Karnataka High Court
Smt. Varamma vs The State By on 10 June, 2025
Author: S.R.Krishna Kumar
Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar
-1-
NC: 2025:KHC:19886
CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF JUNE, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 7105 OF 2024 (482(Cr.PC) / 528(BNSS)
BETWEEN:
1. SMT. VARAMMA,
W/O VIJAYA KUMAR H.,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
R/AT ST. MARY BASILICA,
MSGR FR NORONA ROAD,
SHIVAJINAGARA,
BENGALURU - 560 051.
2. SRI VIJAY KUMAR H.,
S/O LATE HAJARATAYYA,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
R/AT # 3, MUJIRE RAMASWAMY PLAYA CHINNAPPA GARDEN J C
NAGARA BENGALURU-560046
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. SUBHASH R., FOR
SRI. MANOJ KUMAR J. Y., ADVOCATES)
AND:
Digitally 1. THE STATE BY,
signed by DEVARAJEEVANAHALLI POLICE STATION,
CHANDANA BENGALURU
BM
Location:
REP. BY ITS STATER PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
High Court of HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
Karnataka AT BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. SMT. MARATAMMA
W/O JEEVARATNAM,
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,
R/AT 256, 16TH CROSS,
MODI ROAD, ROSHANNAGARA,
NEAR KOUSAR MASIDI,
D J HALLI,
BENGALURU - 560 045.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. CHENNAPPA ERAPPA, HCGP FOR R1;
NOTICE TO R2 SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED)
-2-
NC: 2025:KHC:19886
CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024
HC-KAR
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/S.482 CR.P.C PRAYING TO
QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET FILED IN CR.NO.315/2023 REGISTERED IN
DEVARAJEEVANAHALLI POLICE STATION, U/S.498-A, 304-B R/W SEC.34
OF IPC AND SEC.3 AND 4 OF DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT (NOW
C.C.NO.52303/2024) PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE XI ADDITIONAL
CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE, MAYO HALL BENGALURU.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER
WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
In this petition, petitioner seeks for the following reliefs:
"Wherefore, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may pleased to quash the Charge Sheet filed in Crime No.315/2023, registered in Devarajeevanahalli Police Station, under 498A and 304B read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (Now CC No.52303/2024) pending on the file of XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mayohall, Bengaluru, in the interest of justice."
2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned HCGP for respondent No.1 and perused the material on record.
3. Respondent No.2 having been served with the notice of the petition, has chosen to remain unrepresented and has not contested the petition.
-3-NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR
4. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that respondent No.2-defacto complainant is the mother of one Kavitha, who is alleged to have committed suicide in the year 2023. Petitioners are the parents of Harish Chandra Prasad, who is said to be husband of the aforesaid deceased-Kavitha. On 20.11.2023, respondent No.2 filed the complaint interalia contending that the petitioners - accused Nos.2 and 3 as well as their son Harish Chandra Prasad are guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 304B, 498A and 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. In pursuance of the same, charge sheet is filed, which is currently pending in C.C.No.52303/2024 before the Trial Court.
5. In the case of Satvir Singh and Ors Vs. State of Punjab and Anr - (2011) 8 SCC 633, the Apex Court has held as under:
7. At the outset, we may point out that on the aforesaid facts no offence linked with Section 306 IPC can be found against any of the appellants. The said section penalises abetment of suicide. It is worded thus:
"If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with -4- NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
It is a unique legal phenomenon in the Penal Code, 1860 that the only act, the attempt of which alone will become an offence. The person who attempts to commit suicide is guilty of the offence under Section 309 IPC whereas the person who committed suicide cannot be reached at all. Section 306 renders the person who abets the commission of suicide punishable for which the condition precedent is that suicide should necessarily have been committed. It is possible to abet the commission of suicide. But nobody would abet a mere attempt to commit suicide. It would be preposterous if law could afford to penalise an abetment to the offence of mere attempt to commit suicide.
8. Learned Sessions Judge went wrong in convicting the appellants under Section 116 linked with Section 306 IPC. The former is "abetment of offence punishable with imprisonment -- if offence be not committed". But the crux of the offence under Section 306 itself is abetment. In other words, if there is no abetment there is no question of the offence under Section 306 coming into play. It is inconceivable to have abetment of an abetment. Hence there cannot be an offence under Section 116 read with Section 306 IPC. Therefore, the High Court was correct in altering the conviction from the penalising provisions fastened with the appellants by the Sessions Court.
