Supreme Court - Daily Orders
Haryana State Industrial And ... vs Benlon India Limited on 25 September, 2025
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal Nos.9380-9381/2022
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE Appellant(s)
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD.
VERSUS
BENLON INDIA LIMITED & ORS. Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. These appeals arise from the Order passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi dated 8-9-2022 in Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No.1100/2022 by which the NCLAT declined to look into the appeal on the ground that the same was time barred.
The impugned order reads thus:
“This is an application filed by the Appellant praying for condonation of 132 days delay in filing the appeal. The appeal has been filed against the order dated 20.10.2020 passed by the Adjudicating Authority. The present appeal has been presented on 10.08.2022. The appeal has been filed much beyond the time limit. The power of this Tribunal to con-
done delay in filing the appeal is limited to 15 days only as per Section 61(2) of the IBC Code, 2016. We, thus, are unable to condone the delay in filing the Appeal as prayed in the application. Delay Condonation Application is dismissed. Con- sequently, Memo of Appeal is rejected.”
2. We heard Mr. Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General of Signature Not Verified India appearing for the appellant – Haryana State Industrial and Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date: 2025.09.26 19:16:19 IST Reason: Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited and Mr. Kapil Gupta, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
23. The issue involved is now squarely covered by the decision of this Court in “V. Nagarajan vs. SKS Ispat and Power Ltd. & Ors.” Reported in 2021 INSC 663, wherein this Court observed in Paras 19 and 20 respectively as under:-
“19. Section 12 of the Limitation Act provides guidance on reckoning the period of limitation and excludes the time taken by a party for obtaining a certified copy of the order it seeks to appeal. However, the explanation clarifies that the time taken by the court in preparing the order before an application for a copy is filed by the aggrieved party, is not excluded from the computation of limitation:
“12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.—(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded.
(3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed, or where an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment 3[* * *] shall also be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
Explanation.—In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded.” (emphasis supplied) The import of Section 12 of the Limitation Act and its explanation is to assign the responsibility of applying for a certified copy of the order on a party. A person wishing to file an appeal is expected to file an application for a certified copy before the expiry of the limitation period, upon which the “time requisite” for obtaining a copy is to be excluded. However, the time taken by the court to prepare 3 the decree or order before an application for a copy is made cannot be excluded. If no application for a certified copy has been made, no exclusion can ensue. In fact, the explanation to the provision is a clear indicator of the legal position that the time which is taken by the court to prepare the decree or order cannot be excluded before the application to obtain a copy is made. It cannot be said that the right to receive a free copy under Section 420(3) of the Companies Act obviated the obligation on the appellant to seek a certified copy through an application. The appellant has urged that Rule 14 of the NCLAT Rules empowers the NCLAT to exempt parties from compliance with the requirement of any of the rules in the interests of substantial justice, which has been typically exercised in favour of allowing a downloaded copy in lieu of a certified copy. While it may well be true that waivers on filing an appeal with a certified copy are often granted for the purposes of judicial determination, they do not confer an automatic right on an applicant to dispense with compliance and render Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules nugatory. The act of filing an application for a certified copy is not just a technical requirement for computation of limitation but also an indication of the diligence of the aggrieved party in pursuing the litigation in a timely fashion. In a similar factual scenario, the NCLAT had dismissed an appeal 25 as time-barred under Section 61(2) of the IBC since the appellant therein was present in court, and yet chose to file for a certified copy after five months of the pronouncement of the order.
20. The appellant had argued that the order of the NCLAT notes that the NCLT registry had objected to the appeal in regard to limitation, to which the appellant had filed a reply stating that the limitation period would begin from the date of the uploading of the order, which was 12 March 2020. The appellant submitted that the suo motu order of this Court dated 23 March 2020, taking retrospective effect from 15 March 2020, made under Article 142 of the Constitution, extended the limitation until further orders, which renders the appeal filed on 8 June 2020 within limitation. However it is important to note that this Court had only extended the period of limitation applicable in the proceedings, only in cases where such period had not ended before 15 March 2020. In this case, owing to the specific language of Section 61(1) and 61(2), it is evident that limitation commenced once the order was pronounced and the time taken by the Court to provide the appellant with a certified copy would have been excluded, as clarified in Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, if the appellant had applied for a certified copy within the prescribed period of limitation under Section 61(2) of the IBC. The construction of the law does not import the absurdity the appellant alleges of an impossible act of filing an appeal against an order which was uploaded on 12 March 2020. However, the mandate of the law is to impose an obligation on the appellant to apply for a certified copy once the order was pronounced by the NCLT on 31 December 2019, by virtue of 4 Section 61(2) of the IBC read with Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules. In the event the appellant was correct in his assertion that a correct copy of the order was not available until 20 March 2020, the appellant would not have received a certified copy in spite of the application till such date and accordingly received the benefit of the suo motu order of this Court which came into effect on 15 March 2020. However, in the absence of an application for a certified copy, the appeal was barred by limitation much prior to the suo motu direction of this court, even after factoring in a permissible fifteen days of condonation under Section 61(2). The Court is not empowered to condone delays beyond statutory prescriptions in special statutes containing a provision for limitation.” (emphasis supplied)
4. In view of the aforesaid, the Tribunal could not be said to have committed any error while declining to entertain the appeal on the ground that the same was time barred and there was no provision in the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 to condone the delay.
5. The Appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.
6. At this stage, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that his client has deposited the entire amount with the appellant and according to him, since the appeals are now being dismissed, the appellant may be directed to refund the amount with interest.
7. The respondents may take up this issue with the appellant in accordance with law.
8. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
…………………………………………J (J.B. PARDIWALA) …………………………………………J (ALOK ARADHE) NEW DELHI;
25TH SEPTEMBER, 2025.
5ITEM NO.101 COURT NO.8 SECTION XVII
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal Nos.9380-9381/2022
HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE Appellant(s)
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD.
VERSUS
BENLON INDIA LIMITED & ORS. Respondent(s)
(IA No. 80217/2025 - APPROPRIATE ORDERS/DIRECTIONS) Date : 25-09-2025 These appeals were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE For Appellant(s) :
Mr. Tushar Mehta, SG Mr. Shekhar Raj Sharma, A.A.G. Mr. Akshay Amritanshu, AOR Ms. Nidhi Narwal, Adv.
Ms. Drishti Rawal, Adv.
Ms. Drishti Saraf, Adv.
Mr. Sarthak Srivastava, Adv.
Mr. Mayur Goyal, Adv.
For Respondent(s) :
Mr. Kapil Gupta, Adv.
Ms. Anindita Mitra, AOR UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R
1. The Appeals are dismissed, in terms of the signed order.
2. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(VISHAL ANAND) (POOJA SHARMA)
ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)
(Signed Order is placed on the file)