Pankaj Srivastava vs The State Of Jharkhand Through Central ... on 22 March, 2017

[Cites 21, Cited by 2]

Jharkhand High Court

Pankaj Srivastava vs The State Of Jharkhand Through Central ... on 22 March, 2017

Equivalent citations: 2017 AJR 445, (2017) 3 JLJR 697

In this application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the entire criminal proceeding in connection with RC 11 (S)/2015/SC-1, New Delhi including the order dated 4.11.2016, passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate cum Special Judicial Magistrate, C.B.I., Ranchi, wherey and whereunder cognizance has been taken for the offence punishable under sections 212/120B of the Indian Penal Code.

2. Initially an FIR was instituted being Kotwali (Hindpidhi) P.S. Case No.742/2014 on the fardbeyan of the informant-Tara Shahdeo against accused Ranjit Singh Kohli and his mother Kaushal Rani for the offences punishable under section 498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code.

3. In course of investigation, it was revealed that Ranjit Singh Kohli had returned to Ranchi on 20.8.2014 and he along with his friend Rohit Raman went at the residence of maid servant at Silli. It is alleged that on 20.8.2014, Rohit Raman accompanied the accused Ranjit Singh Kohjli and Kaushal Rani as well as his maid servant and a dog to the house at Bariatu of the sister of the accused namely Kiran Devi and after being accompanied by one Ajay Kumar, bodyguard of the petitioner, went along with them to Archies Hotel situated at Station Road, Chutia where they stayed in the night. Further allegation has been levelled that the accused persons were accompanied by one Rohit Raman to Sherghati at the residence of Shri Rajesh Prasad, SDJM, Sherghati. It is also alleged that on 23.8.2014, accused along with Rajesh Prasad and his wife and child reached Patna Airport by a Tata Sarari Storme vehicle from Sherghati to catch a flight but since the flight was missed, Rajesh Prasad along with his family, mother of Ranjit Singh Kohli, maid servant stayed at a 2 hotel in the night whereas Ranjit Singh Kohli and Ajay Kumar proceeded to Delhi in Bolero vehicle belonging to Rajesh Prasad. Subsequently Rajesh Prasad along with his family and others had caught a flight and had gone to Delhi. Ranjit Singh Kohli and Kaushal Rani were subsequently arrested on 26.8.2014 and 27.8.2014.

4. Based on the aforesaid allegations, Kotwali (Hindpidhi) P.S. Case No. 799 of 2014 was instituted against Rohit Raman, Ajay Kumar and learned S.D.J.M, Sherghati-Shri Rajesh Prasad for the offence punishable under section 212 of the Indian Penal Code.

5. In terms of a Notification issued by the Department of Personnel & Training, Ministry of Personneal Public Grievances and Pension, Government of India, CBI was empowered to investigate Kotwali (Hindpidhi) P.S. Case No. 742 of 2014 and 799 of 2014.

6. In terms of the Notification issued by the Government of India, the Public Interest Litigation being W.P.(PIL) No. 4400 of 2014 was disposed of on 22.5.2015. CBI took up investigation in both the cases including the subject matter of the present application being Kotwali (Hindpidhi) P.S. Case No. 799 of 2014, which was registered as R.C. 11(S)/2015/SC-1. Investigation culminated in submission of charge sheet on 30.9.2016 against the petitioner as well as other accused persons for the offences under section 212/120B of the Indian Penal Code, pursuant to which by order dated 4.11.2016, learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate cum Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI, Ranchi was pleased to take cognizance for the offence punishable under sections 212/120B of the Indian Penal Code.

