Gauhati High Court
Pulin Daimary vs The State Of Assam on 18 July, 2022
Author: N. Kotiswar Singh
Bench: N. Kotiswar Singh
Page No.# 1/15
GAHC010143762018
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : CRL.A(J)/62/2018
PULIN DAIMARY
S/O. LT. SOMESWAR DAIMARY, VILL. SENGAMARI, P.S. SENGAMARI, P.S.
SOOTEA, DIST. SONITPUR, ASSAM.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM
REP. BY PP, ASSAM
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. I A HAZARIKA, AMICUS CURIAE
Advocate for the Respondent : PP, ASSAM
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. KOTISWAR SINGH
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY
Date : 18-07-2022
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
(N. Kotiswar Singh, J) Heard Mr. I.A. Hazarika, learned amicus curiae. Also heard Ms. B. Bhuyan, learned Senior Counsel as well as Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam.
2. The present appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 12.04.2018 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sonitpur at Tezpur in Sessions Case Page No.# 2/15 No.164 of 2013 by which the appellant has been convicted under Sections 323/302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo RI for life and pay fine of Rs.5000/- in default of which to undergo further RI for one month and also sentenced to undergo RI for three months for the offence under Section 323 IPC.
3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that an FIR was lodged on 04.03.2013 by the complainant Nipam Boro before the Sootea Police Station, Sonitpur alleging that on 03.03.2013 at around 6 pm, while his father Babul Boro was having a chat with Nabin Daimary in their courtyard, the accused Pulin Daimary came from behind and dealt a blow on his father's head thereby killing him and when he tried to save his father, the accused also caused grievous injury on his head and left hand.
4. Based on the said FIR, Sootea PS Case No.37/2013 under Section 302/306 IPC was registered and on completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the two accused. Two charges were framed against the appellant Pulin Daimary and Nabin Daimary alleging that (i) they had voluntarily caused hurt to the informant Nipam Boro by inflicting dao blows and thereby committed an offence under Section 323 read with Section 324 IPC and (ii) that the appellant had caused the death of Babul Boro, the father of the informant, by inflicting dao blows on his head and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
5. The prosecution examined as many as 15 witnesses. The defence also led evidence by examining one witness.
6. The learned trial Court, after considering the evidences on record including oral and documentary, convicted the present appellant under Section 323/302 IPC as mentioned above but acquitted the other accused Nabin Daimary by giving benefit of doubt.
7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction of the appellant, the present appeal has been preferred.
8. Before us, the appellant has taken a specific plea that the death of Babul Boro was caused due to grave and sudden provocation caused to the appellant and the appellant had struck the deceased without an intention to cause death though such an act on the part of the appellant might have caused the death of the deceased and, as such, conviction of the Page No.# 3/15 appellant under Section 302 IPC be converted to Section 304 Part-II IPC.
9. In view of the aforesaid submission, there is tacit admission that the appellant had caused the death but without any intention, it may not be necessary to critically analyse all the evidences, which have been led by the prosecution as well as by the defence. However, in order to appreciate the plea raised, it may be necessary to briefly refer to the relevant evidences, which had come on record to examine as to whether there was absence of intention and the ingredients to make the offence under Section 304 Part-II IPC can be said to have been made out.
10. Keeping in mind the aforesaid limited purpose, let us now examine the relevant evidences on record.
11. PW1, Nipam Boro, is the son of the deceased, Babul Boro. He testified that on 03.03.2013 at about 6 pm, his father had gone to the house of Nabin Daimary for recovery of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees three thousand) only as the price of paddy. There was some altercation between Nabin Daimary and his father, which he heard. Thereafter, he went to the house of Nabin Daimary and he saw his father coming from the house of Nabin Daimary. His father told him that Nabin Daimary had assaulted him by pushing him. Accordingly, he along with his father again went to the house of Nabin Daimary and as he was trying to explain to Nabin Daimary, Nabin Daimary asked his wife to bring a dao and threatened to assault them. At that time, appellant, Pulin Daimary, came with a dao and struck on the back side of the head of his father. Thereupon, his father fell down and died. Pulin Daimary also gave a blow to his left wrist and on the back side of his head. His mother also arrived there along with other villagers. Thereupon, the accused persons fled away.
