Uttarakhand High Court
State Of Uttarakhand vs Virendra Kumar on 30 December, 2025
Author: Rakesh Thapliyal
Bench: Rakesh Thapliyal
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND
AT NAINITAL
Second Appeal No. 66 of 1987
State of Uttarakhand. .......Appellant.
Versus
Virendra Kumar
and another. .......Respondents.
Present:
Mr. Sunil Khera, learned Deputy Advocate Genera with Mr. Yogesh Tiwari, learned Addl. CSC for the
State.
Mr. D.S. Patni, learned Sr. Advocate with Mr. Piyush Garg, Mr. Lalit Sharma and Mr. Dharmendra
Barthwal, learned counsel for the respondents.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Thapliyal, J.
1. On the previous date, matter was listed for dictation of judgment but learned counsel for the both the parties want to address on certain more issues, consequently, they are permitted to address.
2. On the previous date, this Court formulated one more additional substantial question of law, which reads as under:
"Whether both the courts below committed illegality in passing the decree despite binding and overriding effect of Section 3 of the Government Grants Act?"
3. The aforesaid substantial question of law is now slightly modified, as under:
"Whether both the courts below have
committed illegality by considering the
overriding effect of the terms and conditions of the lease deed in view of old Section (3) and Section 2 (3) of the Governments Grants Act, as amended in the State of U.P.?"
24. In reference to the aforesaid substantial question of law, Mr. Sunil Khera, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State placed reliance to paragraph 77 and 78 of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. and others VS. Union of India (1986) 1 SCC 133 the reference of which has been given in my previous order dated 23.12.2025. Now, in furtherance of the previous arguments, today, he placed reliance on another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Escort Farms Ltd. Vs. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital and others (2004) 4 SCC 281, particularly, by placing reliance to paragraph 22 to paragraph 35, which are being extracted herein as below:
"22. The Farm being the ostensible owner and agent of the real owners was competent to take part in ceiling proceedings on behalf of the holder of the lands and the proceedings cannot be held to be invalid or infructuous. The learned counsel for the State is right in relying on Explanation I and Explanation II below Section 5 of the Ceiling Act in support of his submission that where the land is held by an ostensible holder it would be presumed to have been held by the real owner. The status of the Farm on the land was merely as a licensee or an agent. The possession of the Farm was clearly as an ostensible owner. The proceedings initiated, conducted and concluded against the ostensible owner are binding both on the ostensible and the real owner in accordance with Section 5 with Explanations I and II thereunder which read as under:
"5. Imposition of ceiling.--(1) On and from the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972, no tenure- holder shall be entitled to hold in the aggregate throughout Uttar Pradesh, any land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him.
Explanation I.--In determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holder, all land held by him in his own right, whether in his own name, or ostensibly in the name of any other person, shall be taken into account.
Explanation II.--If on or before 24-1-1971, any land was held by a person who continues to be in its actual cultivatory possession and the name of any other person is entered in the annual register after the said date either in 3 addition to or to the exclusion of the former and whether on the basis of a deed of transfer or licence or on the basis of a decree, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority, that the first- mentioned person continues to hold the land and that it is so held by him ostensibly in the name of the second- mentioned person."
