Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Narumanchi Subbarao, Having Died By N. ... vs Valamuri Sankara Sastry on 15 June, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1994(2)ALT411
JUDGMENT S.V. Maruthi, J.
1. This Second Appeal arises out of the judgment of the learned District Judge, Guntur allowing A.S. No. 127 of 1985 filed against the judgment of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Tenali dismissing the suit in O.S. No. 89 of 1977.
2. During the pendency of the appeal before the District Judge, the 1st defendant died. Therefore, one Sri N. Rama Prasad, the successor to the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant filed the present Second Appeal. %
3. The plaintiff-respondent filed the suit for a declaration that he was the hereditary Managing Trustee of Sri Sankara Matham, Ramalingeswarapet, Tenali and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the affairs of Sri Sankara Matham and its properties.
4. The facts, in brief, are as follows:-
Plaintiff was the adopted son of one Smt. Velamuri Lingamma. Lingamma installed an idol of Sri Sankaracharya Swami in her own house at Ramalingeswarapet, Tenali in or about 1935 and began to perform poojas. She executed a trust deed dated 20-4-1985 in the name of Sri Janaswami Venkateswara Sastry, Whereunder she gave her stridhana properties for the institution of Sri Sankara Matham for performing Nitya Naivedya Dhoopa Deeparadhana and laid down the procedure for management of Matham. According to the trust deed, as long as the institution exists, a member of her family should be a member in the advisory council. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to hereditary rights under the trust deed. Thereafter, she constructed a terraced building at the adjacent site and donated the same to the institution. She resided in it along with her family and after her death, as per her wishes, plaintiff was residing in the building, performing the duties at the institution as contemplated under the trust deed. Sri Janaswami Venkateswara Sastry fell ill and wanted a successor to be appointed. Therefore, the founder, namely, Smt. Lingamma suggested the name of the 1st defendant viz., Narumanchi Subbarao as successor and in accordance with the wishes of the founder, Sri Janaswami Venkateswara Sastry executed a deed of appointment on 20-4-1960 in favour of the 1st defendant. After the 1st defendant took charge, he tried to shift another institution under his control with the name of "Sitarama Gana Sabha" into the campus of the institution to the dissatisfaction of the founder. On account of it, Lingamma forced the 1st defendant to resign in her favour by executing a deed of appointment on 10-11-1967. Thereafter, the founder - Smt. Lingamma was managing the institution. She appointed her adoptive son, namely, the plaintiff as the hereditary trustee by executing a deed dt.5-5-1967. The institution was registered with the name of Sri Sankara Matham under Section 38 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The plaintiff's rights as hereditary managing trustee were also recognised by the Deputy Commissioner, Endowments Department, Vijaywada in O.A. No. 56/69. Defendants 1 and 2 filed petitions in A.S. 65/72 and A.T.P. No. 56/1377-F posing themselves of Sri Vidya Sankara Matham. A.S.65/72 was dismissed. Subsequently, they filed a petition before the Deputy Commissioner as managing trustees of Sri Vidya Sankar Matham in O.A. 52/75 and obtained a. certificate for the properties of Sri Sankara Matham. Hence the suit.
