Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Ram Bahadur vs Labour Court And Anr. on 12 August, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003(6)ALD139, 2003(5)ALT541
ORDER S. Ananda Reddy, J.
1. This writ petition is filed by the aggrieved workman against the Award of the Labour Court, Guntur in I.D. No. 359 of 1990, dated 1-1-1996, seeking to quash the said Award, as illegal, not based on facts, and for the grant of consequential benefits.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as watchman in the 2nd respondent-Hospital in the year 1967 and continued as such. The workers of the 2nd respondent formed themselves into a Trade Union and the said Union was registered in the name and style of 'St. Ann's Hospital Mazdoor Sangh', which is affiliated to 'Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh'. The petitioner was elected as General Secretary of the Union and used to represent the grievances of the workers before the Management of the 2nd respondent, as the 2nd respondent was not implementing the welfare legislations, which were meant for the welfare of the workers. The petitioner filed representations before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour for implementation of Minimum Wages etc. In 1985, as the respondent-Management tried to evict the workers from the quarters by using unsocial elements, the petitioner gave a police complaint against the Management. Therefore, the Management took exception to this and persuaded the petitioner to withdraw the said complaint and even threatened the petitioner that action would be taken against him. Pursuant to this, a Charge Memo was issued by the 2nd respondent on 25-10-1985 and the petitioner submitted his explanation for the same on 12-11-1985. The Management not satisfied with the said explanation, appointed an Enquiry Officer to conduct domestic enquiry. The petitioner requested the Enquiry Officer to allow him to seek the assistance of the Vice-President of the Union in the enquiry, but the same was refused. Thereafter, the petitioner sought for certain copies of the documents being relied upon by the Management. As they were denied, the petitioner filed O.S. No. 207 of 1986 on the file of District Munsif, Vijayawada seeking stay of the proceedings, along with I.A. No. 174 of 1986, seeking urgent orders of stay and an order of status quo was granted initially, which was vacated finally after hearing the arguments on 10-3-1986. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent issued a communication dated 12-3-1986-that the enquiry pending against the petitioner was withdrawn and peculiarly on the same day an order of discharge was passed, discharging the petitioner from service on the ground of loss of confidence. Therefore, the petitioner filed an application before the Court, for amendment of the plaint, which was dismissed and thus, the suit has become infructuous. Hence, the petitioner raised the industrial dispute in I.D. No. 359 of 1990 before the 1st respondent. The Labour Court after framing appropriate issues and considering the evidence adduced by both sides, upheld the order of discharge, observing that there were strained relations between the employer and the employee and therefore, it would not be possible to continue the petitioner in the employment by the Management. However, the Labour Court awarded compensation of Rs. 5,000/-. Aggrieved by that, the petitioner has come up with the present writ petition.
3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondent-Management had initiated enquiry on certain allegations. Instead of conducting the enquiry and completing the same, the Management has resorted to the impugned action under the colourable exercise of loss of confidence. According to the learned Counsel, if the Management had lost confidence, there was no need to issue any Charge Memo or to conduct any enquiry. But, the Management issued a Charge Memo and conducted an enquiry. When the petitioner was not given the demanded copies of the documents sought to be relied upon by the Management, the petitioner approached the Civil Court to restrain the Management from proceeding with the enquiry. Further, after vacating the status quo order on 12-3-1986, instead of proceeding further with the enquiry, the Management passed the impugned order, withdrawing the said enquiry on the very same day i.e., 12-3-1986. According to the learned Counsel, the said action of the Management is only with an ulterior motive of denying and depriving the petitioner from his employment. The learned Counsel also contended that though the petitioner sought amendment of the plaint, so as to seek declaration of the impugned order as illegal and without jurisdiction, the said amendment application was dismissed and therefore, consequently the suit filed by the petitioner has become infructuous. However, the respondent-Management contended before the Labour Court that the dismissal of the suit by the Civil Court would operate as res judicata, which was accepted, though the said view is clearly devoid of merit. Even on merits also, the learned Counsel contended that during the course of enquiry before the Labour Court, the Management relied upon certain instances of alleged irregularities that were committed by the petitioner in 1974. According to the learned Counsel, if the petitioner has committed certain acts of irregularities in the year 1974, by which if the Management had lost confidence in the petitioner, there is absolutely no justification in continuing him till 1985-86. Even the Charge Memo issued to the petitioner shows that the charges are only with reference to the eviction of the quarters and the police complaint given by the petitioner and not with reference to any of the alleged irregularities committed while discharging duties as watchman. Therefore, the learned Counsel contended that the discharge of the petitioner on the premise of loss of confidence is only a colourable exercise for illegal termination of the petitioner, that too without conducting any enquiry. The learned Counsel also contended that the discharge is not a simipliciter but the grounds, urged before the Labour Court clearly show that the said discharge is based on a stigmatic conduct of the petitioner, while discharging duties as the employee of the respondent-Management, in which case an enquiry ought to have been conducted. Hence, the learned Counsel sought for quashing of the impugned order of the Labour Court.
