Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Krishna Devi vs State Of Rajasthan on 2 August, 2021
Author: Dinesh Mehta
Bench: Dinesh Mehta
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 312/2021
Krishna Devi W/o Shri Surendra Singh, Aged About 52 Years,
Resident Of Vill- Kandhran, Teh- Rajgarh, Distt- Churu, At
Present Working As ANM, CHC - Rajgarh, Teh- Rajgarh, District -
Churu.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary, Department
Of Medical And Health, Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. Director, Medical And Health Services, Tilak Marg, Jaipur.
3. Chief Medical And Health Officer, District Churu.
4. Block Chief Medical And Health Officer, Rajgarh, District
Churu.
5. Principal Secretary, Department Of Rural Development
And Panchayati Raj, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. YP Khileree, Mr. Vikas Bijarniya,
Mr. Rohit Kaswan, Mr. KR Saharan,
Mr. Manish Patel, Mr. Manoj Bohra,
Mr. MP Pareek, Mr. Anil Vyas,
Mr. VS Bhati, Mr. Rishabh Tayal,
Mr. Manjeet Singh, Mr. Shailesh
Agarwal, Mr. DS Motsara,
Mr. Inderjeet Yadav, Mr. Deepak
Nehra, Mr. SK Verma, Mr. ML Deora,
Mr. PD Vaishnava
For Respondent(s) : Mr. KS Rajpurohit, Addl. Advocate
General with Mr. Rajat Arora
JUSTICE DINESH MEHTA
Judgment
Reserved on : 27.07.2021
Pronounced on : 02.08.2021
Reportable
1. Pursuant to 73rd Amendment in the Constitution of India,
twenty nine subjects mentioned in the Eleventh Schedule were
brought under Panchayati Raj Institutions to empower the
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Panchayat Raj in the State. The Rural Development and
Panchayati Raj Department passed an order dated 02.10.2010
whereby activities including the funds and staff of some
departments were transferred from their respective/parent
departments to Panchayati Raj Department. In the spirit of 73 rd
Amendment in the Constitution, the State of Rajasthan
promulgated the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj (Transferred Activities)
Rules, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules of 2011"), which
specifically lays down the rules and regulations for transfer of the
employees of the State Government.
2. Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 provides that a transfer of an
employee shall be made under the transfer policy and directions
issued from time to time. Rule 12 further provides that in case
the guidelines and directions are not followed, Panchayati Raj
Department can initiate action against the Panchayati Raj
Institutions/ Office bearers.
3. By way of the order dated 02.10.2010, issued by the
Principal Secretary Medical & Health Department, all Sub-Centres,
Primary Health Centres (PHC) and Community Health Centres
(CHC) situated in various rural areas, including their staff were
transferred to the Panachati Raj Institutions.
4. Pursuant to above decision of the State, services of the
employees (including the petitioners) were ordered to be governed
by the Rules of 2011. Consequently, though their parent
department continues to be Medical & Health Department, but
their other incidence of service, including transfer are governed by
the Rules of 2011.
5. The petitioners (enumerated in the Schedule appended with
the present order, which be treated an integral part of this order)
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have challenged transfer orders issued by the Director (Non-
gazetted), Medical & Health Services, Rajasthan Jaipur, being
contrary to Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that impugned
transfers made by the Medical & Health Department are in breach
of Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 and issue involved is squarely
covered by the judgment dated 15.01.2020 rendered by this Court
in case of Kiran Kumari Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (SB
Civil Writ Petition No.14964/2019).
7. Mr. K.S. Rajpurohit, learned Addl. Advocate General assisted
by Mr. Rajat Arora could not controvert the legal position that the
issue involved in the present writ petition has been decided by this
Court in the case of Kiran Kumari (supra). He, however
submitted that a very important and substantial argument relating
to directory nature of the Rules of 2011 was not advanced, when
the case of Kiran Kumari (supra) was heard and decided by this
Court. He urged that as the issue of rule being directory goes to
the root of the matter, the same be considered and decided in
favour of the State and petitions be dismissed.
8. Navigating the Court through Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011, he
contended that though expression "shall" has been used in the
opening words of the Rule but the same is directory in nature.
