 years of age and on her husband's side also, the elders had survived upto 70 to 75 years.
22. The appellant/claimant has also deposed that she had suffered great mental shock and agony due to the sudden and premature death of her only son and that they have to live with this most painful experience throughout their life.
23. Insofar as funeral expenses is concerned, a sum of Rs. 5 to 10 thousand is allowed in the normal course and in a given case, any extra expense incurred, if proved, can be allowed. Though a sum of Rs. 50,000/- has been claimed in this regard, we are of the view that a sum of Rs. 20,000/- can be allowed towards the charges7fee paid towards preserving the body, funeral and obsequies etc. Though a sum of Rs. 20,000/- has been claimed towards expenses for journey to reach Mangalore from Jaipur, where the claimant was at the time of the accident, we are not in a position to award this amount in the absence of any material to indicate that this was an additional expense incurred to the claimant due to the preponement of the journey. A sum of Rs. 5,000/- in this regard should be sufficient for the inconvenience caused.
24. With regard to the claim for compensation under the head 'pain and suffering', it is a fact that the claimant has to live the rest of her life with the most fateful and agonising experience of premature death of a most promising son. She is undoubtedly deprived of the choice of the mother who could have lived to see her son get married, beget grandchildren and such joys of life. This is not a loss which can be compensated in terms of money. However, for want of any better alternative in respect of loss of such joys of life, a token and symbolic amount is being awarded. In such circumstances, in our opinion, a sum of Rs. 25,000/- can be awarded as a symbolic amount for the loss and paid and agony.
25. A mother is definitely entitled to look upto her son for sustenance in the evening of her life, more so if the son is the only progeny and a very bright, promising and talented youth with good earning. Premature death of her son has definitely deprived the mother of legitimate dependency on his earnings and though such dependency has not been pleaded in as many words, one can definitely take judicial notice of such dependency by a mother on such earnings, though of course in life there are always exceptions. The quantification of the loss of this dependency is a very ticklish issue and in the absence of any concrete material, it only gets complicated.
26. The claimant was 57 years of age at the time of the accident. The Supreme Court has taken the view that in the case of claim for compensation by the parents of a victim of a motor accident who was about 20 years of age at the time of accident and who was studying in I year B.Sc. Degree and with bright future, a compensation of a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- was fully justified and if at all, it was held that it was on the lower side and not on the higher side (Haji Zainullah Khan (dead) by L.Rs v. Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad, (1991)5 SCC 667 : 1 994 SCC (Cri.) 1568). It is no doubt true in this case the victim had been hit and killed by a truck and the accident was due to the negligence on the part of the driver of the truck. In the present case, the accident is not attributable to the negligence of any other person and as the deceased himself was driving the vehicle. It was not hit by any other vehicle and fixing the liability on any such tort-feasor does not arise here. However, the Tribunal has answered issue 4 namely, "whether the respondent 2 proves that deceased was an unnamed passenger and not 3rd party and he is not liable for any claim as contended" against the respondent and has held that the Insurance Company has not proved that the deceased was an unnamed passenger. The Tribunal has also held that the deceased was in the position of a third party and as such the claim was required to be satisfied and the quantum of compensation was restricted to Rs. 50,000/- by the Tribunal. If the deceased is to be held as a third party, a claim for compensation arising out of the death of such a person necessarily has to be satisfied by the owner of the vehicle.
27. The liability of the owner is indemnified by the insurer and even statutorily the Insurance Company is liable to make good the compensation amount. The trend insofar as satisfying the claims towards compensation by the victims of road accidents or the dependents of the victims, is one to evolve it into a "no fault liability so that the claimants are relieved of the burden of proving negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the vehicle (S. Kaushnuma Begum's case, supra). In the context of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act providing for compulsory insurance of vehicles being used on public roads insofar as third party claims are concerned, the trend is towards interpreting the provisions of a policy covering such risks to bind the insurer to honour such claims rather than to allow the insurer to wriggle out of the liability to compensate by pleading the ouster clause or even by pleading strict non-compliance with the terms of the policy (see Skandia Insurance Company Limited v. Kokilaben Chandravadan and Ors., and B.V. Nagaraju v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Divisional Office, Hassan, .
28. The evolution insofar as compensating the victims of road accidents both on the legislative front and on the interpretary horizon by the Courts, is to view the problem more as a social problem and to ensure that with such approach that third party victims of road accidents are provided just compensation whenever they become victims of road accidents involving motor vehicles. Ultimately, the attitude is one of viewing the whole aspect as one due to the increase of vehicular movement on the road which is part of the development in a society. The problem is looked at as a social problem and not necessarily as a problem of a victim of a road accident vis-a-vis the tort-feasor. The whole object of making insurance compulsory, in respect of the claims arising by third parties due to accidents involving motor vehicles is to achieve this purpose of mitigating the social problem. In such circumstances, from a mother's point of view, death of her only son due to an accident involving a motor vehicle, is necessarily a part of such social problem, a mother being left without the otherwise legitimate and definite dependency in the evening of her life due to an accident even if the person driving the vehicle involved in the accident is her very son, justifies compensation in her favour if the principles that are evolved and the trend that is discernible in the cases referred to above is to be followed. In the circumstances, we are of the view that though the claim petition may not have pleaded the nature and extent of dependency that the accident has caused deprivation of such dependency to the claimant, this is an aspect we can definitely infer in the circumstances and compensate the claimant to the extent justified.
29. Without going into the further details of the actual income of the deceased at the time of the accident and the future potential having regard to a bright career and in turn, arrive at the loss of dependency to the claimant on such projected income of the deceased, we think, quantifying the overall loss of dependency at a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- would be a fair and just amount in the circumstances having regard to the fact that as the mother was aged about 57 years at the time of the accident, the multiplier would be on the lower side though the multiplicand may be on the higher side due to the potential bright future of the claimant's son.
30. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part and the total quantum of compensation payable to the claimant/appellant is enhanced from Rs. 50,000/- awarded by the Tribunal to Rs. 2,50,000/- as detailed below.--
1. Compensation towards loss of future dependency Rs. 2,00,000.00
2.
Towards expenses towards
preponement of journey by the claimant
Rs. 5,000.00
3.
Towards funeral expenses
Rs. 20,000.00
4.
Towards mental agony
Rs. 25,000.00
Total compensation
Rs. 2,50,000.00
31. The amount of Rs. 50,000/- which has already been paid on the application under Section 140 of the Act may be adjusted against this total compensation of Rs. 2,50,000/- and the balance is to be made good by the respondents.
32. We direct that the enhanced compensation shall carry interest at the rate of 8% per annum and the Insurance Company to deposit the same within four weeks from today before the Tribunal.
33. The Tribunal is also directed to invest this sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- in a Fixed Deposit for a period often years in a nationalised Bank in the name of the claimant and to instruct the Bank to permit withdrawal of interest by the claimant periodically. The balance of the amount may be released in favour of the claimant. Appeal allowed to this extent.