5. The defendants filed a written statement alleging that the plaintiff got the deed dt.5-5-1967 executed after drugging his mother and while she was in a semi-conscious state and it was a forged trust deed, and on the basis of the said trustdeed,withoutnotice to others,hegothis name recognisedas the managing trustee in O.A. No. 56/69. Against the said order, one Sri K.L. Ganapathi, Joint Managing Trustee, filed an appeal in O.A. 111/69 before the Deputy Commissioner. The said appeal was allowed, on 25-5-1970 deleting the name of the plaintiff and registering the name of Ganapathi and the 2nd defendant as trustees. The plaintiff preferred a revision before the Joint Commissioner in R.P. No. 13/70 which was dismissed. According to Section 78 of the Act, aggrieved by the orders of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 77, a person should get the order quashed by filing a suit in the District Court within one year and, therefore, tine Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by the plaintiff. The suit was barred by the principles of resjudicata by reason of the judgment in O.S. No. 2 of 1976 dated 16-10-1976, as O.S. 2 of 1976 was filed for the same relief by the same plaintiff against the same defendants and the Court held that it had no jurisdiction and the District Court had jurisdiction and returned the plaint for presentation before the proper Court and the said order had become final as no appeal had been filed. The returned plaint was taken and presented in the District Court, but the District Court returned the same and then the plaintiff p resented it before the Subordinate Judge and the Subordinate Judge again returned the plaint on 14-12-1976. Against the said order, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in C.M.A. No. 14 of 1977 which was dismissed on 5-8-1977. The suit was barred by limitation as it was not filed within one year from the date of the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 25-5-1970. Lingamma had no properties for the construction of the Matham and the Matham was built by donations from public and the property which was endowed by Smt. Lingamma to the Matham was also purchased through public donations. An amount of Rs. 19,000/- donated by the public standing in the name of Smt. Lingamma in the bank was fraudulently withdrawn and misappropriated by the plaintiff. Plaintiff was unauthorisedly occupying the house belonging to the Mutt for the last ten years and he was accused of playing cards and chess and smoking in the mutt premises. The trust board was managing the mutt and the committee removed Lingamma from the trust board and the plaintiff took that minutes book and refused to produce it before the Court in spite of notice issued to him. After the death of Ganapathi, the managing board in its meeting held on 18-9-1975 elected the 1st defendant as the managing turstee and the second defendant as the joint managing trustee.
6. On the basis of the above pleadings, the trial Court framed as many as nine issues. Tine plaintiff examined himself and two others. On behalf of the defendants, the first defendant and six more witnesses were examined. On behalf of the plaintiff Exs.A-1 to A-40 were marked and the defendants filed Exs.B-1 to B-15.
7. One of the issues framed by the trial Court was, whether the sub-Court, Tenali had jurisdiction to try the suit. This issue was tried as a preliminary issue and the Court returned the plaint on 26-12-1977 on the ground that it had no jurisdiction, against which, the plaintiff filed C.M.A. No.lll of 1977 on the file of the District Judge, Guntur- The C.M.A. was dismissed against which plaintiff filed a revision before the High Court in C.R.P. No. 4818 of 1979. The High Court called for a finding on Issue No. 6, namely, "Whether 'Sri Vidya Sankara Mutt' is the same 'Sri Sankara Mutt'." The Subordinate Judge gave a finding that both Mutts are one and the same. The High Court after hearing both sides on the question of jurisdiction held that the suit was not the one filed against the order of Deputy Commissioner and, therefore, the Sub-Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. It was held by this Court in the CRP 4818 of 1979 that the Deputy Commissioner under Section 77 of the Act can decide whether the trusteeship is hereditary or not and the issue whether the plaintiff was a joint trustee along with the 1st defendant cannot be decided by the Deputy Commissioner as he had no power to decide the same under Section 77 of the Act. Therefore, the Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to decide whether the plaintiff was the managing trustee or not under Section 77. The Sub-Court had jurisdiction to try the suit viz., O.S. No. 89 of 1977 as it was a suit for declaration that the plaintiff was the hereditary managing trustee and not a suit for setting aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner. Such a suit was not barred under any of the provisions of the Act and therefore the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. Holding as above, this Court allowed the revision petition filed by the plaintiff.
8. Since this Court held that the Sub-Court had jurisdiction to try the suit in the revision, the trial Court proceeded with the suit to decide the other issues, namely - whether the suit was barred by res judicata in view of the judgment in O.S. No. 2 of 1976 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tenali (Issue No. 2); whether the suit was barred by limitation (Issue No. 3); whether the suit Mutt Sri Sankara Mutt was built by late Lingamma with her own money and whether she was the founder of that Mutt (Issue No. 4); whether the deed of appointment dt.5-5-67 in favour of the plaintiff was valid and confers rights on him as the hereditary managing trustee of the suit Mutt (Issue No. 5).