In the cross-examination, PW1, admitted that he did not remember the people who were present at the time of the altercation. He also stated that at the time of the incident, the wife of Nabin Daimary came and took Nabin Daimary inside the room and locked the door.
He also stated in his cross-examination that at that time, Pulin Daimary came to the house of Nabin Daimary and he could not say what was in his hand. However, at the time when Pulin Daimary gave blow on his father, there was day light. The occurrence took place Page No.# 4/15 in the compound of Nabin Daimary. He also stated that Gautam Boro, Nakul Boro and Sandika Boro were present when his father was assaulted and they were all neighbours.
12. The aforesaid Gautom Boro, Nakul Boro and Sandika Boro mentioned in the cross- examination by PW1 were also examined as PW3, PW10 and PW6 respectively.
13. Let us, now, examine the depositions of Gautom Boro, PW3, the other eye witness.
14. PW3 stated that the incident happened on 03.03.2013 at about 6 pm. He stated that Nabin Daimary and Babul Daimary had some monetary dispute because of which there were some altercations between them in the house of Nabin Daimary and upon hearing hullah, he along with Dipjyoti Boro, Nakul Boro (PW10) and Hondika Boro (PW6) went to the place of occurrence. There he saw Pulin Daimary hitting Babul Boro from behind with a dao. Thereupon, the deceased Babul Boro fell on the ground. He also stated that the appellant then gave a blow to Nipam Daimary, son of the deceased on his head and hand and Nipam Daimary also received certain injuries. He also stated that Pulin Daimary and Nabin Daimary fled away from the place and all these happened in his presence.
In his cross-examination, he stated that though there was an altercation, but there was no fighting. To the suggestion that Babul Boro was hitting the door of Nabin Daimary, he denied the same. He also stated that there was no dao with the deceased and they were trying to open the door with hand. However, appellant, Pulin Daimary, had a beki dao in his hand. He also denied the suggestion that the deceased came to the house of accused Nabin Daimary and threatened to kill for not getting Rs.3,000/- (Rupees three thousand) only and at that time, due to the tussle, the brother of Nabin Daimary, i.e., Pulin Daimary tried to save his brother and Babul Boro received injuries and died.
15. Nakul Boro (PW10) deposed that on the day of the occurrence at around 6 pm, the deceased Babul Boro had gone to the house of accused Nabin Daimary to settle some monetary transactions and, thereafter, an altercation ensued. On hearing the altercation, he went to the house of Nabin Daimary. He deposed that while Babul and Nabin were still arguing, the appellant, Pulin Daimary, came with a dao in his hand and assaulted Babul Boro on his head. Pulin also caused injury on the head and hand of the son of the deceased, who was trying to save his father.
Page No.# 5/15 In the cross-examination, he admitted that along with Babul Boro, other family members also had altercation with Nabin Daimary and at that time, Nabin Daimary's wife dragged him inside the house. He denied that though the door of the house of Nabin Daimary was closed, Babul Boro and his son tried to forcefully get him out of his house and attempted to assault him with dao.
16. The other witness, Handika Boro, who was examined as PW6, stated in similar lines as testified by PW10. She clearly stated that the appellant, Pulin Daimary, dealt a cut blow on the head of Babul Boro because of which he fell down on the ground bleeding profusely and, later on, he died. She also claimed to have seen the entire incident.
During cross-examination, she stated that there was a quarrel, which took place between Babul Boro and Nabin Daimary over certain monetary transaction and she did not know who borrowed money from whom.
17. The wife of the deceased was examined as PW2. She stated that the incident took place about 9 months back at about 6 pm. On that fateful day, her husband had gone to the house of Nabin Daimary to bring Rs.3000/- as the price of paddy. An altercation ensued when the money was sought. She stated that before her, her son had gone to the house of Nabin Daimary. Nabin Daimary pushed her husband and at the time of pushing of her husband, an altercation took place and on hearing the same, she also went to the place of occurrence. Nabin Daimary then told his wife to bring a dao and at that time, the appellant, Pulin Daimary, came from the back side and gave a blow to the head of her husband. PW2 also stated that when her son tried to save the blows of the dao, her son also received injuries on his head and hand. PW2 also stated that her husband died immediately and during night, police came and took the dead-body.
