Jharkhand High Court
Ajeet Rana vs Pooja Kumari on 2 December, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:35989-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No. 147 of 2025
Ajeet Rana, aged 35 years, S/o of Shri Ram Pravesh Rana,
resident of Village-Latbedhwa, P.O.-Sarmapand, P.S.
Jainagar, District-Koderma.
...Respondent/Appellant
Versus
Pooja Kumari, aged about 25 years, W/o Ajeet Rana,
resident of village-Lathedhwa, P.O.- Jainagar, District-
Koderma, At present resident of village-Kanti Basti, P.O.
Telaiya Dam, P.S. Jainagar, District-Koderma.
... ... Petitioner/Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For the Appellant : Mr. Ashim Kumar Sahani, Adv
For the Respondent : Mr. Amritanshu Singh, Advocate
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CAV/Reserved on 25.11.2025 Pronounced on 02/12/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer:
1. The instant appeal, under Section 19(1) of the Family Court Act, 1984, is directed against the order/judgment dated 23.04.2025, passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Koderma in Original Suit No. 118 of 2023, whereby and whereunder the petition filed by the respondent under Section 25 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 for custody of minor children has been partly decreed and it has been ordered that the custody of minor son, Aditya Rana shall remain with his father- Ajeet Rana [appellant] while the custody of daughter Aditi Kumari shall go to her mother-
petitioner, Pooja Kumari [respondent].
1
2025:JHHC:35989-DB Brief facts of the case:
2. The brief facts of the case, as per plaint and written statement filed in the trial court, as taken note in the impugned order, needs to be referred herein as under:
3. The suit being Original Suit No. 118 of 2023 was filed by respondent-mother stating therein that two children were born out of wedlock with the respondent-father who during the course of time developed illicit relationship elsewhere. It is further stated that on 12.06.2023 she came to know that her in-laws were admitted in Sadar Hospital, Koderma having met with an accident and while she was rushing to the said hospital one Chandan Rana overpowered and kidnapped her. The police on 16.06.2023 instituted Jainagar PS Case No. 119 of 2023 against the said Chandan Rana while respondent since then has severed the marital ties with her forcibly keeping the children.
4. Pursuant to notice being served, the respondent-father [appellant herein] appeared and filed his written statement denying the allegations stating inter alia that the suit is not maintainable as the same is without any valid cause of action. It is further alleged that petitioner-mother was having extra-marital affair with said Chandan Rana. On 12.06.2023 while his parents had gone to Jhumri Telaiya the petitioner, namely, Pooja Kumari left home with 2 2025:JHHC:35989-DB Chandan Kumar Rana leaving behind her two children for which Jainagar PS Case No. 119/2023 was instituted.
Pursuant thereto, the respondent herein and Chandan Kumar Rana were recovered and brought back after 15 days. Therefore, ground has been taken that the petitioner-wife [respondent herein] has neither any love nor affection for her children nor is capable to look after them.
5. The petitioner-respondent herein, Pooja Kumari, in support of her case examined herself as PW-1 and other three witnesses being her mother-Munwa Devi as PW-2, her sister Usha Devi as PW-3, and her brother-in-law Tarkeshwar Rana as PW-4, were examined on her behalf.
6. While the respondent, Ajeet Rana [appellant herein] on the other hand has examined his mother Devanti Devi as RW-1, his father Ram Pravesh Rana as RW-2, and himself as RW-3.
7. Two documents, being the judgments in Original Suit 79/2023 and Original Maintenance 105/2023, have been marked as Exhibits A and B respectively on his behalf.
8. The learned family court, on the basis of pleading available on record, framed the issues, and evidences were led on behalf of parties.
9. The learned family court, based upon consideration of principle of handing over the children, and the evidence led on behalf of parties, allowed the suit in part, against which, 3 2025:JHHC:35989-DB the instant appeal has been preferred by the respondent- father [appellant herein].
Submission of learned counsel for the appellant:
10. The learned counsel for the appellant-father has taken the following ground in assailing the impugned order passed by the learned family court.
11. Submission has been made that learned family court misconstrued the pleadings and evidences adduced by the parties resulting into perverse findings, which vitiates the impugned judgment.