23. The Farm, therefore even if recorded in revenue papers as hereditary tenant could not have claimed independent status of being the holder of the land as the land was admittedly taken possession of by the Company under the Govt. Grants Act. The holder of the land for the purpose of the Ceiling Act was the Company which was the government lessee. Even though a formal lease deed was not executed pursuant to the letter of the Government of the year 1950 the Company has never disputed that the possession of land was taken pursuant to the proposal of the Government contained in its letter dated 26-1-1950 and on the terms and conditions mentioned therein. The aforementioned letter can be looked into to ascertain the nature of possession of the Company which was placed in possession of the land by the Government. The possession of the Company therefore as a government grantee is beyond any doubt and, in fact, it has never been the stand of any of the parties before the Ceiling Authority or before the High Court or before us that the Company was not a government grantee or a government lessee. Clause (9) of Section 3 defines the word "holding" to include a government lessee. The definition clause (9) in Section 3 for holding reads thus:
"3. (9) 'holding' means the land or lands held by a person as a bhumidhar, sirdar, asami or gaon sabha or an asami mentioned in Section 11 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, or as a tenant under the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, other than a sub- tenant, or as a government lessee, or as a sub-lessee of a government lessee, where the period of the sub-lease is coextensive with the period of the lease;"
24. The public limited company holding land would be covered by the definition of "tenure-holder" as contained in clause (17) of Section 3. "Tenure-holder" is defined to mean "a person who is the holder of a holding". The word "person" has not been defined in the Ceiling Act but 4 Section 4(33) of the U.P. General Clauses Act defines "person" to include a "company".
25. Learned counsel appearing for a group of transferees placed reliance on sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Ceiling Act to contend that as in determining the ceiling limit of firms, cooperative societies and associations of persons, whether incorporated or not, a "public company" is excluded, the company cannot be held to be a holder of land to impose ceiling. The above argument advanced on behalf of the appellant transferees does not stand to reason on proper interpretation of the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 5 read with the definition clauses (9) and (17) of Section 13. Section 5(4) reads thus:
"5. (4) Where any holding is held by a firm or cooperative society or other society or association of persons (whether incorporated or not, but not including a public company), its members (whether called partners, shareholders or by any other name) shall, for purposes of this Act, be deemed to hold that holding in proportion to their respective shares in that firm, cooperative society or other society or association of persons:
Provided that where a person immediately before his admission to the firm, cooperative society, or other society or association of persons, held no land or an area of land less than the area proportionate to his aforesaid share then he shall be deemed to hold no share, or as the case may be, only the lesser area in that holding, and the entire or the remaining area of the holding, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be held by the remaining members in proportion to their respective shares in the firm, cooperative society, or other society or association of persons."
(emphasis supplied)
26. The limited purpose of sub-section (4) of Section 5, as is clear from the language employed, is to treat the land as being held in proportion to the respective shares of the shareholders in the case of a firm, cooperative society or other society and association of persons. Exclusion of public company from sub-section (4) of Section 5 is with the intention to keep out public companies from the application of the said sub-section in the matter of distribution of landholdings amongst shareholders. The exclusion of public 5 company from sub-section (4) in the matter of distribution of shareholding of the land is not an indication that public company is not deemed to be a "holder" of land or a legal "person" as defined in clauses (9) and (17) of Section 3 of the Ceiling Act read with clause (33) of Section 4 of the U.P. General Clauses Act. The contention, therefore, advanced that the ceiling proceedings could not have been initiated and concluded against the Company through the Farm and they were all invalid and non est, has to be rejected.
2. Legal effect of the provisions of the Government Grants Act, 1895 as amended by the Government Grants (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1960
27. One of the most important issues, which arose in writ petition before the High Court was regarding findings of the Appellate Authority on the validity of the transfers of land made by the Company in favour of the Farm and through the Farm in favour of the different partnership firms and individuals. We have already reproduced above the terms and conditions of the government grant contained in the letter dated 26-1-1950 of the Government of Uttar Pradesh whereunder the erstwhile Ruler of Kashipur was allowed to lease the lands to the Company for development. The terms of the grant show that 597 acres of land was allowed to be held by the ex-Ruler with hereditary rights and 2091 acres were allowed to be leased to the Company of which the Ruler was the main shareholder. In condition (4) it is clearly stipulated that the land held under the lease shall be heritable but the succession will be regulated according to law governing impartible estates.
28. Condition (5) of the grant imposes complete prohibition on transfer of the land granted. The grantee was only allowed to sub-let the land in accordance with the U.P. Tenancy Act but was given no right to transfer or alienate the land except with the permission of the State Government.
