Madras High Court
Y.Sreelatha @ Roja vs Mukanchand Bothra on 25 January, 2002
Author: M. Karpagavinayagam
Bench: M. Karpagavinayagam
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Dated: 25-1-2002
Coram:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M. KARPAGAVINAYAGAM
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.261 of 2000 and CRL.R.C. No.736 of 1999 and Crl.M.P.No.6440 of 2000
---
Y.Sreelatha @ Roja .. Appellant in C.A.
261/2000 & Respt. in
Crl.R.C.736/1999.
Vs.
Mukanchand Bothra .. Respondent in C.A.
261/2000 & petitioner
in Crl.R.C.736/1999.
Criminal Appeal preferred by the accused against the
judgment dated 8.6.1999 on the file of the XV Metropolitan
Magistrate, Chennai. Criminal Revision case preferred by the
complainant against the judgment dated 8.6.1999 on the file of
the XV Metropolitan Magistrate, Chennai.
! For Appellant : Mr.Vibhishman in CA261/2001
& Respondent in Crl.R.C.736/1999
For Respondent: Mr.K.Doraisami,S.C.
in CA261/2001 & For Mr.K.Selvaraj.
in CA261/2001 & For Mr.K.Selvaraj.
Petitioner in Crl.R.C.736/1999
Petitioner in Crl.R.C.736/1999
---
---
: COMMON JUDGMENT
Y.Sreelatha @ Roja was convicted by the trial Court for
the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
and sentenced to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the
Court and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default to undergo S.I.
for two months. Challenging the said conviction and sentence,
the accused filed an appeal before the Principal Sessions Court,
Chennai and the same was admitted on 3 .8.1999.
2. Mukanchand Bothra, the complainant, aggrieved over
the inadequacy of the sentence, filed a revision before this
Court in Crl.R.C.No.73 6 of 1999 and the same was admitted and
notice was ordered on 23.7.19 99.
3. On the application filed by the parties before this
Court, the appeal against conviction pending before the Principal
Sessions Court, Chennai, was directed to be posted before this
Court for being heard along with Crl.R.C.736 of 1999.
Accordingly, the said appeal papers were received by the Registry
of this Court a nd the same was renumbered as C.A.No.261 of 2000.
Since both these matters are taken together for final disposal,
they are being disposed of through this common judgment.
4. The facts of the case in short are these:-
"(a) V.Sreelatha @ Roja, the accused, borrowed a loan of
Rs.5 lakhs from Mukanchand Bothra, the complainant, and executed
a promissory note on 5.7.1996. In order to discharge the said
loan, towards a part liability, the accused issued two cheques,
each for Rs.1 lakh bearing the dates 30.5.1997 and 31.5.1997. On
2.6.1997, the complainant presented these cheques for encashment
and the same were returned as " not arranged forö by intimation
dated 4.6.1997. Thereafter, the complainant issued a statutory
notice on 10.6.1997 calling upon the accused to discharge the
entire cheque amount of Rs.2 Lakhs. Despite receipt of the said
statutory notice on 12.6.1997, the accused neither paid the
amount nor sent any reply. Hence, the complainant filed a
complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
through his Power of Attorney one Bhoopathy.
(b) On the basis of the sworn statement taken from the said
Bhoopathy on 17.3.1998, the case was taken on file and summons
was issued to the accused. After appearance, the trial was
proceeded with.
(c) During the course of trial, the complainant examined himself
as P.W.1 and the Bank Officer, who returned the cheque as ônot
arranged forö, was examined as P.W.2 through whom Exs.P-1 to P-9
were marked. On the side of defence, D.Ws.1 to 5 were examined
and Exs.D-1 to D-4 were marked.
(d) The trial Court ultimately concluded that the prosecution
proved its case and found the accused guilty for the offence
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and sentenced
her to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to
pay a fine of Rs.5,000 /-."
5. The points urged by the learned counsel for the
appellant/ accused could be summarised as follows:-
"(i) The complainant, instead of filing the complaint
directly, has filed the complaint through Power of Attorney. The
power of attorney holder is not competent to speak about the
transaction that took place between the payee and the drawer of
the cheques. Further, the document for the power of attorney was
not filed.