9. The trial Court decided the issues 2 and 3 in favour of the plaintiff and Issue No. 5 against the plaintiff. Issue No. 4 was not seriously disputed before trial Court.
10. In the appeal, the District Judge framed the following points for consideration:
1. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
2. Whether the suit is barred by res judicata?
3. Whether Ex.A-4 appointment deed is true and valid?
4. Whether late Lingamma had a right to appoint a managing trustee by the date of Ex.A-4.
11. The learned Judge decided all the points in favour of the plaintiff, who filed the appeal, and allowed the appeal setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. In other words, the appellate Court declared that the plaintiff was the hereditary trustee of the Sri Sankara Mutt, against which, the present Second Appeal is preferred.
12. Sri P.R. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants raised the following contentions:-
(1) The suit is barred by limitation;
(2) The judgment in O.S. No. 2 of 1976 operates as res judicata;
(3) The suit is not maintainable before the Subordinate Judge; and (4) The plaintiff is not entitled for a declaration that he was the hereditary trustee of the disputed Mutt and that the construction placed by the learned Subordinate Judge on Ex.A-4 is correct.
13. Taking up the first contention that the suit is barred by limitation, the main contention of the Counsel for the appellants is that the plaintiff filed O.A. No. 56/69 on the file of the Deputy Commissioner, Vijayawada under Section 40 read with Section 77 {l)(c) of the Act, claiming that he should be recognised as the Managing Trustee of the Mutt. The said application was allowed on 13-4-69, against which, one Sri K.L. Ganapathi filed an appeal O. A. No. 111 / 69 before the Deputy Commissioner, Vijayawada under Section 40 of the Act to register the Mutt under Section 38 and to modify the entry made under Section 40 by deleting the plaintiff's name and adding the name of Sri Kuppa Veera Raghava Sastry as the Managing Trustee. The said appeal was dismissed for default in December, 1969. Sri Ganapathi filed a restoration petition on 4-2-70 and O.A.111/69 was restored on 11-2-70. While restoring the O.A.111/69, the Deputy Commissioner directed the plaintiff not to take any further action in respect. of the Mutt, Against the said order restraining the plaintiff from taking any further action and also restoring the O.K. dismissed for default filer1 R.F. No. 13/70 before the Joint Commissioner of Endowments, Hyderabad. the said revision was dismissed on 29-8-70 on the ground that the Joint Commissioner, Endowments had no jurisdiction to revise the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner in respect of a Mutt, as under Section 82 of the Act, Mutt was not included. On 25-5-70, the Deputy Commissioner passed ex parte orders in O. A. No. 111/69 declaring Sri Kuppa Veeraraghava Sastry and Sri K.L. Ganapathi as Managing Trustee and Joint Managing Trustee and directed the plaintiff's name to be deleted. In other words, the Deputy Commissioner allowed the appeal, namely, O.A.I 11/69. However, the Deputy Commissioner had not issued any notice to the plaintiff while passing the orders dated 25-5-70. Therefore, the plaintiff filed I. A. No. 90/73 to set aside the ex parte orders passed in O.A.111/69. The said LA. was dismissed on 8-3-75. Counsel submits that the cause of action for the present suit arose on the date when the Deputy Commissioner disposed of O.A.111/69, namely, on 25-5-1970, wherein tine Deputy Commissioner deleted the name of the plaintiff as the hereditary trustee of the disputed Mutt. The present suit filed in the year 1976 is, therefore, barred by limitation.
14. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the cause of action arose only when LA. No. 90/73 filed by the plaintiff to set aside the ex parte order in C.A.I. 11/69 was dismissed viz., 8-3-75. The suit having been filed within a pi riod of three years thereafter was not barred by limitation.
