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Gujarat High Court

P.K. Bansal, Commissioner Of Police And ... vs R.G. Jadeja on 24 February, 1993

Equivalent citations: (1993)2GLR984

JUDGMENT
 

 S. Nainar Sundaram, C.J.
 

1. Civil Application for fixing an early; date for the hearing of the Letters Patent Appeals and for vacating the interim order are listed today. When we took up the Civil Application, we found that it would be worthwhile and would serve the cause of the parties. It the Letters Patent Appeals themselves are heard and disposed of today. We heard Mr. Thakkar, Learned Counsel for the appellants and Mr. A.H. Mehta, Learned Counsel for the respondents, on merits of the Letters Patent Appeals.

2. The Letters Patent Appeals are directed against the common interim order of the learned single Judge, staying the impugned orders of suspension passed against the respondents. In the Special Civil Applications preferred by them the respondents have impugned the order of suspension dated 23-12-1992. Until the learned single; Judge made the common order granting the interim relief of staying the impugned orders of suspension on 3-2-1993, the respondents did suffer the orders of suspension. The learned single Judge himself directed that his order shall not be implemented for a period of 15 days from the date of his order. On 18-2-1993, on the Letters Patent Appeals being entertained, a Bench of This Court stayed the common order of the learned single Judge. Thus, even as on date, the respondents are under suspension.

3. The impugned orders of suspension recite that there were large scale riots, resulting in loss of life and property in particular areas and the respondents who are Police personnel failed in preventing such incidents and since it was decided to initiate a detailed enquiry and till the enquiry stands concluded, the respondents that be placed under suspension. Thus, prima facie satisfaction has been arrived at and grounds have been expressed for placing the respondents under suspension. However, the learned single Judge, of course, for the purpose of according interim reliefs, proceeded to say that even assuming that negligence is attributable to the respondents in respect of the incidents, it would be their ultimate fate, if at all the respondents are found guilty of the charge of negligence that may be levelled in the enquiry that may be initiated and the same could not be a ground for suspending the respondents. The learned single Judge went further and opined that there may be negligence in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation, but it may not constitute misconduct. Practically, the learned single Judge has proceeded to substitute his own views on the question of the alleged negligence which may amount to misconduct.

4. While examining an order of suspension, the Courts are not concerned with the sufficiency of satisfaction. These matters are left to the subjective satisfaction of the authority. Such matters are not automatically and as a matter of course justiciable. Sufficiency of grounds cannot be enquired into; but as to whether opinion was formed at all can be examined. This Court cannot substitute its own satisfaction. There could be interference, if extraneous or irrelevant materials are taken note of; or there has been a total non-application of mind, or the action is patently perverse, unfair and unjust or is tainted with mala fides. This Court is not supposed to examine the formation of the subjective opinion as if an appellate Court. This Court is not concerned with the sufficiency of the satisfaction. We are not prima facie satisfied that at this juncture we could straightway characterise the impugned orders of suspension as suffering from any patent infirmity which should oblige This Court to stay them. We are obliged to make all the above say only for the purpose of finding out as to whether the learned single Judge was in order in staying the impugned orders of suspension. Certainly, what all we have said shall not weigh at the time when the Special Civil Applications get disposed of and that shall be on merits. We are convinced that at the interim stage there is no justification for staying the impugned orders of suspension, Accordingly, we allow these Letters Patent Appeals, set aside the common order of the learned single Judge, subject matter of these Letters Patent Appeal and the interim reliefs asked for by the respondents pending the Special Civil Applications perferred by them, shall stand negatived.

5. It would be proper if the Special Civil Applications are given an expeditious disposal. Mr. A.H. Mehta, Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submits that we ourselves could hear and dispose of the Special Civil Applications at the earliest. To this course, Mr. Yogesh M. Thakkar, appearing for the appellants, has no objection. We also feel that we can adopt the suggestion and dispose of the Special Civil Applications by ourselves. Accordingly, we direct that Special Civil Applications Nos. 9613, 9614, 9615 and 9616 of 1992 shall be listed for final hearing on 12th March, 1993 at 2-45 p.m. No order in Civil Applications Nos. 405, 406, 407 and 408 of 1993.