Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 10.03.2026 vs Of on 16 April, 2026
2026:HHC:11561
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 313 of 2016
.
Reserved on: 10.03.2026
Date of Decision: 16.04.2026.
Kamal ...Petitioner
Versus
of
State of H.P. ...Respondent
Coram
rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the Petitioner : Mr Deepak Kaushal, Senior
Advocate, with Mr Aditya
Chauhan, Advocate.
For the respondent/State : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 23.09.2016 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur District, at Nahan (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.01.2015 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (Parties 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 22026:HHC:11561 shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) .
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences of punishable under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 181, 185 and 192A of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act).
3. rt It was asserted that Virender Singh (PW7) was driving the truck bearing registration No. HP-17B-8238 on 21.09.2011 from Kala Amb to Dehradun. He reached near Katasan at about 10:20 PM. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-71-1075 came from Paonta Sahib at a high speed and hit the rear tyre of the informant's truck. The rear tyres were damaged due to the impact. Som Chand (PW6) and Anil Kumar (PW8) were also travelling in the informant's truck. No person sustained any injury in the accident. Accused Kamal was driving the tipper bearing registration HP-71-1075, and the accident occurred because of the high speed of the tipper and the negligence of the accused. The tipper turned turtle after the accident, and the sand loaded in the tipper was spilled on the road. The matter was ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 3 2026:HHC:11561 reported to the police, and entry (Ext.PW9/A) was recorded in the Police Station. HC Deep Chand (PW9) and Constable Chaman Lal .
were directed to visit the spot to verify the correctness of the entry. HC Deep Chand (PW9) visited the spot and recorded Virender Singh's statement (Ext.PW7/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW5/A) was registered. HC Deep Chand of (PW9) investigated the matter. He found that the accused was heavily intoxicated. HC Deep Chand (PW9) filed an application rt (Ext.PW9/B) for conducting the medical examination of the accused and obtaining his blood sample. Dr. Pankaj Gaur conducted the medical examination of the accused and found that he was unable to walk in a straight line, and he was having slurring of speech and a staggering gait. He obtained the blood sample of the accused and handed it over to the Police official accompanying the accused. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW10/A). HC Deep Chand (PW9) prepared the site plan (Ext.PW9/C). He took the photographs (Ext.P1 to Ext.P7) with the help of his mobile phone. He seized the vehicle along with the documents vide Memos (Ext. PW4/A and Ext.PW1/A). HHC Suresh Chand (PW2) examined the vehicles and found that there was no mechanical defect in them that could have led to the accident. He issued the ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 4 2026:HHC:11561 reports (Ext.PW2/A and Ext.PW2/B). The accused could not produce his Driving Licence or the route permit on demand. The .
blood sample was sent to the SFSL, and as per the report of analysis, the quantity of alcohol in the blood of the accused was found to be 268.18 mg %. The final opinion was issued stating that the accused was under the influence of alcohol. Statements of of witnesses were recorded as per their version and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and rt presented before the learned Trial Court.
4. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, the notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Section 279 of the IPC and Sections 181, 185 and 192A of the MV Act to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
5. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses to prove its case. Sarwan Kumar (PW1) is the witness to recovery. HHC Suresh Chand (PW2) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles. Anshul Singal (PW3) and Rajender Kumar (PW4) did not support the prosecution's case. HC Kanwar Singh (PW5) was ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 5 2026:HHC:11561 working as an MHC who signed the FIR. Som Chand (PW6) and Anil Kumar (PW8) were the occupants of the truck. Virender .
Singh (PW7) is the informant and the driver of the truck. HC Deep Chand (PW9) investigated the matter. Dr Tapender Singh (PW10) proved the MLC.
of
6. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He rt claimed that he only drives a tractor in the field. He admitted that he had consumed liquor but stated that he was present at his home. He admitted that he had been medically examined and his blood sample was taken. He claimed that he was innocent.
However, he did not produce any evidence in his defence.
7. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. There was no reason to disbelieve the statements of the prosecution witnesses.
The accused was taken into custody immediately after the incident. He was medically examined. His blood sample was sent for analysis, and 268.18 mg % alcohol was found in the blood. The identity of the accused was also established as the driver of the vehicle. The accused negligently hit the tipper with the truck. He ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 6 2026:HHC:11561 did not possess a valid driving licence or a route permit.
Therefore, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the .
accused as under: -
Sections Sentences 279 of the Indian The accused was sentenced to of Penal Code undergo simple imprisonment for one month, pay a fine of ₹500/-, and, in default of payment of the fine, undergo rt further simple imprisonment for 15 days.
181 of Motor The accused was sentenced to Vehicles Act undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days, pay a fine of ₹200/-, and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for seven days.
185 of the Motor The accused was sentenced to Vehicles Act undergo simple imprisonment for one month, pay a fine of ₹200/-, and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for seven days.
192-A of the Motor The accused was sentenced to pay a Vehicles Act fine of ₹2000/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month.
All the substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 72026:HHC:11561
8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was .
decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other and there was no of reason to disbelieve the statements. The accused was heavily intoxicated at the time of the accident. He could not control his rt tipper which turned turtle after the accident. The negligent driving of the tipper by the accused was the proximate cause of the accident. The accused did not have a driving licence or a route permit. Therefore, he was rightly convicted by the learned Trial Court. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was not excessive. Therefore, the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court were sustainable. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.
9. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that many prosecution witnesses failed to support the prosecution version. The learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate the material on record, especially the ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 8 2026:HHC:11561 cross-examination conducted by the accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments .
and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
10. I have heard Mr Deepak Kaushal, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr Aditya Chauhan, Advocate for the of petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.
11. rt Mr Deepak Kaushal, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The statement (Ext.PW7/A) made by the informant Virender Singh (PW7) specifically mentioned that the driver of the tipper had run away from the spot. Hence, the prosecution's version that the accused was apprehended on the spot is not believable. The defence taken by the accused that he was picked up from his home was highly probable. The witness Anshul Singhal (PW3) resiled from his statement that the accused was the driver of the vehicle. His testimony was ignored by the learned Courts below. Rajender Kumar (PW4), an independent witness, also did not support the prosecution's case. The prosecution had only examined the ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 9 2026:HHC:11561 occupants of the truck. The informant/truck driver was negligently driving the truck, and he deposed falsely to save .
himself from criminal liability. The other occupants supported him. Learned Courts below failed to appreciate this aspect. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
of
12. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate rt General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Courts below have concurrently held that the accused was negligently driving the tipper. This is also apparent from the fact that Tipper had turned turtle after the accident. The accused did not have a valid Driving Licence, and he was heavily intoxicated.