15. Both the Courts below held that the suit was not barred by limitation as thi cause of action arose on 6-12-1975 i.e., when the defendants filed a third party petition in A.T.P. No. 56/1377-F and not when O.A. No. 111/69 was allowed by the Deputy Commissioner on 25-5-70, as the defendants are not parties to the proceedings in O.A. No. 111/69. Both the Courts held that O.A. No. 111 /69 was filed by one Sri Ganapathi and not by the defendants. Therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff was within time.
16. From the facts narrated above, it is clear that O.A.111/69 was disposed of by the Deputy Commissioner on 25-5-70 and it was an ex parte order and no notice was issued to the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff filed LA. No. 9/73 to set aside the ex parte order in O.A. No.lll of 1969. The said LA. No. 90/73 was dismissed on 8-3-75. Therefore^ the cause of action arose on 8-3-75, as till that d£te, the petition filed by the plaintiff to set aside the ex parte order was pending. Further, the ex parte order in O.A.No.111/69 was stayed till the incumbent, namely, Deputy Commissioner was transferred as the plaintiff also sought for transfer of the proceedings from the Deputy Commissioner. Till such time LA. No. 90/73 was dismissed on 8-3-75, he had no grievance. Therefore, the cause of action arose only on the date when I.A.90/73 was dismissed viz., 8-3-75. Since the suit was filed in the year 1977 i.e., within a period of three years, the suit was not barred by limitation.
17. The next question to be considered is, whether the judgment in O.S. No. 2 of 1976 operates as resjudicata?
18. The contention of the Counsel for the appellants is that the plaintiff filed a suit for a declaration that he was the hereditary trustee of the disputed Mutt and also for an injunction. The defendants filed objection stating that the Additional Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to try the suit. The Additional Subordinate Judge returned the plaint on 16-10-1976 for presentation before the proper Court. Accordingly on 27-11-1976, the plaintiff presented the plaint to the District Court which has also returned on the ground that it had into jurisdiction. On 14-12-1976, the plaintiff again presented the plaint before and the Additional Subordinate Judge, Tenali, who again returned the plaint on tji& ground that it had no jurisdiction. On 5-8-1977, the plaintiff filed CM.A. No. 14 of 1977 on the file of the District Judge, Guntur, which Was dismissed. The orders in the said C.M.A. have become final. Therefore, Counsel submits that the present suit was barred by the principles of res judicata. He also submits that the order returning the plaint holding mat the Additional Subordinate Jujige had no jurisdiction had become final and the said order operates as res judicata. Counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh, wherein it was held that-
"If defendant does not appear and the Court on its own returns the plaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction the order in a subsequent suit may not operate as res judicata but if the defendant appears and an issue is raised and decided then the decision on the question of jurisdiction will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit although the reasons for its decision may not be so."
19. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the judgment in Avtar Singh's case, (AIR 1991 SC 1993) is no longer good law in view of the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad v. Dossiba. . wherein it was held that-
"A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court. If by an erroneous decision of that Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not operate as res judicata. Similarly, by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the causet>f action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise,
20. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the judgment in Mathura Prasad's case (2 supra) was decided by a Bench consisting of three learned Judges, whereas the judgment in Avtar Singh's case, . the judgment was decided by a Bench consisting of two learned Judges. Counsel also submits that the judgment in Mathura Prasad's case, . was-followed by the Supreme Court in Isarella Johnson v. M.A. Susai (AIR 1991 SC 1993) and the judgment in Avtar Singh's case, was held to be not good law. Counsel relied on the following observations of the Supreme Court:
"...............Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land.
