Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Gundala Rama Murthy vs The District Collector And Ors. on 28 December, 1993
Equivalent citations: 1994(2)ALT59
Author: P. Venkatarama Reddi
Bench: P. Venkatarama Reddi
ORDER P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.
1. The petitioner whose authorisation to run Fair Price Shop No. 1 of Sundarada Village was cancelled by the 3rd respondent by an order dated 24-9-1993, has filed this writ petition seeking for a declaration that the notification dated 4-11-1993 issued by the 3rd respondent inviting applications from the Women Candidates for the same Fair Price Shop during the pendency of the revision petition filed before the 1st respondent as illegal and arbitrary.
2. The authorisation was cancelled on the sole ground that an order under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act was passed by the Joint Collector on 27-3-1993 confiscating the seized stock. The appeal filed against the said order was summarily rejected by the Joint Collector by an order dated 3-11-1993 stating that "Section 6-A case against him was proved". A revision has been filed against the said order before the District Collector on 9-12-1993 and the same is pending. It appears that the District Collector, has not passed any order on the stay application. Soon after the dismissal of the appeal by the Joint Collector, the 3rd respondent (Joint Collector) issued a notification calling for applications from women candidates to fill up the vacancy of the Fair Price Shop. It is under these circumstances, the present writ petition has been filed.
3. In my view, the primary authority as well as the appellate authority have not adopted the correct approach to the legal issue. It is to be remembered that the proceedings under the Essential Commodities Act are quite distinct and different from the proceedings under the A.P. Scheduled Commodities Dealers (RDCS) Order. The authority which is competent to exercise power under Section 6-A and the authority empowered to cancel or suspend the authorisation under Clause 3(4) of the Control Order are also different. Respondents 2 and 3 evidently felt that passing of an order under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act should automatically result in cancellation of the authorisation. But as I have already stated, this is a wrong approach to the problem. The authority exercising the power under the A.P. Scheduled Commodities Dealers (RDCS) Order shall take an independent decision after considering the relevant facts and after giving due opportunity of making representation to the petitioner and then only pass an order under Clause 3(4). That the principles of natural justice apply eventhough Clause 3(4) of the Control Order does not specifically say so, cannot be doubted. In the present case, no show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner framing charges and the the petitioner was never called upon to submit his explanation. As already stated, the sole ground for the cancellation of authorisation and for dismissal of the appeal is that confiscation of the seized goods was ordered under Section 6-A. This cannot form the sole basis for passing an order under Clause 3(4) of the Control Order. It may be the competent authority can take into account the relevant material as disclosed from Section 6-A proceedings, and propose to rely on them in the show-cause notice. But as I have already held it is the satisfaction of the authority exercising power under Clause 3(4) of the Control Order that is material but not the satisfaction reached in the course of the proceedings under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act. The findings in the proceedings under the Essential Commodities Act may, at the most, be relevant but not binding on the authority exercising the power under Clause 3(4) of Control Order. In a case of suspension of authorisation pending enquiry under Section 6-A, I have clarified the legal position in P. Hanumantha Rao v. Chief Rationing Officer, 1993 (3) ALT 443 as follows:
"It is axiomatic that an authority to whom statutory power is vested has to apply his mind independently and to reach a conclusion-prima facie or otherwise whether any order is to be passed in exercise of that power. The prima facie satisfaction must be that of the 2nd respondent but not that of the Vigilence Officials. It may be that while exercising the power of suspension pending further enquiry, the adverse material which has come to light in the course of investigation by the Vigilence Officials can be taken into account. But there should not be mechanical exercise of power based merely on a report that a vigilence case has been filed against the petitioner. Secondly interim suspension of the authorisation cannot be made on the ground of mere pendency of 6-A enquiry. There is no such provision in the Control Order. In the very nature of things, interim suspension is meant only to facilitate further enquiry under the provisions of the Control Order and it would only be a prelude to take final action under Clause 3(4) by way of suspension for a specific period or cancellation of the authorisation. The 2nd respondent obviously fell into error in assuming that so long as proceedings under Section 6-A, were pending against the petitioner, the suspension of the dealer's licence should be an automatic consequence. In the present case, though nearly two months have elapsed since the date of passing the suspension order, no steps have been taken so far to initiate the enquiry as a step-in-aid to pass final orders under Clause 3(4). Obviously the 2nd respondent does not want to do anything more than suspending the licence until and unless the case under Section 6-A is disposed. Such an action cannot be countenanced in law. Suspension of the authorisation cannot go on for an indefinite length of time linking it up with the outcome of the proceedings under Section 6-A. No doubt the material which formed the basis for initiating action under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act by the Vigilence Cell Officials can also form the basis for initiation of the proceedings under Section 3(4) of the Control Order. But, without contemplating to take any such proceedings, it is not open to the 2nd respondent to pass a blanket order allowing the suspension to remain in force until Section 6-A proceedings are finalised."
4. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned orders of respondents 2 and 3 cancelling the authorisation and upholding the same in appeal are unsustainable in law. Accordingly they are quashed. At the same time, I give liberty to the 3rd respondent to initiate an enquiry by framing specific charges and to take appropriate decision under Clause 3(4) of the Control Order after giving an opportunity of making representation to the petitioner. If within two months from the date of receipt of this order, the enquiry is not initiated and completed, the petitioner shall be allowed to run the Fair Price Shop by allotting the scheduled commodities. No further action shall be taken pursuant to the notification dated 4-11-1993 calling for applications for filling up the so-called vacancy. The question of acting further pursuant to the said notification will arise only in the light of the ultimate decision taken under Clause 3(4) of the Control Order and subject to any stay that may be granted by the appellate authority.
5. The writ petition is allowed accordingly and subject to the above observations. No costs.