-5-NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR
9. Now, we have to see whether the appellants can be convicted under Section 511 read with Section 304-B IPC. For that purpose it is necessary to extract Section 511 as under:
"511. Punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment.--Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable by this Code with imprisonment for life or imprisonment, or to cause such an offence to be committed, and in such attempt does any act towards the commission of the offence, shall, where no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such attempt, be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both."
10. The above section is the solitary provision included in the last chapter of IPC under the title "Of attempts to commit offences". It makes attempt to commit an offence punishable. The offence attempted should be one punishable by the Code with imprisonment. The conditions stipulated in the provision for completion of the said offence are: (1) The offender should have done some act towards commission of the main offence. (2) Such an attempt is not expressly covered as a penal provision elsewhere in the Code.
11. Thus, "attempt" on the part of the accused is the sine qua non for the offence under Section 511. Before considering the question as to what is meant by doing "any -6- NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR act towards the commission of the offence" as an inevitable part of the process of attempt, we may point out that the last act attributed to the accused in this case is that they asked Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW 5) to go to the rail track and commit suicide. That act of the accused is alleged to have driven the young lady to proceed to the railway line on the next morning to be run over by the train. Assuming that the said act was perpetrated by the appellants and that the said act could fall within the ambit of "attempt" to commit the offence under Section 304-B, it has to be considered whether there is any other express provision in the Code which makes such act punishable. For this purpose, we have to look at Section 498-A which has been added to IPC by Act 46 of 1983. That provision makes "cruelty" (which a husband of a woman or his relative subjects her to) as a punishable offence. One of the categories included in the Explanation to the said section (by which the word cruelty is defined) is thus:
"(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman;"
12. Thus, if the act of the accused asking Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW 5) to go and commit suicide had driven her to proceed to the railway track for ending her life then it is expressly made punishable under Section 498-A IPC. When it is so expressly made punishable the act involved therein stands lifted out of the purview of Section 511 IPC. The very policy underlying Section 511 seems to be for -7- NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR providing it as a residuary provision. The corollary, therefore, is that the accused, in this case, cannot be convicted under Section 511 on account of the acts alleged against him.
13. Now, we have to consider whether the High Court was correct in convicting the appellants under Section 116 read with Section 304-B IPC. Shri R.S. Cheema, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants advanced two contentions against it. First is that Section 304-B cannot apply to a case of suicide at all, whether it is a sequel to cruelty or harassment with the demand for dowry or not. Second is that the concept of abetment of an offence under Section 304-B is inconceivable in the absence of death of a woman within the statutory period mentioned in that provision. In elaborating the first contention, learned Senior Counsel submitted that Section 306 IPC is now intended to cover all cases of suicide in view of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act (which was brought in by Act 46 of 1983).
14. Both the contentions are fallacious. The essential components of Section 304-B are: (i) Death of a woman occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances, within 7 years of marriage. (ii) Soon before her death she should have been subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with any demand for dowry. When the above ingredients are fulfilled, the husband or his relative, who subjected her to such cruelty or harassment, can be presumed to be guilty of offence under Section 304- -8- NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR B. To be within the province of the first ingredient the provision stipulates that "where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances". It may appear that the former limb which is described by the words "death caused by burns or bodily injury" is a redundancy because such death would also fall within the wider province of "death caused otherwise than under normal circumstances". The former limb was inserted for highlighting that by no means death caused by burns or bodily injury should be treated as falling outside the ambit of the offence. In the present context it is advantageous to read Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. It is extracted below:
"113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.--When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband."
15. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that since the word "cruelty" employed therein is a virtual importation of that word from Section 498-A IPC, the offence envisaged in Section 306 IPC is capable of enveloping all cases of suicide within its ambit, including dowry-related suicide. According to him, the second limb of the Explanation to -9- NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR Section 498-A which defines the word "cruelty" is sufficient to clarify the position. That limb reads thus:
"For the purposes of this section, 'cruelty' means--
***
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand."
16. At the first blush we thought that there was force in the said contention but on a deeper analysis we found that the contention is unacceptable. Section 306 IPC when read with Section 113-A of the Evidence Act has only enabled the court to punish a husband or his relative who subjected a woman to cruelty (as envisaged in Section 498-A IPC) if such woman committed suicide within 7 years of her marriage. It is immaterial for Section 306 IPC whether the cruelty or harassment was caused "soon before her death" or earlier. If it was caused "soon before her death" the special provision in Section 304-B IPC would be invocable, otherwise resort can be made to Section 306 IPC.
