Karnataka High Court
St. John'S Teacher Training Institute ... vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 17 July, 2001
Equivalent citations: ILR2002KAR5082, 2002(4)KARLJ204
Author: R.V. Raveendran
Bench: R.V. Raveendran
ORDER R.V. Raveendran, J.
1. The petitioner claims that it is a minority institution running a Teacher Training Institute for women at Veeravanallur, Ambasa-mudram Taluk, Tirunelveli District in the State of Tamil Nadu. It made an application to the Southern Regional Committee of the National Council for Teacher Education (hereinafter referred to as "the SRC-NCTE" for short), on 9-2-1996 seeking recognition of its institution under the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (NCTE Act', for short). The said application was under the category of "New Institution" by paying the processing fee of Rs. 5,000-00 on 13-2-1996.
2. NCTE has made the National Council for Teacher Education (Application for Recognition, the Manner for Submission, Determination of Conditions for Recognition and Permission to start New Course of Training) Regulations, 1995 ("NCTE Regulations", for short), in exercise of its power under Section 32(f) and (g) of the NCTE Act. Regulation 5(e) provides that, every institution intending to offer a course or training in teacher education but was not functioning immediately before 17th August, 1995 shall submit application for recognition with a no objection certificate from the State or Union Territory in which the institution is located.
3. The petitioner claims to have made an application to the Government of Tamil Nadu for issuing a No Objection Certificate (for grant of recognition). The Government of Tamil Nadu, by order dated 14-10-1997, refused to grant the No Objection Certificate, having regard to (i) the manpower requirements; and (ii) its policy not to encourage new institutions as there were more than the required number of trained teachers in that State. Petitioner challenged the said rejection in W.P. No. 7120 of 1997 before High Court of Judicature, Madras. That petition was disposed off on 9-11-1998 with a direction to SRC-NCTE to decide whether the petitioner-institution is an existing institution or not and pass a final order, on petitioner's application dated 9-2-1996.
4. Accordingly NCTE considered the petitioner's application for recognition. It also considered the petitioner's contention that though it had made an application for recognition under the category of "New Institution", it was an existing institution and therefore, a No Objection Certificate from the State Government was not necessary. By an order dated 28-4-1999 (Annexure-C), the application for recognition was rejected by SRC-NCTE, holding that the institution was a new institution and not an existing institution and therefore No objection Certificate was required.
5. The petitioner challenged the said order of SRC-NCTE in W.P. No. 33984 of 2000 in this Court. The said petition was rejected by order dated 15-12-2000 reserving liberty to the petitioner to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority, namely, NCTE, New Delhi. Accordingly, the petitioner filed an appeal before NCTE, New Delhi against the order dated 28-4-1999 passed by SRC-NCTE. The Appellate Authority, by an order dated 31-5-2001 (Annexure-Q) rejected the appeal and confirmed the order of the SRC-NCTE.
6. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this petition for the following reliefs.--
(a) For quashing Sections 14(1), 14(3) and 32(2)(e) of the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, as being violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India;
(b) For quashing the order dated 31-5-2001 (Annexure-Q) passed by the NCTE, New Delhi, confirming the order dated 28-4-1999 passed by SRC-NCTE; and
(c) For a direction to the respondents to declare that the petitioner-institution is an existing minority institution entitled for recognition.
The respondents in the petition are Union of India, NCTE, New Delhi and SRC-NCTE, Bangalore.
7. Sri N. Devadas, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents 2 and 3 raised a preliminary objection in regard to jurisdiction. He submitted that no part of the cause of action for the petition arose within the jurisdiction of this Court and such a writ petition could be filed only in the Madras High Court or Delhi High Court.
8. The learned Counsel for petitioner submitted that as the office of the Southern Regional Committee of NCTE, is situated at Bangalore and as the original order refusing recognition was passed by the SRC-NCTE at Bangalore, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is also contended that when the petitioner challenged the order dated 28-4-1999 of SRC-NCTE in W.P. No. 33984 of 2000, this Court had entertained the said petition without any objection in regard to jurisdiction.
