Karnataka High Court
Xxi Additional Sessions Judge, ... vs Ningegowda on 21 November, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1997CRILJ3873
Author: H.N. Narayan
Bench: H.N. Narayan
JUDGMENT Saldanha, J.
1. This is a contempt proceeding arising out of a reference made by the learned Sessions Judge, Bangalore, wherein he was held that there appears to be a prima facie case for action under the Contempt of Courts Act against the respondent before us, who was and still is, an Assistant Commissioner of Police, by the name of Sri Ningegowda. We do not propose to elaborately set out any of the facts because, the respondent was effectively the Officer in-charge of the investigation in certain criminal proceedings namely, Crime No. 217/94 of the High Grounds Police Station, which had been instituted at the instance of one Sri Devadas. According of the complaint filed before the lower Court by Sri B. M. Nandakumar, he and some others were anticipating their arrest for which reason, an application was filed before the Sessions Court on 24-5-1994 praying for anticipatory bail. The Sessions Court allowed the application and directed that the accused if arrested, should be released on bail in the sum of Rs. 10,000/- with one surety in the like amount. The complainant alleges that he along with Anil Poonacha and some other persons were arrested by the respondent sometime on 28-29th May 1994. The grievance projected to the lower Court is that they are supposed to have shown a xerox copy of the anticipatory bail order to the respondent who refused to comply with it and there is a further allegation that at a subsequent point of time, four Advocates appeared on the scene and that even when they produced the copy of the Court order, that the respondent is alleged to have not only ignored it, but that he is supposed to have torn it and trampled on it with his boots. The sum and substance of the complaint is that even the superior Police Officers namely, the D.C.P. and the Commissioner of Police did not comply with the Court order and that the accused persons were produced before the learned C.J.M., Bangalore, at his residence on that night, who directed that the accused be retained in custody and produced before the regular Court on the next morning. When the accused were produced before the learned C.J.M. on the following day, he released them on bail in view of the fact that there was already a bail order in their favour.
2. A serious grievance was made against the Police Officer concerned to the effect that they had deliberately and wantonly disregarded the Court order and the thrust of the charge is against Ningegowda, the present respondent, namely the A.C.P., because it is alleged that he showed the maximum disrespect to the order by repeatedly disregarding it, tearing it to pieces and trampling it under his boots. In support of these charges, the learned advocates have filed certain affidavits and after considering the material before him, the learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the D.C.P. and the Commissioner of Police cannot be held responsible for having disregarded the Court order, but that the present respondent is squarely liable in far as there is adequate material particular in the form of the affidavits, to indicate that the Court order was produced before him and that he showed utmost disregard and contempt for that order. Undoubtedly, the allegation against the respondent is extremely serious and on the last date of hearing, the learned Advocate Sri Nagesh who represents the respondents, did vehemently contend before us that this the manner in which Police Officer treat the Court orders and he submitted that this Court must take the strictest possible view of the misconduct of the respondent and that he should be awarded exemplary punishment so that other Police Officers who dare to behave in this arrogant fashion, should know that the Courts will not tolerate any such misbehaviour on their part.
3. We have heard the matter in some detail today and the learned counsel who represents the respondents has taken us through the record which is considerably elaborate. This is a case in which everything has been stated on affidavit and is already on record and there is nothing more that can emerge through the recording of any oral evidence. Apart from this, this Court needs to consider as to whether at all the reference made by the learned Sessions Judge was valid in the facts and circumstances of the case and if the Court comes to the conclusion that the reference itself was misconceived, then there is no question of any further proceedings.