17. No doubt, Section 306 IPC read with Section 113-A of the Evidence Act is wide enough to take care of an offence under Section 304-B also. But the latter is made a more serious offence by providing a much higher
- 10 -
NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR sentence and also by imposing a minimum period of imprisonment as the sentence. In other words, if death occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within 7 years of the marriage as a sequel to the cruelty or harassment inflicted on a woman with demand of dowry, soon before her death, Parliament intended such a case to be treated as a very serious offence punishable even up to imprisonment for life in appropriate cases. It is for the said purpose that such cases are separated from the general category provided under Section 306 IPC (read with Section 113-A of the Evidence Act) and made a separate offence.
18. We are, therefore, unable to concur with the contention that if the dowry-related death is a case of suicide it would not fall within the purview of Section 304-B IPC at all. In Shanti v. State of Haryana [(1991) 1 SCC 371 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 191] and in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 935] this Court has held that suicide is one of the modes of death falling within the ambit of Section 304-B IPC.
19. Now we have to consider whether the appellants are liable to be punished under Section 116 linked with Section 304-B IPC. We have already noted above that according to the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, there is no question of considering Section 304-B unless death of a woman had occurred. In the present case, death did not occur. Before considering that contention we may delve into the question whether Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW 5)
- 11 -
NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand for dowry "soon before her death", on a hypothetical assumption that her attempt to commit suicide had succeeded.
20. Prosecution, in a case of offence under Section 304-B IPC cannot escape from the burden of proof that the harassment or cruelty was related to the demand for dowry and also that such cruelty or harassment was caused "soon before her death". The word "dowry" in Section 304-B has to be understood as it is defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. That definition reads thus:
"2. In this Act, 'dowry' means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly--
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person;
at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim personal law (Shariat) applies."
21. Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry. One is before the marriage, second is at the time of marriage and the third is "at any time" after the marriage. The third occasion may appear to be an unending period. But the crucial words are "in connection with the marriage
- 12 -
NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR of the said parties". This means that giving or agreeing to give any property or valuable security on any of the above three stages should have been in connection with the marriage of the parties. There can be many other instances for payment of money or giving property as between the spouses. For example, some customary payments in connection with birth of a child or other ceremonies are prevalent in different societies. Such payments are not enveloped within the ambit of "dowry". Hence the dowry mentioned in Section 304-B should be any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given in connection with the marriage.
22. It is not enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry at some time, if Section 304-B is to be invoked. But it should have happened "soon before her death". The said phrase, no doubt, is an elastic expression and can refer to a period either immediately before her death or within a few days or even a few weeks before it. But the proximity to her death is the pivot indicated by that expression. The legislative object in providing such a radius of time by employing the words "soon before her death" is to emphasise the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, have been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a perceptible nexus between her death and the dowry-related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. If the interval elapsed between the infliction of such harassment or cruelty and her death is wide the court would be in a position to gauge that in all probabilities the
- 13 -
NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR harassment or cruelty would not have been the immediate cause of her death. It is hence for the court to decide, on the facts and circumstances of each case, whether the said interval in that particular case was sufficient to snuff its cord from the concept "soon before her death".
23. Applying the said principle in this case we have to refer to the evidence of the prosecution to know whether the findings made by the High Court on the facts warrant interference. PW 5 Tejinder Pal Kaur in her evidence said that 4 or 5 months after her marriage, she was ill-treated on the ground of insufficiency of dowry and then she reported the matter to her father. But PW 5 did not say one word in her evidence regarding any other ill-treatment relating to dowry thereafter. It is true, she said in her evidence that in November 1995, a sum of Rs 20,000 was paid by her father. But neither PW 5 (Tejinder Pal Kaur) nor PW 6 (Narendra Singh) testified that the said amount was paid as part of the dowry or in connection with the marriage. We cannot overlook two important events which had happened in the family during the said long interregnum of three years. One is the birth of the elder son on 12-11-1993 and the other is the birth of the second son on 10-6-1995. We have to bear in mind that the payment of Rs 20,000 was made five months after the birth of the second son. Even PW 6 had no case that his daughter was subjected to any ill-treatment in connection with the demand for dowry on any day after she reported to him about the demand for further dowry way back in the early 1993 months. All
- 14 -
NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR amounts paid by the in-laws of the husband of a woman cannot become dowry.