In her cross-examination, she stated that when she was explaining to Nabin not to get excited, at that time, Pulin Daimary assaulted her husband with a dao, which she had not seen. She also stated that after the first altercation, her husband had returned towards her house and from the way, he went back again and at that time, her son also went with him. Thus, she does not appear to be a eye witness as far as the assault is concerned.
Page No.# 6/15 However, we need not discuss the evidence of PW5, PW7, PW8 and PW9 at this stage as they were seizure witnesses and not eye witnesses.
18. There is another witness, namely, Dipjyoti Boro, who was examined as PW11, who claimed himself to be an eye witness. He stated that on hearing the altercation, he went to the house of Nabin Daimary and saw the appellant, Pulin Daimary, coming to the house of Nabin Daimary and inflicting blow on the head of Babul Daimary with a dao.
Since the statement of PW11 was not recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC during investigation, though he corroborates the prosecution case, we will consider his evidence at a later stage. So is the evidence of Nokul Boro who was examined as PW10 whose statement was also not recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC.
19. In view of the specific submission that the appellant had struck the deceased on his head due to grave and sudden provocation, we will, now, examine as to whether there is any such evidence, which will form the basis of such submission made.
20. In order to establish that the incident occurred due to grave and sudden provocation, it has to be shown that there was no intention of causing death but the death was caused due to loss of self-control due to grave and sudden provocation.
21. Learned amicus curiae submits that there is sufficient evidence on record to show that there was an altercation prior to the incident, which provided the foundation for the assault. It has been submitted that there is also evidence in the form of testimony of DW1 Minu Doimary, wife of Nobin Doimary, the brother of the appellant that the deceased had come along with his son Nipam equipped with lathi and dao with the intention to assault her husband, Nabin Daimary, because of which she confined her husband in the house and locked the door from outside. It was stated by DW1 that during that time, the deceased Babul Boro and his son knocked at the door and window with a beka dao, lathi. At that time, her elder brother Pulin Daimary came but Babul Boro along with his son chased Pulin to kill him. Thereupon, an altercation took place between Pulin and deceased Babul Boro.
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22. According to the learned amicus curiae, the fact that the deceased and his son had come with a beki dao and that they were trying to assault Nabin Daimary because of which the altercation between the deceased and the appellant took place stands established as per the evidence of DW1.
23. It has been submitted that because of the provocation caused by the deceased in trying to assault and break open the door of his brother Nabin Daimary and the subsequent confrontation with the deceased, the appellant assaulted the deceased.
24. It is also submitted that there was no intention to cause death of the deceased as is clearly indicated by the fact that though the appellant was armed with dao, he struck the deceased only once. The post-mortem report also indicates presence of only one injury. In the post-mortem report, the injury received by the deceased has been recorded as a deep injury over head from left parietal to the occipital region measuring 10 cm x 1 cm x 3 cm (depth) and the doctor, who conducted the post-mortem on the dead-body of the deceased and examined as PW4, testified to the effect that the cause of death of the person is due to head injury caused by a sharp weapon.
According to the learned amicus curiae, this shows that there was only one injury received by the deceased, which clearly indicated that the intention of the appellant was not to kill the deceased, but had acted to protect the life of his brother who was under attack of the deceased and his son and the appellant was provoked to act in the manner aforesaid after he was also confronted by them.
25. Accordingly, it has been submitted that since there was no intention to cause the death of the deceased, but was due to grave and sudden provocation due to attempted assault on his brother as well to the appellant, the conviction may be converted from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-II IPC.
26. In order to appreciate the submission of learned amicus curiae that there was grave and sudden provocation and, as such, the death caused to the deceased was not a murder, which comes within the scope of Exception to Section 300 IPC and punishable under Section 304 IPC, we will, now, refer to Section 300 IPC.
