C. Puttaswamy vs State Of Karnataka on 19 September, 2019

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Karnataka High Court

C. Puttaswamy vs State Of Karnataka on 19 September, 2019

Bench: G. Narendar

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 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

     DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2019

                        BEFORE

        THE HON'BLE Mr. JUSTICE G. NARENDAR

      WRIT PETITION Nos. 32229-30/2019 (S-RES)

BETWEEN :
--------------

1.    C. Puttaswamy
      S/o. late Kempegowda
      Aged about 50 years
      Working as Municipal
      Commissioner (Under suspension)
      Channapatna
      City Municipal Council
      Channapatna
      Ramanagara Dist. 562 160.


2.    T.S. Mohan Kumar
      S/o. late Tagade Gowda
      Aged about 50 years
      Working as Second Division
      Assistant (Under Suspension)
      Office of the City Municipal
      Council, Channapatna
      Ramanagara Dist. 562 160.       ... Petitioners


(By Sri. M. Nagaprasanna, Sr. Counsel, for
Sri. K. Puttegowda K., Adv.)
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AND :
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1.    State of Karnataka
      By its Principal Secretary
      To Government
      Urban Development
      Department
      Vikas Soudha
      Dr. Ambedkar Veedhi
      Bengaluru - 560 001.

2.    Director
      Municipal Administration
      Directorate of Municipal
      Administration
      9th Floor, Visvesvaraya Tower
      Dr. Ambedkar Veedhi
      Bengaluru - 560 001.             ... Respondents

(By Sri. T.S. Mahanthesh, AGA)

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      These Writ Petitions are filed under Articles 226 and
227 of the constitution of India with a prayer to quash the
order dated 19.07.2019 and etc.

     These Writ Petitions coming on for Orders this day,
the Court passed the following;


                         ORDER

Heard learned Senior Counsel Sri. Nagaprasanna for petitioners and learned Additional Government Advocate.

2. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioners would contend that under the impugned order the provisions of Rule (10)(1)(a) of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 (for short hereinafter referred as `the Rules') are invoked and the invocation of the said Rule is inappropriate and unsustainable in view of the fact that the said Rule deals with a situation of trap where the delinquent official is caught red handed and in the instant case it is otherwise where one of the subordinate employee was trapped by the ACB and the said person has revealed the names of these two petitioners as the beneficiaries and hence, the invocation of Rule 10(1)(A) of the Rules is unsustainable.

3. Per contra learned Additional Government Advocate would submit that the petitioners have been arrested and were in judicial custody for more than 48 hours and hence the petitioners were deemed to have been 4 suspended under the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of the Rules.

4. The fact in brief are that a complaint was lodged with ACB Police, Ramnagar. The de-facto complainant had approached the Municipal Council for change of katha for which the caseworker is alleged to have demanded Rs.5,000/- and it was accordingly paid by him. Thereafter he instructed the complainant to approach petitioners.

Accused No. 3 thereafter informed that petitioners were demanding a sum of Rs.25,000/-. On the basis of a complaint a trap was organized by the ACB and accordingly accused No.3 - Driver of the department received the amount on behalf of accused Nos. 1 and 2.

Accused No. 3 was immediately arrested. Accused were produced before the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Ramanagar and were remanded to Judicial Custody till 18.07.2019 and were released on bail by order dated 10.07.2019. In that view of the matter, in similar 5 circumstances, in the case of Basavaraju M and another Vs. The Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagar Palike and another reported in ILR 2017 Kar 2213 the Court was pleased to hold as under:

5. A reading of sub-Rule (2) of Rules 10 of the K.C.S. Rules would clearly negate the contention of the petitioners that the impugned order is passed without authority. The fact remains that the petitioners were arrested and detained on 29.11.2016 and continued in custody till 07.12.2016 i.e., for a period in excess of 48 hours. The provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of the K.C.S. Rules is a deeming provision, by which a Government servant, who is detained in the custody for a period in excess of 48 hours shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension as if by an order passed by the competent authority. The implication is that the Government servant shall remain automatically suspended from service if he/she is in detention for a period in excess of 48 hours. The order impugned herein has to be read as communication of the deemed suspension.

6. As regards the legality of a rule providing for deemed suspension, the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nelson Motis Vs. Union of India and another; reported in (1992)4 Supreme Court Cases 711, while interpreting similar provisions of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 Rule 10(4) was pleased to uphold the concept of deemed suspension has observed as follows:

"7. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that while in a case governed by sub-rule (3), a government servant, on the order of his punishment by way of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service being set aside, stands suspended only if he had been under suspension earlier, sub-rule (4) provides for automatic suspension of a government servant, even if he was never under suspension at any point of time [emphasis supplied by me]; and this invidious distinction amounts to illegal discrimination which renders sub-

rule (4) unconstitutional. The argument is that with a view to save the sub-rule, its application has to be limited to cases in which the government servant has been, during the pendency of the disciplinary proceeding, under suspension. The learned counsel proceeded to say that the established principle of interpretation favouring reading down of a statutory provision in order to avoid it being struck down as illegal, is applicable to this case. If this is found not possible in view of the clear language of sub-rule (4), the same should be struck down as unconstitutional. In either event, it should be further held that the appellant, who was not under suspension earlier, cannot be treated to have been placed under suspension when his writ petition was allowed by the Tribunal. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal in N.V. Karwarkar v. Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu. Reference was also made to certain observations of this Court in Khem Chand v. Union of India, and 8 Divisional Personnel Officer, Western Railway v. Sunder Dass.