(ii) The name of the payee has not been correctly written
in the cheques in question. The complainantÆs name is MUKANCHAND
BOTHRA. But, the cheques were issued in the name of MUKALCHAND
BOTHRA. Therefore, complainant is not the payee of the cheques
in question and as such, he can not institute the complaint.
(iii) The complainant did not prove that there was a
legally enforceable debt by producing the receipts or vouchers to
show that the loan was lent to the accused. Though the
complainant claimed himself as a financier, D.W.3 Deputy
Tahsildar stated that the complainant does not have the licence
to carry on the money lending business. Further, he has not
filed the income tax return showing the said loan. D. W.2, the
Income Tax Officer, deposed that the complainant did not file his
return subsequent to 1991. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.1 that
he gave the loan to the accused is false.
(iv) The cheques in question bearing dates 30.5.1997 and
31.5.1997 would not have been issued after the date of the
promissory note (i.e.,) 5.7.1996, as the complainant himself
admitted that the agreement was executed on 30.12.1995. The
complainant received several cheques and promissory notes from
the accused and her brother for security purpose during the year
1993 to 1995 and some of the cheques were misused by filing both
civil suits and criminal complaints including the present false
complaint in order to coerce the accused and tarnish her
popularity as movie star. The accused was merely a guarantor to
the said agreement and she issued those cheques as security
only."
6. On the basis of these points, the learned counsel for
the accused would submit that the conviction imposed by the trial
Court is not valid and consequently, the accused is entitled to
be acquitted.
7. While both these matters were taken up for final
disposal and the arguments were heard, the accused/appellant
chose to file an application before this Court in Crl.M.P.No.6440
of 2000 to permit her to adduce additional evidence under Section
391 Cr.P.C. pending appeal.
8. In reply to the various points urged by the learned
counsel for the accused, the learned senior counsel for the
complainant would submit that all these points have been
correctly dealt with by the trial Court and while rejecting the
said contentions, proper reasonings have been given by the trial
Court for basing the conviction.
9. The learned senior counsel for the complainant would
further submit that in regard to inadequacy of the sentence, the
cheque amount involved in this case is Rs.2 Lakhs and when
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would provide for
the sentence of imprisonment for one year or to pay a fine of
twice the cheque amount, the trial Court ought to have imposed
appropriate sentence by sending the accused to undergo
imprisonment for one year or to pay a fine or compensation to the
value of twice the cheque amount.
10. I have heard the contentions urged by the learned
counsel on either side and carefully perused the materials
available on record.
11. On a careful analysis of the records, I am of the
view that none of the grounds urged by the learned counsel for
the appellant/ accused would impress me, as the materials
available on record would clearly show that the prosecution
proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and as such, the findings
given by the trial Court for conviction on the accused cannot be
said to be wrong.
12. Regarding the first point relating to filing of the
complaint through the power of attorney, it is to be stated that
during the course of trial, the validity of the cognizance on the
basis of the sworn statement of the power of attorney holder was
not questioned.
13. Furthermore, there is no law, which prohibits filing
of the complaint through power of attorney either on behalf of
the individual or on behalf of the company. Only when the
validity of the power of attorney is questioned, the Court could
be called upon to decide the genuineness or the validity of the
power of attorney.
14. In this case, it is noticed that the complaint was
taken on file on the basis of the sworn statement given by one
Bhoopathy, who is the power of attorney holder. Thereafter, when
the trial commenced, the complainant himself was ready to depose
his evidence. When an application was filed by the complainant
in Crl.M.P.No.750 of 1999 on 9.4 .1999 seeking for permission to
examine him as P.W.1, the counsel for the accused made an
endorsement stating no objection for such examination.
Accordingly, the complainant, who is the payee and in whose
favour the cheques in question were drawn, was examined as P.W.1
in chief and cross.
15. When such being the case, it cannot be contended
that the power of attorney holder should not have been allowed to
file the complaint. It is true that the power of attorney holder
may not be able to give full details of the transaction that took
place between the drawer and payee of the cheques, but such
lacuna is not available in this case, since the complainant came
to the box and subjected himself for cross-examination.
Therefore, the first point relating to power of attorney does not
merit consideration.
