Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
State Of Rajasthan And Another vs Smt. Salma Khan And Others on 20 December, 2000
Equivalent citations: I(2001)ACC534, 2001(1)WLC379, 2001(1)WLN274
Bench: Ar. Lakshmanan, A.K. Parihar
ORDER Lakshmanan, CJ.
1. Heard Mr. Akbar Khan for the appellants.
(2). This Special Appeal is preferred by the State of Rajasthan against the judgment dated 3.5.2000 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing !he Civil Misc. Appeal No. 649/1992 filed by the appellants for setting aside the judgment and award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ajmer (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') dated 10.9.1992 passed in Claim Petition No. 16/1992 filed by the respondents 1 to 5 herein.
(3). Before the Tribunal, two contentions were raised. The first contention relates to limitation. The second contention is that the death did not occur on account of accident but as a result of suicide committed by Israr Beg and, therefore, the Tribunal should not have entertained the claim petition and should not have granted any compensation. The very same contentions were raised before the learned Single Judge. The Tribunal framed issues 1 and 4 for consideration. One issue was whether the death was occasioned on account of accident or as a result of suicide committed by the deceased Israr Beg. The Tribunal after detailed consideration of the material and evidence placed by the claimants and the other side reached to the conclusion that the death was on account of the accident and not as a result of suicide committed by him. In sofar as the limitation is concerned, he Tribunal had exercised its power to condone the delay.
(4). In this special appeal before us, the same contentions are raised. In sofar as the limitation is concerned, it was contended that since the accident took place on 11.8.1981 and the claim petition was filed before the Tribunal on 19.2.1982 i.e. beyond the period of six months as prescribed under Sec. 110(A) (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as 'the old Act') (under Sec. 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the new Act') and, therefore, the claim petition was time barred. It is also contended that the Tribunal has not framed any issue upon this point as such, the Tribunal has committed a gross error of law as well as facts with material irregularity and, therefore, the judgment and award deserves to be quashed and set aside on this ground alone.
(5). The learned Single Judge (Hon'ble Mr. Justice P.P. Naolekar) vide his judgment dated 3.5.2000 rejected both the contentions and dismissed the appeal. Against which, the present special appeal has been filed.
(6). Mr. Akbar Khan again reiterated the same contentions raised before the learned Single Judge. We have perused the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal which clearly states that the death of Israr Beg was due to the accident only and not on account of suicide. For reaching such conclusion, the Tribunal has considered the evidence led in by both the sides and appreciated the same in a proper manner. Under such circumstances, the said finding recorded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the learned Single Judge does not call for any interference.
(7). In sofar as the limitation is concerned, Mr. Akbar Khan, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the claim petition was beyond the period of months as prescribed under the provisions of the Old Act and under Sec. 110(A)(3) of the Old Act, the delay cannot be condoned since the delay has not been properly explained. We are unable to accept the said submission. Sec. 166 of the new Act deals with the application for compensation. Sub-section (3) of Sec. 166 of the new Act reads as follows:
"(3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of (he occurrence of the accident.
Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time."
(8). The proviso to sub-section (3) of Sec. 166 of the new Act also provides that the Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the period of six months but not later than 12 months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.
(9). The above provision i.e. sub-section (3) of Sec. 166 of the new Act was deleted by the amending Act No. 54 of 1994. The proviso to sub-sec, (3) of Section 166 of the new Act provides that a Claims Tribunal can entertain an application for compensation not above the period of 12 months from the date of occurrence of the accident provided sufficient cause is shown. This clearly means that if an application for compensation is filed beyond a period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident, the Tribunal shall not be entitled to entertain it or in other words, it shall have no power to condone the delay. There is thus an express provision in proviso to sub- section (3) of Sec, 166 of the new Act that delay in making an application for compensation shall be condonable only if it is not beyond 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident and that proviso expressly excludes the applicability of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act in case where an application for compensation is delayed by more than 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. Thus, as per the provisions of Sec. 166(3) of the new Act, the Tribunal acting under the new Act has no jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the period of 12 months from the date of occurrence of the accident.
(10). Sub-section (3) of Sec. 166 of the new Act was deleted by the Amending Act No. 54 of 1994 which came into effect from 14.11.1994. As already noticed under the provisions of old Section 166(3), no application for compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. Proviso to this sub-section also provides that claim petition made after expiry of six months but not later than 12 months can be entertained if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by a sufficient cause from making the application in time. The said section has now been deleted. Therefore, there is no limitation for preferring the claim petition. The Supreme Court in the Case of Dhannalal vs. D.P. Vijayvargiya and Others (1) held that the benefit of deletion of Sec. 166(3) of the Act of 1988 is also to be extended to pending claim petitions where plea of limitation has been raised. The scope and applicability of the deleted section by the Amending Act No. 54 of 1994 was considered by the Supreme Court in the above matter. The Supreme Court held that from the Amending Act, it does not appear that sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 of the new Act has been deleted retrospectively. But at the same time, there is nothing in the Amending Act to show that benefit of deletion of sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 166 is not to be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. In the instant case, the appeal filed by the appellants was pending before the learned Single Judge and now being pursued before this Court. In view of the Amending Act, we are of the opinion that the claimants became entitled to file such a claim petition since the period of limitation having been deleted and the claim petition being pursued before this Court. Therefore, the same cannot be dismissed on the ground of limitation.
(11). Accordingly, we find no merit in the appeal and the same is, hereby, dismissed. The judgment and award of the Tribunal and the judgment of the learned Single Judge are affirmed.