8. The language of sub-rule (4) of Rule 10 is absolutely clear and does not permit any artificial rule of interpretation to be applied. It is well established that if the words of a statute are clear and free from any vagueness and are, therefore, reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, it must be construed by giving effect to that meaning, irrespective of consequences [emphasis supplied by me]. The language of the sub-rule here is precise and unambiguous and, therefore, has to be understood in the natural and ordinary sense. As was observed in innumerable cases in India and in England, the expression used in the statute alone declares the intent of the legislature. In the words used by this Court in State of U.P. v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj when the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the act speaks for 9 itself. Reference was also made in the reported judgment to Maxwel stating:

"The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words."

The comparison of the language with that of sub-rule (3) reinforces the conclusion that sub-rule (4) has to be understood in the natural sense. It will be observed that in sub-rule (3) the reference is to "a Government servant under suspension" while the words "under suspension", are omitted in sub- rule (4). Also the sub-rule (3) directs that on the order of punishment being set aside, "the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force" but in sub-rule (4) it has been said that "the Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension". The departure made by the author in the language of sub-rule (4) from that of sub- rule (3) is conscious and there is no scope for attributing the artificial and strained meaning thereto. In the circumstances it 10 is not permissible to read down the provisions as suggested. We, therefore, hold that as a result of sub-rule (4) a government servant, though not earlier under suspension, shall also be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the Appointing Authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, provided of course, that the other conditions mentioned therein are satisfied. [emphasis supplied by me]"

7. As held by the Hon'ble Apex Court, a reading of sub-Rule (2) of Rules 10 of the K.C.S. Rules as extracted supra leaves no scope for ambiguity and is framed in categorical terms. The suspension of a Government servant who has been detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours is by operation of the statute as if an order is passed by the Competent Authority itself. This is the deeming fiction and whereby it shall be presumed that an order of suspension by the Competent Authority automatically comes into existence in the particular case as set-out in the provisions of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 of K.C.S. Rules and 11 no separate order placing the official under suspension is required to be made by the Competent Authority.

8. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal Nos.300-303/2017 [State of Karnataka Vs. Selvi J.Jayalalithaa & Ors.] has observed as follows:

"A few disquieting thoughts that have lingered and languished in distressed silence in mentation demand expression at the parting with a pulpit touch. Hence, this supplement.

2. The attendant facts and circumstances encountered as above, demonstrate a deep rooted conspiratorial design to amass vast assets without any compunction and hold the same through shell entities to cover up the sinister trail of such illicit acquisitions and deceive and delude the process of law. Novelty in the outrages and the magnitude of the nefarious gains as demonstrated by the revelations in the case are, to say the least, startling.

3. A growing impression in contemporary existence seems to acknowledge, the all pervading pestilent presence of corruption almost in every walk of life, as if to rest reconciled to the octopoid stranglehold of this malaise with helpless awe. The common day experiences indeed do introduce one with unfailing regularity, the variegated cancerous concoctions of corruption with fearless impunity gnawing into the frame and fabric of the nation's essentia. Emboldened by the lucrative yields of such malignant materialism, the perpetrators of this malady have tightened their noose on the societal psyche. Individual and collective pursuits with curative interventions at all levels are thus indispensable to deliver the civil order from the asphyxiating snare of this escalating venality.

4. In the above alarming backdrop of coeval actuality, judicial adjudication of a charge based on an anti-corruption law motivated by the 13 impelling necessities of time, has to be informed with the desired responsibility and the legislative vision therefor. Any interpretation of the provisions of such law has to be essentially purposive, in furtherance of its mission and not in retrogression thereof. Innovative nuances of evidential inadequacies, processual infirmities and interpretational subtleties, artfully advanced in defence, otherwise intangible and inconsequential, ought to be conscientiously cast aside with moral maturity and singular sensitivity to uphold the statutory sanctity, lest the coveted cause of justice is a causality."

5. In that view of the mater, the writ petition is devoid of merits and is accordingly rejected.

6. After the order has been dictated, learned Senior counsel for petitioners would make and mention and request that it is more than three months and articles of charges have not been issued and in the light of the law 14 laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary Vs. Union of India and another, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291. If articles of charges have not been issued within three months and if no reasoned order is passed for extension of the suspension, the same would vitiate the order of suspension. In the event the respondents do not issue the articles of charges within the stipulated time, it is open for the petitioners to approach the authorities with a request in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court.

Accordingly, the petition is rejected.

Sd/-

JUDGE LRS.

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