There is no perversity in the judgments passed by learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.
13. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
14. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 10 2026:HHC:11561 not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: -
.
"10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like of the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short "CrPC") vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or rt propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.
15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
"14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 11
2026:HHC:11561
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where scope of .
Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) "12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set of right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful rt consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative.
Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 12 2026:HHC:11561 charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC."
16. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 .
SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to re-
appreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the of absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
"12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the rt revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)
5. ... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 13 2026:HHC:11561 hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the .
oral evidence. ..."
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it of is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC rt p. 135) "14. ... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction."
::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 142026:HHC:11561
17. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) .
309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:
"16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the of Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it rt is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative."
18. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:
"27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.
28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 15 2026:HHC:11561 concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.
19. The present revision has to be decided as per the .
parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
20. The informant, Virender Singh (PW7), stated that he was driving the truck bearing registration No. HP-17B-8238 on of 21.09.2011. Anil Kumar (PW8) and Som Chand (PW6) were travelling in the truck. When they reached near Katasan, a tipper rt bearing registration No. HP-71-1075 came from the opposite side at a high speed towards the wrong side of the road. The tipper hit the rear tyre and the body of the truck. The tyres burst in the accident. The accused was driving the tipper. He ran away from the spot, but he was apprehended after some time. The tipper turned turtle after the accident. He stated in his cross-
examination that Anil Kumar (PW8) and Som Chand (PW6) had remained with him on the date of the accident. He had informed the police telephonically about the accident within 5 to 10 minutes of the accident. The police reached the spot within an hour and immediately took the photographs. The headlights of the vehicle were switched off. The police had caught the accused by 11:30 pm. The accused had disclosed his name as Kamal. He ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 16 2026:HHC:11561 denied that Ram Singh was driving the tipper on the date of the accident, who had run away after the accident, taking advantage .
of the darkness. The accused was apprehended at a distance of 100 meters from the place of the accident. He was going towards his home. He denied that he was making a false statement.
of
21. HC Deep Chand (PW9) stated that an intimation regarding the accident was received in the Police Station on rt 21.09.2011 at 10:35 PM. He went to the spot to verify the correctness of the information and recorded the informant's statement. The accused was heavily intoxicated on the spot, and he was sent to the hospital for his medical examination. He stated in his cross-examination that he had not prepared sketch of the place of arrest or memo of arrest. He volunteered to say that the offence was bailable and there was no requirement to inform any person. He had apprehended the accused at a distance of 10-12 steps from the place of the accident. He denied that the accused was sleeping in his home, and he was brought from the home.
22. The statement of this witness corroborates the informant's statement that the accused was caught at some distance from the place of the accident. He has specifically denied ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 17 2026:HHC:11561 the suggestions given to him that the accused was apprehended from his home, which was a plea taken by the accused in his .
statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.
23. Som Chand (PW6) stated that he was travelling in the truck bearing registration No. HP-17B-8238, which was being of driven by Virender Singh (PW7). When the truck reached near Katasan, a tipper came from the opposite side towards the wrong rt side of the road and hit the truck. The rear tyre of the truck was damaged. The accused was driving the tipper. He informed the police, and the police reached the spot. He stated in his cross-
examination that there was darkness at the place of the accident.
The name of the accused was ascertained on the spot. The accused was heavily intoxicated, and he was unable to walk properly. He had told the police that he had dragged the accused out of the tipper. He was confronted with the previous statement, where this fact was not recorded.
24. It was submitted that there are contradictions in the statement of this witness and the statement of the informant. He stated that he had called the police, whereas the informant stated that he had called the police. This contradiction shows that these ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 18 2026:HHC:11561 witnesses were not making the correct statements, and the learned Courts below erred in relying upon their testimonies. This .
submission cannot be accepted. The incident occurred on 21.09.2011. The statement of Som Chand (PW6) was recorded on 08.01.2014, and the statement of Virender Singh (PW7) was recorded on 26.06.2014, about three years after the incident. The of memories fail with the passage of time, and the contradictions are bound to come. Hon'ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State rt of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: -
"32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under:
"I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 19 2026:HHC:11561 whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.
II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence .
had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the of matter of trivial details.
III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But rt courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole.
V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.
VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen.
VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise.::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 20
2026:HHC:11561 The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.
VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to .
person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.
IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main of purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.
X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time rt duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person.
XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events that take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on.
XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him.
XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 21 2026:HHC:11561 the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness." [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State .
of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217: 1983 Cri LJ 1096: (AIR 1983 SC 753) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525: AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP (AIR 1959 SC 1012)"
25. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479:
of 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth rt or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: -
"38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it appears that no specific question was put to him as to whether the appellant was present at the place of occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) "24. ... The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 22 2026:HHC:11561 discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness."
39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of .
Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies.
40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this of Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32) "30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially rt affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses.
Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such a discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even, in law, render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 23 2026:HHC:11561 Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v.
.
State of Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205: 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100: 2002 SCC (Cri) 961].
31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when of exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case that the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), rt (2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]].
32. These are variations that would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 persons can hardly be expected to state a minute- by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all his attention to take steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide him with medical aid and inform the police. The statements which are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh [Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777]."
::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 242026:HHC:11561
41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this Court held: (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49) .
"46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses have given different timings as to when they had seen the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the accused. ... Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these of witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution.
rt ***
49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statements of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any material or serious contradiction in the statement of these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused."
42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238], this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) "24. ... The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief.
::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 252026:HHC:11561 Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter .
and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness."
26. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817, wherein it was observed: -
of "17. It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries attributed to the hand or foot, but the constant narrative of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the rt place of occurrence, armed with guns, and they caused the injury on informant, PW-6. However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions, as observed by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457. This Court, while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as under:
"42. Only such omissions which amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 26 2026:HHC:11561 differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any .
dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness."
27. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Achchar Singh vs. State of H.P., AIR 2021 SC 3426, that the of testimony of a witness cannot be discarded due to exaggeration alone. It was observed:
rt "24. It is vehemently contended that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is exaggerated and thus false.
Cambridge Dictionary defines "exaggeration" as "the fact of making something larger, more important, better or worse than it is". Merriam-Webster defines the term "exaggerate" as to "enlarge beyond bounds or the truth". The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines it as "enlarged or altered beyond normal proportions". These expressions unambiguously suggest that the genesis of an 'exaggerated statement' lies in a fact, to which fictitious additions are made to make it more penetrative. Every exaggeration, therefore, has the ingredients of 'truth'. No exaggerated statement is possible without an element of truth. On the other hand, the Advanced Law Lexicon defines "false" as "erroneous, untrue; opposite of correct, or true". Oxford Concise Dictionary states that "false" is "wrong; not correct or true". Similar is the explanation in other dictionaries as well. There is, thus, a marked differential between an 'exaggerated version' and a 'false version'. An exaggerated statement contains both truth and falsity, whereas a false statement has no grain of truth in it (being the 'opposite' of 'true'). It is well said that to make a mountain out of a molehill, the molehill shall have to exist primarily. A Court of law, being mindful of such ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 27 2026:HHC:11561 distinction, is duty-bound to disseminate 'truth' from 'falsehood' and sift the grain from the chaff in case of exaggerations. It is only in a case where the grain and the .
chaff are so inextricably intertwined that, in their separation, no real evidence survives that the whole evidence can be discarded. [Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643, 18.]
25. Learned State counsel has rightly relied on Gangadhar Behera (Supra) to contend that even in cases where a major portion of the evidence is found deficient, if the residue is of sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused, a conviction can be based on it. This Court in Hari Chand v. State of Delhi, (1996) 9 SCC 112 held that:
rt"24. ...So far as this contention is concerned, it must be kept in view that while appreciating the evidence of witnesses in a criminal trial, especially in a case of eyewitnesses, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus cannot apply, and the court has to make efforts to sift the grain from the chaff. It is of course true that when a witness is said to have exaggerated in his evidence at the stage of trial and has tried to involve many more accused and if that part of the evidence is not found acceptable the remaining part of the evidence has to be scrutinised with care and the court must try to see whether the acceptable part of the evidence gets corroborated from other evidence on record so that the acceptable part can be safely relied upon..."
26. There is no gainsaying that homicidal deaths cannot be left to judicium dei. The Court, in its quest to reach the truth, ought to make earnest efforts to extract gold out of the heap of black sand. The solemn duty is to dig out the authenticity. It is only when the Court, despite its best efforts, fails to reach a firm conclusion that the benefit of the doubt is extended.
27. An eye-witness is always preferred to others. The statements of P.W.1, P.W.11 and P.W.12 are, therefore, to be ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 28 2026:HHC:11561 analysed accordingly, while being mindful of the difference between exaggeration and falsity. We find that the truth can be effortlessly extracted from their statements. The .
trial Court fell in grave error and overlooked the credible and consistent evidence while proceeding with a baseless premise that the exaggerated statements made by the eyewitnesses belie their version."
28. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arvind Kumar @ Nemichand and others Versus State of Rajasthan, of 2022 Cri. L.J. 374, that the testimony of a witness cannot be discarded because he had made a wrong statement regarding rt some aspect. The principle that when a witness deposes falsehood, his entire statement is to be discarded does not apply in India. It was observed: -
"48. The principle that when a witness deposes falsehood, the evidence in its entirety has to be eschewed may not have a strict application to the criminal jurisprudence in our country. The principle governing sifting the chaff from the grain has to be applied. However, when the evidence is inseparable and such an attempt would either be impossible or would make the evidence unacceptable, the natural consequence would be one of avoidance. The said principle has not assumed the status of law but continues only as a rule of caution. One has to see the nature of the discrepancy in a given case. When the discrepancies are very material, shaking the very credibility of the witness, leading to a conclusion in the mind of the court that it is neither possible to separate it nor to rely upon, it is for the said court to either accept or reject."
29. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the statements of the witnesses cannot ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 29 2026:HHC:11561 be discarded due to omissions, contradictions, or discrepancies.
The Court must consider whether the discrepancies negatively .
affect the prosecution's case and whether they pertain to the core of the case rather than the details.
30. In the present case, the contradictions relate to of informing the police telephonically and do not affect the core of the prosecution case, namely the accident. Therefore, this rt contradiction cannot be used to discard the prosecution's case.
31. It was submitted that Som Chand (PW6) witness deposed that he had dragged the accused out of the tipper, which fact was not recorded in the statement recorded by the police.
Therefore, this witness has improved upon his previous version, and his testimony is not reliable. This submission cannot be accepted. Learned defence counsel did not ask HC Deep Chand (PW9), whether the witness Som Chand (PW6) had told him about dragging the accused out of the vehicle. Therefore, the omission has not been proved as per the law. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court about a century ago in Emperor vs. Vithu Balu Kharat (1924) 26 Bom. L.R. 965 that the previous statement has to be proved before it can be used. It was observed:
::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 302026:HHC:11561 "The words "if duly proved" in my opinion, clearly show that the record of the statement cannot be admitted in evidence straightaway but that the officer before whom .
the statement was made should ordinarily be examined as to any alleged statement or omitted statement that is relied upon by the accused for the purpose of contradicting the witness; and the provisions of Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act apply to this case, as well as to any other similar ease. Of course, I do not mean to say that, if the particular police officer who recorded the of statement is not available, other means of proving the statement may not be availed of, e.g., evidence that the statement is in the handwriting of that particular officer."
32. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in rt Muthu Naicker and Others, etc. Versus State of T.N. (1978) 4 SCC 385, that if the witness affirms the previous statement, no proof is necessary, but if the witness denies or says that he did not remember the previous statement, the investigating officer should be asked about the same. It was observed: -
"52. This is the most objectionable manner of using the police statement, and we must record our emphatic disapproval of the same. The question should have been framed in a manner to point out that, from amongst those accused mentioned in examination-in-chief, there were some whose names were not mentioned in the police statement and if the witness affirms this, no further proof is necessary and if the witness denies or says that she does not remember, the investigation officer should have been questioned about it."