12. Further submission has been made that in view of the facts admitted by the respondent that respondent-wife left both the minor children uncared for and she fled away with said Chandan Kumar Rana from her matrimonial home in absence of appellant and his family members, itself goes to suggest that she does not have love and affection towards her children but this aspect of the matter has not been taken into consideration by learned family court.
13. It has been submitted that if a mother leaves her minor children and elopes with another person, in such a situation it is not fit to hand over the guardianship of minor daughter to such lady. Further in view of dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce there was no justified reason to allow the 4 2025:JHHC:35989-DB custody of one of the children to the respondent who has developed extra-marital relation.
14. Further ground has been taken that the respondent has fled away with another person, namely, Chandan Kumar Rana, who later on was recovered by the police, as such in that pretext it is quite impossible for the respondent to take care of the child [daughter]. But the learned family court has failed to appreciate the fact that such act of her mother can create a psychological and mental effect on the child.
15. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the finding recorded by the learned family court while granting the custody of minor daughter to the respondent-mother is based upon presumption and assumption which is contrary to the pleadings available on record, as such the impugned judgment is perverse and requires interference by this Court.
16. The learned counsel for the appellant based upon the aforesaid ground has submitted that since there is no consideration of these facts by learned trial court, as such the impugned judgment requires interference by this Court. Submission of learned counsel for the respondent:
17. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has taken the following ground in defending the order passed by the learned family court.
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18. Submission has been made that admittedly out of the wedlock of appellant and respondent one son namely Aditya Rana and daughter Aditi Kumari were born. However, when on 12.6.2023, she rushed to Koderma Sadar Hospital to attend her parents-in-law who reportedly had met with an accident, leaving her children with her neighbours but she was overpowered by one Chandan Rana, for which, an FIR was lodged and pursuant thereto the police recovered and produced her before SDJM, Koderma, But her husband and in-laws refused to take her back from the Court. Under this peculiar situation, her children are residing with her husband [appellant] and in-laws but being infants they require their mother.
19. Further submission has been made that she with the aid of her parents is financially well and capable to take care of them. In her deposition, she has claimed to be earning Rs.14,000/- per month at Ranchi where she lives with her mother.
20. It has been submitted that the learned family court has taken into consideration the fact that the minor girl is of very tender age and not even school going, as such she is oblivious to the nature of litigation or even of the dispute between her parents. Therefore, the minor daughter is in requirement of her mother as she appeared ragged, uncared, and neglected. Furthermore as the children are under the 6 2025:JHHC:35989-DB care of their grand-mother as such the welfare of the daughter would be best served by giving her custody to her mother.
21. The learned family court based upon the aforesaid ground and on consideration of the aforesaid fact has passed the impugned judgment which requires no interference by this court.
Analysis
22. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through pleading available on record as also the finding recorded by learned family court.
23. This Court, before going to examine as to whether the finding recorded by learned family court denying the custody of the minor daughter to the father, the appellant herein, requires interference needs to refer herein the provision of law as provided under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and as also the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.
24. Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 deals with natural guardian of a Hindu minor, Section 9 thereof deals with the testamentary guardians and their powers and Section 13 deals with the provision of welfare of the minor to be paramount consideration. For ready reference, these provisions are quoted as under: 7
2025:JHHC:35989-DB "6. Natural guardians of a Hindu minor.--The natural guardians of a Hindu minor; in respect of the minor's person as well as in respect of the minor's property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property), are-- (a) in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl--the father, and after him, the mother: provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother; (b) in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl--the mother, and after her, the father; (c) in the case of a married girl--the husband: Provided that no person shall be entitled to act as the natural guardian of a minor under the provisions of this section-- (a) if he has ceased to be a Hindu, or (b) if he has completely and finally renounced the world by becoming a hermit (vanaprastha) or an ascetic (yati or sanyasi). Explanation.--In this section, the expressions "father" and "mother" do not include a step-father and a step-
mother.