7. Assailing the initiation of the criminal proceeding against the petitioner who was the then Principal District & Sessions Judge, Deoghar including the order taking cognizance, Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that merely being in contact with the main accused persons in a case instituted under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code would not attract an offence under section 212 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Sinha submits that Section 52A of the Indian Penal Code, which defines Harbour is interconnected with the main offence and nowhere the investigating agency has come out with any material to suggest that the petitioner had taken an active part in trying to save the main accused from legal punishment. He has further harped upon Section 26 of the IPC to suggest that the petitioner did not have sufficient cause or reason to believe that Ranjit Singh Kohli was an accused in 3 a case instituted under section 498A of the IPC. Furthering his argument, learned senior counsel submits that on 19.8.2014 at 11.45 P.M. a case under section 498A of IPC was registered at the instance of the informant-Tara Sahdeo against Rajit Singh Kohli and mother and the petitioner had a conversation with Ranjit Singh Kohli on 19.8.2014 at 10.26 P.M., which would show that there was no sufficient reason to believe that the petitioner was intending in screening Ranjit Singh Kohli from legal punishment. It has further been submitted that even assuming the petitioner was in touch with Ranjit Singh Kohli, that by itself would not attract an offence punishable under section 212 of the IPC. Learned senior counsel submits that the evidence put forward by the CBI cannot be said to be legal evidence in strict sense of the term. It has also been submitted that there is no material collected by the CBI to suggest that the police constable Ajay Kumar was deputed by the petitioner to Ranjit Singh Kohli. It has been submitted that the police constable Ajay Kumar never reported to the petitioner and he had directly reported to Ranjit Singh Kohli and such non reporting on the part of Ajay Kumar would not make out a case under section 212 of IPC and such circumstance further dilutes the prosecution case against the petitioner. Continuing with his argument, it has been stated that the alleged act of the petitioner was much prior to the registration of the FIR as admittedly from the statement recorded of the Superintendent of Police, Deoghar, petitioner had called between 8 P.M. to 10 P.M., which is much prior to the institution of the FIR. Learned senior counsel also submits that there is no allegation against the petitioner of trying to influence the police as mere request for proper investigation into the allegations so that innocent persons are not hauled up would not mean that the petitioner was harbouring the main accused. It has also been submitted that question of harbouring the main accused-Ranjit Singh Kohli is negated in view of the fact that within a week of institution of the FIR, he was arrested. Learned senior counsel goes on to add that Ranjit Singh Kohli cannot be termed to be an offender as an offender would only include a person who has been duly convicted by the trial court and only after such conviction could be petitioner be proceeded against for the offence under section 212 of the Indian Penal Code. Learned senior counsel in support of his contention that Ranjit Singh Kohli cannot be termed to be an offender so as to attract section 212 of IPC in the case of the 4 petitioner, has referred to a judgement reported in AIR 1946 Patna 573(Ram Raj Chaudhury Vs. Emperor. Learned senior counsel in support of his contention that there must be legal evidence present so as to prosecute a person under section 212 of IPC has referred to the judgment in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami & Anr. Vs. State of Uttaranchal & Ors., reported in 2008(1)JLJR 82 (SC). It has been stated that no assumption or presumption is permissible to charge the petitioner of harbouring of an offender. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has attacked the order taking cognizance by submitting that the same is barred by limitation as prescribed in Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. inasmuch as although FIR was instituted on 19.8.2014 but chargesheet was submitted on 30.9.2017 and cognizance was taken on 4.11.2016. He submits that the maximum punishment prescribed under the statute for an offence under section 498A ofIPC is three years and if the petitioner is an accused of harbouring, the punishment, which is prescribed, would attract section 468 of Cr.P.C. and since there has been a considerable delay in taking of cognizance , the entire criminal proceedings as well as the order taking cognizance is liable to be quashed. In support of his contention that no offence is made out in the fact and circumstances of the case, reference has been made to the judgment in the case of Riyaz Khan Faridi Vs. State of Jharkhand through CBI, reported n 2013(4) JLJR 125.