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27. The offence of committing homicide is dealt with under Section 299 IPC and Section 300 IPC.
Section 299 IPC states that whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.
However, as provided under Section 300 IPC, such culpable homicide would amount to murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or, if it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death of the person to whom the harm is caused. Similarly, if it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature or if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid shall also amounts to murder.
28. Thus, what the Indian Penal Code, 1860 provides is that while all murders are culpable homicides, but all culpable homicides are not murders. Only such culpable homicides will be murder only when it fulfils the conditions as mentioned under Section 300 IPC.
Section 300 IPC, however, provides certain exceptions to the extent that even if such culpable homicide amounting to murder comes within the principal provisions of Section 300 IPC, yet there are certain exceptions provided, viz., if the offence is committed when there is loss of power of self-control due to grave and sudden provocation as provided in Exception 1, or when the offence has been committed in good faith as a right of private defence of life or property, etc as mentioned in Exception-2 and if it is committed by a public servant for the advancement of public justice, etc., as mentioned in Exception-3, or if it is done without premeditation in a heat of passion upon sudden quarrel as mentioned in Exception-4, or when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent, i.e., suicide as mentioned in Exception- 5, such act cannot be considered to be murder.
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29. In the present case, there is no doubt that the death of a person has been caused, i.e., a homicide has taken place. The appellant specifically claims that the death was caused due to grave and sudden provocation. Thus, he is tacitly admitting that it is a culpable homicide but would like to claim that it is not a murder by seeking the benefit of Exception 1 as provided under Section 300 IPC.
30. To constitute an act to be grave and sudden provocation to come within the scope of Exception 1 of Section 300 IPC, such an act must deprive the accused of his self-control due to the grave and sudden provocation resulting in causing of death of the deceased. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sukhlal Sarkar Vs. Union of India, (2012) 5 SCC 703, it is not enough to show that the appellant was provoked into loosing his control, it must be shown that the provocation was such as would in the circumstances have caused a reasonable man to loose his self-control. A person, who claims the benefit of provocation, has to show that the provocation was grave and sudden that he was deprived of power of self- control and that he caused the death of a person while he was still in that state of mind.
31. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principle, we will examine as to whether there was any grave and sudden provocation and, if so, whether it had the effect of depriving the appellant of the power of his self-control and whether there was circumstances in existence, which would cause the appellant considering him to be a reasonable man to loose his self-control.
32. The fact that there was altercation between the deceased and the appellant is clearly made out but whether such altercation had led to loss of power of self-control of the appellant does not appear to have been properly made out. There is nothing on record to show that the deceased or any of his party had used such words or committed any deed amounting to grave and sudden provocation to the appellant which had led to loss of the power of self-control by the appellant. The plea of the appellant that the deceased and his son had tried to assault his brother and was trying to break open the door of the house of Nabin Daimary, in our view, being not directed to the appellant was not sufficient enough to make him loose his self-control. There is nothing on record to show that any of the deceased or his party had directed anger or action to harm the appellant except for the evidence of DW1. What appears from the record is that the deceased and his party had some altercation Page No.# 10/15 with the brother of the deceased and their anger appears to have been principally targeted towards the brother Nabin Daimary not to the appellant Pulin Daimary. Of course, DW1 states that the deceased and his son also confronted the deceased.
33. The evidences show that there was some altercation and confrontation, but the appellant has not been able to show the provocation made to him which was sudden which made him loose his self-control.
34. Under the circumstances, we are not able to convince ourselves that there were circumstances, which were grave and were sudden provocative acts, which led to the loss of self-control of the appellant in the present case to assault the deceased.
35. Therefore, we are not inclined to accept the said plea that the appellant committed the offence while being deprived of the power of self-control under grave and sudden provocation to get the benefit of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC so as to convert his sentence from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Par-II IPC.
36. We have already discussed that the act of the appellant does not amount to loss of the power of self-control due to grave and sudden provocation.
