Allahabad High Court
Guddu And Another vs State Of U.P. And Another on 28 July, 2022
Author: Rajeev Misra
Bench: Rajeev Misra
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Court No. - 80 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 16207 of 2022 Applicant :- Guddu And Another Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Shashi Dhar Shukla Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Rajeev Kumar Tiwari Hon'ble Rajeev Misra,J.
Heard Mr. Shashi Dhar Shukla, the learned counsel for applicants, the learned A.G.A. for State and Mr. Rajeev Kumar Tiwari, the learned counsel for first informant/opposite party 2.
This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed challenging entire proceedings of Special Sessions Trial No 03 of 2015 (State of U.P. Vs. Guddu and others), arising out of Case Crime No. 1722 of 2014, under Sections 354-A and 323 IPC, Section 7/8 Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 3 (1) (11) Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989, Police Station Khalilabad, District Sant Kabir Nagar, now pending in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, POCSO Act, Sant Kabir Nagar.
Record shows that during the pendency of aforementioned criminal case parties amicably settled their dispute outside the Court. On the basis of compromise so arrived at between parties, an application dated o6.05.2022 was filed by first informant/opposite party 2 before Court below praying therein that the proceedings of aforementioned criminal case be terminated in view of the compromise entered into by the parties. It is on the basis of aforesaid application, present application has been filed before this Court.
Instant application came up for admission on 28.6.2022 and this Court passed the following order:-
"Sri Rajeev Kumar Tiwari has filed Vakalatnama on behalf of opposite party no. 2 which is taken on record.
Heard Sri Shashi Dhar Shukla, learned counsel for the applicants, Sri A.P. Tripathi, learned AGA for the State and Sri Rajeev Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2.
This is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the applicants who are two in number for quashing the proceedings of Special Session Trial No. 03 of 2015 (State of U.P. vs. Guddu and others), relating to Case Crime No. 1722 of 2014, under Sections 354-A & 323 IPC, Section 7/8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 3(1)(11) of The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Police Station- Khalilabad, District-Sant Kabir Nagar, pending in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, POCSO Act, Sant Kabir Nagar.
Learned counsel for the applicants has argued that though a first information report was lodged on 19.10.2014 against the applicants referable to commission of the aforesaid offence in the above noted sections and thereafter a charge sheet was also submitted by the Investigating Officer under Sections 354-A & 323 IPC, Section 7/8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 3(1)(11) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Police Station- Khalilabad, District-Sant Kabir Nagar but eventually the compromise has been entered into between the applicants and the opposite party no.2 complainant (page 32/33).
According to learned counsel for the applicants the compromise so submitted before the court of Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, POCSO Act, Sant Kabir Nagar need to be verified and interim protection so accorded to it.
Sri Rajeev Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 has not disputed the said fact as he has rather supported the case of the applicants while arguing that a compromise application has already been submitted which is pending.
Sri A.P. Tripathi, learned AGA has argued that once the parties have themselves gone into compromise and the compromise application as stated by them is pending then he has no objection and a suitable directed be issued to the court below to verify the compromise.
In view of said factual aspect let the opposite parties shall file their counter affidavit if they do chose.
In the meantime, the court of Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, POCSO Act, Sant Kabir Nagar in the proceedings in Special Session Trial No. 03 of 2015 (State of U.P. vs. Guddu and others) relating to Case Crime No. 1722 of 2014, under Sections 354-A & 323 IPC, Section 7/8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 3(1)(11) of The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Police Station- Khalilabad, District-Sant Kabir Nagar, shall verify the compromise within one month while directing the parties to be present on a particular date and thereafter transmit the fate of the compromise so said to have been filed by them on the next date fixed.
List the matter as fresh on 21st July, 2022.
Till the next date of listing further proceedings of Special Session Trial No. 03 of 2015 (State of U.P. vs. Guddu and others), relating to Case Crime No. 1722 of 2014, under Sections 354-A & 323 IPC, Section 7/8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 3(1)(11) of The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Police Station- Khalilabad, District-Sant Kabir Nagar, pending in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, POCSO Act, Sant Kabir Nagar shall remain stayed."
In pursuance of above order dated 28.6.2022 parties appeared for verification of the compromise so entered into by them before Court below. A fresh compromise deed dated 6.5.2021 was filed by the parties before Court below. Concerned Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (POCSO) Act. Sant Kabir Nagar, verified the said compromise, vide order dated 7.7.2022. Subsequently, Office has submitted an office report dated 21.7.2022, regarding submission of compliance report by Court below to this Court. The report of Court below along with copy of the compromise as well as photo copy of the order dated 7.7.2022 is on record.
On the aforesaid premise, the learned counsel for applicants contends that dispute between the parties is a purely private dispute. During pendency of above mentioned criminal case before Court below, parties have amicably settled their dispute. On the basis of settlement so arrived at between parties, a compromise deed dated 6.5.2022 was filed before Court below.