24. Shri U.R. Lalit, learned Senior Counsel for Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW 5) contended that payment of Rs 20,000 in November 1995 should be presumed as part of the three-year-old demand for further dowry. When the very participants in the deliberations have no such case it is not proper for the court to make an incriminating presumption against the accused on a very crucial ingredient of the offence, more so when it is quite possible to draw a presumption the other way round as well.
25. Thus, there is dearth of evidence to show that Tejinder Pal Kaur (PW 5) was subjected to cruelty or harassment connected with the demand for dowry, soon before the attempt to commit suicide. When the position is such, it is an unnecessary exercise on our part to consider whether Section 116 IPC can ever be linked with the offence under Section 304-B IPC.
26. We, therefore, conclude that the appellants cannot be convicted under Section 116 IPC either by linking it with Section 306 or with Section 304-B. Hence the conviction and sentence passed on them under Section 116 IPC is set aside.
27. We have no reason to interfere with the conviction passed on the appellants under Section 498-A IPC. We do confirm the same. We are told that the first appellant Satvir Singh (A-1) has undergone the substantial
- 15 -
NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR portion of the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him and the remaining appellants have also undergone a long period of imprisonment by now in connection with this case. But we feel that the fine portion of the sentence imposed on the appellants is too insufficient, particularly when such fine was intended to be disbursed as compensation to PW 5. In our view PW 5 Tejinder Pal Kaur should get at least three lakhs of rupees as compensation from the appellants. We are told that A-2 Devinder Singh and A-3 Paramjit Kaur have now become aged as both have crossed the age of
70. We therefore, modify the sentence under Section 498-A IPC in the following terms:
The sentence of imprisonment imposed on the appellants shall stand reduced to the period which they have already undergone. We enhance the fine part of the sentence for the offence under Section 498-A IPC, to Rs one lakh each for all the three appellants. They shall remit the fine amount in the trial court, within three months from today, failing which each of the defaulters shall undergo imprisonment for a further period of nine months.
28. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms."
6. In the instant case, a perusal of the FIR, complaint, charge sheet material, statement of witnesses, documents etc., will indicate that there is nothing on record to establish that the petitioner subjected the deceased to cruelty before the deceased
- 16 -
NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR committed to suicide and consequently, prosecuting the accused for the alleged offence does not arise in the instant case.
7. In the case of State of Haryana Vs. Angoori Devi and Another - (2020) 18 SCC 773, the Apex Court has held as under:
This appeal filed by the State of Haryana is against a judgment and order dated 3-5-2012 [Angoori Devi v. State of Haryana, 2012 SCC OnLine P&H 8654] passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh allowing the appeal filed by the respondents, reversing the judgment of conviction passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jhajhar convicting the respondents under Sections 498-A read with Section 304-B of the Penal Code, 1860 and acquitting the respondents.
2. The victim (Babli) and her sister (Neeru) were married to two brothers, Kartar (Respondent 3) and Pawan, sons of Smt Angoori Devi (Respondent 1) and Akhey Ram (Respondent 2). After 3½ years of marriage the victim, wife of Kartar Singh (Respondent 3) died of burn injuries.
3. The victim's father (hereinafter referred to as "the complainant") lodged an FIR, pursuant to which Sessions Crime No. 9 of 29-3-1996 was commenced. It was alleged that about 1¼ years ago when his daughter Babli was
- 17 -
NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR pregnant, her in-laws had asked her to leave the house and return only if she brought Rs 60,000.
4. It is alleged that the victim informed her parents about this demand and she started living with her parents. She gave birth to a daughter, after which she stayed with her parents for 5 to 6 months. Thereafter, the complainant requested the accused to take the victim back. It is stated that the victim has lived with her in-laws for about 20 days, after which she was thrown out from her matrimonial home. Her mother-in-law (Respondent 1) and father-in-law (Respondent 2) demanded gold ring and a chain. It is stated that a village panchayat was convened after which Babli was sent to her in-laws house on 29-10-1995. On 3- 12-1995, the complainant came to know about the death of the victim. He came to know that the victim had been burnt to death. He went to the spot and saw the dead body.