9. Testamentary guardians and their powers.--(1) A Hindu father entitled to act as the natural guardian of his minor legitimate children may, by will appoint a guardian for any of them in respect of the minor's person or in respect of the minor's property (other than the undivided interest referred to in section 12) or in respect of both. (2) An appointment made under sub-section (1) shall have no effect if the father predeceases the mother, but shall revive if the mother dies without appointing, by will, any person as guardian. (3) A Hindu widow entitled to act as the natural guardian of her minor legitimate children, and a Hindu mother entitled to act as the natural guardian of her minor legitimate children by reason of the fact that the father has become disentitled to act as such, may, by will, appoint a guardian for any of them in respect of the minor's person or in respect of the minor's property (other than the undivided interest referred to in section 12) or in respect of both. (4) A Hindu mother entitled to act as the natural guardian of her minor illegitimate children may; by will, appoint a guardian for any of them in respect of the minor's person or in respect of the minor's property or in respect of both. (5) The guardian so 8 2025:JHHC:35989-DB appointed by will has the right to act as the minor's guardian after the death of the minor's father or mother, as the case may be, and to exercise all the rights of a natural guardian under this Act to such extent and subject to such restrictions, if any, as are specified in this Act and in the will. (6) The right of the guardian so appointed by will shall, where the minor is a girl, cease on her marriage.
13. Welfare of minor to be paramount consideration.--
(1) In the appointment of declaration of any person as guardian of a Hindu minor by a court, the welfare of the minor shall be the paramount consideration. (2) No person shall be entitled to the guardianship by virtue of the provisions of this Act or of any law relating to guardianship in marriage among Hindus, if the court is of opinion that his or her guardianship will not be for the welfare of the minor."
25. It needs to refer herein that the word „after‟ as used in Section 6(a) can be construed so as to save it from being unconstitutional the presumption being that the legislature acted in accordance with the constitution. Moreover, when Sections 4 and 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act are construed harmoniously the word „after‟ can be understood to mean „in the absence of‟, thereby referring to father's absence from the care of the minor's property or person for any reason whatever. Hence, in such situations mother can act as natural guardian of the minor during the lifetime of the father, who would be deemed to be „absent‟ reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, (1999) 2 SCC 228. 9
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26. It is evident from Section 13 that while appointing any person as guardian of a Hindu minor the paramount consideration is the welfare of the minor and no person shall be entitled to the guardianship by virtue of the provisions of this Act or of any law relating to guardianship in marriage among Hindus, if the court is of opinion that his or her guardianship will not be for the welfare of the minor.
27. The matter to be considered by the Court in appointing guardian has been made under the provisions of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. For ready reference, the relevant provision of the Act, 1890 is quoted as under:
"4. (1) "minor" means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, (9 of 1875) is to be deemed not to have attained his majority:
(2) "guardian" mean's a person having the care of the person of a minor or of his property, or of both is person and property:
7. Power of the Court to make order as to guardianship.--(1) where the Court is satisfied that it is for the welfare of a minor that an order should be made-- (a) appointing a guardian of his person or property, or both, or (b) declaring a person to be such a guardian, the Court may make an order accordingly.
(2) An order under this section shall imply the removal of any guardian who has not been appointed by will or other instrument or appointed or declared by the Court. (3) Where a guardian has been appointed by will or other instrument or appointed or declared by the Court, an order under this section appointing or declaring another person to be guardian in his stead shall not be made until the powers of the guardian appointed or declared as aforesaid have ceased under the provisions of this Act.
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17. Matters to be considered by the Court in appointing guardian.--(1) In appointing or declaring the guardian of a minor, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be guided by what, consistently with the law to which the minor is subject, appears in the circumstances to be for the welfare of the minor. (2) In considering what will be for the welfare of the minor, the Court shall have regard to the age, sex and religion of the minor, the character and capacity of the proposed guardian and his nearness of kin to the minor, the wishes, if any, of a deceased parent, and any existing or previous relations of the proposed guardian with the minor or his property. (3) If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference, the Court may consider that preference. 1 * * * * * (5) The Court shall not appoint or declare any person to be a guardian against his will."
28. The law, therefore, is well settled that even though the father is the natural guardian as stipulated in the statute but the paramount consideration in the matter of handing over the custody of the child is welfare of the child.