33. The Gauhati High Court held in Md. Badaruddin Ahmed v. State of Assam, 1989 SCC OnLine Gau 35: 1989 Cri LJ 1876, that if ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 31 2026:HHC:11561 the witness denies having made the statement, the portion marked by the defence should be put to the investigating officer .
and his version should be elicited regarding the same. It was observed at page 1880: -
"13. The learned defence counsel has drawn our attention to the above statement of the Investigating Officer and of submits that P.W. 4 never made his above statement before the police and that the same, being his improved version, cannot be relied upon. With the utmost respect to the learned defence counsel, we are unable to accept his above rt contention. Because, unless the particular matter or point in the previous statement sought to be contradicted is placed before the witness for explanation, the previous statement cannot be used in evidence. In other words, drawing the attention of the witness to his previous statement sought to be contradicted and giving all opportunities to him for explanation are compulsory. If any authority is to be cited on this point, we may conveniently refer to the case of Pangi Jogi Naik v. State reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 205: (1965 (2) Cri LJ 661). Further, in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1959 SC 1012: (1959 Cri LJ 1231) it was also held that the statement not reduced to writing cannot be contradicted and, therefore, in order to show that the statement sought to be contradicted: was recorded by the police, it should be marked and exhibited. However, in the case at hand, there is nothing on the record to show that the previous statement of the witness was placed before him and that the witness was given the chance for explanation. Again, his previous statement was not marked and exhibited. Therefore, his previous statement before the police cannot be used. Hence, his evidence that when he turned back, he saw the accused Badaruddin lowering the gun from his chest is to be taken as his correct version.::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 32
2026:HHC:11561
14. The learned defence counsel has attempted to persuade us not to rely on the evidence of this witness on the ground that his evidence before the trial Court is contradicted by .
his previous statement made before the police. However, in view of the decisions made in the said cases we have been persuaded irresistibly to hold that the correct procedure to be followed which would be in conformity with S. 145 of the Evidence Act to contradict the evidence given by the prosecution witness at the trial with a statement made by him before the police during the investigation will be to of draw the attention of the witness to that part of the contradictory statement which he made before the police, and questioned him whether he did, in fact, make that statement. If the witness admits having made the rt particular statement to the police, that admission will go into evidence and will be recorded as part of the evidence of the witness and can be relied on by the accused as establishing the contradiction. However, if, on the other hand, the witness denies to have made such a statement before the police, the particular portions of the statement recorded should be provisionally marked for identification as B-1 to B-1, B-2 to B-2 etc. (any identification mark) and when the investigating officer who had actually recorded the statements in question comes into the witness box, he should be questioned as to whether these particular statements had been made to him during the investigation by the particular witness, and obviously after refreshing his memory from the case diary the investigating officer would make his answer in the affirmative. The answer of the Investigating Officer would prove the statements B-1 to B-1, B-2 to B-2, which are then exhibited as Ext. D. 1, Ext. D. 2, etc. (exhibition mark) in the case and will go into evidence, and may, thereafter, be relied on by the accused as contradictions. In the case in hand, as was discussed in above, the above procedure was not followed while cross- examining the witness to his previous statements, and, therefore, we have no alternative but to accept the statement given by this witness before the trial Court that ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 33 2026:HHC:11561 he saw the accused Badaruddin lowering the gun from his chest to be his correct version."
34. Andhra Pradesh High Court held in Shaik Subhani v.
.
State of A.P., 1999 SCC OnLine AP 413: (1999) 5 ALD 284: 2000 Cri LJ 321: (1999) 2 ALT (Cri) 208 that putting a suggestion to the witness and the witness denying the same does not amount to putting the of contradiction to the witness. The attention of the witness has to be drawn to the previous statement, and if he denies the same, rt the same is to be proved by the investigating officer. It was observed at page 290: -
"24... As far as the contradictions put by the defence are concerned, we would like to say that the defence Counsel did not put the contradictions in the manner in which it ought to have been put. By putting suggestions to the witness and the witness denying the same will not amount to putting contradiction to the witness. The contradiction has to be put to the witness as contemplated under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. If a contradiction is put to the witness and it is denied by him, then his attention has to be drawn to the statement made by such witness before the Police or any other previous statement and he must be given a reasonable opportunity to explain as to why such contradiction appears and he may give any answer if the statement made by him is shown to him and if he confronted with such a statement and thereafter the said contradiction must be proved through the Investigation Officer. Then, it only amounts to putting the contradiction to the witness and getting it proved through the Investigation Officer."::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 34
2026:HHC:11561
35. The Calcutta High Court took a similar view in Anjan Ganguly v. State of West Bengal, 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 22948: (2013) .
2 Cal LJ 144 and held at page 151: -
"21. It was held in State of Karnataka v. Bhaskar Kushali Kothakar, reported as (2004) 7 SCC 487, that if any statement of the witness is contrary to the previous statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. or suffers of from omission of certain material particulars, then the previous statement can be proved by examining the Investigating Officer who had recorded the same. Thus, there is no doubt that to prove the previous statement rt Investigating Officer ought to be examined, and the statement of the witness recorded by him can only be proved by him, and he has to depose to the extent that he had correctly recorded the statement, without adding or omitting, as to what was stated by the witness.
23. Proviso to Section 162(1), Cr.P.C. states in clear terms that the statement of the witness ought to be duly proved. The words, if duly proved, cast a duty upon the accused who wants to highlight the contradictions by confronting the witness to prove the previous statement of a witness through the police officer who has recorded the same in the ordinary way. If the witness in the cross-examination admits contradictions, then there is no need to prove the statement. But if the witness denies a contradiction and the police officer who had recorded the statement is called by the prosecution, the previous statement of the witness on this point may be proved by the police officer. In case the prosecution fails to call the police officer in a given situation Court can call this witness, or the accused can call the police officer to give evidence in defence. There is no doubt that unless the statement as per proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 162, Cr.P.C. is duly proved, the contradiction in terms of Section 145 of the Indian ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 35 2026:HHC:11561 Evidence Act cannot be taken into consideration by the Court.
24. To elaborate on this further, it will be necessary to .
reproduce Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act.
"S. 145. A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which of are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him."
