Punjab-Haryana High Court
Mann Singh vs Dharamjit Singh And Ors. on 26 February, 1993
Equivalent citations: (1993)104PLR239
ORDER N.K. Sodhi, J.
1. After hearing counsel for the parties, I pronounced the orders on January 20, 1993 allowing the writ petition but reasons for the same were to be recorded later. I now proceed to record those reasons.
2. The question that arises for decision in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is whether in the absence of any other circumstances, an offence of murder committed due to enmity could be said to involve moral turpitude.
3. Mann Singh petitioner who was a member of the Bhutta Agricultural Cooperative Service Society Ltd., Bhutta, District Ludhiana (for short, "the Primary Society") had become its President. This Society as such was a member of the Ludhiana Central Cooperative Bank Limited, Ludhiana which is a Central Society registered under the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 hereinafter called 'the Act'. According to Section 15A of the Act, no individual can be admitted as member of a Central Apex Society unless such a Society has been exempted by the Registrar in this behalf by a general or special order which is not the case here. Elections to the Board of Directors of the Ludhiana Central Cooperative Bank were held on December 21, 1990 and as par provisions of the Act and the Rules and Bye-laws framed thereunder, an election programme was notified. Petitioner as a representative of the Primary Society contested the election on its behalf and accordingly filed his nomination papers from Zone No. 3. Dharamjit Singh respondent No. 1 as a representative of one Khara Cooperative Agricultural Service Society Limited, Khara, District, Ludhiana also filed his nomination papers. Petitioner won the election from Zone No. 3 securing 24 votes as against 10 secured by Dharamjit Singh respondent. The petitioner was, thus, declared elected.
4. An election dispute was raised by respondent No. 1 under Sections 55/56 of the Act and the matter was referred to the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Punjab. The objection raised by the defeated candidate was that the petitioner who was convicted for the murder of one Harchand Singh had been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and his conviction having been upheld by this Court, he stood disqualified from being a member of the Primary Society and also as a member of the Committee of the Bank as he had been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude. Reliance was placed on the provisions of Rules 14 and 26 of the Punjab Cooperative Societies Rules, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rule'). The petition was dismissed by the Joint Registrar as per order dated May 10, 1991 and the election of the petitioner from Zone No. 3 was upheld. Respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal before the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Punjab who by his order dated March 4, 1992 allowed the same ho ding that the offence of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was one involving moral turpitude and according to him Rule 25 of the Rules contemplates that persons committing such heinous crimes could not represent Co-operative Societies. The Registrar, therefore, directed that the petitioner would be deemed to have ceased to be a member of the Primary Society and consequently his election as a member of the Committee of the Bank was set aside. The matter was taken in revision before the State Government which by an order dated June 1, 1992 dismissed the same and upheld the order passed by the Registrar. The Present petition has been filed impugning the order of the Registrar as well as that of the State Government.
5. It is common case of the parties that the petitioner alongwith one Dalip Singh (now dead) was tried and convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for having murdered Harchand Singh, His conviction was upheld by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 377-DB of 1983 and other connected appeals decided on November 23, 1983 and be was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. He filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court which was granted and his Criminal Appeal No. 412 of . 1985 is still pending there. During the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court the sentence of the petitioner was suspended and he is on bail. Motive for the murder as found by the Additional Sessions Judge was that Harchand Singh deceased alongwith some others had some time earlier murdered Hazdra Singh father of Dalip Singh who was an accused alongwith the petitioner and Dalip Singh and the petitioner than with a view to take revenge had killed Harchand Singh. Another cause for the enmity which led to the murder of Harchand Singh was that the petitioner was the Vice President of the Truck Union Ludhiana where Harchand Singh started his own transport company and the petitioner along with his companions wanted that the company of Harchand Singh should fail. In nut-shell, the petitioner is said to have murdered Harchand Singh due to old enmity. Now what has to be seen is whether the offence of murder committed by petitioner in the aforesaid circumstances involves moral turpitude so as to disqualify him from being a member of the Primary Society. If the answer to the question is in the negative, then the orders impugned herein will have to be quashed.
6. The term 'moral turpitude' has not been defined either in the Act or in the Indian Penal Code. According to the New Lexicon Webester's Dictionary of the English Language, 'turpitude' means 'inherent wickedness'. The concept of moral turpitude as stated in Black's Law Dictionary is that it involves baseness, vileness or the deprivity in private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. Thus, it is an act or o behaviour that gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of community and is a morally culpable quality held to be present in some criminal offenses as distinguished from, others. In other words, it is the quality of a crime involving grave infringment of the moral sentiment of the community as distinguished from statutory male prohibital.