16. Nextly, it is contended that the name of the payee
has not been correctly mentioned.
17. It is true that the name of the complainant is
MUKANCHAND BOTHRA. It is the case of the complainant that he
received the cheques from the accused, which were drawn in favour
of the complainant and presented the cheques for collection in
Karnataka Bank, where his account is maintained. When the
cheques were sent to the State Bank of India, T.Nagar Branch, in
which the account of the accused is maintained, it was returned
only with the endorsement ônot arranged forö and accordingly, the
intimation of dishonour of the cheques was sent by the Karnataka
Bank to the complainant. Thus, it is clear that the cheques were
not returned on the ground that the name of the payee was not
correctly mentioned.
18. On the other hand, a suggestion was put to the
complainant that those cheques were issued by the accused in
favour of the complainant MUKANCHAND BOTHRA only as security in
the capacity as guarantor. It is also noticed that no suggestion
was put in the cross-examination that the complainant was not the
payee, but someone else.
19. That apart, when the statutory notice was issued by
the complainant as payee of the cheques with reference to the
dishonour of the cheques, the accused, who received it, did not
choose to send any reply raising this sort of plea. Therefore,
mere spelling mistake by writing the name of the complainant in
the cheques as MUKALCHAND BOTHRA, instead of MUKANCHAND BOTHRA,
cannot be a ground to hold that the complainant is not the payee
of the cheques. Therefore, this point also would fail.
20. Nextly, it is contended that there is no material to
show that there was a legally enforceable debt when the cheques
were issued. For this argument, there is no basis.
21. It is the consistent plea of the prosecution through
statutory notice, complaint and the deposition that the accused
received a loan of Rs.5 Lakhs on 5.7.1996 and when the said
amount was demanded, the accused issued two post-dated cheques
for Rs.1 lakh each bearing the dates as 30.5.1997 and 31.5.1997.
22. It is the further case of the complainant that while
the loan amount of Rs.5 lakhs was given, the accused executed a
promissory note in respect of the said amount on 5.7.1996. To
establish the said fact, P.W.1 had not only adduced oral
evidence, but also marked Ex.P-1 promissory note executed by the
accused. He further marked Ex.P-6 statutory notice and Ex.P-7
acknowledgement signed by the accused for having received the
said statutory notice.
23. It is also noticed that in the cross-examination of
the complainant, suggestions were made by the accused that the
debts covered by the cheques were earlier discharged. Under
those circumstances, it is clear that the cheques were obtained
by the complainant towards discharge of part of the liability in
respect of the promissory note executed by the accused for Rs.5
Lakhs.
24. Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would
provide thus:-
ôIt shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved,
that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature
referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in
part, or any debt or other liability.ö
25. The term ôdebt or other liabilityö has been defined
in Explanation to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
which is as follows:
ôFor the purpose of this Section, ôdebt or other
liabilityö means a legally enforceable debt or other liability."
26. Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would
provide for presumption as to negotiable instruments of
consideration, which is as follows:-
ôUntil the contrary is proved, the following presumptions
shall be made:-
(a) of consideration -ù that every negotiable instrument was made
or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when
it has been accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred, was
accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;ö
27. Thus, Sections 118, 138 and 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act would require that the Court ôshall presumeö the
liability of the drawer of the cheques for the amount for which
the cheques were drawn on accepting the consideration.
28. Therefore, it is obligatory on the Court to raise
this presumption in every case where the factual presumption has
been established. Such a presumption is a presumption of law, as
distinguished from a presumption of fact which describes provisi
ons by which the court ô may presumeö a certain state of affairs.
29. In other words, when the prosecution provided the
facts required to form a basis for presumption, no discretion is
left with the Court but to draw the statutory conclusion, in
favour of the complainant. In the case of a discretionary
presumption, the presumption if drawn may be rebutted by an
explanation which ômight reasonably be true and which is
consistent with the innocenceö of the accused.
30. In the case of a mandatory presumption ôthe burden
on the accused personö would not be a light, as one cannot be
held to be discharged merely by reason of the fact that the
explanation offered by the accused is reasonable and probable.