Hence, it is not necessary for the State Government/Medical &
Health Department to seek/take consent of the Panchayati Raj
Department, before effecting transfers from one District to
another and even intra or inter-Panchayat Samiti transfers.
9. In support of his contention that inspite of use of word
"shall", Rule 8 is directory, learned Addl. Advocate General relied
upon following judgments :-
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(i) (2008) 12 SCC 372 (Bachahan Devi & Anr. Vs. Nagar
Nigam, Gorakhpur & Anr.) Para - 17
(ii) (2009) 6 SCC 735 (Ram Deen Mayurya (Dr.) Vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh & Ors.) Para - 43, 49, 52
(iii) AIR 1964 Raj. 223 (Sardar Mal Vs. Smt. Gayatri Devi)
Para-23.
10. It was also argued that in light of Rule 3 of the Rules of
2011, since the service conditions as also the cadre control of
transferred employees remains with the parent department - the
Medical & Health Department of the State is competent to pass
orders of transfers in relation to a transferred employee within one
Panchayat Samiti; from one Panchayat Samiti to another
Panchayat Samiti and from one District to another District.
11. Taking support of Rule 13 of the Rules of 2011, an argument
was advanced that the decision of the Panchayati Raj Department
is final, and if any doubt arises relating to application,
interpretation and scope of these Rules, the decision/order of the
Panchayati Raj Department would prevail. He submitted that the
order dated 16.06.2018 issued by the State Government permits
the Medical & Health Department to transfer one employee from
one District to another without consent of the Panchayati Raj
Department, and the same is having supremacy and even without
consent, the Medical & Health Department of the State can
transfer an employee.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted in unison that
this issue has come up before this Court on a number of occasions
and every time State's action has been held illegal, and in-spite of
the settled legal position, the Medical & Health Department of the
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State is illegally transferring the employees, whose services have
been entrusted to Panchayati Raj Department. They argued that
the Medical & Health Department does not have power to transfer
the employees, who are working under the aegis of Panchayati Raj
Department, as has been held by this Court in the following
judgments :
(i) (Samleta Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) :
"3. Concededly no such consent was taken. I note
that vide order dated 20.09.2017 it was directed that
joining of duties by the petitioner pursuant to impugned
transfer order dated 15.09.2017 at the place where she
has been transferred shall be subject to the decision of the
writ petition.
4. The respondents have not been able to show to
the Court as to why consent of the Panchayati Raj
Department is not warranted."
(ii) (State of Raj. & Ors. Vs. Samleta) :
"Sub-rule (ii) of Rule 8 of the Rajasthan Panchayati
Raj (Transfer Activities) Rules, 2011 clearly postulates that
when a person is transferred from one District to another,
there is a prerequisite condition of obtaining prior consent
of Panchayati Raj Department. In the present case, the
respondent is an employee of the Panchayati Raj
Institution and she has been transferred from one district
to another. Admittedly, no consent as per Rule 8 of the
Rules of 2011 was obtained from the Panchayati Raj
Department and therefore, her transfer is bad and in
violation of the provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011.
Even in the cases of transfer of surplus employees,
consent has to be obtained from the Panchayati Raj
Department.
In view of the above observations, we are not
inclined to interfere in the order passed by the learned
Single Judge.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed."
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(iii) (Smt. Bimla Devi Vs. State of Raj. & Ors.) :
"Sh. S.K. Gupta Additional Advocate General
appearing for the respondents submits that in each &
every matter consent as required under Rule 8 of the
Rules, 2011 is not necessary and submits that a circular
dated 16.06.2018 was issued in this regard by the
Panchayati Raj Department.
After hearing counsel for the parties, the contention
advanced by the counsel for the petitioners holds
substance for the reasons; firstly according to Rule 8 of
the Rules, 2011 the consent is necessary to be obtained as
required from the Panchayati Raj. Department; secondly a
bare perusal of the order/circular dated 16.6.2018 clearly
shows that it holds that for transfer of an employee the
consent of the Panchayati Raj Department is not necessary
which is violative of Rule 8 of the Rules, 2011.
In that view of the matter, the writ petitions filed by
the petitioners deserve acceptance and the transfer orders
impugned herein deserve to be set aside.
Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed and the
respective transfer orders impugned in the present
petitions are set aside. However, the respondent-State is
at liberty to pass order of transfer afresh, if exigency of
service so require, only after strict compliance of Rule 8 of
the Rules, 2011. Copy of the order be separately placed in
each file."
(iv) (Harish Chandra Katara Vs. State of Raj. &
Ors.) :
"Learned counsel appearing for the respondent
department placed reliance on the order dated 16.06.2018
(Annex.9 in SBCWP No.7212/2019), purportedly directing
under Rule 8 and ordering that the required consent of the
Panchayati Raj Department would not be required and
therefore, the plea raised by the petitioners in this regard
has no substance.
Learned counsel for the petitioners in SBCWP
No.7212/2019 submits that the circular dated 16.06.2018
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relied on by the respondents being contrary to the express
provisions of Rule 8, the transfer orders without requisite
consent under Rule 8 has been set aside in Smt. Bimla
Devi v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. ; SB Civil Writ Petition
No.16963/2018, decided on 12.11.2018 at Jaipur Bench.
.........
.........
In view of the express provision of Rule 8 as well as the judgment in the case of Bimla Devi (supra), wherein the circular sought to be relied on by the respondents has been taken into consideration, the action of the respondents in effecting transfers of the petitioners in SBCWP Nos.4214/2019 and 7212/2019 cannot be sustained. The order dated 08.03.2019 (Annex.2 in SBCWP No.4214/2019) and order dated 08.03.2019 (Annex.8 in SBCWP No.7212/2019), qua the petitioners are quashed and set aside."
13. While conceding that Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 has not been held to be mandatory in express terms by the Single Benches, learned counsel argued that the Division Bench in case of State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Samleta (DB Special Appeal (W) No.736/2018), decided on 11.10.2018 has held Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 to be mandatory.
14. Reading the relevant part of the Division Bench judgment in case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Samleta (highlighted portion of para 12(ii) above), it was argued that the Division Bench has clearly held that consent has to be obtained from Panchayati Raj Department by the Medical Health Department, while transferring an employee from one District to another. According to the learned counsel for petitioners, such adjudication is unequivocally mandatory.
15. Heard.
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16. The enunciation made by this Court in case of Kiran Kumari (supra), Samleta (supra) and Bimla Devi (supra) clearly suggests that this Court has found/held the transfers made by Medical & Health Department to be violative of Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011. But as the argument that Rule 8 is directory was not advanced by the State, there was no occasion for this Court to record a finding to this effect. But merely because such finding is absent, it cannot be said that this issue is still alive or undecided.
17. The Division Bench in its judgment in the case of Samleta (supra) has held that Rule 8 is mandatory. The argument advanced by Mr. Rajpurohit that Rule 8 is directory in nature is only a new facet of the consistent stand of the State, which has never found favour from this Court. The fact that the transfers made by the Medical & Health Department sans consent of the Panchayati Raj Department has been held contrary to Rule 8 of the Rules, implies that various Benches of this Court have found the Rule 8 to be mandatory.
18. In the opinion of this Court, the decision to transfer various departments in the Panchayati Raj Department, including Primary Health Services etc. and to assign services of the petitioners and other similarly situated employees was taken in a bid to augment Panchayati Raj Institutions and to ensure their autonomy and empowerment in spirit of 73rd Amendment to the Constitution and Article 243 of the Constitution that mandates endowment of powers and strengthening of the Panchayati Raj Institutions at the root level.
19. A perusal of Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 reveals that a transferred employee can be transferred from one Gram Panchayat to another Gram Panchayat by the Administration and (Downloaded on 02/08/2021 at 08:59:17 PM) (9 of 18) [CW-312/2021] Establishment Committee of a Panchayat Samiti; from one Panchayat Samiti to another Panchayat Samiti within the District by District Establishment Committee of the Zila Parishad concerned; while inter-district transfers can be made by the parent department, however, with the consent of the Panchayati Raj Department.