7. In Durga Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 Punj. 97 this Court observed that the term 'morral turpitude' is rather vague and it may have different meanings in different contexts. The term has generally been taken to mean conduct which is contrary to justice honesty, modesty or good morals and contrary to what a man owes to a fellow man or to society in general.
8. In Mangali v. Chhakki Lal, A.I.R. 1963 All. 527 a question arose whether an offence under Section 60 of the U.P. Excise Act for possessing 'bhang' involved 'moral turpitude'. While answering this question in the negative, learned Judge laid down the following three tests :-
1. Whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general,
2. Whether the motive which led to the act was a base one and
3. Whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society.
9. These tests were followed with approval by a Division Bench of this Court in Risal Singh v. Chandgi Ram, A. I. R. 1966 Punj. 393. and it was held that conviction under Section 19(1) of the Arms Act implied no depravity or wickedness of character. Again, these tests were noticed and followed by another Division Bench of this Court in Narain Singh v. N. S Cheema, 1977 S. L. W. R. 440. and it was held that conviction under Section 61(1) (a) of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 for having in possession illicit liquor did not involve moral turpitude as none of the three tests enunciated by A. P. Srivastava, J. in Mangali's case (supra) stood satisfied.
10. If one were to look at the matter in a very narrow sense or in general terms of righteousness, society does not permit or approve of any offence being committed. It has to be borne in mind that every act punishable in law is not an offence involving 'moral turpitude'. If it were so, the disqualifications for membership of a cooperative society or of its committee in Rules 14 and 26 of the Rules would not have been qualified by words 'involving moral turpitude' and a person convicted of any offence would have been disqualified. It appears to me that the question whether a certain offence involves 'moral turpitude' will necessarily depend on the circumstances in which it is committed and how the society views the commission of that offence in those circumstances. An offence committed under one set of circumstances may involve moral turpitude and the same offence committed under a different set of circumstances may not. For instance, a person who goes to commit theft or rape may not be able to achieve his object and on being caught may kill the person apprehending him. Such an offence of murder committed under these circumstances would certainly involve moral turpitude as it involves depravity or wickedness or character and the crime involves grave infringement of the moral sentiments of the community as distinguished from statutory prohibitions. I need not multiply such instances. Now examining the circumstances of the case in hand, I am of the opinion that the offence of murder committed due to enmity would net per se involve baseness of character. It is a matter of common knowledge that in many societies people do sometime commit murder with a view to avenge their enmity and such murders are not looked down upon as involving that baseness or depravity of character as to amount to moral turpitude. In other words, this conduct by itself cannot be said to possess a morally culpable quality which is present in those criminal offences which involve 'moral turpitude*. In my view none of the three tests as laid down in Mangali's case (supra) and with which I am in full agreement are satisfied in the present case. In the result, it must be held that the offence of murder committed in the circumstances of the present case does not involve moral turpitude.
11. It was then urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the expressions 'sentence' and 'conviction' as used in Rules 14 and 16 of the Rules mean final sentence awarded and conviction recorded an appeal is pending in a higher court. Strong reliance for this proposition has been placed on a Single Bench judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Dr. Tarlochan Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, 1983 (1) S. L. R. 456. Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that a convict is one who has been pronounced guilty of a criminal charge and the conviction of an accused does not cease to exist merely because an appeal filed by him is pending in a superior Court. He cites a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980 (1) S. L. R. 173. I need not examine the merits of the rival contentions since I have already held that the offence of murder committed in the circumstances of the present case did not involve moral turpitude.
12. Before concluding, it may be mentioned that the learned counsel for the respondents cited Gurbachan Singh v. Executive Magistrate 1st Class, Samrala, 1983 P. L. J. 157; Gian Chand v. The Additional District Judge, Hoshiar pur, 1986 P. L. J. 311 and the State of Punjab v. Amrik Singh, (1990-1) 97 P. L. R. 615, to contend that the offence of murder committed in the circumstances of the present case was an offence involving moral turpitude. I am afraid these judgments are of no assistance as these cases were decided on their own facts.
13. For the reasons recorded above, the view taken by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Punjab and the State Government in the impugned orders (Annexures P-1 and P-2 with the writ petition) cannot be sustained in law and the said orders are, therefore, quashed. The writ petition is, consequently, allowed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.