Devaram Jatav vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 20 January, 2020

[Cites 17, Cited by 6]

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Devaram Jatav vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 20 January, 2020

This petition has been filed under section 482 of the Cr.P.C., :: 2 :: M.Cr.C.No.32156/2019 (Devaram Jatav and others Vs. State of M.P. and another) seeking quashment of FIR registered as Crime No.287/2018 at Police Station- University, Gwalior for the offences punishable under Sections 294, 307, 323, 506, 34 of IPC on the basis of compromise.

2. Prosecution story, in nutshell, is that on 15.6.2018 the petitioners pull the water pipe line of Mohalla, at that time complainant came and tried to stop them then petitioners abused him and thereafter they started beating complainant with Lathi and Farsa, due to which he sustained injuries on the head and other parts of the body. On the aforesaid basis, FIR has been registered.

3. Pursuant to the said FIR, criminal law was set in motion and petitioners were arrested. Thereafter the petitioners and the complainant have jointly filed application under Section 320 (2) of the Cr.P.C which was registered as I.A. No.5893/2019 stating that the dispute between the parties has been resolved and they are not inclined to prosecute the matter any more.

4. This Court, vide order dated 3.9.2019, had directed the parties to appear before the Principal Registrar of this Court for recording their statements and for verification of factum of compromise. The Principal Registrar has submitted his report on 11.9.2019 itself and verified the compromise. The Principal Registrar noted that according to Section 320 of Cr.P.C. the offence under sections 323, 506, 34 of :: 3 :: M.Cr.C.No.32156/2019 (Devaram Jatav and others Vs. State of M.P. and another) IPC are compoundable, but section 294 and 307 of IPC are not compoundable.

5. Learned Counsel on their behalf submitted that intention to cause death cannot be inferred from the prosecution version. The medical report of the injured also does not disclose any injury dangerous to life. In the x-ray report no fracture was found on injured. Therefore, looking to the nature of injury, it cannot be said that the offence under section 307, IPC is prima facie made out. To buttress his contention, reliance has been placed on decision of the Apex Court in the case of Narinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2014)6 SCC 466), wherein it has been held that it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. and medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. It is submitted that in the MLC, the doctor has not opined that the injury received by injured was dangerous to life. As such, continuance of criminal proceedings against the petitioners under section 307 of the IPC is nothing but abuse of process of law and the same are, therefore, liable to be set aside in the wake of compromise entered into between the parties.

6. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the :: 4 :: M.Cr.C.No.32156/2019 (Devaram Jatav and others Vs. State of M.P. and another) injured has sustained grievous injury. It is submitted that section 307 and its illustrations nowhere suggest that the injury should be dangerous to life to constitute an offence under section 307, IPC.

What is required to be seen is the intention of the accused and in the instant case the intention of the petitioners to kill the injured is well discernible. It is submitted that in the aforesaid circumstances, no case is made out for quashment of proceedings under section 307 of the IPC on the basis of compromise entered into between the parties.

7. Heard, learned counsel for the parties.

8. The sole question that arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether the proceedings under section 307 of the IPC can be quashed on the basis of compromise entered into between petitioners and the complainant & injured by invoking inherent powers of this Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. ?

9. To address upon the above question, it would be worthwhile to advert to the legal position in this regard. The Supreme Court in the case of Gulab Das and others Vs. State of M.P. Reported in AIR 2012 SC 888 has held as under :

"7. In the light of the submissions made at the bar the only question that falls for determination is whether the prayer for composition of the offence under Section 307, IPC could be allowed having regard to the compromise arrived at between the parties. Our answer is in the negative. This Court has in a long line of decisions ruled that offences which are not compoundable under Section 320 of the :: 5 :: M.Cr.C.No.32156/2019 (Devaram Jatav and others Vs. State of M.P. and another) Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be compounded even if there is any settlement between the complainant on the one hand and the accused on the other. Reference in this regard may be made to the decisions of this Court in Ram Lal and Anr. v.State of J and K (1999) 2 SCC 213 : (AIR 1999 SC 895), and Ishwar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 15 SCC 667 : (AIR 2009 SC 675). We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the prayer for permission to compound the offence for which Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 stand convicted."

10. For exercising powers under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement, the Apex Court in the case of Narinder Singh (Supra), has inter alia laid down the following principles :-

"29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2 When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3 Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on :: 6 :: M.Cr.C.No.32156/2019 (Devaram Jatav and others Vs. State of M.P. and another) society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4 ..... ..... ......

29.5 ...... ..... ......

29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

(Emphasis supplied)

11. The Apex Court in a recent decision in State of Madhya :: 7 :: M.Cr.C.No.32156/2019 (Devaram Jatav and others Vs. State of M.P. and another) Pradesh Vs Laxmi Narayan and Others (Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2019) has re-traced the legal position on the subject including the one laid down in the case of Narinder Singh (Supra) and held as under:-

"13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:

i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-

compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;

iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this :: 8 :: M.Cr.C.No.32156/2019 (Devaram Jatav and others Vs. State of M.P. and another) provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC.

For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;

v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non- compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.

12. From the above conspectus of legal position on the point in issue, it is clear that this Court can go into the nature of injuries, part on which it is inflicted, weapon used when the investigation is over and charge-sheet has been filed. Therefore, prima facie this Court does not find any reason to quash the proceedings under sections 294 and 307 of the IPC, which are non compoundable in nature.

13. So far as the compromise entered between petitioners in respect of offences under sections 323, 506 and 34 of the IPC is :: 9 :: M.Cr.C.No.32156/2019 (Devaram Jatav and others Vs. State of M.P. and another) concerned, the said offences being compoundable, the compromise to that extent is accepted. The FIR and consequential proceedings so far as they relate to sections 323, 506 and 34 of the IPC in respect of all the petitioners are quashed. However, in respect of other offences i.e. section 294 and 307 of IPC, the criminal proceedings shall continue.

14. With the aforesaid, the petition stands disposed of.

(S.A.Dharmadhikari) Judge 20/1/2020 Pawar/-

ASHISH PAWAR 2020.01.27 18:00:54 +05'30'

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Madhya Pradesh High Court