20. A combined reading of the contingencies enumerated in Rule 8 reveals that in first two situations viz. transfers within the districts, the transfers can be made by the authorities under the Panchayati Raj Department. A simple look at Rule 8 makes it crystal clear that as per the scheme of the Rules, the Panchayati Raj Department is having upper hand if not supremacy. Panchayati Raj Department is the competent department to effect or facilitate transfers within District; whereas its consent is quintessential if the Medical & Health Department proposes to effect inter-district transfer.
21. Argument of Mr. Rajpurohit that expression "shall" used in Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 should be read or taken as "may", even if accepted for the sake of argument, would hardly serve his cause. Because requirement of consent of Panchayati Raj Department is provided in Clause (iii) of Rule 8 without giving any leeway. If the expression "shall" is substituted by the expression "may", Rule 8 would appear like this :-
"Transfer of such transferred employees may be made under the transfer policy and directions issued by the State Government from time to time, by:-".
22. The change as attempted to by learned Addl. Advocate General would have hardly made any difference. Because then, the discretion would be to transfer the employees or not to (Downloaded on 02/08/2021 at 08:59:17 PM) (10 of 18) [CW-312/2021] transfer. But once a decision to transfer an employee is taken, then, the conditions contained in Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Rule 8 are required to be complied with, in the manner and by the authority prescribed. This being the position, even if the expression "shall" of Rule 8 is read as "may", it would hardly dilute the requirement of consent of Panchayati Raj Department.
23. True it is, that no consequence has been provided in case of non-observance of mandate of Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 but if the argument of the State is accepted, then, the public authorities will conveniently flout the mandate of laws framed by the legislature. The Courts cannot afford to countenance such endeavours, as the consequence would be disasterous and would pose threat to the very rule of law.
24. The judgments cited by learned AAG lay down general principles in relation to expression "shall / may" - when despite use of the expression "shall" a provision is to be treated as directory. So far as judgment in case of Bachahan Devi (supra) is concerned, the case in question involved interpretation of Order 41 Rule 25 of the CPC in which both the expression "may" and "shall" have been used. Interpreting the provisions, the Supreme Court carefully examined the use of expression "shall" and "may" in the said provision. However, a perusal of para No.11 of the judgment reveals that the expression "shall" given in the latter part of the provision has been held mandatory inasmuch as the Supreme Court observed : "once the appellate Court directs the lower court to do so, it is incumbent upon the trial Court to take additional evidence required." (Downloaded on 02/08/2021 at 08:59:17 PM)
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25. Paras - 43, 49 and 52 of the judgment in case of Ram Deen Maurya (supra) cited by learned Addl. Advocate General also deals with the general principles. Para 44 of the judgment notices provisions of Rule 4(6) of the Rules concerned, which has four parts. The question before the Supreme Court was whether applications for transfer, which were not submitted through the management along with the consent of both the management, which has been processed by the competent authority was valid or not. In such circumstances, inspite of use of expression "shall" in clause (ii), the Supreme Court held the expression "shall" to be directory. Reasons for doing so have been given in para 52 of the judgment, which reads thus :-
"52. While considering the non-compliance with the procedural requirement, it has to be kept in view that such a requirement is designed to facilitate justice and furthers its ends and, therefore, if the consequence of non-compliance is not provided, the requirement may be held to be directory."
26. Above quoted part of the judgment clearly shows that the Supreme Court has held the provision to be directory, as the same was designed to facilitate justice or it contained procedure of dealing with applications for transfers. And since consequence of non-compliance was not provided in the rule, such requirement was held to be directory. It is in that context the Supreme Court has ruled that if consequence of a requirement is not provided, then, the provision should be held directory.
27. Similar is the situation in the case of Sardar Mal (supra). In the aforesaid case, the Full Bench of this Court was dealing with the provisions of Section 81(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1950 and while dealing with the same, the Full Bench has (Downloaded on 02/08/2021 at 08:59:17 PM) (12 of 18) [CW-312/2021] held that provision of requirement of furnishing attested copy is mandatory.
28. The judgments cited by learned Addl. Advocate General relate to such provisions or conditions where the burden of observance of law is cast on citizenry. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that regardless of the use of expression "shall", the provision under consideration was required to be treated as directory. But in the instant case, the duty has been cast upon the public authority to do a particular act in a particular manner. When a duty is cast upon a public authority, it is not necessary for the statute to provide consequence. In the opinion of this Court, merely because the consequence of the breach has not been provided in the Rules, Rule 8 cannot be treated to be directory. All public authorities are bound to follow the mandate of law may be substantive or procedural and they are required to act in tandem with the laws as framed by the law makers.
29. The Supreme Court has time and again held that if a statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, the same has to be done in the manner prescribed. Reference of the following judgments of the Supreme Court would be apt at this juncture : -
(i) Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 3558, relevant para of the judgment is as under:
"12. ... ... ... It is a well-settled salutary principle that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. See with advantage : Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, Ind App 372 : AIR (Downloaded on 02/08/2021 at 08:59:17 PM) (13 of 18) [CW-312/2021] 1936 PC 253(2); Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Anr. v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, 1954 SCR 1098 : AIR 1954 SC 322; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358 : (1964) SCWR 57 ... ... ..."
(ii) Dipak Babaria Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. : AIR 2014 SC 1792, relevant para is as under:
"53. It is well settled that where the statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. This proposition of law laid down in Taylor v. Taylor (1875) 1 ChD426, 431 was first adopted by the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor reported in AIR 1936 PC 253 and then followed by a bench of three Judges of this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1954 SC 322. This proposition was further explained in paragraph 8 of State of U.P. v. Singara Singh by a bench of three Judges reported in AIR 1964 SC 358 in the following words:
"8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor is well recognised and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted ... ... ..."
This proposition has been later on reiterated in Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad reported in 1999 (8) SCC 266 : (AIR 1999 SC 3558), Dhananjaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka reported in 2001 (4) SCC 9 : (AIR 2001 SC 1512) and Gujarat (Downloaded on 02/08/2021 at 08:59:17 PM) (14 of 18) [CW-312/2021] Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Essar Power Limited reported in 2008 (4) SCC 755 : (AIR 2008 SC 1921)."
30. In the opinion of this Court, above principle canvassed by Mr. Rajpurohit is applicable only in the cases when the provisions under consideration deal with performance of public duties under an enactment. Almost all the judgments in which the use of word "shall" has been held as directory are, those, in which the statute provided for time limit of doing a particular thing. In case the time limit was not met by the public authority and consequence has not been given in the enactment, the provision has been held directory. (Re: Nasiruddin Vs. Sita Ram Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC 577).
31. A gainful reference of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmed Ishaque (AIR 1955 (SC) 233) can be made. Para Nos.35 to 37 are reproduced hereinfra :
"35. On the question whether Rule 47(1)(c) is mandatory, the argument of Mr. Pathak is that notwithstanding that the rule provides that the Returning Officer shall reject the ballot papers, its real meaning is that he has the power to reject them, and that on that construction, his discretion in the matter of accepting them is not liable to be questioned. He relies on certain well-recognised rules of construction such as that a statute should be construed as directory if it relates to the performance of public duties, or if the conditions prescribed therein have to be performed by persons other than those on whom the right is conferred. In particular, he relied on the following statement of law in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, pages 381 and 382 :
"To hold that an Act which required an officer to prepare and deliver to another officer a list of voters on or before a certain day, under a penalty, made a list not delivered till a later day invalid, would in effect, put it in the power of the person charged with the duty of preparing it to disfranchise (Downloaded on 02/08/2021 at 08:59:17 PM) (15 of 18) [CW-312/2021] the electors, a conclusion too unreasonable for acceptance".
36. He contended that to reject the votes of the electors for the failure of the polling officer to deliver the correct ballot papers under Rule 23 would be to disfranchise them, and that a construction which involved such a consequence should not be adopted.
37. It is well-established that an enactment in form mandatory might in substance be directory, and that the use of the word "shall" does not conclude the matter. The question was examined at length in Julius v. Bishop of Oxford [1880] 5 A.C. 214, and various rules were laid down for determining when a statute might be construed as mandatory and when as directory. They are well- known, and there is no need to repeat them. But they are all of them only aids for ascertaining the true intention of the legislature which is the determining factor, and that must ultimately depend on the context. What we have to see is whether in Rule 47 the word "shall" could be construed as meaning "may". Rule 47(1) deals with three other categories of ballot papers, and enacts that they shall be rejected. Rule 47(1)(a) relates to a ballot paper which "bears any mark or writing by which the elector can be identified". The secrecy of voting being of the essence of an election by ballot, this provision must be held to be mandatory, and the breach of it must entail rejection of the votes. That was held in Woodward v. Sarsons [1875] L.R. 10 C.P. 733 on a construction of section 2 of the Ballot Act, 1872. That section had also a provision corresponding to Rule 47(1)(b), and it was held in that case that a breach of that section would render the vote void. That must also be the position with reference to a vote which is hit by Rule 47(1)(b). Turning to Rule 47(1)
(d), it provides that a ballot paper shall be rejected if it is spurious, or if it is so damaged or mutilated that its identity as a genuine ballot paper cannot be established. The word "shall" cannot in this sub-rule be construed as meaning "may", because there can be no question of the Returning Officer being authorised to accept a spurious or unidentifiable vote. If the word "shall" is thus to be construed in a mandatory sense in Rule 47(1)(a), (b) and
(d), it would be proper to construe it in the same sense in Rule 47(1) (c) also. There is another reason which clinches the matter against the first respondent. The practical bearing of the distinction between a provision which is mandatory and one which is directory is that (Downloaded on 02/08/2021 at 08:59:17 PM) (16 of 18) [CW-312/2021] while the former must be strictly observed, in the case of the latter it is sufficient that it is substantially complied with. How is this rule to be worked when the Rule provides that a ballot paper shall be rejected ? There can be no degrees of compliance so far as rejection is concerned, and that is conclusive to show that the provision is mandatory."
32. As against this, in the present case, Rule 8 is not a provision dealing with the procedural requirement or formality of processing an application etc. As a matter of fact, it is a power given to the State officials to effect transfers - it cannot be equated with a provision, which is meant to facilitate justice and furthers its ends.
33. As as upshot of the discussion foregoing, this Court does not find any merit and substance in the additional argument so zealously advanced by Mr. K.S. Rajpurohit. He has not been able to persuade me to take a view other than what has been taken in Kiran Kumari's case (supra).
34. Following the judgment rendered in case of Kiran Kumari (supra), all these writ petitions are allowed; impugned transfer orders being passed in violation of Rule 8 of the Rules of 2011 are hereby quashed and set aside qua the petitioners.
35. All the interlocutory application(s) also stands disposed of.
(DINESH MEHTA),J 36-91, 35, 98, 221-223 & 280-ArunV/-
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SCHEDULE
S.No. Civil Writ Petition No. Petitioner(s) Respondents
1. SB Civil Writ Petition No.10645/2020 Jaswant Singh State of Rajasthan
2. SB Civil Writ Petition No.11723/2020 Dr. Anushansha Saharan State of Rajasthan
3. SB Civil Writ Petition No.197/2021 Ranjeet Karatiya State of Rajasthan
4. SB Civil Writ Petition No.206/2021 Manju Devi State of Rajasthan
5. SB Civil Writ Petition No.267/2021 Gurdeep Singh State of Rajasthan
6. SB Civil Writ Petition No.271/2021 Om Prakash Potliya State of Rajasthan
7. SB Civil Writ Petition No.294/2021 Manju Solanki State of Rajasthan
8. SB Civil Writ Petition No.298/2021 Amar Kaur State of Rajasthan
9. SB Civil Writ Petition No.335/2021 Saroj State of Rajasthan
10. SB Civil Writ Petition No.344/2021 Smt. Bali Choudhary State of Rajasthan
11. SB Civil Writ Petition No.357/2021 Geeta Devi State of Rajasthan
12. SB Civil Writ Petition No.371/2021 Krishna State of Rajasthan
13. SB Civil Writ Petition No.374/2021 Manju Lata State of Rajasthan
14. SB Civil Writ Petition No.376/2021 Vimla Devi State of Rajasthan
15. SB Civil Writ Petition No.377/2021 Prakash Kaur State of Rajasthan
16. SB Civil Writ Petition No.402/2021 Babita State of Rajasthan
17. SB Civil Writ Petition No.404/2021 Sunita State of Rajasthan
18. SB Civil Writ Petition No.423/2021 Sudesh Kumar Garg State of Rajasthan
19. SB Civil Writ Petition No.431/2021 Pawan Kumar State of Rajasthan
20. SB Civil Writ Petition No.471/2021 Bhunesh Kumar Kalla State of Rajasthan
21. SB Civil Writ Petition No.476/2021 Mool Shanker State of Rajasthan
22. SB Civil Writ Petition No.513/2021 Rajesh Bai State of Rajasthan
23. SB Civil Writ Petition No.524/2021 Afsana Banu State of Rajasthan
24. SB Civil Writ Petition No.576/2021 Reena Meena State of Rajasthan
25. SB Civil Writ Petition No.585/2021 Suman State of Rajasthan
26. SB Civil Writ Petition No.591/2021 Sunil Kumar State of Rajasthan
27. SB Civil Writ Petition No.592/2021 Radha Meena State of Rajasthan
28. SB Civil Writ Petition No.597/2021 Sushila Devi State of Rajasthan
29. SB Civil Writ Petition No.599/2021 Pushpa Chopra State of Rajasthan
30. SB Civil Writ Petition No.600/2021 Sudershana State of Rajasthan
31. SB Civil Writ Petition No.618/2021 Leela Meena State of Rajasthan
32. SB Civil Writ Petition No.627/2021 Bharpai Devi State of Rajasthan
33. SB Civil Writ Petition No.676/2021 Kusumlata State of Rajasthan
34. SB Civil Writ Petition No.684/2021 Vidya State of Rajasthan
35. SB Civil Writ Petition No.685/2021 Munesh Kumari State of Rajasthan
36. SB Civil Writ Petition No.691/2021 Thana Ram State of Rajasthan
37. SB Civil Writ Petition No.702/2021 Sulochana State of Rajasthan
38. SB Civil Writ Petition No.703/2021 Pradeep Kirodiwal State of Rajasthan
39. SB Civil Writ Petition No.714/2021 Kaushalya State of Rajasthan
40. SB Civil Writ Petition No.715/2021 Rose Janet State of Rajasthan
41. SB Civil Writ Petition No.716/2021 Sunita Kumari State of Rajasthan
42. SB Civil Writ Petition No.724/2021 Suman Kumari State of Rajasthan
43. SB Civil Writ Petition No.725/2021 Suman Verma State of Rajasthan
44. SB Civil Writ Petition No.739/2021 Ambika Kumari State of Rajasthan
45. SB Civil Writ Petition No.744/2021 Sangeeta Aseri State of Rajasthan
46. SB Civil Writ Petition No.884/2021 Manju State of Rajasthan
47. SB Civil Writ Petition No.915/2021 Hanumana Ram Dhaka State of Rajasthan
48. SB Civil Writ Petition No.919/2021 Jitender Mangoliya State of Rajasthan
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49. SB Civil Writ Petition No.1124/2021 Kiran Depan State of Rajasthan
50. SB Civil Writ Petition No.1167/2021 Anchal State of Rajasthan
51. SB Civil Writ Petition No.1572/2021 Smt. Asha State of Rajasthan
52. SB Civil Writ Petition No.1786/2021 Smt. Rama Devi State of Rajasthan
53. SB Civil Writ Petition No.1794/2021 Mamta State of Rajasthan
54. SB Civil Writ Petition No.2454/2021 Devi State of Rajasthan
55. SB Civil Writ Petition No.2771/2021 Madan Lal Dahwal State of Rajasthan
56. SB Civil Writ Petition No.308/2021 Rajbala State of Rajasthan
57. SB Civil Writ Petition No.5991/2021 Himmat Singh Garasiya State of Rajasthan
58. SB Civil Writ Petition No.832/2021 Pawan Kumar Arya State of Rajasthan
59. SB Civil Writ Petition No.1035/2021 Rekha State of Rajasthan
60. SB Civil Writ Petition No.1054/2021 Sobharam State of Rajasthan
61. SB Civil Writ Petition No.8090/2021 Ashok Kumar Legha State of Rajasthan (Downloaded on 02/08/2021 at 08:59:17 PM) Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)