31. The words ôunless the contrary is provedö contained
in Sections 1 18 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would
make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by æproofÆ
and not by a bare explanation, which is merely plausible. Unless
the explanation is supported by proof, the mandatory presumption
created by the provision cannot be said to be rebutted.
32. It is contended by the learned counsel for the
accused that the complainant received several cheques and several
promissory notes from the accused and her brother and the same
were misused, even though the entire amount of loan had been
discharged.
33. When such is the defence case, it is for the accused
to adduce oral and documentary evidence to establish that the
entire amount had been paid back to the complainant.
Unfortunately, in this case, no steps were taken by the accused
to prove the same.
34. On the other hand, the accused chose to examine the
Income Tax Officer as D.W.2 and the Executive Deputy Tahsildar as
D.W.3 to speak about the fact that P.W.1 complainant does not
have the licence for money lending and no income tax return was
filed showing the loan in the present transaction.
35. Summoning of these witnesses and examining them in
the Court are not only unnecessary, but also wasting of the
CourtÆs time to the core. As a matter of fact, P.W.1 would admit
that he did not possess licence under the Money Lenders Act and
he did not file any income tax return.
36. Under those circumstances, it would be sheer waste
of time in summoning of these officials to come to the Court and
depose the same fact, which had been admitted by the complainant.
By adopting this course, the accused has caused inconvenience to
the official, defence witnesses, as well as to the Court.
37. On the other hand, the accused must have examined
other witnesses or produced documents to show that the loan
amount had already been discharged and despite that, the cheques,
which were given for the discharge of the loan, were not
returned.
38. Though on the defence side, D.Ws.1 to 6 were
examined, none of the witnesses would speak about the defence
plea raised in this case. That apart, the accused did not care
to enter the witness box to support her case.
39. In the light of the materials produced by the
complainant through oral and documentary evidence and in the
light of the fact that the accused failed to make an attempt to
rebut the presumption by proving the defence plea in terms of
Sections 118, 138 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
which is held to be mandatory as per the decision of the Supreme
Court in HABBALAPPA DUNDAPPA KATTI AND OTHERS v. STATE OF
KARNATAKA (2001 (3) CRIMES 218 (S.C), it has to be held that the
cheques had been issued by the accused only towards discharge of
the liability and the same had been dishonoured and the cheque
amounts were not repaid in time, despite the receipt of the
statutory notice.
40. The last point that was urged is that the cheques
dated 30.5.1997 and 31.5.1997 would not have been issued, as the
agreement was entered into between the parties on 30.12.1995.
The complainant never stated that there was an agreement entered
into between the accused and the complainant on 30.12.1995 and he
would only refer to the agreement entered between the brother of
the accused and the complainant, which has no connection with the
present transaction.
41. According to the complainant, the accused received a
loan of Rs.5 Lakhs and executed the promissory note on 5.7.1996
and while demanding the payment, he received two post-dated
cheques dated 30.5.1997 and 31.5.1997. Therefore, the agreement
dated 30.12.1995 would not project relevancy with reference to
the issue in question.
42. As already stated, once the execution of the cheques
is not denied, it shall be presumed under Section 139 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act that the cheques were issued by the
accused for discharge of the liability, unless it is established
through acceptable evidence by the defence to show that the
cheques were misused, even though the amounts covered under the
cheques were repaid.
43. Therefore, by merely stating that the cheques were
given as security in respect of the agreement entered into
between the complainant and her brother Kumaraswamy even without
examining the said Kumaraswamy as defence witness or by producing
the agreement, the Court cannot be asked to accept her plea.
44. Under those circumstances, all these points urged by
the learned counsel for the appellant/accused would have to be
rejected, particularly, when the evidence adduced by the
complainant oral and documentary is acceptable.
45. At this juncture, let us now go to the prayer made
in the application in Crl.M.P. No.6440 of 2000 by the accused
before this Court seeking permission to adduce additional
evidence by summoning various documents.
46. Under Section 391 Cr.P.C., the appellate Court is
empowered, if it thinks that the additional evidence is
necessary, to record its reason and take such evidence by itself
or direct it to be taken by the lower Court.