29. The law relating to custody of minors has received an exhaustive consideration by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in a series of pronouncements. In the case of Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal (2009) 1 SCC 42 the principles of English and American law in this regard were considered by Hon‟ble Apex Court to hold that the legal position in India is not in any way different. Noticing the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Saraswatibai Shripad Ved v. Shripad Vasanji Ved [AIR 1941 Bom 103] , Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal (1973) 1 SCC 840 and Thrity Hoshie Dolikuka v. Hoshiam Shavaksha 11 2025:JHHC:35989-DB Dolikuka (1982) 2 SCC 544, the Hon‟ble Apex eventually concluded in paras 50 and 51 which reads as under:
"50. [T]hat when the court is confronted with conflicting demands made by the parents, each time it has to justify the demands. The court has not only to look at the issue on legalistic basis, in such matters human angles are relevant for deciding those issues. The court then does not give emphasis on what the parties say, it has to exercise a jurisdiction which is aimed at the welfare of the minor. As observed recently in Mausami Moitra Ganguli case [Mausami Moitra Ganguli v. Jayant Ganguli, (2008) 7 SCC 673] , the court has to give due weightage to the child's ordinary contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favourable surroundings but over and above physical comforts, the moral and ethical values have also to be noted. They are equal if not more important than the others.
51. The word „welfare‟ used in Section 13 of the Act has to be construed literally and must be taken in its widest sense. The moral and ethical welfare of the child must also weigh with the court as well as its physical well-being. Though the provisions of the special statutes which govern the rights of the parents and guardians may be taken into consideration, there is nothing which can stand in the way of the court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction arising in such cases."
30. Thus, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has categorically held that while considering the issue of custody of the minor child the court has not only to look at the issue on legalistic basis, in such matters human angles are relevant for deciding those issues. Further it has been held that the Court should not emphasis only on what the parties say rather the welfare of the minor should be paramount consideration. Further the Hon‟ble Apex Court has opined that the Court has to give 12 2025:JHHC:35989-DB due weightage to the child's ordinary contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favourable surroundings but over and above physical comforts, the moral and ethical values have also to be noted.
31. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in the aforesaid Judgment interpreted the word „welfare‟ used in Section 13 of the Act and has observed that it must be taken in its widest sense, though the provisions of the special statutes which govern the rights of the parents and guardians may be taken into consideration, there is nothing which can stand in the way of the court exercising its "parens patriae jurisdiction" arising in such cases.
32. It needs to refer herein that in child custody matters, the court's "parens patriae" jurisdiction empowers the Court to act as a guardian for the child, prioritizing their best interests above all else. This principle, allows the court to intervene and make decisions that protect the child's welfare, even if it means overriding the wishes of the parents or guardians.
33. In the case of Nil Ratan Kundu v Abhijit Kundu, 2008 (9) SCC 413 the Hon‟ble Apex Court has held that in deciding a difficult and complex question as to the custody of a minor, a court of law should keep in mind the relevant statutes and the rights flowing therefrom. But such cases cannot be 13 2025:JHHC:35989-DB decided solely by interpreting legal provisions. It is a human problem and is required to be solved with human touch. A court while dealing with custody cases, is neither bound by statutes nor by strict rules of evidence or procedure nor by precedents. In selecting proper guardian of a minor, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well- being of the child. In selecting a guardian, the court is exercising "parens patriae jurisdiction" and is expected, nay bound, to give due weight to a child‟s ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favourable surroundings. But over and above physical comforts, moral and ethical values cannot be ignored. They are equally, or we may say, even more important, essential and indispensable considerations. If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference or judgment, the court must consider such preference as well, though the final decision should rest with the court as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor.
34. In the case of Yashita Sahu v State of Rajasthan, (2020) 3 SCC 67, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has propounded that the welfare of the child is paramount in matters relating to custody. In this context, we may refer to Para 22 thereof, which reads as follows:
22. A child, especially a child of tender years requires the love, affection, company, protection of both parents. This is not 14 2025:JHHC:35989-DB only the requirement of the child but is his/her basic human right. Just because the parents are at war with each other, does not mean that the child should be denied the care, affection, love or protection of any one of the two parents. A child is not an inanimate object which can be tossed from one parent to the other. Every separation, every reunion may have a traumatic and psychosomatic impact on the child. Therefore, it is to be ensured that the court weighs each and every circumstance very carefully before deciding how and in what matter the custody of the child should be shared between both the parents. Even if the custody is given to one parent the other parent must have sufficient visitation rights to ensure that the child keeps in touch with the other parent and does not lose social, physical and psychological contact with any one of the two parents. It is only in extreme circumstances that one parent should be denied contact with the child.