On the aforesaid premise, it is urged that once parties have entered into a compromise, no useful purpose shall be served by prolonging proceedings of above mentioned criminal case. Interest of justice shall better be served in case, entire proceedings of above mentioned criminal case are quashed by this Court itself in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C, instead of relegating the parties to Court below.
Per contra, the learned A.G.A. for State does not oppose the present application. He has invited the attention of Court to the compromise deed dated 06.05.2022 filed by the parties. He further contends that once first informant/opposite party 2 has compromised with accused applicants, then in that eventuality she cannot have any grievance in case proceedings of above mentioned criminal case are quashed by this Court.
Learned A.G.A. further contends that dispute between parties is basically a private dispute. Parties have already compromised which has also been acted upon and verified by Court below. As such, no ground exists to continue the prosecution of applicant.
Mr. Rajeev Kumar Tiwarim, the learned counsel for first informant/opposite party 2 has adopted the arguments of learned A.G.A.
This Court is not unmindful of the following judgements of Apex Court:
1. B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 SCC 675
2. Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation[2008)9 SCC 677]
3. Manoj Sharma Vs. State and others ( 2008) 16 SCC 1
4. Shiji @ Pappu and Others VS. Radhika and Another, (2011) 10 SCC 705
5. Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303
6. K. Srinivas Rao Vs. D.A Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226
7. Dimpey Gujral and others Vs. Union Territory through Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh and others, (2013) 11 SCC 497
8. Narindra Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab ( 2014) 6 SCC 466
9. Yogendra Yadav and Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand and another (2014) 9 SCC 653
10. C.B.I. Vs. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389
11. C.B.I. Vs. Sadhu Ram Singla and Others, (2017) 5 SCC 350
12. Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others Vs. State of Gujarat and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641
13. Anita Maria Dias and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2018) 3 SCC 290
14. Social Action Forum For Manav Adhikar and Another Vs. Union of India and others, (2018) 10 SCC, 443 (Constitution Bench)
15. State of M.P. VS. Dhruv Gurjar and Another, (2019) 5 SCC 570
16. State of M.P. V/s Laxmi Narayan & Ors., (2019) 5 SCC 688
17. Rampal Vs. State of Haryana, AIR online 2019 SC 1716
18. Arun Singh and Others VS. State of U.P. and Another (2020) 3 SCC 736
19. Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012 (Ramgopal and Another Vs. The State of M.P.), 2021 SCC OnLine SC 834.
wherein the Apex Court has categorically held that compromise can be made between the parties even in respect of certain cognizable and non compoundable offences. However, Apex Court in State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan (Supra) that no compromise can be made in respect of offences against society as they are not private in nature. Similarly in Ram Pal Vs. State of Haryana (Supra) it has been held that no compromise can be made in cases relating to rape and sexual assault. Reference may also be made to the decision given by this Court in Shaifullah and others Vs. State of U.P. And another [2013 (83) ACC 278] in which the law expounded by the Apex court in some of the aforesaid cases has been explained in detail.
Recently Apex court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur (Supra) has laid down the following guideline with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings as well compromise in criminal proceedings in paragraphs 16 to 16.10, which read as under:
"16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions 16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8 and 16.9 above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."
Recently in Ramgopal and another (supra), Court has again reiterated the guidelines regarding quashing of criminal proceedings in view of compromise. Following has been observed in paragraph 18-19:-
"18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that plenary jurisdiction of this Court to impart complete justice under Article 142 cannot ipso facto be limited or restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. It is also noteworthy that even in the absence of an express provision akin to Section 482 Cr.P.C. conferring powers on the Supreme Court to abrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable under Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court with scopious powers to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure complete justice. In doing so, due regard must be given to the overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal justice system, which is grounded on the sub-lime philosophy of maintenance of peace of the collective and that the rationale of placing an individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation.
19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences 'compoundable' within the statutory framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercise carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations."
Considering the facts and circumstances of case, submissions made by counsel for parties and the material on record, this court is of considered opinion that dispute between parties is a purely private dispute and not a crime against society. Moreover, during pendency of present application, parties have already compromised their dispute. Compromise so entered into by parties have been acted upon and verified by Court below. As such, no difference exists between parties. Consequently, no useful purpose shall be served by prolonging the proceedings of above mentioned case. In view of compromise entered into by the parties, chances of conviction of accused applicant is remote and bleak. As such continuation of proceedings would itself cause injustice to parties. The trial would only entail loss of judicial time in a futile pursuit particularly when torrents of litigation drown the courts with an unimaginable flood of dockets.
In view of above, aforementioned applications succeed and are liable to be allowed. Consequently, entire proceedings of Case Crime No. 1722 of 2014, as well as Special Sessions Trial No 03 of 2015 (State of U.P. Vs. Guddu and others), arising out of aforementioned case crime number, under Sections 354-A and 323 IPC, Sections 7/8 Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 3 (1) (11) Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989, Police Station Khalilabad, District Sant Kabir Nagar, now pending in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, POCSO Act, Sant Kabir Nagar are, hereby, quashed.
Aforesaid applications are, accordingly, allowed.
Cost made easy.
Order Date :- 28.7.2022 HSM