4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contentions, relied upon the following decisions:
Kamal Kishore v. Management, RAW. Airways Inc. ; L. Michael v. Johnson Pumps Ltd., ; T. Vijaya Kumar v. The Government of A.P. and Ors., 1977 ALT 96 (NOC).
5. The 2nd respondent-Management, on the other hand, supported the Award passed by the Labour Court.
Sri MRK Chowdary, the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the 2nd respondent contended that the petitioner was discharged from service on account of loss of confidence. According to the learned Counsel, it is not mandatory that an enquiry should be conducted for passing orders of discharge of an employee for loss of confidence by the Management. According to the learned Counsel, as long as there is substantive material available on record to satisfy the Labour Court that the employee was discharged on account of loss of confidence by the employer and when once the Labour Court recorded a finding to that effect, there are no grounds warranting to interfere with such findings of the Labour Court. The learned Counsel also contended that the appointment of the petitioner in 1967 is disputed. Though, no specific date was stated even in the counter filed by the Management before the Labour Court, but, however, it is the grievance of the Management that the petitioner had committed irregularities while discharging his duties as watchman. The allegations are that the petitioner was allowing the visitors as well as the vendors to enter into the hospital premises, contrary to the Rules, prohibiting such entry. It is also stated that even when the petitioner working as a watchman, did not follow the instructions issued by the other members of the hospital. It is stated that when a patient, by name Venkateswar Rao ran away from the hospital, Sister Tulasamma caught him and showed to the petitioner and instructed him not to allow the said patient to go out of the hospital. But, soon after, the said Venkateswar Rao, his mother and sister were allowed to leave the Hospital premises. Therefore, a Memo was issued to that extent, under Ex.M.10. Further, the petitioner gave a false complaint against the Management to the police, who enquired with the Management by telephone in connection with the eviction of the quarters by the workers of the 2nd respondent-Management. According to the learned Counsel, as the workers' quarters were in dilapidated condition, as per the directions of the Municipality, they were got evicted. Though all other workers have vacated the quarters, the petitioner failed to vacate the quarter and hence the petitioner was finally evicted only on 2nd October 1985. On the next day i.e., on 3-10-1985, the petitioner gave a police complaint complaining against the Management. Further, according to the Management, when the Charge Memo was issued and an Enquiry Officer was appointed, the petitioner did not allow the said officer to proceed with the enquiry and filed a suit restraining the enquiry from proceeding with the enquiry, but, however, the suit filed by the petitioner was finally dismissed. Therefore, it is contended that in the light of the above material, it cannot be said that there is no material before the Tribunal for its satisfaction to come to the conclusion that the discharge of the petitioner was on account of loss of confidence by the employer. When once such a finding is recorded by the Labour Court, it is not open to this Court, while exercising judicial review, to interfere with such finding. Therefore, the learned Counsel sought for dismissal of the writ petition.
6. The learned Counsel for the respondent-Management relied upon the following decisions, in support of his contentions:
Parry & Co. Ltd, v. C.E. Association, ; Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General, AIR 1952 SCC 319, Zora Singh v. J.M. Tandon, ; Francis Klein & Co. v. Workmen, .; Binny Ltd. v. Workmen, ; O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation, Ltd., ; Mangatu J. Verghese v. D.D. & B. Mills, 2001 (1) LLJ 155.
