Karnataka High Court
Deputy General Manager vs Kamappa on 24 November, 1992
Equivalent citations: I(1993)ACC636, 1993ACJ539, ILR1993KAR584, 1993(1)KARLJ80
JUDGMENT M. Ramakrishna, J.
1. The main ground on which this Appeal is presented by the K.S.R.T.C., is that the compromise petition filed before the Lok Adalath - though not signed by the appellant, Deputy General Manager and Divisional Controller, K.S.R.T.C., or the Law Officer, the contesting respondent in the Court below - was acted upon and a finding recorded thereon against the interest of the appellant and that therefore the finding does not bind the appellant.
2. Sri Ramesh, learned Counsel appearing for the lnsurer-3rd respondent, drew our attention to the Decision of the Supreme Court in : BYRAM PESTONJI - GARIWALA V. UNION BANK OF INDIA AND ORS., In Paragraphs 40, 43 and 44 of the Judgment referring to a similar plea put forward in that case arising out of an order under Order 23 Rule 3, C.P.C. read with Order 3 Rule 1 and Section 11, the Supreme Court held as follows:-
"The words 'in writing and signed by the parties', inserted in Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. by the C.P.C. (Amendment) - Act, 1976 necessarily mean and include duty authorised representative and Counsel. Thus a Compromise in writing and signed by counsel representing the parties, but not signed by the parties in person, is valid and binding on the parties and is executable even if the compromise relates to matters concerning the parties, but extending beyond the subject matter of the suit. A judgment by consent is intended to stop litigation between the parties just as much as a judgment resulting from a decision of the Court at the end of a long drawn out fight. A compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment."
3. In the instant case, the plea set up by the appellant is that even though the comprise petition had been presented by the parties, such a petition had not been signed by either the appellant or the Law Officer.
4. To repel this argument, Sri Ramesh, learned Counsel submits that as long as there is vakalathnama in the prescribed form duly signed by the appellant herein with his official seal on it authorising the Advocate named therein to conduct the case on his behalf, it must be presumed that such a person has got the authority to act and make any submission with a view to safeguard the interest of his client. Therefore, the Court must presume that the Divisional Controller, Raichur Dn., consented to the compromise, which has been acted upon with a view to give relief to the parties. Therefore, his submission is that the appellant cannot find fault with the order of the Court below saying that there was no authorisation or the compromise had not been signed by him.
5. It is seen from the vakalathnama available in the original records in M.V.C. No. 69/90 that the same was signed on 16th June 1990 at Raichur by the Divisional Controller. It bears his official seal also, The Advocate in whose favour it has been made, has also signed it. Therefore, having regard to the contents of the vakalathnama prescribed under the provisions of the Advocates' Act, the Court will have to infer that the Advocate mentioned therein has been duly authorised to act for the executant of the vakalathnama. Indeed, it is seen from Para-2 of the Vakalathnama that the Advocate has also been authorised to enter into a compromise in the above matter and to act in furtherance therein to safeguard the interest of the signatory. Accordingly, the Advocate who was authorised to appear and act on behalf of the appellant herein, rightly consented to the compromise petition filed before the Lok Adalath. Acting on such a compromise petition filed on behalf of both parties, the Court passed an order based on which an award came to be passed by the Court below which cannot be found fault with by the appellant on the above grounds.
6. Viewed from these circumstances, we are of the view that the contention now urged in support of the Appeal is one without any force.
7. There is one more aspect which requires to be noticed by the Court. Before presenting this Appeal, the appellant filed a Review Petition under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C., before the Court below. That review application is still pending before the Tribunal. That being so, this Appeal is not maintainable. On these two aspects, we are of the view that this Appeal deserves to be dismissed without going into the merits.
In the result and for the reasons stated above, this Appeal fails and is dismissed.