8. Controverting the argument of learned senior counsel for the petitioner, Mr. K.P. Deo, learned counsel for the CBI, has submitted that Fardbeyan of the informant was recorded at 9.30 P.M. on 19.8.2014 and the petitioner had called Ranjit Singh Kohli subsequent to the same and therefore the same is a sufficient reason to believe that the petitioner was well aware that Ranjit Singh Kohli was an offender. Learned counsel submits that if the police constable Ajay Kumar had not reported for duty, the petitioner could have made an application for recalling Ajay Kumar as it was expected from a Judicial Officer holding a post of Principal District & Sessions Judge. It has been stated that after the news of Ranjit Singh Kohli was flashed in the media, petitioner had made efforts to recall the police constable Ajay Kumar, which further fortifies the intention of the petitioner in harbouring Ranjjt Singh Kohli. It has been stated that Ranjit Singh Kohli being an offender in the case under section 498A of IPC was being shielded by the petitioner by providing him with a 5 bodyguard and being in touch with him after the fardbeyan was recorded, ingredients required for prosecuting a person under section 212 of IPC being present, the petitioner is bound to be prosecuted for committing such offence. So far as the challenge, which has been made to the order taking cognizance as being barred under section 468 of CR.P.C., it has been submitted that Section 468 of Cr.P.C. will not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case and the judicial pronouncement as relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is not relevant or germane for such consideration. It has therefore been submitted that since a case under section 212/120B of IPC is made out against the petitioner, the present application is liable to be dismissed.

9. Replying to the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the CBI, it has been submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that although Fardbeyan was recorded earlier but the main consideration has to be made with respect to the registration of the case and since the communication between the petitioner and Ranjit Singh Kohli was much prior to such registration, petitioner cannot be held liable to be prosecuted under section 212 of IPC. It has been submitted that non recalling police constable-Ajay Kumar , who had not reported for duty, would not also attract Section 212 of IPC. Learned senior counsel reiterates what has been stated by him with respect to taking of cognizance being barred under section 468 of Cr.P.C. and has further stated that the contention raised by the petitioner in that respect has not been properly answered by the learned counsel for the CBI.

10. Before adverting to the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, it would be necessary to have a glance at Section 212 of IPC, which reads as follows:-

"Harbouring offender.--Whenever an offence has been committed, whoever harbours or conceals a person whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the offender, with the intention of screening him from legal punishment; if a capital offence.--shall, if the offence is punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine; if punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment.

--and if the offence is punishable with 1[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year, and not to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both. 2["Offence" in this section includes any 6 act committed at any place out of 3[India], which, if committed in 3[India], would be punishable under any of the following sections, namely, 302, 304, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 402, 435, 436, 449, 450, 457, 458, 459 and 460; and every such act shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be punishable as if the accused person had been guilty of it in".

11. On dissection of Section 212 of IPC, same can be divided into four parts. Notably (a) Commission of an offence, (b) Harbouring or concealing a person, (c) Reason to believe that such person is the offender and (d) Intention is of screening such a person from legal punishment. The word harbour has been defined in Section 52A of IPC , which reads as follows:-

Section 52A in The Indian Penal Code [52A. "Harbour".--Except in section 157, and in section 130 in the case in which the harbour is given by the wife or husband of the person harboured, the word "harbour" includes the supplying a person with shelter, food, drink, money, clothes, arms, ammunition or means or conveyance, or the assisting a person by any means, whether of the same kind as those enumerated in this section or not, to evade apprehension.]

12. Reason to believe has been defined in Section 26 of IPC, which reads as follows:-

26. "Reason to believe".--A person is said to have "reason to believe" a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise".

13. The main thrust of argument made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that the main accused Ranjit Singh Kohli cannot be said to be an offender unless and until he is convicted by the trial court. Whether the main accused Ranjit Singh Kohli can be termed to be an offender or not so as to attract Section 212 of IPC in the case of the petitioner, the said question is being considered at the first instance. Section 212 of IPC starts with the sentence "whenever an offence has been committed". It does not state that "whenever an offence has been proved to have been committed". The commission of an offence and proving the guilt of an accused involved in the commission of an offence are two entirely different aspects. Whether the meaning and purport of an "offender" as envisaged in Section 212 of IPC can mean, include or be stretched to mean that whenever a person accused of an offence is convicted can the second leg of the offence be brought forward is the moot question, which is to be considered. It is noted herein that the term "offender"has not been defined either in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in the Indian Penal Code. Learned senior counsel in support of his contention has referred to the case of Ram Raj 7 Chaudhury (supra). The said judgment has referred to another case of one Jang Bahadur, wherein it was held as follows:-

"There is another aspect of the case which has been lost sight of by the Courts below. The prosecution was premature. Section 212 says nothing about the harbouring of an absconder or an accused person. It renders punishable only the harbouring of a person when it is known or there is reason to believe that he is an offender. The first thing to be proved in a case under this section is that an offence has been committed by the person harboured. Jang Bahadur' trial however has not yet been concluded actually convicted , he is like every one else, led to the presumption that he is innocent. Only court can say in due course whether he is ally an offender or not. The court has not yet that; and until the court has pronounced upon fact, a prosecution for harbouring him is clearly nature".