Reasons must be assigned if one parent is to be denied any visitation rights or contact with the child. Courts dealing with the custody matters must while deciding issues of custody clearly define the nature, manner and specifics of the visitation rights.'
35. In the case of Gaytri Bajaj v. Jiten Bhalla, (2012) 12 SCC 471, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has observed that it is the welfare and interest of the child and not the rights of the parents which is the determining factor for deciding the question of custody and the question of welfare of the child has to be considered in the context of the facts of each case and decided cases on the issue may not be appropriate to be considered as binding precedents. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under:
14. From the above it follows that an order of custody of minor children either under the provisions of the Guardians 15 2025:JHHC:35989-DB and Wards Act, 1890 or the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 is required to be made by the court treating the interest and welfare of the minor to be of paramount importance. It is not the better right of either parent that would require adjudication while deciding their entitlement to custody. The desire of the child coupled with the availability of a conducive and appropriate environment for proper upbringing together with the ability and means of the parent concerned to take care of the child are some of the relevant factors that have to be taken into account by the court while deciding the issue of custody of a minor. What must be emphasised is that while all other factors are undoubtedly relevant, it is the desire, interest and welfare of the minor which is the crucial and ultimate consideration that must guide the determination required to be made by the court.
36. It is settled position of law that there cannot be any straitjacket formula in the matters of custody. „Welfare of the child‟ is of paramount importance, reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Gautam Kumar Das v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 10 SCC 588.
37. In the case of Shazia Aman Khan v. State of Orissa, (2024) 7 SCC 564 the Hon‟ble Apex Court while referring the ratio of Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu, (2008) 9 SCC 413 has observed that welfare of the children is to be seen and not the rights of the parties, the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under:
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19. In Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu [Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu, (2008) 9 SCC 413] , this Court laid down the principles governing custody of minor children and held that welfare of the children is to be seen and not the rights of the parties by observing as under : (SCC pp. 428-
29, paras 52 & 55) "Principles governing custody of minor children
52. In our judgment, the law relating to custody of a child is fairly well-settled and it is this. In deciding a difficult and complex question as to the custody of minor, a court of law should keep in mind relevant statutes and the rights flowing therefrom. But such cases cannot be decided solely by interpreting legal provisions. It is a human problem and is required to be solved with human touch. A court while dealing with custody cases, is neither bound by statutes nor by strict rules of evidence or procedure nor by precedents. In selecting proper guardian of a minor, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the child. In selecting a guardian, the court is exercising parens patriae jurisdiction and is expected, nay bound, to give due weight to a child's ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favourable surroundings. But over and above physical comforts, moral and ethical values cannot be ignored. They are equally, or we may say, even more important, essential and indispensable considerations. If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference or judgment, the court must consider such preference as well, though the final decision should rest with the court as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor.
***
55. We are unable to appreciate the approach of the courts below. This Court in a catena of decisions has held that the controlling consideration governing the custody of children is the welfare of children and not the right of their parents."
(emphasis supplied)
21. This Court in Roxann Sharma v. Arun Sharma [Roxann Sharma v. Arun Sharma, (2015) 8 SCC 318 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 87] , opined that the child is not a chattel or ball that it 17 2025:JHHC:35989-DB is bounced to and fro. Welfare of the child is the focal point. Relevant lines from para 18 are reproduced hereunder : (SCC p. 328) "18. ... There can be no cavil that when a court is confronted by conflicting claims of custody there are no rights of the parents which have to be enforced; the child is not a chattel or a ball that is bounced to and fro the parents. It is only the child's welfare which is the focal point for consideration. Parliament rightly thinks that the custody of a child less than five years of age should ordinarily be with the mother and this expectation can be deviated from only for strong reasons."
20. This Court has consistently held that welfare of the child is of paramount consideration and not personal law and statute. In Ashish Ranjan v. Anupma Tandon [Ashish Ranjan v. Anupma Tandon, (2010) 14 SCC 274 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 948] , this Court held as under : (SCC p. 282, para
19) "19. The statutory provisions dealing with the custody of the child under any personal law cannot and must not supersede the paramount consideration as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor. In fact, no statute on the subject, can ignore, eschew or obliterate the vital factor of the welfare of the minor."