25. Therefore, it is appropriate that before the previous statement or statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. is rt proved, the attention of the witness must be drawn to the portion in the statement recorded by the Investigating Officer to bring to light the contradiction, a process called confrontation.
26. Let us first understand what the proper procedure is. A witness may have stated in the statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. that 'X murdered Y'. In Court witness state 'Z murdered Y'. This is a contradiction. Defence Counsel or Court, and even prosecution if the witness is declared hostile, having resiled from a previous statement, is to be confronted to bring contradiction on record. The attention of the witness must be drawn to the previous statement or statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C., where it was stated that 'X murdered Y'. Since Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act uses the word being proved, therefore, in the course of examination of the witness, a previous statement or a statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. will not be exhibited but shall be assigned a mark, and the portion contradicted will be specified. The trial Court in the event of contradiction, has to record as under.
27. The attention of the witness has been drawn to portions A to A of the statement marked as 1, and confronted with the portion where it is recorded that 'X murdered Y'. In this manner, by way of confrontation, contradiction is brought ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 36 2026:HHC:11561 on record. Later, when the Investigating Officer is examined, the prosecution or defence may prove the statement, after the Investigating Officer testifies that the .
statement assigned mark was correctly recorded by him, at that stage statement will be exhibited by the Court. Then the contradiction will be proved by the Investigating Officer by stating that the witness had informed or told him that 'X murdered Y' and he had correctly recorded this fact.
28. Now, a reference to the explanation to Section 162, of Cr.P.C., which says that an omission to state a fact or circumstance may amount to contradiction. Say, for instance, if a witness omits to state in Court that 'X murdered Y', what he had stated in a statement under rt Section 161, Cr.P.C. will be materia? contradiction, for the Public Prosecutor, as the witness has resiled from the previous statement, or if he has been sent for trial for the charge of murder, omission to state 'X murdered Y' will be a material omission, and amount to contradiction so far as the defence of 'W is concerned. At that stage also attention of the witness will also be drawn to a significant portion of the statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., which the witness had omitted to state, and note shall be given that attention of the witness was drawn to the portion A to A wherein it is recorded that 'X murdered Y'. In this way, the omission is brought on record. The rest of the procedure stated earlier, qua confrontation shall be followed to prove the statement of the witness and the fact stated by the witness.
29. Therefore, to prove the statement for the purpose of contradiction, it is necessary that the contradiction or omission must be brought to the notice of the witness. His or her attention must be drawn to the portion of the previous statement (in the present case statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C)"
36. A similar view was taken in Alauddin v. State of Assam, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 760, wherein it was observed:::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 37
2026:HHC:11561 "7. When the two statements cannot stand together, they become contradictory statements. When a witness makes a statement in his evidence before the Court which is .
inconsistent with what he has stated in his statement recorded by the Police, there is a contradiction. When a prosecution witness whose statement under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC has been recorded states factual aspects before the Court which he has not stated in his prior statement recorded under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC, it is said that there is an omission. There will of be an omission if the witness has omitted to state a fact in his statement recorded by the Police, which he states before the Court in his evidence. The explanation to Section 162 CrPC indicates that an omission may amount to a rt contradiction when it is significant and relevant. Thus, every omission is not a contradiction. It becomes a contradiction provided it satisfies the test laid down in the explanation under Section 162. Therefore, when an omission becomes a contradiction, the procedure provided in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 162 must be followed for contradicting witnesses in the cross- examination.
8. As stated in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of section 162, the witness has to be contradicted in the manner provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Section 145 reads thus:
"145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing.--A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him."
The Section operates in two parts. The first part provides that a witness can be cross-examined as to his previous statements made in writing without such writing ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 38 2026:HHC:11561 being shown to him. Thus, for example, a witness can be cross-examined by asking whether his prior statement exists. The second part is regarding contradicting a .
witness. While confronting the witness with his prior statement to prove contradictions, the witness must be shown his prior statement. If there is a contradiction between the statement made by the witness before the Court and what is recorded in the statement recorded by the police, the witness's attention must be drawn to specific parts of his prior statement, which are to be used of to contradict him. Section 145 provides that the relevant part can be put to the witness without the writing being proved. However, the previous statement used to contradict witnesses must be proved subsequently. Only if rt the contradictory part of his previous statement is proved can the contradictions be said to be proved. The usual practice is to mark the portion or part shown to the witness of his prior statement produced on record. Marking is done differently in different States. In some States, practice is to mark the beginning of the portion shown to the witness with an alphabet and the end by marking with the same alphabet. While recording the cross-examination, the Trial Court must record that a particular portion marked, for example, as AA was shown to the witness. Which part of the prior statement is shown to the witness for contradicting him has to be recorded in the cross- examination. If the witness admits to having made such a prior statement, that portion can be treated as proved. If the witness does not admit the portion of his prior statement with which he is confronted, it can be proved through the Investigating Officer by asking whether the witness made a statement that was shown to the witness. Therefore, if the witness is intended to be confronted with his prior statement reduced into writing, that particular part of the statement, even before it is proved, must be specifically shown to the witness. After that, the part of the prior statement used to contradict the witness has to be proved. As indicated earlier, it can be treated as proved if the witness admits to having made such a statement, or it ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 39 2026:HHC:11561 can be proved in the cross-examination of the concerned police officer. The object of this requirement in Section 145 of the Evidence Act, of confronting the witness by showing .
him the relevant part of his prior statement, is to give the witness a chance to explain the contradiction. Therefore, this is a rule of fairness.
9. If a former statement of the witness is inconsistent with any part of his evidence given before the Court, it can be used to impeach the credit of the witness in accordance with clause (3) of Section 155 of the Evidence Act, which of reads thus:
"155. Impeaching credit of the witness. -- The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by rt the adverse party, or, with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him--
(1) .............................................. (2) ............................................. (3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted."
It must be noted here that every contradiction or omission is not a ground to discredit the witness or to disbelieve his/her testimony. A minor or trifle omission or contradiction brought on record is not sufficient to disbelieve the witness's version. Only when there is a material contradiction or omission can the Court disbelieve the witness's version either fully or partially. What is a material contradiction or omission, depending upon the facts of each case? Whether an omission is a contradiction also depends on the facts of each individual case.