47. In this case, in the application filed under Section
391 Cr.P.C, it is seen that this Court has been asked to permit
the accused to adduce additional evidence by summoning various
records relating to several criminal cases pending in various
Criminal Courts and the records relating to the civil suits
pending in City Civil Court and in the High Court.
48. Though the petition would contain a detailed story
as to how the accused was made to face all the proceedings
instituted by the complainant, nothing is stated about the
necessity or grounds on the basis of which this Court can
exercise its power to permit the petitioner to adduce additional
evidence.
49. In the present application, no circumstance has been
shown to make this Court to think that the additional evidence is
necessary. When those grounds are absent, this Court may not be
able to record its reason by allowing the said application,
especially, when the Section would provide that recording its
reason is mandatory.
50. As noted above, it is noticed in the application that the
accused prays this Court to summon the records from XIV
Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, VIII Metropolitan Magistrate,
George Town, and IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet and the
civil Courts records from the XI Assistant Judge, City Civil
Court, Chennai and the records from the Original side of the High
Court and the records from the Appellate side of the High Court.
51. I am at a loss to understand as to how those records could
be sought to be summoned, when those records from various Courts
would not be relevant to decide the issue in question. This is
nothing, but an attempt to waste the time of the Court again and
to abuse the process of this Court.
52. Under those circumstances, the application in
Crl.M.P.No.6440 of 2000 filed under Section 391 Cr.P.C. is
liable to be dismissed.
53. In view of the discussions made in the earlier paragraphs
with regard to the merits of the appeal, the appeal against the
conviction is also liable to be dismissed.
54. Let us now come to the revision seeking for enhancement of
sentence.
55. There is no dispute in regard to the powers vested with this
Court in revision for enhancement of sentence as laid down by the
Supreme Court in PRATAP v. STATE OF U.P. (AIR 1973 S.C. 786)
and in the decision of this Court in J.S.AGENCIES AND OTHERS v.
M/s. NAMAKKAL SOUTH INDIA TRANSPORTS (1999 (1) CRIMES 70)
followed in EKNATH V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (AIR 1977 S.C. 1177)
AND NADI KHAN v. STATE (AIR 1976 S.C. 2205).
56. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides that
the person who committed the offence under this Section shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the
cheque, or with both.
57. Even though the trial Court held that the offence was proved
in respect of the cheque amount to the value of Rs.2 Lakhs, it
thought it fit to sentence the accused to undergo imprisonment
till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-.
58. According to the learned counsel for the
petitioner/complainant, this is neither adequate nor in
consonance with the spirit of the penal Section.
59. The reading of the Section as well as the guidelines given
by the Supreme Court in regard to the necessity of payment of
compensation in the cases arising out of the proceedings under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would make it
obvious that the sentence must be sufficient so as to make the
complainant to get suitable compensation.
60. It is true that the Judicial Magistrate is empowered
to impose a maximum fine of Rs.5,000/- under Section 29 Cr.P.C.
But, it may be pointed out that if the Judicial Magistrate thinks
that the fact situation in a particular case warrants imposition
of sentence more severe than the limit fixed under Section 29
Cr.P.C., after finding the accused guilty, he can forward to the
Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 325 Cr.P.C. for imposing
the fine more than Rs.5,000/-.
61. In this case, such a course has not been adopted by
the trial Court which merely sentenced the accused to pay a fine
of Rs.5,000/- being the maximum limit of the fine, which the
Judicial Magistrate could impose. Another course open to the
Magistrate is to invoke Section 357 Cr.P.C. But, the learned
Judicial Magistrate has not taken into consideration the fact
that the complainant in the complaint itself requested for
compensation as contemplated under Section 357 Cr.P.C.
62. This Court as well as the Supreme Court has
invariably emphasised the need for making liberal use of Section
357 Cr.P.C. regarding compensation, especially, when the cheque
amount is high. Under such circumstances, the learned Judicial
Magistrate should have considered for imposing adequate
compensation under Section 357 Cr.P.C.
63. There are two limbs in Section 357 Cr.P.C. Under
Section 357(1)(b) Cr.P.C., while imposing the sentence of fine,
the Judicial Magistrate can award either the portion of the fine
or the entire portion as compensation. In other words, the
Judicial Magistrate cannot order compensation more than
Rs.5,000/-. But, under the second limb of Section 357, namely,
357(3) Cr.P.C., the Judicial Magistrate can award any sum as
compensation taking note of the fact situation.