22. Another principle of law which is settled with reference to custody of the child is the wish of the child, if she is capable of. Reference can be made to Rohith Thammana Gowda v. State of Karnataka [Rohith Thammana Gowda v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 20 SCC 550 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 937] case. It was held as under : (SCC para 18) "18. We have stated earlier that the question „what is the wish/desire of the child‟ can be ascertained through interaction, but then, the question as to „what would be the best interest of the child‟ is a matter to be decided by the court taking into account all the relevant circumstances. A careful scrutiny of the impugned judgment would, however, reveal that even after identifying the said question rightly the High Court had swayed away from the said point and entered into consideration of certain aspects not relevant for 18 2025:JHHC:35989-DB the said purpose. We will explain the raison d'etre for the said remark."
38. Thus, from the aforesaid settled position of law it is evident that the consideration governing the custody of children is the welfare of the children" and not the rights of the parties." Further, the welfare of child is determined neither by economic affluence nor a deep mental or emotional concern for the well-being of the child. The answer depends on the balancing of all these factors and determining what is best for child's total well-being.
39. In the backdrop of the provisions of law and judicial pronouncements, in order to assess the welfare of the minor child, we have gone through the oral evidence adduced by the parties.
40. PW-1, Pooja Kumari is the mother of minor children, who has stated in her deposition that the suit has been filed by her for the custody of her son Aditya Rana aged 6 years and daughter Aditi Kumari aged 3 years born out of her wedlock with the respondent Ajeet Rana [appellant herein]. On 12.6.2023 she had to leave her children with her neighbour and proceeded to Koderma Sadar Hospital to attend her parents-in-law who reportedly had met with an accident. On her way to the hospital she was overpowered by the said Chandan Rana. This incident led to institution of Jainagar PS 119/2023 u/s 366, 379, 498 IPC pursuant to which the 19 2025:JHHC:35989-DB police recovered and produced her before SDJM, Koderma. Her husband and in-laws refused to take her back from the Court. Thus her children since then have been residing with her husband and in-laws but being infants they require their mother.
41. She has further deposed that with the aid of her parents is financially well-off and capable to take care of them. All her attempts to get her children or even to meet them has been thwarted by the respondent.
42. In her cross-examination she claimed to have left behind the children with her neighbour Pramila Devi whom she claimed would appear as a witness in her favour. However the said Pramila Devi has not been examined as a witness on her behalf. She has further deposed that before she was recovered along with Chandan Rana, she was kept in Gaya for 14 days by him where she was raped daily. She has claimed to be earning Rs.14,000/- per month at Ranchi where she lives with her mother.
43. P.W.-2 Munwa Devi has reiterated that Pooja Devi was tortured for additional dowry by her in-laws while the incident of Jainagar P.S. Case 119/2023 was unexpected and despite no fault of her she was divorced by the respondent [appellant herein] and her children were taken away forcibly by him. Both the kids require their mother and 20 2025:JHHC:35989-DB she with the help of her parents is capable to take care of them. This witness is the mother of the petitioner [respondent herein] and has stated in her cross-examination that the two kids were taken care of by their grand-parents while the petitioner works as a computer operator in Telaiya itself. She further contradicted herself by stating that the petitioner was not earning presently and was maintained by her father. She has not married the said Chandan Rana as he was already married. This witness further denied that the kids want to reside with their grandparents.
44. PW-3 Usha Devi in her examination-in-chief on affidavit has stated verbatim the same as that of PW-2.
45. In her cross-examination she has claimed that the kids were residing with their parental aunt i.e. their father's sister but denied any lack of love by petitioner for her children or that she was incapable to look after them.
46. PW-4 Tarkeshwar Rana has also deposed similar to other witnesses and he is husband of petitioner's [respondent herein] sister. It has been deposed that she was recovered from Telaiya Railway Station along with Chandan Rana. Prior to the incident no case against dowry demand was instituted by the petitioner. Father of the petitioner is a carpenter while she herself is a tutor in a coaching institute. 21
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47. RW-1 Devanti Devi is the mother of the respondent, Ajeet Rana [appellant herein]. She has alleged illicit physical relationship between Chandan Rana and petitioner, Pooja Kumari [respondent herein]. She has deposed that on 12.6.2023 while she along with her husband had gone to Asnabad to oversee the construction of their house, Pooja Kumari eloped with Chandan Rana leaving behind both the kids. The police on being informed by her husband had registered Jainagar PS Case No-119 of 2023 upon which she was recovered after 15 days. Thus Pooja Kumari has no love for her kids and has tarnished their image in the village. The divorce case being Original Suit No. 79 of 2023 has been decreed in favour of her son and they have been taking care of the kids adequately.