6. The same view has been reiterated by a Bench comprising three learned Judges of this Court in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (dead) through his LRs. . We find that the decision of three learned Judges of this Court is Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy has not been noticed at all by the Division Bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court which delivered the Judgment in Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh and hence, to the extent, that the judgment in Avtar Singh's case takes the view that the principle of res judicata is applicable to an erroneous decision on jurisdiction, it cannot be regarded as good law. In our opinion, a Court which has no jurisdiction law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata. It is well settled that there can be no estopped on a pure question of law and in this case the question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law."
21. Counsel submitted that in view of die above, the order in O.S. No. 2 of 1976 returning the plaint by the Subordinate Judge and also by the District Judge does not operate as res judicata, as they have failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them under law.
22. To consider the issue, it is necessary to refer to the prayer sought in the suit O.S.2 of 1976. The relief claimed in the suit was for a declaration that the plaintiff was the hereditary managing trustee of Sri Sankara Matham, niamalingeswarapet, Tenali in consequence restraining the defendants permanently from interfering with the day-to-day management of Sri Sankara Matham. In the plaint, the respondent-plaintiff did not seek for setting aside the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner, namely, the order passed in OJA. No. 111/69. The suit was filed for a declaration that he was the hereditary Managing Trustee as per the trust deed executed by Smt. Lingamma dated 5-67. Therefore, the view expressed by the Additional Subordinate Judge that the Sub-Court had no jurisdiction was an erroneous decision and it had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law. It is true that the District Judge also had returned the plaint. However, the order of the District Judge returning the plaint was correct as the Additional Subordinate had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The present suit was also filed in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge. Therefore, the judgment of the Additional Subordinate Judge in O.S. No. 2 of 1976 does not operate as res judicata in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad's case (2 supra). The judgment in Avtar Singh's case (1 supra) is no longer good law. I am, therefore, of the view that the judgment in O.S. No. 2 of 1976 does not operate as res judicata.
23. The next contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that the present suit is not maintainable. Counsel submits that under Section 78 of the Act, 1966, a suit is to be filed within one year in the District Court aggrieved by the order under Section 77. Counsel also submits that though this Court in C.R.P. No. 4818 of 1979 held that the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to try the suit, the said order can be challenged in the Second Appeal as that order was only an interlocutory order. He also pointed out that under Section 105(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, where a decree is appealed from, any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. Since the Second Appeal was filed against the decree granted in favour of the plaintiff, it is open to the appellants to challenge the correctness of the order passed in the Civil Revision Petition 4818 of 1979 under Section 105(1) C.P.C. In support of his contention, Counsel relied upon a judgment of the Madras High Court in Pichu Ayyangar v. Ramanuja, AIR 1940 Madras 756. The facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed a suit for framing a scheme. The Court overruled the defendant's preliminary objection that the Court had no power to frame a scheme. The High Court in revision upheld the defendant's objection and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On the High Court's order being communicated, the lower Court passed a formal decree dismissing the suit. In the Appeal, the High Court held that High Court's order was not final but interlocutory and was inappropriate inasmuch as the High Court dismissed the suit itself instead of directing the lower Court to dispose of it according to law. The order fell under Section 1O5(1) and appeal from the decree was competent by virtue of Section 105(1) as the order affected the decision of the lower Court when passing the decree. It was also held that "The present appeal is from the decree, and as the order affected the decision of the Court when passing the decree, it is clearly open to this Court by virtue of Section 105 to consider its correctness".
24. Counsel submits that the above judgment was followed by the Madras High Court in S.S. Subba Reddiar v. Seetharaman and Ors., . .
25. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the judgment in Pichu Ayyangar's case AIR 1940 Madras 756 is no longer good law in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Satyadhyan v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, .. He also submits that the order in the revision petition has become final and the appellants had not challenged the same by way of any further appeal and the order in the C.R.P. was not an interlocutory order. Therefore, Section 105 C.P.C. is not applicable. Satyadhyan's case . was a case where the question that arose for consideration is, whether an order of remand is an interlocutory order and whether the correctness of the same can be challenged in an appeal filed against the final order. Holding in the affirmative that the order of remand was an interlocutory order which did not terminate the proceedings and so the correctness thereof can be challenged in an appeal from the final order, the learned Judges pointed out the distinction between the interlocutory orders which have the force of a decree and the interlocutory orders which are a step towards the decision of the dispute between parties by way of a decree or a final order. The Supreme Court relied on a judgment of the Privy Council in Ram Kirpal Shukul's case (11 Ind. App. 37). The following observations of the Supreme Court are relevant for our purpose:
"....... Interlocutory orders which have the force of a decree must be distinguished from other interlocutory orders which are a step towards the decision of the dispute between parties by way of a decree or a final order. Moheshur Singh's case, Forbes' case and Sheonath's case dealt with interlocutory judgments which did not terminate the proceedings and led upto a decree or final order. Ram Kirpal Shukul's case, Bani Ram's case and Hook's case deal with judgments which though called interlocutory, had, in effect, terminated the previous proceedings............."
26. From the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above, it is clear that in order to determine whether a particular order was an interlocutory order or not, we have to see whether the order terminates the proceedings. If the order terminates the proceedings, then it becomes a final order; otherwise, it remains to be an interlocutory order. If it is an interlocutory order, the correctness of the same can be challenged in an appeal filed against the final order. In the order passed in C.R.P. 4818 of 1979, this Court held that tine Subordinate Judge, Tenali had jurisdiction to try the suit. If the decision in the revision was otherwise, the plaint must have been returned to the plaintiff and it would have put an end to the suit filed by the plaintiff as far as that Court is concerned. Therefore, the order was a final order as it had the consequence of putting an end to the controversy and as such Section 105 C.P.C. is not applicable. Hence, the suit is maintainable.
27. In view of tine Judgment in Satyadhyan's case (5 surpa), the judgment in Pichu Ayyangar's case (3 supra) is no longer good law.
28. The next question to be considered is whether the construction placed by the Subordinate Judge on Ex.A-4 is correct.
29. The learned District Judge relying on the evidence of P.W.I viz., plaintiff, P.W.2 and P.W.3 who are the attestor and scribe of the document Ex.A,-4 and also on an examination of the document that Smt. Lingamma fixed her thumb impression on each and every page of the document and also on the reverse of the first sheet in acknowledgement of her executing the document, found that Lingamma appeared before the Registrar and admitted the execution of the document. He also found that the allegation that Lingamma was drugged at the time Ex.A-4 was executed, was not substantiated. The learned Judge found that Ex.A-4 was true and valid document. It was also found that Lingamma appointed the plaintiff as the Managing Trustee of the Mutt under Ex.A-4 dated 5-5-67 long prior to removing her as the Managing Trustee by the Trust Board. He also found that the so-called resolution dated 24-3-65 alleged to have been passed removing Lingamma as the Managing Trustee was not passed. He also found that the 2nd defendant came into the picture only on 2-7-67 after the execution of Ex.A-4 as he was co-opted under Ex.A-4. It was also found that "what happened from 2-7-67 onwards is contrary to the trust deed itself and the trustees or advisory committee members existing by that day exercised rights which they are not vested with them". The learned Judge therefore held that the removal of Lingamma from the management was not anterior to Ex.A-4 but by a resolution subsequent to Ex.A-4 and therefore she had a right to nominate a managing trustee in pursuance of Ex. A-3 and the terms of Ex.A-1 by the date of executing A-4, and therefore the document was a valid document vesting managing trusteeship in the plaintiff. It was also held that the plaintiff acquired the rights of managing trustee under Ex.A-4 by virtue of the document executed by Lingamma and any co-option of members made without his participation and notice to him is invalid and does not bind him. In other words, the learned Judge held that the plaintiff was the Managing Trustee under Ex.A-4. The finding arrived at by the learned Judge being a finding of fact based on material evidence on record, I see no reason to interfere with the same.
30. The Second Appeal, therefore, fails and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.