14. The aforesaid judgement would thus reveal that the first thing which has to be proved is that an offence has been committed by the person harboured and that till a judgment is pronounced, a prosecution for harbouring such accused becomes premature. Although the term "'offender" has not been defined but section 2N of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines an offence, which means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. Taking a cue from the terminology of offence, which is not dependent on the ultimate result, a person who is arrayed as an accused can be said to be an offender and if his guilt is proved, his status becomes that of a convict. In Black Law Dictionary, an offender has been defined as a person, who has committed a crime.

15. In the case of Barnard and Another Vs. Gorman, reported in 1941 All England Law Reports 45, while considering the purport and meaning of the term offender, it was held as follows:-

"Offender in that sentence plainly means a person charged with an offence, and not necessarily a person who is guilty. The fact is that the word offender has both a narrower and a wider meaning(rather like the word reus in Latin). It may have the stricter meaning of one who is guilty of an offence, but it also sometimes has the meaning of a person who is under accusation of having committed an offence".

16. Lord Romer has further gone on to consider the term offender and has held as follows:-

" The question that Your Lordships are asked to determine is whether the word "offender" as there used means a person who has committed one of the specified offences or whether it means a person who is suspected of having committed one. That the ordinary meaning of the word "offender" is a person who has in fact offended must be conceded, but the context in which a word is found may be, and very often is, strong enough to show that it is intended to bear other than its ordinary meaning, and such a context is, in my opinion, to be found in the present case, for the section provides that the "offender" may be proceeded against by summons , and to give the word "offender" in this connection its ordinary meaning would be to render the provision nonsensical. It would mean that before issuing the summons the magistrate would have to decide that the offence had in fact been committed. The principle of verdict first and trial afterwards might as on one occasion did that of 'sentence first and 8 verdict afterwards, find some support in the Court of Wonderland, but it is not one that is regarded with favour in this country. Furthermore, if the "offender" failed to appear upon the hearing of the summons, any warrant issued for his arrest would have been issued illegally should the defendant's innocence subsequently be established. In this last mentioned event, moreover, any proceedings upon the summons taken in his absence would be a mere nullity, and could be successfully challenged by him. It seems clear, therefore, that when the section provides that the offender may be proceeded against by summons, the word."

17. In the case of State of Kerala represented by the Public Prosecutor, Ernakulam, reported in 2008 Cr. Law Journal 824, while considering the similar issue with respect to the term offender, it was held as follows:-

"17. Nowhere in section 212 it is stated that the person concealed should be convicted for an offence. Even if the main offender leaves unpunished by the court, the object of the provision under Section 212 requires that the person who has concealed or harboured the offender whom he believes and knows has committed the offences shall not leave unpunished if the other Ingredients are established. The criminality lies in act of concealment committed with the knowledge or belief that the person who is harboued or concealed is the offered and also with the criminal intention of screening him from legal punishment. Hence, we are unable to accept the dicta in Kuriakose Chacko v. State (supra) and similar line of decisions to the effect that the word 'offender' under section 212 means a convicted offender. It is true that if the accused who is alleged of committing the offence under section 212 if charged separately, on the facts of a particular case, it may be advisable to wait for the conclusion of trial of main accused as finding in the same may have a bearing on the question whether 'an offence at all has been committed', but, in such case, we are of the opinion that proper course advisable would be to commit the case to the Sessions Court where the main offence is being tried and club with the main case as was done in this case. It will give an opportunity to the accused also to prove that no offence has been committed as alleged. In such case, only after considering the question of commission of the offence part pleaded by the main offender etc. question of commission of offence under section 212 will be considered by the trial judge and no prejudice will be caused to the accused also."