4. The respondent's learned counsel pointed out to the Court that the affidavits have been filed undoubtedly by certain learned advocates, but that they happen to be Advocates who were representing the accused. He also submits that this Court will have to very carefully consider whether on the probabilities of this case, that material can at all be accepted. In this regard, he has first of all pointed out to us that the manner in which the anticipatory bail order was obtained is highly improper in so far as the law enforcement authorities were investigating into charges of some seriousness and in such a situation, that it was manifestly unfair for the applicants to have snatched an order from the Court without due, proper, fair and adequate notice to the investigating authorities. The High Courts have repeatedly been at pains to point out, particularly to the subordinate Courts, that hurried bail orders, particularly in applications for anticipatory bail, should never be passed without notice to the learned Public Prosecutor or the representatives of the investigating authorities as the case may be, who in turn, must be given adequate time to contact the Officers concerned and inform the Court of the other side of the picture. Times, without number, various incorrect statements are made in these bail applications and a wrong impression is created in the mind of the learned Judge that the accused are absolutely innocent or that they have wrongly been proceeded against or that there is no case against them and that the investigating authorities are harassing them for mala fide reasons. There may be instances where these grounds are of some substance, but it is a fundamental duty of the Court before which such an application is made, to direct immediate notice to the learned Public Prosecutors to obtain instructions, even if necessary over the telephone and inform the Court as to what precisely the other side of the case is. If this is not done, and if hurried bail orders are passed as has happened in the present case without notice to the investigating authorities, there is every possibility that an accused who would normally not qualify for bail would get released and if this happens at the early or curcial stage of the investigation, it could undoubtedly harm, affect and frustrate the entire investigating process. It is for this reason that the Courts have frowned upon any such orders and it is for this reason, that the Courts do not pass ex-parte orders, particularly in anticipatory bail applications. In this background, we are pained to note that whatever be the reason, the anticipatory bail orders in this case were obtained without the investigating authorities knowing of the applications and having an opportunity of pointing out to the Court what they desire to say about the application. This in our considered view reflects very strongly on the accused and whoever was handling the case on their behalf and it is a significant factor because, it is in this background that we will have to view of the validity of the affidavits that have been filed in support of the complaint.
5. The respondent's learned counsel pointed out to us that this was not an ordinary investigation being done by some subordinate Police Officer, but that the authorities up to the level of D.C.P. and the Commissioner of Police were directly concerned with it and the complainant himself admits this position. The learned Sessions Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that some confidence needs to be reposed in the Officers of that level by the Court under normal circumstances and the learned Sessions Judge has come to the conclusion that the D.C.P. and the Commissioner of Police would never have disrespected or disregarded the anticipatory bail order if they were produced before them and has, therefore, discharged the notice as against these Officers. The respondent's learned advocate strongly submitted that by the same token, there is no reason why the present respondent who was an Assistant Commissioner of Police should be treated differently and why the Court should assume that the Court orders which were obviously not produced before the higher Police Officers should only have been produced before him. There is considerable substance in this submission because, we take note of the fact that had the Court orders been produced before the respondent and has he disregarded them, the superior Police Officers could still have directed him to comply with those orders, and the fact that there was no occasion for them to do this, leads to the irresistible conclusion that the orders were never produced before the respondent.
6. We are considerably reinforced in this view because of the fact that had the respondent desired to behave incorrectly, he could easily have retained the accused in the lock-up until the next day and straightway produced them before the regular Court. The fact that the respondent produced the accused before the C.J.M. that very night is a factor which clearly indicates his bona fides and what happened when the accused were produced before the learned C.J.M. goes heavily against the complainant and those who have supported him through the affidavits. We have no doubt in our mind that when the accused were produced before the learned C.J.M., even if they had orally informed him themselves or through their learned advocates, that the Court of Session had passed an order for their release on bail, there would have been no doubt about the fact that the learned C.J.M. would have straight-way passed an order in their favour at that point of time. We have also taken note of the fact that if the respondent is alleged to have torn the Court orders and trampled them under his boots, that there would have been no doubt about the fact that his misconduct would have been reported straightway to the learned C.J.M. when the accused were produced before him either by the accused or by the learned advocates who represented them. This again has not happened and in this background, we have no doubt about the fact that the entire story made out which is to the effect that the order was produced before the respondent, that he disregarded it was that he misbehaved, cannot be accepted.
7. It is in this background, that after a very careful and meticulous scrutiny of the entire paper book that is placed before us, we have no hesitation in holding that the complaint alleging contempt on the part of the respondent was totally devoid of substance and that the learned Sessions Judge was not justified in having even made a reference to the High Court for action under the Contempt of Courts Act. Having arrived at this conclusion, the question of going into any evidence or any further proceedings does not arise. We also need to observe that we do not approve of what has happened in this case, particularly the filing of the lawyers affidavits which do not represent a correct state of affairs.
8. Having regard to the aforesaid situation, in our considered views, the reference itself being unjustified, we discharge the notice that has been issued against the respondent and close the present proceedings.
9. In the view that we have taken, we need to observe that the remarks made against the Police Officer concerned namely, the present respondent, the D.C.P. and the then Commissioner of Police, require to be expunged.
10. The matter shall accordingly stand disposed of.
(In view of the observations made by this Court with regard to the grant of bail either on a regular application or on an anticipatory bail application, the Registrar General shall circulate a copy of this judgment to the learned District Judges as also the Principal Judge, City Civil Court at Bangalore, so that the same be brought to the notice of all their colleagues.)
11. Order accordingly.