9. To decide upon the preliminary objection, a reference of Article 226 and the general principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under it is necessary. The relevant portions of Article 226 are extracted below:
"Article 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.--(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose;
(2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories".
The following principles in regard to exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, are well-settled and recognised:
(a) That except for the territorial limitation placed upon a High. Court by the Constitution, there is really no limit upon the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue prerogative writs, except self-imposed limitations;
(b) The jurisdiction under Article 226 being an extraordinary original jurisdiction, issue of writs is purely discretionary and no petitioner can claim the relief under Article 226 as a matter of right;
(c) Where there is adequate jurisdiction in another High Court to deal satisfactorily with a case, a High Court may, in appropriate cases, refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226, and leave the petitioner to pursue his remedy in the other High Court;
(d) Irrespective of the relief sought, the High Court may mould the relief to be granted to meet the peculiar or special circumstances of a case;
(e) Where the order passed by a Statutory Authority situated within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court merges in the order of the Appellate Authority which is situated outside its jurisdiction, unless there is any other factor giving rise to any cause of action within its territories, such High Court will not entertain a writ petition, merely on the ground the original authority is located within its territorial jurisdiction.
10. The petitioner-institution is situated in the State of Tamil Nadu. Its office is also situated in the State of Tamil Nadu. The petitioner does not have any office or institution, nor carry on any activity in the State of Karnataka. The cause of action for the reliefs sought did not arise within the territories in relation to which this High Court exercises jurisdiction.
10.1 The first prayer relates to the constitutional validity of Sections 14(1), 14(3) and 32(2)(e) of the NCTE Act, 1993. Obviously, a petition for the said relief can be filed by the petitioner only in the Madras or Delhi High Court.
10.2 The second prayer is for quashing the order dated 31-5-2001 passed by the NCTE, New Delhi. Here again, a petition may lie either in the Delhi High Court under Article 226(1) or in the Madras High Court under Article 226(2). A writ petition by a person having his place of residence, business, avocation in Tamil Nadu or carrying on business or activities in Tamil Nadu, cannot challenge an order passed by an Authority in Delhi, in the High Court of Karnataka. Even though the order impugned (appellate order of NCTE) is passed in an appeal against an order passed by SRC-NCTE situated in Karnataka, as the order of the original authority (SRC-NCTE) has merged in the order of the Appellate Authority (NCTE) at Delhi, what could be challenged is the order of the Appellate Authority and not the order of the original authority. Therefore, the second prayer is also not maintainable in this Court.
10.3 The third prayer is purely consequential to second prayer. The prayer is for a direction to respondent to declare that the petitioner-institution is an existing minority institution entitled to recognition. A declaration that an institution is a minority institution can be granted by a competent Court in the State of Tamil Nadu. In fact petitioner claims that it has already obtained such a declaration from the High Court of Judicature, at Madras by order dated 21-1-1994 in S.A. No. 20 of 1989. Neither NCTE nor SRC-NCTE can grant a declaration that petitioner is a minority institution. A declaration that petitioner-institution is entitled to recognition, depends on and consequential to the challenge to the order dated 31-5-2001 of NCTE, New Delhi, holding that petitioner is not entitled to recognition. Such a declaration can be granted only if the appellate order of NCTE, New Delhi is set aside or quashed. Hence, the third prayer is also one for which the cause of action did not arise within the territories in regard to which this Court exercises jurisdiction.
10.4 It is thus seen that no part of cause of action in regard to any of the three prayers arose within the jurisdiction of this Court and therefore, this petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction.
11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the third prayer is for a direction to SRC-NCTE, Bangalore (as also NCTE, New Delhi and Union of India) to declare that petitioner-institution is an existing minority institution entitled to recognition and therefore, a part of the cause of action for the petition arose within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court As noticed above, the third prayer is purely consequential upon the second prayer and the petitioner cannot get such a declaration without getting rid of the order of the Appellate Authority. Even assuming that some part of the cause of action for the writ petition arises within the jurisdiction of this Court, on account of the office of SRC-NCTE being situated at Bangalore, as the jurisdictional High Court for petitioner is the Madras High Court, this Court will not entertain such a petition and the petitioner should seek relief before the Madras High Court.