7. From the above rival contentions the issue to be considered in this writ petition is whether the Award of the Labour Court warrants any interference by this Court.
8. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was appointed and worked as watchman in the 2nd respondent-Hospital. With reference to certain allegations against the petitioner, a Charge Memo was issued on 25-10-1985, framing the following charges:
"(1) You were informed along with other workers orally, in the month of August, 1985, to vacate the present quarters, as the quarters have to be demolished and two storied new quarters would be built in that place. All the other workers vacated by September 30th except yourself. You were told a number of times to vacate and finally you vacated on 2-10-1985 and moved to the alternate accommodation provided to you.
(2) You gave a false telegram on 3-10-1985 to the Police Authorities that you are forcibly going to be evicted from the old quarters when you are actually residing in the new accommodation provided to you. Thus your action in giving false report to the police is a serious misconduct on your part.
(3) You accused falsely the Hospital Authorities in your letter dated 18-10-1985 that you were forcibly evicted from the quarters on 30-9-1985 by use of force and illegal methods while you were on duty in the hospital at the said time and quarters demolished illegally. Making false accusations against the hospital is a misconduct on your part.
(4) When Sr. Sylvester tried to deliver the letter dated 17-10-1985 at 7.00 am, on that day, you refused to receive the same in hand. Failure to receive the lawful orders from the hospital is a misconduct on your part."
Though the petitioner submitted his explanation to the Memo of Charges, the Management did not satisfy with the explanation and therefore, proposed to conduct a domestic enquiry and accordingly a local Advocate was appointed as Enquiry Officer on 12-11-1985 to conduct the domestic enquiry. As per the material on record, as the petitioner was not permitted to take the defence assistance to assist him in the domestic enquiry and further, as the document sought to be relied upon by the Management was not furnished, he filed suit - O.S.No. 207 of 1986 on the file of the District Munsif, Vijayawada restraining the Management from proceeding with the domestic enquiry. Incidentally, he also filed I.A.No. 174 of 1986 seeking interim injunction restraining the respondent-Management in proceeding with the enquiry. The Court below passed an order of status quo on 6-3-1986 originally till 7-3-1986 and later extended to 10-3-1986; and on 10-3-1986 on behalf of the Management is was represented before the Court that no enquiry report was filed so far and the Management will not act upon it, pending disposal of the I.A. Therefore, the Court modified the order of status quo. But, peculiarly the Management passed an order on 12-3-1986 withdrawing the domestic enquiry and passed the impugned order discharging the petitioner stating that the Management lost confidence in him, and one month salary in lieu of notice was also paid to the petitioner. When the petitioner came up before the Labour Court, evidence was adduced on behalf of the Management stating that the petitioner was irregular in discharging his duties as watchman, which, according to the Management is the basis for loss of confidence. It is also brought on record that the petitioner used to allow the visitors as well as the vendors into the hospital premises contrary to the Rules. Another specific instance is referred that when one of the patients, by name Venkateswar Rao, has tried to leave the hospital without permission of the authorities, the said patient was entrusted to the petitioner with specific instructions not allow him to leave the hospital premises. But the petitioner did not follow the said instructions and the said Venkateswar Rao left the hospital premises without permission of the authorities. Further, according to the Management, the suit is filed preventing the Management from proceeding with the domestic enquiry and further when the petitioner sought to amend the plaint after he was discharged from service, the said amendment petition was dismissed. Therefore, according to the Management the said order operates as res judicata and it is not open to the petitioner to question the order of discharge before the Labour Court. But, peculiarly, the Labour Court observed that in view of the said order there is some force in the contention of the Management, which is not understandable how the dismissal of an amendment petition in a suit would be a decision on the issue. But, however, the Labour Court basing on the material placed before it, arrived at a conclusion that by virtue of the actions of the petitioner, the Management lost confidence in him, and also recorded a finding that there is strained relationship between the parties, therefore, it was not possible to order reinstatement, hence instead of ordering reinstatement, the Labour Court awarded a compensation of Rs. 5,000/-. In fact, the Labour Court did not give specific finding, whether the order of discharge is a colourable exercise or an order based on merits, but recorded a finding that on account of the strained relations between the petitioner and the Management, there is loss of confidence by the Management in the petitioner. In fact, according to the Labour Court, the strained relationship between the employer and the petitioner amounts to loss of confidence over the employee by the employer. Therefore, reinstatement cannot be ordered but compensation can be ordered. The said findings are assailed in the present writ petition.