48. In her cross-examination, she has further stated that Pooja Kumari was residing in her parental home since the occurrence but she is well-educated while her father is a carpenter at Bangalore. However she was not aware when it was suggested that Pooja was employed in a school of Ranchi earning Rs.15,000/- per month while her son is a carpenter at Hazaribagh. She has further admitted that the applicant [respondent herein] after the birth of her two children under went tubal ligation for her sterilization to prevent further pregnancy and affirmed that Ajeet would be married again.
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49. RW-2, Ram Pravesh Rana is father of the respondent and his deposition on affidavit is verbatim same as of his wife RW-1 Devanti Devi.
50. In his cross-examination he has stated to be employed as a printing operator in a company at Deoghar while his son is employed in a private company at Hazaribagh. His wife resides with him but stated later on that she does not accompany him to Deoghar. The two children study in an English medium school at village itself. He has not seen Pooja to be visiting Chandan Rana any time after the occurrence. He has however admitted that the children can be looked after better by their mother and not step-mother.
51. RW-3, Ajeet Rana who is the respondent himself [appellant herein] has made same statement in his examination-in- chief on affidavit as the other two witnesses. It has come in his cross-examination that he was employed in Orissa for three years after marriage while presently he is employed as a Poclain Driver in Hazaribagh earning Rs.23,000/- per month. He is a weekly visitor to his village at Latbedhwa. His father lives in Deoghar while his brother resides in Delhi and his two sisters are married. His mother lives in Latbedhwa taking care of his children.
52. From the pleadings available on record, it is evident that admittedly the suit was filed by the respondent-Pooja 23 2025:JHHC:35989-DB Kumari for custody of the minor children one aged 6 years, a boy, and the other aged 3 years, a girl at that time and who were in custody of the father.
53. It is a settled law that in all matters of custody irrespective of the law under which the same is sought, the welfare of the child is of paramount-importance. The Court has not only to look at the issue on legalistic basis but has to take into consideration the human angles as well.
54. From the testimonies of the witnesses and pleadings available on record, it is evident that the family of appellant- Ajeet Rana comprises of his father, mother, two married sisters and a brother besides himself. The two sisters are married and reside at their respective matrimonial homes. His brother lives in Delhi while his father is employed as a printing operator in a plastic factory at Deoghar. The appellant himself is employed in a company at Hazaribagh as a poclain operator. The two children study in a school at the village itself. The appellant does not commute daily from his village to Hazaribagh and is a weekly visitor to his village. Thus, the day-to-day care of the two children falls entirely on the grand-mother as none of the other family members is in any position to look after the daily affairs of the children.
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55. The respondent-mother, on the other hand, resides at Ranchi with her mother and is engaged gainfully as a private tutor. It has further come in evidence that she is employed as a computer operator in Telaiya. She has not married to said Chandan Rana as he himself was already married. Further, as per finding recorded in the impugned order, as per claim of the respondent-mother, she cannot have any further baby as she has already undergone tubal ligation which rules out further pregnancy.
56. The learned family court, considering the rival pleadings and evidences from the perspective of child's age, parent's ability to provide for child's needs as well as preference of the children this Court, has opined that the respondent-mother is better placed or suited to obtain the custody of her children. The respondent-mother appears to be educated, employed, and is in a position to nourish and provide for her children on daily basis. The children can have the love, affection and care of her mother every day compared to weekly access to their father.
57. However, before conclusion of the hearing of the suit, children were called in the Court and during interaction in the Chamber, the learned Principal Judge has opined that the boy appeared to be having very hardened feelings against his mother. The learned Principal Judge, considering his stance and disdain with which he looked down his mother, 25 2025:JHHC:35989-DB has made an opinion that it will not be in the best interest of his well-being, more particularly psychological and mental health to give his custody to his mother. The evidence though suggests that though the father would not be available to the children on daily basis, yet, it cannot be said that he is unwilling or not fit to look after his son. Moreover the family of the appellant-father is of carpenters and as such the boy if he continues in his father's home would have the exposure as carpenter and can very well learn the skills of the profession while pursuing his studies. Accordingly, it was held that the custody of minor son Aditya Rana shall remain with his father.