29. Learned counsel on behalf of the Farm and the lessees and transferees from the Farm while separately addressing this Court claimed an indefeasible right to continue to hold and possess the land on the ground that the government grantee came to be recorded as hereditary tenant since 1953-54 and under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 read with the U.P. 6 Tenancy Act, 1939, the lessees have acquired the status of "sirdars" and thereafter on paying ten times the land revenue of the land, they have become "bhumidhars" of the lands in their possession. It is contended that acceptance of ten times the land revenue for the land for conferral of "bhumidhari" right on the tenants of the land are actions of the State which are binding on them and the Ceiling Authorities were estopped from depriving the tenants of their status and possession of the land.
30. The above claim of the lessees and transferees of having acquired status of sirdars and bhumidhars cannot be accepted. The possession of the land was given to the Company, admittedly, under the terms and conditions of the government grant which did not permit transfer of land without permission of the Government. The position of a government grantee is of a lessee as contained in the definition clause (9) of Section 3 of the Ceiling Act. The conditions of the grant allow sub-leases of the land but contrary to the terms of the grant, the sub-lessees can claim no independent tenancy right so as to frustrate the terms and tenure of the grant. Irrespective of the provisions creating rights in favour of tenants under the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, the terms and conditions of the grant have been given an overriding effect by provisions contained in Section 2, as inserted by the U.P. Amendment Act of 1960 to the Government Grants Act with retrospective effect. Section 2 as introduced to the Government Grants Act in its application to the State of U.P. clearly provides that the rights and obligations inter se between the Government as grantor of the land and its grantee would in no way be affected by the sub-leases granted by the government grantee in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act:
"2. (1) Transfer of Property Act, 1882, not to apply to government grants.--Nothing contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grant or other transfer of land or of any interest therein, heretofore made or hereafter to be made, by or on behalf of the Government to or in favour of any person whomsoever; and every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act had not been passed.7
(2) U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 not to affect certain leases made by or on behalf of the Government.--Nothing contained in the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, or the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, shall affect, or be deemed to have ever affected any rights, created, conferred or granted, whether before or after the date of the passing of the Government Grants (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1960, by leases of land by, or on behalf of, the Government in favour of any person; and every such creation, conferment or grant shall be construed and take effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, or the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926.
(3) Certain leases made by or on behalf of the Government to take effect according to their tenor.--
All provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in any such creation, conferment or grant referred to in Section 2, shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor; any decree or direction of a court of law or any rule of law, statute or enactment of the legislature, to the contrary notwithstanding:
Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent, or be deemed ever to have prevented, the effect of any enactment relating to the acquisition of property, land reforms or the imposition of ceiling on agricultural land."
(emphasis added by underlining [Ed.: Herein italicized] )
31. The recording of the names of the Company or the Farm in the revenue papers on 5-3-1954 as hereditary tenant and deposit of ten times the land revenue by the sub-lessee for acquiring bhumidhari rights were ineffectual in view of the provisions of Section 2 of the Government Grants (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1960 which give an overriding effect to terms of the grant. The High Court, therefore, rightly negatived the claim set up by the lessee/sub-lessees of the land from the Company through the Farm, to the status of "sirdars" or "bhumidhars".
32. No action of the Revenue Authorities can, therefore, estop the Ceiling Authorities from ignoring the claims of tenancy rights on the land set up by the lessees/sub-lessees. The rights between the Government and the grantee are strictly to be regulated by the terms of the grant and in 8 accordance with the Government Grants (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1960. The entries in revenue records and recognition of any tenancy rights of the lessee and/or sub- lessee as hereditary tenant, sirdars or bhumidhars under the U.P. Tenancy Act can have no adverse legal effect on the government grant which has an overriding effect under the Govt. Grants Act. No estoppel can operate against the overriding statute so as to bind the Ceiling Authorities to accept the tenancy rights of the lessees/sub-lessees as indefeasible in application of the Ceiling Act to the lands in question.
33. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for amending Section 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 by the U.P. Amendment Act of 1960 makes it clear that the State Legislature intended to apply only the provisions of the Land Reforms Act and the Ceiling Act to the lands held by persons under the Govt. Grants Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons reads thus:
"Provisions of Section 2 of the Government Grants (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1959, have the effect of saving a grant of an agricultural lease by or on behalf of the Government from the operation not only of the Acts mentioned therein, but also of any other law, including the law for imposition of ceiling on land holdings, that might be made in future. There is also an apprehension that the result of the wordings of Section 2 may be to undo the vesting of estates of government grantees under Section 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. With a view, therefore, to remove any such apprehension and to put the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Bill, 1959, when enacted, beyond the purview of the Government Grants Act, this Bill is being introduced. Vide U.P. Gazette, Extraordinary, dated 3-2- 1960."
34. The Land Reforms Act, 1950 being saved by sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Govt. Grants Act is applicable to the government grants. Under Section 18(1)(c) of the Land Reforms Act, a government grantee holding land rent-free was allowed to retain possession of the land as "bhumidhar". Section 18 of the Land Reforms Act with clause (c) in sub-section (1) reads thus:
9"18. Settlement of certain lands with intermediaries or cultivators as bhumidhar.--(1) Subject to the provisions of Sections 10, 15, 16 and 17, all lands--
(a) in possession of or held or deemed to be held by an intermediary as sir, khudkasht or an intermediary's grove,
(b) held as a grove by, or in the personal cultivation of a permanent lessee in Avadh,
(c) held by a fixed-rate tenant or a rent-free grantee as such, or
(d) held as such by--
(i) an occupancy tenant, possessing
the right to
transfer the
holding by
sale,
(ii) a hereditary tenant,
(iii) a tenant on patta
dawami or istamrari referred to in
Section 17,
(e) held by a groveholder,
on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such intermediary, lessee, tenant, grantee or groveholder, as the case may be, who shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be entitled to take or retain possession as a bhumidhar thereof."
35. As seen above, proviso below sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Government Grants (U.P. Amendment) Act makes applicable the Ceiling Act to the land held by a grantee under the government grant. It has already been noted that a "government grantee" or a "lessee" is covered within the definition of "tenure-holder" given in clause (17) read with clause (9) of the Ceiling Act and the definition of "person" in Section 4(33) of the U.P. General Clauses Act. Thus conjointly reading the provisions of the Ceiling Act and the Land Reforms Act, the grantee of land from the Government is a holder of land in the status of a bhumidhar and the land can be subjected to ceiling limit. To the lands held by the Company, which is a grantee of the Government, the 10 provisions of the Ceiling Act would be attracted. Such grantee being a lessee from the Government has no right to transfer the land without permission of the Government. It can grant leases or sub-leases under the U.P. Tenancy Act but the lessees/sub-lessees can claim no rights contrary to the terms of the grant. All the transfers made by the Company or Farm by sale or lease contrary to the terms of the government grant create no independent rights in favour of the said transferees or lessees. The claims of transferees and lessees based on the provisions of the U.P. Tenancy Act were, therefore, rightly negatived by the Ceiling Authority and the High Court."