9. According to the petitioner, the action of the Management is only a colourable exercise, as the petitioner being an active member of the Trade Union and was representing on behalf of the Members of the Union. On certain allegations, a Charge Memo was issued and the charges framed in the Memo are not so serious, so as to discharge or dispense with the petitioner from his employment. In fact, the learned Counsel contended that the Management did not rely upon those charges before the Labour Court, but brought in certain alleged irregularities that were said to have been committed in the year 1974, though the petitioner was allowed to work without imposing any punishment till 1985. Therefore, it is the case of the petitioner that these facts were brought on record to justify the illegal and colourable exercise to terminate the services of the petitioner.
10. The learned Counsel also contended that the term loss of confidence would cast a stigma with reference to the conduct of the petitioner and without proper enquiry such action of discharge is illegal and unsustainable.
11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kamal Kishore (supra), wherein the Apex Court while considering the similar issue held that 'loss of confidence by the employer in the employee is a feature which certainly affects the character or reputation of the employee and, therefore, the plea of loss of confidence in the employee indeed casts a stigma. Whether termination is grounded upon stigma would not vary from case to case depending upon whether it involves a Government servant or a workman. But the procedural safeguards are different when termination is sought to be founded upon stigma. If disciplinary inquiry has not preceded the prejudicial order in the case of a Government servant, the action would be bad while in the case of a workman the order could be justified even in the course of adjudication before the appropriate Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, even though no inquiry had been undertaken earlier'.
In the case of L. Michael v. Johnson Pumps Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court, while considering the similar issue, observed that the Tribunal has the power and indeed, the duty of X-ray the order and discover its true nature, if the object and effect, if the attendant circumstances and the ulterior purpose be to dismiss the employee because he is an evil to be eliminated. But if the Management to cover up the inability to establish by an enquiry, illegitimately but ingeniously passes an innocent-looking order of termination simipliciter, such action is bad and is liable to be set aside. Loss of confidence is no new armour for the Management; otherwise security of tenure, ensured by the new industrial jurisprudence and authenticated by a catena of cases of the Supreme Court, can be subverted by this neo-formula. It was further held that the impugned action was not bona fide. Some testimony of unseemly attempts by the workman to get at secrets outside his orbit, some indication of the source of suspicion, some proof of the sensitive or strategic role of the employee, should and would have been forthcoming had the case been bona fide. There is only the ipse dixit of the employer that he was suspecting since 1968, that the appellant was divulging secrets relating to his business. The employer has not disclosed the grounds on which this suspicion arose in 1968. Further, after, 1968, the appellant was given two extra increments, in addition to his normal increments, in appreciation of his hard work. This circumstance completely demolishes even the whimsical and tenuous stand taken by the employer.
In the case of T. Vijaya Kumar v. The Government of A.P. and Ors. (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that the termination of services of the petitioner for loss of confidence was not justified in the circumstances of the case. If a finding is based on no evidence or is the result of a misreading of the material evidence or is so unreasonable or grossly unjust that no reasonable person would judicially arrive at that conclusion, it is the duty of the Court to interfere and set the matter right. Loss of confidence was given only the reason to get over the difficulty of not being able to prove the guilt of the petitioner in the departmental enquiry.
12. On the other hand, the contention of the Management is that there is sufficient material on record and the Tribunal, on appreciation of the said material, has come to the conclusion that the discharge of the petitioner was on account of loss or confidence, and in such cases, it is not open to this Court to interfere with such finding, while exercising jurisdiction of judicial review.