58. So far custody of minor girl is concerned, finding has been recorded that she is of very tender age. She was oblivious to the nature of litigation or even of the dispute between her parents. She appeared to be in requirement of her mother as she appeared ragged, uncared, and neglected. Further finding has been recorded on the basis of testimonies of the witnesses and other material available on record that as the children are under the care of their grand-mother as such the welfare of the daughter would be best served by giving her custody to her mother. The minor daughter has even not started to go for her formal schooling as such change in her place of residence will also have no adverse effect. Accordingly, direction was passed upon the appellant-father 26 2025:JHHC:35989-DB to hand over the custody of minor daughter Aditi Kumari to the respondent-mother forthwith.
59. The law has been propounded by Hon‟ble Apex Court, as taken note of above, that the welfare of the child is paramount consideration while handing over the custody of the minor and herein the fact is admitted that the minor daughter is of tender age, and was found uncared and neglected and further the mother is also earning and has not contracted second marriage, as alleged, hence this Court is of the view that that the learned family court while giving custody of minor daughter to the mother has not committed error.
60. This Court, after discussing the aforesaid factual aspect along with the legal position and adverting to the consideration made by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment, has found therefrom that the issue of giving custody of minors [son and daughter] has well been considered along with the evidence as well as from the pleadings made in the plaint and the written statement. Accordingly, the learned Family Judge, on consideration of the evidence, has come to the conclusion that the custody of minor son Aditya Rana shall remain with his father, Ajeet Rana while the custody of minor daughter Aditi Kumari shall go to her mother, Pooja Kumari. The father was accordingly directed to hand over the custody of minor daughter Aditi 27 2025:JHHC:35989-DB Kumari to the mothr forthwith. Accordingly, the suit filed by the respondent-mother was partly allowed.
61. It needs to refer herein that avowedly, the mother is best suited to care for her offspring, so aptly and comprehensively conveyed in Hindi by the word "mamta". Furthermore, recognising her maternity would obviate the necessity of determining paternity. The Hon‟ble Apex Court while drawing the importance of mother as guardian and best suited person for custody of minor child has observed in the case of Vivek Singh v. Romani Singh ((2017) 3 SCC
231) that it may also be underlying that the notion that a child's primary need is for the care and love of its mother, where she has been its primary care giving parent, is supported by a vast body of psychological literature. Empirical studies show that mother-infant "bonding" begins at the child's birth and that infants as young as two months old frequently show signs of distress when the mother is replaced by a substitute caregiver. An infant typically responds preferentially to the sound of its mother's voice by four weeks, actively demands her presence and protests her absence by eight months, and within the first year has formed a profound and enduring attachment to her. Psychological theory hypothesizes that the mother is the centre of an infant's small world, his psychological homebase, and that she "must continue to be so for some 28 2025:JHHC:35989-DB years to come". Developmental psychologists believe that the quality and strength of this original bond largely determines the child's later capacity to fulfil her individual potential and to form attachments to other individuals and to the human community.
62. Further, this Court, while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties on the issue of perversity, needs to refer herein the interpretation of the word "perverse" as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under:
"24. The expression "perverse" has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression "perverse" means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.29
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25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that "perverse finding" means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order.
In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a "perverse verdict" may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined "perverse" as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn.
"Perverse.--Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable."
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn.
Perverse.--Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn. Perverse.--Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.) Perverse.--Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn. 30
2025:JHHC:35989-DB "Perverse.--A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence."
63. This Court, on consideration of the finding arrived at by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court and based upon the aforesaid discussion and judicial pronouncements, is of the view that the judgment passed by the learned Family Judge is not coming under the fold of the perversity, since, the conscious consideration has been made of the evidences, as would be evident from the impugned judgment.
64. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the judgment dated 23.04.2025 passed in Original Suit No. 118 of 2023 by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Koderma needs no interference.
65. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed.
66. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
2nd December, 2025
Alankar/ A.F.R.
Uploaded on 02.12.2025
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