Learned amicus curiae has strenuously argued that there is evidence to the effect that there was a fight which ensued between his brother and the deceased and his party and as the deceased and his party was trying to assault the appellant's brother in his house and also confronted the appellant, a sudden quarrel erupted and in the heat of passion, the appellant committed the aforesaid crime.
37. In view of above, we would like to examine whether the case of the appellant can be covered under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC reads as under:-
"Exception 4. Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner."
The ingredients of Exception 4 are that if the culpable homicide is committed (i) without Page No.# 11/15 premeditation, (ii) in a sudden fight, (iii) in a heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and (iv) without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, such a case may be brought within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.
38. From the evidence, it has not come out very clearly that there was premeditation on the part of the appellant to assault the deceased. It is a fact that there was an altercation, fracas and quarrel, which ensued between the deceased and with the appellant's brother purportedly on account of certain unsettled monetary transactions. The quarrel started apparently after the deceased and his party came to the house of the appellant's brother and the quarrel was witnessed by many of the witnesses. A sudden fight appears to have erupted on account of visit of the deceased and his party to the house of the appellant's brother and quarrel which ensued.
39. We have also noted that there is specific evidence to the effect that the deceased and his son forcefully tried to open the door of the house of the appellant's brother. Whether at that time, the deceased and his son were armed or not is not clearly established though DW1 states so. Yet the fact remains that the deceased and his son tried to enter the house of the appellant's brother.
40. Though the prosecution witnesses have testified that the deceased had not come with a dao, DW1 had stated that during the quarrel, the deceased and his son tried to forcefully open the door and window of the house of the deceased. DW1 also stated that the deceased and his son chased the appellant's brother to kill him. Thus, there is a contrary evidence by the DW1 that deceased was armed, which, however, has been denied by the witnesses produced by the prosecution.
41. PW1 also states that at the time of the incident, wife of Nabin Daimary, the brother of the appellant, took him inside the room and locked the door. Obviously, if the brother of the appellant was taken inside the room and the door was locked, it would indicate that there was some kind of threat on the life or body of Nabin Daimary. This evidence coming from the prosecution witness itself would show that Nabin Daimary and his wife must have felt certain threat to the life or body of Nabin Daimary compelling them to go inside the room of his house and lock themselves. In this context we may also refer to the evidence of DW1 that the Page No.# 12/15 deceased and his son armed with dao tried to assault her husband. If that is so, it can be inferred that the altercation was not mere verbal exchange of words but involved something more serious because of which Nabin Daimary, brother of the appellant, felt threatened. As to whether the deceased and his son were armed with dao as alleged by DW1 has not been clearly established. Yet, even if it is not established, in view of the specific claim of DW1 that the deceased was armed with dao, which has not been shaken in the cross-examination, this evidence cannot be rejected as fictitious or a figment of imagination. The possibility of the deceased being armed and being very aggressive towards Nabin Daimary totally cannot be ruled out in view of their quarrel over some money what the deceased felt owed to him by Nabin Daimary and the fact that the deceased and his son were aggressive towards Nabin Daimary, the brother of the appellant, is clearly established. The allegation of DW1 that deceased was armed with dao cannot be also totally ruled out. It is also to be mentioned that the altercation took place on the prior day also, between Nabin Daimary and the deceased and on the day of the incident, it was the deceased who came to the house of the deceased and had an altercation. Thereafter, the deceased came back and went back to the house of Nabin Daimary again along with his son and there was an altercation. It is not that the appellant and his brother went to the house of the deceased where the quarrel took place. The fact that the altercation took place at the house of Nabin Daimary and the deceased and his son tried to go forcibly inside his house, would indicate that Nabin Daimary must have felt threatened.
42. Under the circumstances, the intervention of the appellant has to be examined. It is true that the appellant had no business to interfere in the quarrel, that too, armed with a dao. Yet, in a village setting where a dao is ordinarily kept as a household implement and when a person feels that his brother has been threatened because of the sudden quarrel, generation of heat of passion cannot be ruled out and cannot said to be unusual. Therefore, the plea of the appellant that he lost his cool in a heat of passion upon seeing his brother being assaulted or threatened by the deceased and his party in a sudden quarrel and that the appellant also felt vulnerable because of which the appellant hit the deceased without any premeditation cannot be said to be an unreasonable explanation.