5. According to the complaint, since the victim had died due to torture and beating by her in-laws to press their demand for dowry, the matter was reported to the Sadar Police Station, Bahadurgarh. Investigation was commenced and the body of the victim was sent for post- mortem examination. The post-mortem report opined that the cause of death was shock as a result of ante-mortem superficial deep burns over entire body.
6. The prosecution examined nine witnesses. No witnesses were examined on behalf of the defence. In the examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
- 18 -
NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR Procedure, Respondent 3, Kartar Singh, husband of the victim, deposed that Respondents 1 and 2, being his parents, resided separately.
7. The complainant who deposed as the fourth prosecution witness (PW 4) stated that immediately after marriage the respondent started harassing the victim for dowry and also used to beat his daughter. The victim was thrown out of the house when she was in the family way as they wanted her to bring Rs 60,000 in cash, gold articles and a refrigerator.
8. According to the complainant, as he could not afford to give cash and ornaments, the victim was thrown out. While the victim was at his house, she gave birth to a girl child. After about six months, through the intervention of a panchayat, he sent the victim back to her matrimonial home. No member of the panchayat was examined.
9. The victim stayed there for 15-20 days, after which she was set on fire and killed by the accused. According to the complainant, Rakesh, elder brother of Akhey Ram (Respondent 3) came to his village and told him about the death of the victim. Thereafter, the complainant along with villagers went to the house of the accused and saw the victim lying dead.
10. The complainant has, in his evidence, claimed that his younger daughter, Neetu told him that the victim had been killed by the accused and later set on fire after
- 19 -
NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR pouring kerosene on her body. The younger daughter Neetu was, however, not examined by the prosecution.
11. The victim's brother, Subhash who deposed as the fifth prosecution witness (PW 5) more or less reiterated what the complainant, his father, had said.
12. Admittedly, there is no eyewitness to the incident. Respondent 3 has in his statement under Section 313 stated that his parents did not live with him and that he was not at home when the incident took place.
13. The High Court found that the complainant did, in his evidence, say that he had first hand knowledge of demand of dowry. The High Court refused to uphold the conviction on the basis of hearsay evidence, since the primary witness Neetu was never produced in court to give evidence. Moreover, the High Court found discrepancies between his evidence in court and his statement to the police, with which he had been confronted.
14. The High Court found substance in the submission made by the counsel for the respondents that if the respondents had really harassed or maltreated the victim, her sister married to another son of Respondents 1 and 2, brother of Respondent 3, would not have abstained from giving evidence. The Court also opined that the counsel was justified in submitting that if there had been harassment as a result of greed for dowry, the victim and her sister who was married to the victim's brother-in-law (husband's brother) would also have been harassed and
- 20 -
NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR tortured. There is no allegation of harassment of the victim's sister Neetu.
15. Considering the evidence, the Court did not find the evidence strong enough to hold the respondents guilty. We agree with the High Court that the evidence is weak, and not sufficient for conviction.
16. It is true, that the victim died of burns. The death was otherwise than under normal circumstances and within 7 years of marriage. However, to attract Section 304-B of the Penal Code, the prosecution has to establish that soon before the death the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with demand for dowry. The High Court rightly found that the evidence did not show any proximate connection between the demand of dowry and the act of cruelty or harassment and/or the death. The prosecution has not been able to prove that the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death in connection with any demand for dowry.
17. Under Section 304-B of the Penal Code, the prosecution cannot escape from discharging its burden of proving that the harassment or cruelty was related to demand for dowry soon before death. In this case, the High Court has been swayed by the fact that the evidence of the complainant, being the father of the victim, did not evince direct knowledge of demand of dowry. The judgment and order [Angoori Devi v. State of Haryana, 2012 SCC OnLine P&H 8654] under appeal is not liable to be interfered with.
- 21 -
NC: 2025:KHC:19886 CRL.P No. 7105 of 2024 HC-KAR
18. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
8. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and the principles enunciated in the aforesaid judgments, I am of the considered opinion that continuation of the proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law warranting interference of this Court in the present petition.
9. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
i) The petition is hereby allowed.
ii) The impugned proceedings in Crime No.315/2023 of Devarajeevanahalli Police Station on the file of XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Mayohall, Bengaluru, insofar as the petitioners are concerned are hereby quashed.
Sd/-
(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE MDS List No.: 1 Sl No.: 11