12. Article 226 as it originally stood empowered a High Court to issue a writ only to an authority within its territorial jurisdiction. It was stymied by the wording of the Article from issuing writs to authorities situated outside its territorial limits, but exercising jurisdiction in relation to causes of action arising within its territorial limits. The introduction of Clause (2) in Article 226, removed that impediment and enabled a High Court to issue writs to any authority situated outside its territorial jurisdiction in regard to any cause of action arising within its territorial limits. The effect of Article 226(2), on a Tribunal or Authority exercising jurisdiction over several States but having its office outside such States, is as if the Tribunal or Authority has its seat or office in the respective State when deciding matters arising from that State.
12.1 Let me take the illustration of a debt due to a Financial Institution from a company situated at Hyderabad secured by immovable and movable properties situated at Hyderabad. The Debt Recovery Tribunal, where proceedings are initiated for recovery may be situated at Bangalore. The Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, hearing appeals against the orders of DRT, might be situated in Bombay or Madras. But whether the Tribunal is situated at Bangalore or Bombay, the matter will have to be decided with reference to the laws in force in Andhra Pradesh subject to the binding authority of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The Tribunal cannot ignore or refuse to follow the decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court on the ground that, it is only bound by the law laid down by the Karnataka High Court as its seat is at Bangalore or Bombay High Court as its seat is at Bombay. In such cases, the Tribunal will also be subject to the writ jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
12.2 Similarly, where a Tribunal/Authority situated in Bangalore, passes an order exercising jurisdiction in regard to a matter arising from Tamil Nadu, it is no doubt true that the Karnataka High Court will have jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions against such order of the Tribunal/Authority by reason of Article 226(1). But in such a case, this Court may be reluctant to entertain the petition and would normally direct the litigant to approach the jurisdictional High Court. Such reluctance stems not from want of jurisdiction, but from the self-imposed restrictions, to ensure equal treatment and to avoid conflicting decisions of the nature which are demonstrable from the facts of this case itself.
13. The validity of Regulation 5(e) was challenged before the High Court of Judicature at Madras. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court upheld its validity in Lords and Angels Teacher Training Institute v. State of Tamil Nadu. The Madras High Court held that the requirement under Regulation 5(e) and (f) for obtaining a No Objection Certificate from the State Government cannot be held to be unreasonable, as a State Government is vitally concerned with education in general and teachers' education in particular. The Court also upheld the requirement relating to No Objection Certificate as perfectly legal and necessary for upliftment of teachers' education in the State of Tamil Nadu for the following reasons:
". . . . a No Objection Certificate from the State Government was found to be necessary, keeping in view the overall perspective of the situation prevailing in the State with particular reference to the manpower requirement in teachers' education. . . . Such institutions have to necessarily get academic support only from the State Government like manpower, admission modalities and grant in aid etc.".
13.1 The validity of Regulation 5(e) and (f) was also considered by a Division Bench of this Court in National Council for Teacher Education, Southern Regional Committee, Bangalore and Anr. v. Dr. Sri Jachani Rastriya Seva Peetha, Bangalore and Anr., 2001(6) Kar. L.J. 17, ILR 2001 Kar. 1148. This Court also upheld the validity of Regulation 5(e) and (f). But, while so doing, this Court held that Regulation 5(e) has to be read down as only providing for seeking the views of the State Government by way of No Objection Certificate or as an input for proper consideration. This Court also held that even in the absence of a NOC, NCTE can consider and grant applications for recognition. This Court further held that there was no obligation on the part of the applicant to produce a No Objection Certificate from the State Government and it is sufficient if he makes an application for No Objection Certificate and produces an endorsement showing that he has applied to the State Government for a No Objection Certificate.