10. We are tempted to quote what is held in a landmark decision of this Court in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P.1959 Supp (2) SCR 875. Paragraph 13 of the said decision reads thus:
"13. The learned counsel's first argument is based upon the words "in the manner provided by Section 145 ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 40 2026:HHC:11561 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872" found in Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act, it is said, empowers the accused to put all .
relevant questions to a witness before his attention is called to those parts of the writing with a view to contradicting him. In support of this contention, reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in Shyam Singh v. State of Punjab [(1952) 1 SCC 514: 1952 SCR 812]. Bose, J. describes the procedure to be followed to contradict a witness under Section 145 of the Evidence of Act, thus at p. 819:
Resort to Section 145 would only be necessary if the witness denies that he made the former statement. In that event, it would be necessary to rt prove that he did, and if the former statement was reduced to writing, then Section 145 requires that his attention must be drawn to these parts which are to be used for contradiction. But that position does not arise when the witness admits the former statement. In such a case, all that is necessary is to look to the former statement of which no further proof is necessary because of the admission that it was made."
It is unnecessary to refer to other cases wherein a similar procedure is suggested for putting questions under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, for the said decision of this Court and similar decisions were not considering the procedure in a case where the statement in writing was intended to be used for contradiction under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is in two parts:
the first part enables the accused to cross-examine a witness as to a previous statement made by him in writing or reduced to writing without such writing being shown to him; the second part deals with a situation where the cross- examination assumes the shape of contradiction: in other words, both parts deal with cross-examination; the first part with cross-examination other than by way of ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 41 2026:HHC:11561 contradiction, and the second with cross-examination by way of contradiction only. The procedure prescribed is that, if it is intended to contradict a witness by the writing, his .
attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. The proviso to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only enables the accused to make use of such a statement to contradict a witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. It would be doing violence to the language of the proviso if the said of statement be allowed to be used for the purpose of cross- examining a witness within the meaning of the first part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Nor are we impressed by the argument that it would not be possible to invoke the second rt part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act without putting relevant questions under the first part thereof. The difficulty is more imaginary than real. The second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act clearly indicates the simple procedure to be followed. To illustrate: A says in the witness box that B stabbed C; before the police, he had stated that D stabbed C. His attention can be drawn to that part of the statement made before the police, which contradicts his statement in the witness box. If he admits his previous statement, no further proof is necessary; if he does not admit it, the practice generally followed is to admit it subject to proof by the police officer. On the other hand, the procedure suggested by the learned counsel may be illustrated thus: If the witness is asked, "Did you say before the police officer that you saw a gas light?" and he answers "yes", then the statement which does not contain such recital is put to him as a contradiction. This procedure involves two fallacies: one is that it enables the accused to elicit by a process of cross-examination what the witness stated before the police officer. If a police officer did not make a record of a witness's statement, his entire statement could not be used for any purpose, whereas if a police officer recorded a few sentences, by this process of cross-examination, the witness's oral statement could be brought on record. This procedure, ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 42 2026:HHC:11561 therefore, contravenes the express provision of Section 162 of the Code. The second fallacy is that by the illustration given by the learned counsel for the .
appellants, there is no self-contradiction of the primary statement made in the witness box, for the witness has not yet made on the stand any assertion at all which can serve as the basis. The contradiction, under the section, should be between what a witness asserted in the witness box and what he stated before the police officer, and not between what he said he had stated before the of police officer and what he actually said before him. In such a case, the question could not be put at all: only questions to contradict can be put, and the question here posed does not contradict; it leads to an answer rt which is contradicted by the police statement. This argument of the learned counsel based upon Section 145 of the Evidence Act is, therefore, not of any relevance in considering the express provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." (emphasis added) This decision is a locus classicus, which will continue to guide our Trial Courts. In the facts of the case, the learned Trial Judge has not marked those parts of the witnesses' prior statements based on which they were sought to be contradicted in the cross-examination."
37. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Matadin v. State of U.P., 1980 Supp SCC 157, that the statement under Section 161 Cr.PC is not detailed and is meant to be brief. It does not contain all the details. It was observed at page 158:
"3. The learned Sessions Judge had rejected the evidence of the eyewitnesses on wrong, unconvincing and unsound reasons. The Sessions Judge appears to have been swayed by some insignificant omissions made by some of the witnesses in their statements before the police, and on the basis of these omissions, dubbed the witnesses as liars. The ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 43 2026:HHC:11561 Sessions Judge did not realise that the statements given by the witnesses before the police were meant to be brief statements and could not take the place of evidence in the .
Court. Where the omissions are vital, they merit consideration, but mere small omissions will not justify a finding by a court that the witnesses concerned are self- contained liars. We have carefully perused the judgment of the Sessions Judge, and we are unable to agree that the reasons that he has given for disbelieving the witnesses are good or sound reasons. The High Court was, therefore, fully of justified in reversing the judgment passed by the trial court. We are satisfied that this is a case where the judgment of the Sessions Judge was manifestly wrong and perverse and was rightly set aside by the High Court. It was rt urged by Mr Mehta that, as other appellants except Matadin and Dulare do not appear to have assaulted the deceased, they should be acquitted of the charge under Section 149. We, however, find that all the appellants were members of the unlawful assembly. Their names find a place in the FIR. For these reasons, we are unable to find any ground to distinguish the case of those appellants from that of Matadin and Dulare. The argument of the learned counsel is overruled. The result is that the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. The appellants who are on bail will now surrender to serve out the remaining portion of their sentence."
38. Similar is the judgment in Esher Singh v. State of A.P., (2004) 11 SCC 585: 2004 SCC OnLine SC 320, wherein it was held at page 601:
"23. So far as the appeal filed by accused Esher Singh is concerned, the basic question is that even if the confessional statement purported to have been made by A- 5 is kept out of consideration, whether residuary material is sufficient to find him guilty. Though it is true, as contended by learned counsel for the accused-appellant ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 44 2026:HHC:11561 Esher Singh, that some statements were made for the first time in court and not during the investigation, it has to be seen to what extent they diluted the testimony of Balbeer .