5. By referring the aforesaid judgment, Mr. Khera, argued that respondent being sub-lessee of John Vegan cannot claim any right contrary to the terms and conditions of lease of 1924 and as such, no independent right is accrued in favour of the respondents. He submits that in this particular case, lease was expired in 1954, therefore, no independent right is accrued in favour of the respondents by virtue of the U.P. State amendment of 1960 in Government Grants Act. In reference to the implementation of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act in Tarai and Bhanwar area Mr. Khera submits that since lease has already expired in the year 1954, therefore, enforcement of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act will not create any right in favour of the respondents. In response to the arguments of respondents that they paid lease rent even after expiry of the lease, he placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Murlidhar Jalan Vs. State of Meghalaya AIR 1997 SC 2690 and submits that if there is any mistake on the part of the government officials in accepting the lease rent even on expiry of lease, no right is accrued in favour of the respondents to claim sirdari or bhumidhari right over the land leased out in 1924 to Mr. John and on expiry of the lease in 1954, land automatically vest with the Government. Mr. Khera further submits that even if respondents on expiry of lease continued in possession, their status is only of "trespasser". In view of the Apex Court decision in the case of Murlidhar Jalan 11 (supra) relevant extract of which are being extracted herein as under:
"3. The appellant had filed a civil suit for perpetual injunction seeking declaration of his title as landholder of the property. The trial court granted the decree. But on appeal, the High Court reversed it in First Appeal No. 58 of 1990 dated 20-12-1996. The Division Bench of the High Court affirmed that order in appeal. The question is whether the appellant is entitled to the declaration of his title in respect of the property. Shri Goswami, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, contends that initially the appellant had come into possession of the property in his character as a tenant by virtue of perpetual lease for 99 years; after the expiry of the initial period of lease in 1965 though the Government had not renewed the lease, nonetheless, the Government had impliedly renewed the same by accepting the rent. The property was required for a public purpose and that the Government continued to be in possession of the property as a tenant recognising title of the appellant. Therefore, the High Court was clearly in error in rejecting the claim of the appellant and confirming the decree of the appellate court. In support thereof, he places reliance on Bishan Das v. State of Punjab [AIR 1961 SC 1570 : 1961 Andh LT 939] . We find no force in the contention. It is an admitted position that renewal was not granted. Thereby, the previous lease stood expired and the relationship as tenant and landlord came to be terminated. He accepted the title of the Government; thus thereafter, he continued to be in possession as a trespasser. It is true that a lower level officer accepted the rent; and recognition was obviously made on a mistaken impression that the land was required for a public purpose; but on the basis thereof, it 12 cannot be construed that the title of the appellant was confirmed by the conduct of the Government. Accordingly, the declaration of title as landholder cannot be granted. The High Court, therefore, was right in refusing to grant the relief. It is not a case of taking possession without due process of law. The possession only continues to a facet of the facts. Apart from that there is no other documentary evidence on the basis of which it could be concluded that the title of the Government is defeated by acceptance of the rent or by requisition of the property by mistaken act on the part of the Government."
6. Mr. Khera also submits that even if there is no reinforcement of any provision of law in the lease deed, the lease deed will be governed by the provisions of the Government Grants Act except those lease granted under the specific statute like U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act or Transfer of Property Act.
7. Mr. Khera also pointed out in reference to Section 2 (3) of the Government Grants Act, as amended by the State of U.P. that the condition (d) of the lease deed which provides that lessee cannot claim benefit which agricultural tenants and lessees are given in the Tarai and Bhanbhar Estate, has overriding effect over the provisions, as contained in other Act.
8. Finally, Mr. Khera concluded his arguments by submitting that all the substantial question of law as formulated, and the issue framed by the Apex Court should be answered in favour of the appellant / State.
9. On the other side, Mr. D.S. Patni, learned Sr. Advocate for the respondents, argued that lease of 1924 was a special lease and was not under the Government Grants Act. In support of his arguments, he placed reliance to the judgment of Apex Court in 13 the case of the State of U.P. Vs. Zahoor Ahmad and another (1973) 2 SCC 547, particularly by placing reliance to paragraph 10, 11, 12 and 13, which are being reproduced herein as below:
"10. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act did not apply and therefore the respondent could not hold over within the meaning of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. The State relied on the Government Grants Act. Section 2 of the Government Grants Act enacts that nothing in the Transfer of Property Act shall apply to any grant or other transfer of land or of any interest therein in favour of any person, but every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act had not been passed.