13.2 Thus, there is a slight perceptional variation between the view of the Madras High Court in Lords and Angels Teacher Training Institute's case, supra and the decision of this Court in Dr. Sri Jachani Rashtriya Seva Peetha's case, supra, in regard to the relevancy and importance of NOC from the State Government. While both Courts have upheld the validity of Regulation 5(e) and (f), the Madras High Court appears to be of the view that a No Objection Certificate is relevant and necessary (though not as a prior permission or approval), while this Court has held that mere filing of an application for NOC, to the State Government is sufficient and on the basis of an endorsement issued by the State Government in that behalf, NCTE will have to consider an application for recognition.
13.3 It is stated that SRC-NCTE has jurisdiction to consider the applications for recognition from the States of Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. Obviously, when it is considering an application from Karnataka, it will consider the application with reference to the provisions of the Act and Regulations as interpreted by the Karnataka High Court. Similarly, when it is considering an application for recognition from an institute situated in Tamil Nadu, or Andhra Pradesh or Kerala, necessarily it will have to consider the application with reference to the provisions of the Act and Regulations as interpreted by the respective jurisdictional High Courts. The SRC-NCTE cannot, ignore the law as interpreted by Madras High Court in regard to an application for recognition from an institution in Tamil Nadu, nor apply the law as interpreted by Karnataka High Court to an application from Tamil Nadu, on the ground that its office (Office of SRC-NCTE) is situated at Bangalore. When a Tribunal or Authority is exercising jurisdiction over more than one State, while deciding a matter with reference to a cause of action which arose in a particular State, the matter will have to be decided with reference to the law applicable in regard to that State and not with reference to the State where the Tribunal or Authority is situated. Debt Recovery Tribunals, Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunals, Income-tax Appellate Tribunals and CEGA Tribunal are examples of such a position.
13.4 If this Court should entertain a writ petition in regard to an institution situated in Tamil Nadu, it may lead to conflicting decisions and a judicial conundrum. The Madras High Court and Karnataka High Court have taken slightly divergent views in regard to principles relating to recognition under Section 14 of the NCTE Act, possibly with reference to the prevailing conditions in their respective States. The application for recognition is filed by an institution in Tamil Nadu before SRC-NCTE having its office at Bangalore. The application is rejected by SRC-NCTE purporting to follow principles laid down by the High Court of Madras. The said decision of SRC-NCTE, confirmed by Appellate Authority, is challenged before the High Court of Karnataka. The institution contends that the decision of SRC-NCTE is erroneous with reference to the law laid down by the Karnataka High Court in Dr. Sri Jachani Rastriya Seva Peetha's case, supra. SRC-NCTE contends that the order is correct and is in accordance with the principles laid down by Madras High Court, in Lords and Angels Teacher Training Institute's case, supra. Then what should this Court do? Should it uphold the decision of SRC-NCTE as being fully in consonance with the principles laid down by the jurisdictional Court (Madras High Court), as the institution is situated in Tamil Nadu; or having entertained the petition, should it interfere with the order of SRC-NCTE, on the ground that the decision is not in consonance with the principles laid down by this Court in Dr. Sri Jachani Rastriya Seva Peetha's case, as Dr. Sri Jachani Rastriya Seva Peetha's case, supra, is binding on this Court. (Note: What is stated in this sub-para is only by way of illustration as what may happen if the writ petition is held to be maintainable. It is not to be construed as holding that the order of SRC-NCTE and NCTE are in accordance with the decision in Lords and Angels Teacher Training Institute's case, supra, or in violation of the decision in Dr. Sri Jachani Rastriya Seva Peetha's case, supra).
13.5 To avoid such, conflict in views and to ensure equal treatment to similarly situated institutes in a State, it would be appropriate and just if all such institutions are required to seek the reliefs before the jurisdictional High Court (Madras High Court). Therefore, even assuming that some part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court, this is a fit case for this Court to decline to exercise the power under Article 226.
14. The petition is, therefore, dismissed reserving liberty to the peti-
tioner to approach the appropriate High Court for relief. In the circum stances, nothing stated above shall be construed as expression of any opinion on the merits of the petitioner's claims and contentions.