Singh and Dayal Singh (PWs 16 and 32) used to bring home the accusations. A mere elaboration cannot be termed a discrepancy. When the basic features are stated, unless the elaboration is of such a nature that it creates a different contour or colour of the evidence, the same cannot be said to have totally changed the complexion of the case. It is to be noted that in addition to the evidence of PWs 16 and 32, of the evidence of S. Narayan Singh (PW 21) provides the necessary links and strengthens the prosecution's version. We also find substance in the plea taken by learned counsel for the State that evidence of Amar Singh Bungai (PW 24) rt was not tainted in any way, and should not have been discarded and disbelieved only on surmises. Balbir Singh (PW 3), the son of the deceased, has also stated about the provocative statements in his evidence. Darshan Singh (PW
14) has spoken about the speeches of the accused Esher Singh, highlighting the Khalistan movement. We find that the trial court had not given importance to the evidence of some of the witnesses on the ground that they were relatives of the deceased. The approach is wrong. The mere relationship does not discredit the testimony of a witness.
What is required is careful scrutiny of the evidence. If, after careful scrutiny, the evidence is found to be credible and cogent, it can be acted upon. In the instant case, the trial court did not indicate any specific reason to cast doubt on the veracity of the evidence of the witnesses whom it had described as the relatives of the deceased. PW 24 has categorically stated about the provocative speeches by A-1. No definite cross-examination on the provocative nature of speech regarding the Khalistan movement was made, so far as this witness is concerned."
39. This position was reiterated in Shamim v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 10 SCC 509: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1559, where it was held at page 513:
::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 452026:HHC:11561 "12. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, inspires confidence. Once that impression .
is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on of trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, and attaching importance to some technical error without going to the rt root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. Minor omissions in the police statements are never considered to be fatal. The statements given by the witnesses before the police are meant to be brief statements and cannot take the place of evidence in court. Small/trivial omissions would not justify a finding by the court that the witnesses concerned are liars. The prosecution's evidence may suffer from inconsistencies here and discrepancies there, but that is a shortcoming from which no criminal case is free. The main thing to be seen is whether those inconsistencies go to the root of the matter or pertain to insignificant aspects thereof. In the former case, the defence may be justified in seeking advantage of incongruities obtained in the evidence. In the latter, however, no such benefit may be available to it."
40. Similar is the judgment in Kalabhai Hamirbhai Kachhot v. State of Gujarat, (2021) 19 SCC 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 347, wherein it was observed at page 564:
"22. We also do not find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel that there are major contradictions in ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 46 2026:HHC:11561 the deposition of PWs 18 and 19. The contradictions which are sought to be projected are minor contradictions which cannot be the basis for discarding their evidence. The .
judgment of this Court in Mohar [Mohar v. State of U.P., (2002) 7 SCC 606: 2003 SCC (Cri) 121], relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent State, supports the case of the prosecution. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness. Para 11 of the judgment reads as under:
(SCC p. 611) of "11. The testimony of an injured witness has its own efficacy and relevancy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries on his body would show that he was present at the place of occurrence and had seen the rt occurrence by himself. Convincing evidence would be required to discredit an injured witness. Similarly, every discrepancy in the statement of a witness cannot be treated as fatal. A discrepancy which does not affect the prosecution's case materially cannot create any infirmity. In the instant case, the discrepancy in the name of PW 4 appearing in the FIR and the cross-
examination of PW 1 has been amply clarified. In cross- examination, PW 1 clarified that his brother Ram Awadh had three sons: (1) Jagdish, PW 4, (2) Jagarnath, and (3) Suresh. This witness, however, stated that Jagarjit had only one name. PW 2 Vibhuti, however, stated that at the time of occurrence, the son of Ram Awadh, Jagjit alias Jagarjit, was milking a cow, and he was also called as Jagdish. Balli (PW 3) mentioned his name as Jagjit and Jagdish. PW 4 also gave his name as Jagdish."
23. The learned counsel for the respondent State has also relied on the judgment of this Court in Naresh [State of U.P. v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 216]. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that the evidence of injured witnesses cannot be brushed aside without assigning cogent reasons. Paras 27 and 30 of the judgment, which are relevant, read as under: (SCC pp. 333-
34) ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 47 2026:HHC:11561 "27. The evidence of an injured witness must be given due weight, being a stamped witness; thus, his presence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally .
considered to be very reliable, and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, and this lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. The witness would not like or want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to implicate a third person falsely for the commission of the offence. Thus, rt the evidence of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. (Vide Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719:
(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107], Balraje v. State of Maharashtra [Balraje v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 211] and Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P. [Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1262]) ***
30. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental dispositions such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a contradiction, creating serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and other witnesses also make material improvement while deposing in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However, minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground on ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 48 2026:HHC:11561 which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety. The court has to form its opinion about the credibility of the witness and record a finding as to whether his .
deposition inspires confidence.
'9. Exaggerations, per se, do not render the evidence brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test the credibility of the prosecution version when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility.' [Ed.: As observed in Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh, (2004) 9 SCC 186, p.
of 192, para 9: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1435] Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements of a witness cannot be dubbed as improvements, as the rt same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars, i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited. (Vide State v. Saravanan [State v.
Saravanan, (2008) 17 SCC 587 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 580], Arumugam v. State [Arumugam v. State, (2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], Mahendra Pratap Singh v.
State of U.P. [Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., (2009) 11 SCC 334 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1352] and Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra [Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 375]"
24. Further, in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], this Court has considered the effect of the minor contradictions in the depositions of witnesses while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial. In the aforesaid judgment, it is held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as under: (SCC p. 483) ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 49 2026:HHC:11561 "42. Only such omissions that amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in .
the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses, of as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would rt not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness."
41. Therefore, the testimony of Som Chand (PW6) cannot be discarded simply because he had not narrated this fact to the police.
42. It was consistently stated by the informant and this witness that the tipper had turned turtle. This fact is also corroborated by the site plan (Ext.PW9/C), wherein the truck has been shown to have turned turtle. The photographs (Ext.P1, Ext.
P4, Ext. P2 and Ext.P6) also show that the tipper had turned turtle. Therefore, somebody must have helped the driver to come out of the tipper, and the statement of Som Chand that he had taken the accused out of the truck is believable.