The learned Counsel relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Parry and Company Limited (supra), wherein the Apex Court while considering the powers of the High Court under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari with reference to an order passed by the Labour Commissioner under the provisions of the Shops and Establishment Act, made the following observations:
"The Commissioner was certainly bound to decide the questions and he did decide them. At the worst, he may have come to an erroneous conclusion, but the conclusion is in respect of a matter, which lies entirely within the jurisdiction of the Labour Commissioner to decide and it does not relate to anything collateral, an erroneous decision upon which might affect his jurisdiction. The records of the case do not disclose any error apparent on the face of the proceeding or any irregularity in the procedure adopted by the Labour Commissioner, which goes contrary to the principles of natural justice. Thus there was absolutely no ground here which would justify a superior Court in issuing a writ of 'certiorari' for removal of an order or proceeding of an inferior Tribunal vested with powers to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. What the High Court has done really is to exercise the powers of an Appellate Court and correct what it considered to be an error in the decision of the Labour Commissioner. This obviously it cannot do. The position might have been different if the Labour Commissioner had omitted to decide a matter which he was bound to decide and in such cases a mandamus might legitimately issue commanding the authority to determine questions which it left undecided."
Similarly, in the case of Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General (supra), the Apex Court was considering the contentions for the issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and held:
"It is plain that such a writ cannot be granted to quash the decision of an inferior Court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the decision is wrong. Indeed, it must be shown before such a writ is issued that the authority, which passed the order acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice. Want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter, so that the inferior Court might not have authority to enter on the inquiry or upon some part of it. It may also arise from the absence of some essential preliminary or upon the existence of some particular facts collateral to the actual matter, which the Court has to try and which are conditions precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by it. But once it is held that the Court has jurisdiction but while exercising it, it made a mistake, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right inasmuch as a Court has jurisdiction to decide rightly as well as wrongly."
In the case of Zora Singh v. J.M. Tandon (supra), the Apex Court was considering the scope of interference in a petition under Article 226 and held:
"The principle, that the decision of a Tribunal would be vitiated if some of the reasons relied on by it for its conclusions turn out to be extraneous or otherwise unsustainable, applies to cases in which the conclusion is arrived at on subjective satisfaction. For, in such cases it would be difficult for superior Court to find out which of the reasons brought about such satisfaction. But in a case where the conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, if it is found that there was legal evidence before the Tribunal, even if some of it was irrelevant, a superior Court would not interfere if the finding can be sustained on the rest of the evidence. The reason is that in writ petition for certiorari the superior Court does not sit in appeal, but exercises only supervisory jurisdiction and therefore, does not enter into question of sufficiency of evidence."
The learned Counsel also relied upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in Mangatu J. Verghese v. D.D. & B. Mills (supra), where a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court had an occasion to consider the issue of discharge of an employee on the ground of loss of confidence. The Court, while negativing the contention of the employee, recorded its finding as under:
"There has been sufficient material on record for the respondent-employer to lose confidence. The employee from the accounts department having disclosed on affidavit the confidential details from the accounts books to the opponents of his employer is more than enough for the employer to loose his confidence in him. It is not the question of information being truthful or otherwise, it is the conduct of the employee who goes out of his way to betray the confidence placed by his employer in him. It is obvious from the oral evidence before the Industrial Court that he knew what was the background in which that information was sought for. In the aforesaid circumstances, I am not able to agree with the submissions of Shri Dharap that there was no material or evidence on the basis of which there was loss of confidence in the employee. There was more than tangible evidence in the hands of the respondent-employer in the form of affidavit filed by the employee in the pending litigation in favour of the opponents of his employer. This one affidavit is enough for any reasonable and prudent man to loose confidence in such an employee. According to me, nothing more is required or necessary. The respondent-employer has lawfully, rightly and justifiably passed the order of discharge simipliciter on the basis of loss of confidence. Though there was no enquiry which preceded the discharge order, the respondent-employer has justified its action by adducing proper evidence before the Labour Court. Even assuming that the order of loss of confidence carries a stigma that it amounts to a misconduct for which a domestic enquiry was essential, the said deficiency of want of enquiry can be removed by adducing evidence before the Court to justify its action and such an order of the Labour Court passed on the evidence adduced before it would relate back to the order of discharge."