64. In this context, the observation of the Supreme
Court in PANKAJBHAI NAGJIBHAI PATEL v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT AND
ANOTHER (2001 (1) CRIMES 165 (S.C.)) is worth mentioning:-
ôEven that apart, a Magistrate who thinks it fit that the
complainant must be compensated with his loss he can resort to
the course indicated in Section 357 of the Code. This aspect has
been dealt with in K.BHASKARAN v. SANKARAN VAIDHYAN BALAN AND
ANOTHER (1999 (7) S.C.C. 5 10) as follows:-
However the Magistrate in such cases can alleviate the
grievance of the complainant by making resort to section 357(3)
of the Code. It is well to remember that this Court has
emphasised the need for making liberal use of that provision
(HARI SINGH v. SUKHBIR SINGH ((1988) (4) S.C.C. 551). No limit
is mentioned in the sub-section and therefore, a Magistrate can
award any sum as compensation. Of course while fixing the
quantum of such compensation the Magistrate has to consider what
would be the reasonable amount of compensation payable to the
complainant. Thus, even if the trial was before a Court of
Magistrate of the first class in respect of a cheque which covers
an amount exceeding Rs.5,000/- the Court has power to award
compensation to be paid to the complainant.ö
65. In the light of the above observation, the learned
Magistrate could have very well invoked Section 357 (3) Cr.P.C.
to award compensation either for the cheque amount or twice the
cheque amount or any reasonable amount to alleviate the grievance
of the complainant. 66. However, the bar put on the
Magistrate in respect of Section 29 Cr.P.C. would not be
applicable to the High Court, as Section 357(4) Cr.P.C. would
state that the order under Section 357 Cr.P.C. could be used by
the High Court, while exercising its power under revision.
67. Therefore, this Court under Section 357(1)(b) could
impose a fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheques
and in the event of default in payment of the amount, the accused
could be sentenced to imprisonment for a specified period. In
the alternative, this Court could invoke Section 357 (3) Cr.P.C.
by ordering compensation of any sum and the quantum of
compensation could be decided taking note of the fact situation.
68. Out of these two provisions, this Court is of the
view that it would be appropriate to invoke Section 357(1)(b)
Cr.P.C. by which the accused could be sentenced to pay a
substantial fine amount (i.e.,) twice the cheque amount.
69. The trial Court imposed the sentence of imprisonment
for only one day. Though this is not sufficient, I am not
inclined to send the accused to prison, since her career as Cine
Artiste would be spoiled and it may also affect the production of
the films in which she is acting. So, instead of enhancing the
sentence of imprisonment, it would be appropriate to enhance the
sentence of fine to twice the amount of the cheques and the
cheque amount can be awarded as compensation to the complainant.
70. Accordingly, the fine amount of Rs.5,000/- imposed
by the trial Court is enhanced to Rs.4 Lakhs being twice the
cheque amount.
71. It is noticed that the fine of Rs.5,000/- has
already been paid in the trial Court. Therefore, the
appellant/accused is directed to deposit the balance fine amount,
namely, Rs.3,95,000/- in the trial Court within four weeks from
today, in default, the accused will undergo rigourous
imprisonment for one year. After such deposit, the trial Court
is directed to pay the entire cheque amount of Rs.2 Lakhs to the
complainant, 72. With the above observation, the revision filed
by the petitioner/complainant is liable to be allowed. 73. In
the result, the Criminal Appeal and Crl.M.P. No.6440 of 2000
filed by the appellant/ accused are dismissed and the Criminal
Revision Case filed by the petitioner/appellant is allowed.
25-1-2002
Index: Yes
dpp
/True copy/
Sd/
Asst.Registrar
To
1. The XV Metropolitan Magistrate,
George Town,Chennai.
2. The Public Prosecutor,
High Court,
Chennai.
M. KARPAGAVINAYAGAM, J.
Common Judgment in CRL.A.No.261 of 2000; Crl.R.C. No.736 of 1999; & Crl.M.P.No.6440 of 2000.
25-1-2002