11. An example of a Government grant within the meaning of the Government Grants Act occurs in the decision in Jnanendra Nath Nanda v. Jadu Nath Banerji [ILR (1938) 1 Cal 626] . Two leases of two lots were granted by the Sunderban Commissioner on behalf of the Secretary of State. The lands comprised in the lots were waste lands of the Government. The waste lands of the Sunderbans were not the property of any subject. The Sunderbans were a vast impenetrable forest. It was the property of the East India Company. It later on vested in the Crown in those days by virtue of an Imperial statute. The history of the legislation showed that grants of Sunderbans lands which were vested in the Crown at that time were Crown Grants within the meaning of the Crown Grants Act as it then stood.
12. On the other hand, there is an illustration of what is not a Government grant within the meaning of the Government Grants Act. The decision in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Lal Mohan Chaudhuri [ILR 63 Cal 523] , furnishes that illustration. The Government in that case granted lease in respect of Khas Mahal lands. The lease of Khas Mahal was held not to fall within the category of grants as contemplated in the then Crown Grants Act.
13. The lease in the present case was for the purpose of erecting a temporary rice mill and for no other purpose. The mere fact that the State is the lessor will not by itself make it a Government grant within the meaning of the Government Grants Act. There is no evidence in the present case in the character of the land or in the making of the lease or in the content of the lease to support the plea on 14 behalf of the State that it was a grant within the meaning of the Government Grants Act."
10. In support of his arguments, Mr. Patni, also submits that lease is not under the Government Grants Act and since there is no recital of Government Grants Act in the lease deed, therefore, it cannot be said that lease of 1924 is governed by the provisions of the Government Grants Act. He further submits that the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act being saved by proviso to Section 2 (3) of the Government Grants Act as applicable to the State of U.P. are applicable on the Government Grants Act and the provisions of Section 2 (3) of the Government will not have an overriding effect over provisions of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The said view is supported by paragraph 34 and 35 of the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Escort Farm Ltd. (surpa).
11. Mr. D.S. Patni, also placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Lalji Tandon (2004) 1 SCC 1 particularly by reliance on paragraph 13, which reads as under:
"13. In India, a lease may be in perpetuity. Neither the Transfer of Property Act nor the general law abhors a lease in perpetuity. (Mulla on the Transfer of Property Act, 9th Edn., 1999, p. 1011.) Where a covenant for renewal exists, its exercise is, of course, a unilateral act of the lessee, and the consent of the lessor is unnecessary.
(Baker v. Merckel [(1960) 1 All ER 668] , also Mulla, ibid., p. 1204.) Where the principal lease executed between the parties containing a covenant for renewal, is renewed in accordance with the said covenant, whether the renewed lease shall also contain similar clause for renewal depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, regard being had to the intention of the parties as displayed in the 15 original covenant for renewal and the surrounding circumstances. There is a difference between an extension of lease in accordance with the covenant in that regard contained in the principal lease and renewal of lease, again in accordance with the covenant for renewal contained in the original lease. In the case of extension it is not necessary to have a fresh deed of lease executed, as the extension of lease for the term agreed upon shall be a necessary consequence of the clause for extension. However, option for renewal consistently with the covenant for renewal has to be exercised consistently with the terms thereof and, if exercised, a fresh deed of lease shall have to be executed between the parties. Failing the execution of a fresh deed of lease, another lease for a fixed term shall not come into existence though the principal lease in spite of the expiry of the term thereof may continue by holding over for year by year or month by month, as the case may be."
12. After advancing arguments by Mr. Patni, a query put by this Court on Mr. D.S. Patni, learned Sr. Counsel that if the lease is not covered by the provisions of the Government Grants Act, then under which law and Statute it is covered. On such a query Mr. Patni, submits that the lease of 1924 is covered by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.
13. Both the parties by concluding their arguments also submits that fate of the connected First Appeals shall be subject to the final outcome of the instant second appeal.
14. Arguments heard. Judgment reserved.
(Rakesh Thapliyal, J.) 30.12.2025 SKS