18. The object of Section 212 of IPC has to be gathered from the language itself. Giving a narrow and constricted meaning to the word offender would clearly render section 212 of IPC redundant and imbecile and would frustrate the legislative intent. The word offender therefore in the strict sense of the term as used in Section 212 of IPC would include a person who is an accused and a criminal proceeding can be initiated and continued irrespective of the accused being convicted or not by the trial court. It is, therefore, concluded that the main accused harbouring of whom has led to institution of the case against the petitioner under section 212 IPC is an offender for the purpose of Section 212 of IPC.

19. Thus, the dust having been settled , with the plea of the petitioner being negated, as indicated above, this Court is now proceeding with the other aspects of the case.

20. In the case of Riyaz Khan Faridi (Supra), it was held as follows:-

"16. In my view, the instant case falls within third categories as circumstances/allegations, as stated above, appearing against the petitioner in absence of any evidence that this petitioner sold Disinfestants and Fogger Machine at much higher rate than the market rate to M/s Nand Kishore Fogla, who charged exorbitantly from the Government and that booty was shared with this petitioner and that this petitioner in connivance with Rajesh Fogla had given share of the booties to different persons would hardly prove the charge, even if the case of the prosecution is accepted that this petitioner had meeting with other accused persons before finalization of the tender and that he had participated in the process of tender.

17. In such situation, any continuance of the proceeding against the petitioner would certainly amount to abuse of the process of the court".

21. So far as the power of the Court in a proceeding under section 482 Cr.P.C. is concerned, reference has been made to the case of Inder Mohan Goswami (Supra) and the paragraph referred to is quoted hereunder:-

"23.. This Court in a number of cases had laid down the scope and ambit of courts' powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised:

(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court; and

(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice."

22. Reference has also been made to the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supplement 1 SCC 335, special thrust being given to condition Nos. 5 and 7, which relates to institution of a malicious prosecution and the allegations being inherently improbable and absurd.

23. The "reason to believe" as defined in Section 26 of the IPC has been elaborately and succinctly explained in the case of Jyoti Prasad Vs. State of Haryana, reported in 1993 Supp (2) SCC 497, which reads as follows:-

"Knowledge" is an awareness on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind. "Reason to believe" is another facet of the state of mind. "Reason to believe" is not the same thing as "suspicion"

or "doubt" and mere seeing also cannot be equated to believing.

"Reason to believe" is a higher level of state of mind. Likewise "knowledge" will be slightly on a higher plane than "reason to believe".

A person can be supposed to know where there is a direct appeal to his senses and a person is presumed to have a reason to believe if he has sufficient cause to believe the same. A person must have reason to believe if the circumstances are such that a reasonable man would, by probable reasoning, conclude or infer regarding the nature of the thing concerned. Such circumstances need not necessarily be capable of absolute conviction or inference; but it is sufficient if the circumstances are such creating a cause to believe by chain of probable reasoning leading to the conclusion or inference about the nature of the thing. These two requirements i.e. "knowledge" and "reason to believe" have to be deduced from various circumstances in the case".