Page No.# 13/15 There is also nothing to suggest that the appellant had taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The incident of assault by the appellant appears to have been happened in a few moments and the appellant fled from the scene after hitting the deceased.
Thus, what we find is that while the version of the prosecution is a plausible scenario, the explanation proffered by the appellant can also not be ruled out. Thus, having faced with two possible scenarios, one which is favourable to the prosecution and the other, which is favourable to the appellant, we will give benefit of doubt in favour of the scenario as projected and portrayed by the appellant.
43. Under the circumstances, we are inclined to convert the conviction of the appellant to Section 304 Part-II IPC and, accordingly, we convict the appellant under Section 304 Part-II IPC instead of Section 302 IPC as done by the learned Sessions Judge and direct him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 8 years with fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for another 3 months. The period of sentence, already served, will be set off against the sentence as awarded by us.
44. In the judgment, the learned Sessions Judge had directed to pay an amount of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand) only as victim compensation to be awarded to the wife of the deceased. The judgment was rendered on 12.04.2018. However, it has been brought to our notice by Ms. Bhuyan, learned Senior counsel and Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam of a Notification issued by the State Government on 05.03.2016 in exercise of powers conferred under Sub-Section 9 of Clause 5 of the Assam Victim Compensation Scheme, 2012 fixing the quantum of compensation which may be payable to various categories of victims as mentioned in the said Notification. In the said Notification, in respect of death, the amount of compensation has been fixed at rupees two lakhs. Thus, the aforesaid amount of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand) only fixed by the learned Sessions Judge on 12.04.2018 is not in conformity with the Notification dated 05.03.2016 issued by the State of Assam and will be required to be fixed in terms of the said notification dated 05.03.2016 as the judgment was rendered after issuance of the aforesaid notification.
Learned Senior counsel as well as the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has also stated that there is another Notification issued by the Government of Assam, Political (A) Page No.# 14/15 Department, Dispur dated 01.02.2019 vide Notification No.PLA.524/2015/Pt/190(ECF-38361 by which the quantum of compensation has been revised in respect of various categories of victims, injuries and loss. In respect of death at Serial No.6, the amount of compensation has been enhanced and fixed at Rs.5.00 lakhs in the said Notification dated 01.02.2019.
45. Accordingly, we increase the amount of compensation to Rupees five lakhs instead of Rs.80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand) only awarded by the learned Sessions Judge. Let the said amount of Rs.5.00 Lakhs be paid to the wife of the deceased by deducting Rs.80,000/- if already paid to her.
We are of the opinion that if the deceased is entitled to the compensation amount of Rs.2.00 lakhs fixed by the State Government vide Notification dated 05.03.2016 and if the same had not paid to Bina Boro, wife of the deceased Babul Boro, in our view, she may be awarded the compensation at the enhanced rate of Rs.5.00 Lakhs in terms of the Notification dated 01.02.2019.
We hold so for the reason that the enhanced amount will be payable if no compensation had been paid in terms of the earlier Notification dated 05.03.2016.
While the said Notification has prospective effect from the date of issue of the Notification, i.e., 01.02.2019, yet the Notification does not state that the compensation will be payable only where cause of action arose only after 01.02.2019. Thus, it will also cover the cases in which no compensation has been paid earlier in terms of the earlier notification dated 05.03.2016.
46. Since the incident had occurred in the year 2013, the State Government would without any further delay release the said amount of Rs.5.00 lakhs to the wife of the deceased PW2, Bina Boro within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order without any further reference to the Legal Services Authority. The State Legal Services Authority as well as the District Legal Services Authority of Sonitpur, however, will assist the wife of the deceased in getting the aforesaid compensation amount.
47. Mr. I.A. Hazarika, who has ably assisted this Court as amicus curiae, be paid the necessary fees as per Rules.
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48. Let the LCR be returned forthwith to the concerned Court.
49. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed to the extent indicated above.
JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant