Patna High Court - Orders
Shravan Sharma vs State Of Bihar on 22 November, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CRIMINAL APPEAL (DB) No.123 of 1996
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Shravan Sharma son of Late Sri Prasad Sharma, Resident of Village-Baijaili,
Police Station-Dandkhora, District-Katihar.
... ... Appellant
Versus
The State of Bihar.
... ... Respondent
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Appearance :
For the Appellant/s : Mr. Amish Kumar, Amicus Curiae
Mr. Prabhakar Thakur, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Dilip Kumar Sinha, APP
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BIBEK CHAUDHURI
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S. B. PD. SINGH
ORAL ORDER
(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BIBEK CHAUDHURI)
8 22-11-2025The instant criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed in Sessions Case No.110 of 1994 on 22.01.1996 by the learned Sessions Judge, Katihar, whereby and whereunder the appellant was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the I.P.C.
2. Be it stated at the outset that the deceased is the father of the appellant. The de facto complainant/informant is the elder brother of the appellant.
3. The background of the case is that the deceased father of the appellant partitioned and delivered his land amongst his two sons orally. The said two sons used to possess their specific portions of land on the basis of oral partition made by their father. The informant sold out 01 Bigha and odd lands Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.123 of 1996(8) dt.22-11-2025 2/11 to one Ibrahim at Rs.10,000/- per Bigha and received Rs.7,000/- out the the said sale price.
4. The appellant demanded equal share of the said purchased money from his father because the registered Kobala was executed in favour of the said Ibrahim by the father of the informant and the appellant due to the reason that the land was not partitioned either by a registered deed of partition or by a decree of the Court. The father of the appellant refused to request the informant to pay a share of the purchased money to the appellant because of the fact that the informant sold out a portion of land, which he was possessing as his own share. Subsequently, on 14.03.1994, the informant came to the house of his father with rice and fish for him and requested him to take the food. His father refused to take the food at that point of time. At this, the appellant started assaulting him with the help of a piece of bamboo (Mungra) and dragged him to his house. The deceased was also assaulted on the courtyard of the house of the appellant, as a result of such assault he died and the dead body was left on an open field on the western side of his house. It is also stated by the informant that the incident was witnessed by one Bulel Rishi, Dayanand Yadav, Yogi Sharma, Dokai Sharma, Naresh Sharma and others.
Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.123 of 1996(8) dt.22-11-2025 3/11
5. The learned Advocate on behalf of the appellant in course of his argument submits that the charge against the appellant was not properly framed, inasmuch as it is not stated as to whether the deceased was murdered with the help of a piece of bamboo or by way of throttling , resulting in asphyxia. In absence of such specification of the charge, the appellant was not intimated for what charge he was facing trial and for improper framing of charge, the entire trial is vitiated.
6. It is needless to say that the form of charge is delineated in the treaties of "Law of Crimes" by Ratanlal and Dhirajlal's at Page-1702, Vol.-2, 26th Edition, as hereunder:-
"86. Charge.-1 (name and office of Magistrate, etc.), hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:-
That you, on or about the ____day of ____, at ____ did commit murder by intentionally (or knowingly) causing the death of (specify the name of the deceased), and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of the Court of Session.
And I hereby direct that you be tried by the said Court on the said charge."
7. In the form of charge, it is necessary to mention the offence committed by an accused with the ingredients i.e. intentionally or knowingly causing the death of the deceased. Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.123 of 1996(8) dt.22-11-2025 4/11
8. Thus, on perusal of the form of charge, we do not find any illegality or irregularity, the appellant was fully within his knowledge that he was being tried for committing murder of his father by intentionally or knowingly causing his death.
9. The learned Advocate on behalf of the appellant has pointed out number of contradictions in the evidence on record. Firstly, he referes to the evidence of PW-1, who happens to be the wife of the informant. From her evidence, it was clear that on the date of occurrence the informant was not present in his house, he went to the house of his sister in another village situated about 5-6 kms. away from the place of occurrence. This evidence in the chief of PW-1 falsifies while in cross examination, she admits that when she was taking food, her husband returned to his house. PW-1 stated during her cross examination that on the date of occurrence, she saw the dead body of her father-in-law laying on the land for the first time.
10. The issue as regards the presence of the de facto complainant/informant at the place of occurrence when the alleged incident took place is required to be considered on the basis of the evidence on record of the informant as well as his wife.
11. It is needless to say that the wife of the informant Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.123 of 1996(8) dt.22-11-2025 5/11 is an illiterate from a rural background village lady. In the examination-in-chief, she stated that she saw the appellant assaulting her father-in-law with the help of a piece of bamboo. In her cross-examination, she stated that when her husband returned home she narrated the entire incident to him, even if it is assumed that the husband of PW-1 was not present at the time of occurrence. The prosecution case cannot be said to be vitiated because there is no hard and first rule that the informant necessarily be an eye witness. According to the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, any person having knowledge of cognizable offence may initiate the criminal administration of justice in motion by filing a fardbeyan or a written report, which the police authority is under obligation to receive and register a case.
12. The learned Advocate on behalf of the appellant submits that from the evidence of PW-1 it is ascertained that police reached to the place of occurrence on the date of occurrence itself and recorded the statement of PW-1. It is further urged by the learned Advocate for the appellant that the said statement is the first statement regarding the incident recorded by the police, when it disclosed a cognizable offence, the police ought to have initiated a specific case for the death of Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.123 of 1996(8) dt.22-11-2025 6/11 the father of the appellant on the basis of the statement of PW-1, but the said statement was suppressed by the police authorities and a subsequent statement recorded at about 07:00 A.M. made by the informant was accepted as the FIR in the case.
13. It is further submitted by the learned Advocate for the appellant that there is obvious reason to raise doubt in the so called statement of the informant because of the fact that the informant had some dispute over payment of share of sell proceeds of a portion of land to the appellant. Therefore, wrong implication of the accused/appellant ought not to have been ruled out. Under such circumstances, the appellant should not be entitled to get benefit of doubt.
14. It is pertinent to mention in this regard that the learned Advocate on behalf of the appellant did not raise any voice of criticism in the course of argument with regard to the veracity of the evidence of PW-2-Yogi Sharma, PW3-Dokai Sharma, PW-4-Mahendra Prasad Sharma, PW-5-Dayanand Yadav, PW-6-Nilu Kumar Yadav and PW-7-Naresh Sharma. All the above-mentioned witnesses are eye witnesses to the occurrence.
15. The learned Advocate on behalf of the appellant, on the other hand, pointed out some contradictions from the Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.123 of 1996(8) dt.22-11-2025 7/11 evidence of the Investigating Officer recorded in Paras-9, 10 and 11 in respect of some of the above-named witnesses. Let me state the said contradictions, the Investigating Officer stated that witness Naresh Sharma did not state to him that when he was going to bring his cow from the land situated outside the village, he saw the incident. He also did not say that when he was coming back from the land, the human cry over the said incident was going on.
16. In our considered view, these contradictions are minor contradiction, which do not touch the root of the case.
17. It is true that the Investigating Officer did not find any stain of blood in the wearing apparel of the deceased at the place where the deceased was assaulted by a piece of bamboo or on the seized piece of bamboo or on the earth of the house of the deceased or the house of the appellant.
18. It is found from the evidence on record as well as the case diary that the Investigating Officer did not try to collect the bloodstain and controlled earth from the place of occurrence. However, it is no longer resintegra that for faulty investigation, the prosecution case cannot be thrown away when the evidence of the eye witnesses is consistent.
19. With regard to contradictions, the learned Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.123 of 1996(8) dt.22-11-2025 8/11 Advocate for the appellant refers to a recent decision in the case of Gambhir Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 365.
20. It is needles to say that the said report of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relies upon the previous decision of Sharad Birdhichand Sharda Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116, which is an authority with regard to circumstantial evidence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court not only refers to the decision but relies on Para-153 of Sharad Birdhichand Sharda (Supra), para-153 runs thus:-
"153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may be" established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793] where the observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807 :
SCC (Cri) p. 1047] "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.123 of 1996(8) dt.22-11-2025 9/11 from sure conclusions."
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."
21. The instant case is not based on circumstantial evidence but on eye witness account. We are not in a position to discard the eye witness account in the appeal before us.
22. Last but not the least the autopsy surgeon was examined before the Trial Court as PW-9, he found the following external and internal injuries on the person of the deceased and submitted his opinion as hereunder:-
"External Injuries:-
(1) Abrasion 2" x 1/2" over mid chest (2) Abrasion 1" x 1/2" over left upper back (3) Abrasion 1" x 1/2" over right elbow (4) Multiple abrasion 1/4" x multiple simulating nail Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.123 of 1996(8) dt.22-11-2025 10/11 marks on left side of neck.
Internal Injuries:-
On dissection of chest, almost whole chest wall was broken on either side. Both lungs congested. Left lung firbosed and small in size. Heart-ventricle full of blood. Liver, spleen congested stomach contains semi-digested food materials. Bladder contains about 200 CC of urine. Tracheal ring broken in upper part of neck and tissue around congested.
Rigger mortis present in both upper and lower limbs. Time elapsed since death about 24 hours. In my opinion the cause of death is due to asphyxia and shock on account of the above mentioned injuries.
The post-mortem report which is in two pages is in my pen and signature. It is marked Ext.-2.
The said injuries were ante-mortem and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death."
23. In course of examination, the autopsy surgeon was suggested that the abrasions received by the deceased might have been caused by a fall on a hard and blunt substance, which he promptly denied.
24. Furthermore, the autopsy surgeon found tracheal ring broken in upper part of neck and tissue around congested. He opined that death of the deceased was caused due to the cumulative effect of the injuries he received as well as by asphyxia as a result of throttling and all the injuries were ante- mortem in nature and sufficient in ordinary course of cause Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.123 of 1996(8) dt.22-11-2025 11/11 death of a person. Therefore, we find no infirmity in the judgment delivered by the Trial Court.
25. With regard to sentence, we also do not think it appropriate to discuss at length because this is a barbaric act by a son of killing his own octogenarian father. The appellant was sentence to imprisonment for life i.e. the minimum sentence under Section 302 of the IPC.
26. Mr. Amish Kumar has assisted this Court on behalf of the appellant with all seriousness and devotion before us and we highly appreciate and regard his endeavor for the cause of justice in the instant appeal, on a day when there was no regular Court.
27. Considering such circumstances, we do not find any reason to interfere in the instant appeal, accordingly, the instant appeal is dismissed.
(Bibek Chaudhuri, J) ( S. B. Pd. Singh, J) mdrashid/-
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