24. The chargesheet reveals that on 19.8.2014, Ranjit Singh Kohli had called the petitioner who was posted as Principal District & Sessions Judge, Deoghar at 10.26 P.M. and informed him about the lodging of the criminal case against him. The petitioner is said to have talked with the Sr. Superintendent of Police, Ranchi in the night of 19.8.2014 itself requesting him to consider the complaint made by Ranjit Singh Kohli. The intention of the petitioner in trying to shield Ranjit Singh Kohli is evident from the fact that the petitioner had requisitioned for an additional bodyguard from the Sr. Superintendent of Police, Deoghar who had initially deputed a police constable Sanjay Kumar Pandey but on refusal by the petitioner and upon his direction, police constable Ajay Kumar was deputed as bodyguard to the petitioner. Police constable Ajay Kumar as per the investigation was earlier sent to act as a bodyguard of Ranjit Singh Kohli at the time of his wedding. Refusal of the petitioner in accepting Sanjay Kumar Pandey as a bodyguard and directing him for providing police constable Ajay Kumar would further point to the fact that in order to provide help to Ranjit Singh Kohli, such bodyguard was ordered to be deputed . Non reporting of police constable Ajay Kumar in spite of receiving a command to report to the petitioner and straightaway proceeding to Ranchi and being constantly in telephonic touch with Ranjit Singh Kohli would attract a strong suspicion as the petitioner never reported to the authorities about the police constable Ajay Kumar having not reported for his duty to the petitioner. Uproar in the Media led the petitioner to make efforts to call back police constable Ajay Kumar , which further more proves the intention of the petitioner in harbouring Ranjit Singh Kohli. It further appears from the investigation that the petitioner had come to Delhi on 24.8.2014, at which time, Ranjit Singh Kohli and others were also in Delhi. In his application for leave, the petitioner has mentioned about his place of visit as Allahabad whereas he has been stationed in Delhi and had remained in constant touch with Ranjit Singh Kohli. The petitioner being a high ranking Judicial Officer must have been aware of the pitfalls of harbouring Ranjit Singh Kohli. The chain of circumstances as, enumerated above, and as has been disclosed in course of investigation would reveal a concerted effort made by the petitioner to shield Ranjit Singh Kohli. The petitioner therefore had a reason to believe that Ranjit Singh Kohli was an offender in a case instituted 11 under section 498A of IPC and harbouring such offender would definitely attract prosecution of the petitioner under section 212 of IPC. In such circumstance, therefore, judgment referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Riyaz Khan Faridi (Supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case.

25. Thus, an offence under section 212 of IPC having been made out against the petitioner, no cause for interference in the merits of the case is necessitated. Last leg of argument advanced by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is with respect to the technical aspect of the case as it has been contended that the cognizance taking court was barred in taking cognizance in view of section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The primary contention is that although FIR was instituted on 19.8.2014 but the cognizance was taken on 4.11.2016 way beyond the prescribed period for taking of cognizance even if it is assumed that the petitioner has committed an offence under section 212of the IPC. The question, which has been raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, is no longer res integra as it has been settled in a catena of decisions that the main ingredients to consider section 468 Cr.P.C. is the date of occurrence and the date such offence is reported.

26. In the case of Sarah Mathew Vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases by its Director Dr. K.M. Cherian and others, reported in (2014) 2 SCC 62, while considering the relevant date for calculating limitation, it was held as follows:-

"51. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that Bharat Kale2 which is followed in Japani Sahoo3 lays down the correct law. Krishna Pillai4 will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC."

27. Constitution Bench judgement passed in the case of Sarah Mathew(Supra) had affirmed the view taken in the case of Japani Sahoo Vs. Chandra Shekhar Mohanty, reported in (2007)7 SCC 394, wherein it was held as follows:-

"52. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date must be considered as the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of process by a court. We, therefore, overrule all decisions in which it has been held that the crucial date for computing the period of limitation is taking of cognizance by the Magistrate/court and not of filing of complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings".

28 The aforesaid judement therefore reveals that the date when the cognizance was taken by the Magistrate is irrelevant as the actual date of initiation of the criminal proceeding vis a vis the commission of an offence is relevant for computing the period of limitation.

29. The FIR in connection with Kotwali (Hindpidhi) P.S. Case No. 799 of 2014 was registered on 7.9.2014, which was immediately after it came to light that Ranjit Singh Kohli and his mother was sheltered and harboured by the other accused persons. Thus, it cannot be said that there had been a delay in instituting the FIR and merely because cognizance has been taken on 4.11.2016 that cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to be beyond the period of limitation prescribed as also in view of the judicial pronouncement referred to above. The question of limitation as envisaged under section 468 Cr.P.C. as raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner also does not succeed.

30. Consequent to the findings given by this Court, no cause for interference arises in the criminal proceedings instituted against the petitioner and accordingly having found no merit in this application, the same is hereby dismissed.

(Rongon Mukhopadhyay,J) Rakesh/

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