Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sarjeet Kaur vs Gurmail Singh And Anr. on 12 August, 1999
Equivalent citations: (1999)123PLR402
Author: Swatanter Kumar
Bench: Swatanter Kumar
JUDGMENT Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. By this common judgment I propose to dispose of civil revisions No. 329 of 1999 and 333 of 1999 as they arise in somewhat common circumstances and between the same parties.
2. The ambit and scope of the provisions of Order 17 Rule 3 and Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code vesting powers in the Court in relation to closing evidence of the parties and proceeding further with the suit is the basic question that falls for determination in these two revisions. The revision petitions were called out three times but the counsel for the petitioner did not care to appear. The counsel for the respondent was present and as such matter was heard in the absence of counsel for the petitioner.
3. It will be appropriate to refer to the basic facts. The plaintiff-petitioner herein had filed a suit for declaration to the effect that decree dated 25.7.1991 passed in civil suit No. 581 of 1991 was illegal, null and void and not binding on the petitioner. The petitioner had also prayed for injunction. The petitioner had claimed half share in the suit land. The present suit was contested by the defendants who stated that the previous decree was passed in accordance with law and the present suit was nothing but a frivolous and vexatious litigation pursued by the petitioner. Upon parties completing their pleadings, the case was fixed for recording evidence of the plaintiff. As the plaintiff failed to lead evidence on different dates, the learned trial Court even thereafter granted number of opportunities and then closed the evidence of the plaintiff vide order dated 14.11.1998, which has been impugned by the plaintiff in the present petitions. Both the revisions have identical facts and orders of the same date.
4. One suit was filed against Gurmail Singh while the other was filed against Gurmail Singh and his minor child as well. Reference to the impugned order would be inevitable in the circumstances of the case:-
"No PW is present, neither served. Today, it was the last opportunity. A perusal of the file shows that for the first time vide order dated 21.8.1996 last opportunity was granted to the plaintiff to conclude her evidence but even thereafter six more opportunities have been granted to the plaintiff for this purpose but despite this the evidence has not been concluded." No list of witnesses etc. has been filed to show what evidence is remained. Heard. In the circumstances, finding no justification for further adjournment for this purpose, the evidence of the plaintiff is closed by Court order. Now to come upon 9.1.1999 for the evidence of the defendant. DWs be summoned, if PF, DM and list of witnesses is filed within 15 days, failing which no assistance of Court shall be granted, for summoning the witnesses."
5. Language of the impugned order clearly shows that the plaintiff had exhausted all limits for seeking adjournment on every score, whatsoever. The very purpose of granting last opportunity stood frustrated by grant of six subsequent adjournments, but even then the plaintiff neither summoned witnesses nor examined any. Wonder there was any other choice left before the learned trial Court but to pass the impugned order. This Court had the occasion to discuss the scope of such power of the Court and consequence of persistent default on the part of the party in the trial Court, in the case of Joginder Singh and Ors. v. Smt. Manjit Kaur, Civil Revision No. 5885 of 1998, decided on 14.1.1999, held as under:-
The cumulative effect of the provisions of Order 18 Rule 2 read with Rules 1 and 2 of Order 17 of Code of Civil Procedure and inherent powers of the Civil Court vested in it under Section 151 of the Code, place an implied obligation on the Court not to adjourn the case unless sufficient cause was shown. The cause by itself cannot always be treated as a ground for repeated adjournments. Un-necessary and avoidable adjournments must be denied by the Courts. On the one hand, trial Courts are expected to dispose of suits and other proceedings expeditiously, and on the other, if parties to a lis are permitted to get the suits adjourned on the mere asking and that too for the indefinite times, it would frustrate the very spirit behind the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure.
Obligation on a Court cannot be read as construed in isolation. It must find its reasoning from the basic concept of genuine attitude of the litigant. A litigant must help the Court by effective participation for expeditious disposal of the suit. Having taken more than six opportunities after the last opportunity was granted by the Court, the plaintiff can hardly challenge the correctness of the impugned order and more particularly on the ground that the learned trial Court has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it or the trial Court has wrongly exercised jurisdiction.
6. The Rajasthan High Court in the case of Chander Singh v. Chottulal, A.I.R. 1994 Rajasthan 186, while commenting upon the afore-said provisions of the Code, held as under:-
"It is clear from the order-sheet of the case that the learned trial Court repeatedly adjourned the case in utter disregard of the provisions of Order 17, Rule 1, C.P.C. Its provisos (b) and (c) run as under:-
(b) no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party, except where the circumstances are beyond the control of that party.
(c) the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in another Court shall not be a ground for adjournment."
Such liberal attitude of the trial Courts is mainly responsible for the huge arrears of cases and inordinate delay in their disposal. The learned trial Court should have closed the defendant's evidence much earlier, it had acted illegally in granting said adjournments to the defendant. It has not acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction in any manner in passing the impugned order."
7. The conduct of the plaintiff-petitioner no way demands exercise of judicial discretion in the Court in his favour on the grounds of equity or legal maxims. Prudent reasoning leads one to no other conclusion but to one that the learned trial Court was fully justified and in fact was left with no alternative other than closing the evidence of the petitioner.
For the reasons afore stated both the revision petitions are dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.