::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 502026:HHC:11561
43. Anil Kumar (PW8) stated that he was employed as a conductor in a Truck bearing registration No. HP-17B-8238. The .
truck was going towards Dehradun on 21.09.2011. When the truck reached near Katasan, a tipper being driven by the accused came from the opposite side towards the wrong side of the road. The tipper hit the rear tyre of the truck and turned turtle. The accused of was caught subsequently. He was heavily intoxicated. The police came to the spot and investigated the matter. He stated in his rt cross-examination that he did not possess a conductor's licence on the date of the accident. The truck was going uphill at a speed of about 20 km per hour. The road was 7-8 meters wide. The police reached the spot after one hour. The photographs were taken on the next day. The accused was surrounded by 5-7 persons. He denied that Ram Singh was driving the tipper on the date of the accident, and he had wrongly disclosed his name as Kamal.
44. The statement of this witness corroborates the statements of the informant and the owner of the truck. Nothing was suggested to these witnesses in their cross-examination to show that they were making false statements. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly accepted their testimonies.
::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 512026:HHC:11561
45. Anshul Singhal (PW3) stated that he is the owner of the truck bearing registration No. HP-71-1075. He was permitted .
to be cross-examined. He denied in the cross-examination by the learned APP that the accused was intoxicated and the accident occurred because of the high speed of the tipper. He was informed by the driver that the truck was damaged in the accident. He of admitted that he did not possess the permit for the tipper. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. He stated rt that he had employed Ram Singh as a driver.
46. It was submitted that this witness has not supported the prosecution's case, and this is sufficient to acquit the accused.
This submission cannot be accepted. He was contradicted by his previous statement, which was subsequently exhibited by HC Deep Chand (PW9). HC Deep Chand (PW9) specifically stated that he has recorded the statement of Anshul Singhal (Ext.PW9/D) as per his version. Anshul Singhal (PW3) had mentioned in his previous statement that he had employed Kamal as a driver, and Kamal was intoxicated. Thus, he is shown to have made two inconsistent statement: one before the police that he had employed Kamal as a driver and the other before the Court that he had employed Ram Singh as a driver. Both these statements ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 52 2026:HHC:11561 cannot stand together, and his credit has been impeached under Section 155 (3) of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down by the .
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the previous statement, his statement cannot be relied upon. However, when he is confronted with some of portions of the previous statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It rt was observed:
"52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross- examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto."::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 53
2026:HHC:11561
47. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman versus. State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed:
.
"12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross- examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence. We find support for the view we have taken from the various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The State of (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400, the Apex Court observed:
"It is now well settled that when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be rt cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to discredit this witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony.
48. Therefore, his testimony cannot be relied upon and cannot be used to discard the prosecution's version.
49. Further, his conduct does not support his testimony.
He claimed that he had employed Ram Singh as a driver. However, he failed to produce any document showing the employment of Ram Singh. He stated that he came to know after receipt of the summons that a false case was made against the accused.
However, he had not protested regarding this fact. Thus, his conduct does not justify his statement that he had employed Ram Singh as a driver and not the accused.
::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 542026:HHC:11561
50. Rajender Kumar (PW4) stated that he saw a tipper having turned turtle on the road. The accident did not occur in his .
presence. He was permitted to be cross-examined, and he denied that a tipper bearing registration No. HP-71-1075 came from Paonta Sahib side and hit the truck bearing registration No. HP17B-8238. He denied that the driver of the tipper was heavily of intoxicated. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. rt
51. HC Deep Chand (PW9) has also proved that the statement of Rajender Kumar (Ext.PW9/E) was written as per his version. Rajender Kumar (PW4) had told the police that the accident had occurred in his presence, and the accused was driving the tipper at the time of the accident. Thus, he has also made contradictory statements, his credibility has been impeached, and no reliance can be placed upon his testimony.
52. The statements of the informant Som Chand (PW6) and Anil Kumar (PW8) that the tipper was being driven towards the wrong side of the road are duly corroborated by the site plan (Ext.PW9/C), wherein the truck is shown towards the extreme left-hand side of the road, whereas the tipper is shown towards ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 55 2026:HHC:11561 its right side. Thus, the site plan duly proved that the tipper was being driven towards the right side of the road, which was the .
proximate cause of the accident.
53. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule of 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall rt allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed:
"The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road."
54. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed:
::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 562026:HHC:11561 "The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the .
place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road."
55. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj of 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held:
"16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In rt the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft.
The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side."
56. In the present case, the driver of the tipper had breached the rule and the regulation which led to the accident, ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 57 2026:HHC:11561 and the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligently driving the tipper.
.
57. The accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he was medically examined and his blood sample was taken. The blood sample was sent to the SFSL, of and the report (Ext.PW9/G) was issued, in which it was mentioned that the quantity of alcohol in the blood was 268.18 rt mg %. Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that if a person drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle having alcohol exceeding 30 mg per 100 ml in his blood, he shall be punishable with imprisonment, which may extend to six months or the fine which may extend to ₹2000/- or with both. In the present case, the quantity of alcohol found in the blood of the accused was much more than 30 mg per 100 ml, and he was rightly held guilty of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 181 of the MV Act.
58. The accused did not produce his driving licence.
Therefore, he was rightly held guilty of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 181 of the MV Act.
::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 582026:HHC:11561
59. Anshul Singhal (PW3) admitted that he did not possess any permit for the tipper. Section 192-A of the MV Act .
punishes a person driving a motor vehicle without a valid permit required under Section 66(1) of the MV Act.
60. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly of convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC and Sections 181, 185 and 192A of the MV Act.
rt
61. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and pay a fine of ₹500/-, and in default of payment of fine to undergo further imprisonment of 15 days for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in not extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving. It was observed:
"11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 59 2026:HHC:11561 person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor .
suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So, V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus:
of "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency rt of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces."
12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine.
13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 60 2026:HHC:11561 should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any .
human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the of Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles."
62. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder rt Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: -
"13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208].
63. Similarly, the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196:
"25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS 61 2026:HHC:11561 accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the "Emperors of all they survey". Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, .
where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as "larger than life". In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the of sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish."
64. Therefore, a deterrent sentence was required to be rt imposed, especially because the accused was driving with alcohol in his blood exceeding the legal limit. Thus, no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court.
65. No other point was urged.
66. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.
67. The present revision stands disposed of and so are the pending miscellaneous application(s) if any.
68. The record of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of the judgment.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 16th April, 2026 (Nikita) ::: Downloaded on - 16/04/2026 20:31:58 :::CIS