In the case of Francis Klein and Company v. Workmen (supra), the Apex Court held that where the services of an employee, who is discharging an office of trust, are terminated on ground of loss of confidence, the Industrial Tribunals should not either direct his reinstatement or direct that he should be employed in another job.
In the case of Binny Ltd. v. Workmen (supra) the workman went on special leave on a false representation. Therefore, the Management cancelled the leave sanctioned and ordered him to return to duty at once. But the workman did not report to duty, until the expiry of the leave of eight days, and thereafter he entered the factory hospital as a patient for being treated for fasting, as he participated during the alleged leave period in a hunger strike. Therefore, the Management terminated his services on the ground of loss of confidence. When the said order was assailed before the Labour Court, the Labour Court ordered reinstatement with consolidated back wages of Rs. 5,000/-. When the said matter came up before the Apex Court, the Apex Court held that the award for reinstatement and back wages cannot be sustained when the employer has lost confidence in such workman.
In the case of O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court had an occasion to consider a similar issue and observed as under:
"We do not propose to pronounce on the validity or otherwise of the allegations and counter allegations made by the parties in their respective affidavits. Suffice it to say that the relations between the parties appear to have been strained beyond the point of no return. The Trade Union of the employees has lodged a strong protest and even held out a threat of strike, in the context of some acts of the appellant. Such unrest among the workmen is likely to have a prejudicial effect on the working of the undertaking which would prima facie be detrimental to the larger national interest, not to speak of detriment to the interest of concerned undertaking. We are not impressed by the submission that the Union is virtually a 'company's Union. In any case such disputed questions of facts cannot be resolved in this forum. We are prima facie satisfied that the apprehension is not ill-founded. What is more, reinstatement is perhaps not even in the interest of the appellant as he cannot give his best in the less-than-cordial-atmosphere and it will also result in misery to him, let alone the other side. Neither the undertaking nor the appellant can improve their image or performance, or achieve success. In fact, it appears to us that both sides will be unhappy and miserable. These are valid reasons for concluding that compensation in lieu of reinstatement, and not reinstatement, is warranted in the circumstances of the present case."
13. If we examine the facts of the present case in the light of the above, though the material on record may show that there is some suspicion that the employer might have resorted to this action of discharge of the petitioner on account of loss of confidence, but in the light of the material brought on record and also in the light of the finding recorded by the Tribunal that there are strained relations between the employer and the employee, I do not find that there is any possibility of ordering reinstatement of the employee. The petitioner was working as a watchman, being a post of trust, as the petitioner is responsible for the security and safety of the employer and its properties in the hospital and it would be difficult to engage a person in whom the Management has lost confidence or at least where there are strained relations.
14. Under the above circumstances, no exception can be taken to the decision of the Labour Court in not ordering reinstatement. But, however, with reference to the compensation that was awarded, the sum of Rs. 5,000/-, awarded by the Labour Court, is too low to be reckoned taking the left over service of the petitioner and the loss that had caused to him.
15. Admittedly, the petitioner was discharged from service in the year 1986, At the time of hearing, it was represented by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the petitioner is still left with three more years of service. If the total period of service left over is computed, by the date of order of discharge, the petitioner was denied about twenty years service. The learned Counsel also stated that on the date of discharge of the petitioner from services, he was being paid a sum of Rs. 375/- per month, while the present emoluments of a watchman is about Rs. 2,875/- per month. In fact, it is stated by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that he made a claim of Rs. 7,00,000/- or more based on a Memo said to have been filed by him, which, according to the learned Counsel for the respondent was very much on the higher side and the Management is not in a position to pay that much amount. In any case, after taking into account, the left over service of the petitioner and the salary that was being paid to the petitioner at the time of discharge and also the salary or the wages that are being paid to a watchman as on date, it would be proper to award a compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two lakhs only) to be paid to the petitioner by the 2nd respondent-Management, within a period of three months from the date of this order.
16. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.