Madras High Court
R. Padmavathi vs The Land Commissioner, (Land Records) ... on 19 June, 2001
Equivalent citations: (2001)3MLJ1
Author: V.S. Sirpurkar
Bench: V.S. Sirpurkar
ORDER V.S. Sirpurkar, J.
1. The present writ petition is against the order passed by the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal, whereby the Special Appellate Tribunal disposed of Special Revision Petition No.108 of 1992 and D. No. 825 of 1993. For appreciating the controversy involved the factual panorama will have to be understood.
2. One Muthu Reddiar was the rightful land holder. He held extensive lands. He is no more. It is an admitted position that R. Padmavathi, the petitioner before us, is his legal representative. Proceedings began under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act and an order came to be passed on 1.12.1973 in respect of the land holding of the said Muthu Reddiar. This proceeding was held under Section 22 of the Act and the authority examined the Return filed by the said Muthu Reddiar in Form 2 on 27.12.1972. During the enquiry, it was found that the said Muthu Reddiar had made two gift settlements in favour of his minor grandsons and another gift settlement in favour of his brother-in-law's minor sons. He had also sold land to the extent of 6.10 acres to three persons after 26.3.70 but before the notified date, that is 2.10.1970. The concerned Authority examined all these transactions and came to the conclusion on the basis of the enquiry and the evidence before him that the transactions were made after the commencement of the Act, but before the notified date. In respect of the gift deeds, items 1 and 2 at page 2 of the order, the authorised Officer held that they were gift deeds out of love and affection and were not with an intention to defeat the provisions of the Act. Same finding was recorded in respect of item No.3 in the Table given in that order. So also, in respect of items 4, 5 and 6 in respect of which the transferees were enquired on 27.1.1973, the finding of the authorised Officer is that the transactions were made without any intention to defeat the provisions of the Act. In short, all the six transactions in the Table in that order were held innocuous and valid under Section 22 of the Act. It was held that after deducting the land which was gifted and sold, the net extent of the land held by the landowner came to 25.50 ordinary acres equal to 11.998 standard acres as on 15.2.1970 and since his family consisted of himself and wife - two members, he was entitled to hold 15.000 standard acres under Section 5 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act 58 of 1961 as amended by the Act 17 of 1970. Since the total holding was found to be below the ceiling limit, further proceedings were dropped.
3. Nothing happened in respect of the order which was passed way back on 1.12.1973. It seems that thereafter one order came to be passed by the Authorised Officer and the Assistant Commissioner, Land Reforms Tribunal (the same authority who had passed the earlier order) on 18.11.1988. In the preamble of that order, the extent of the land held by the said Muthu Reddiar, son of Muthu Vellappa Reddiar was stated. Then a specific reference was made to the order dated 1.12.1973 and holding the Gift deeds and the sale deeds to be valid transactions under Section 2 of the Act. In paragraph 3, the Authority mentioned that as the interpretation of Section 22 of the Act was in doubt, the matter was taken before the Supreme Court in C.A.Nos.2542 to 2544 of 1972 filed on behalf of the State in the case of Authorised officer, Thanjavur on 4.5.1979 claiming that the transactions effected between the date of commencement of the Act and the notified date of the Act are void. It is further stated in paragraph 3 that the lands covered by the transactions attracting Section 22 of the Act should have been included in the holdings of the other holder. A reference is then made to a High Court Judgment by Nainar Sundaram, J. in W.P. Nos. 3435 and 3436 of 1978, dated 3.2.1981 holding the interpretation of law given by the Supreme Court takes retrospective effect from the date of the commencement of the Act. On this basis the whole matter was re-examined on 13.5.1981 at the Taluk Office, Perambalur and ultimately the authority came to the conclusion that all the transactions earlier referred to in the order dated 1.12.1973 were void and all the lands disposed of by those transactions were liable to be included in the holding of Muthu Reddiar. The copy of the order seems to have been sent to Muthu Reddiar and seven other persons. Ultimately it was held that the holding of Muthu Reddiar was to the extent of 75.37 ordinary acres equivalent to 26.913 Standard acres of lands as on 15.2.1970 and therefore there was an acquirable surplus of 11.998 standard acres of land in the holding of Muthu Reddiar.
4. It must be stated before we go further that Muthu Reddiar or his representative were not parties to C.A. No.2542 to 2544 of 72 a reference to which matter has been made in paragraph 3 of the order. In short, this order has completely upset the earlier order dated 1.12.1973. It seems that this order was not known to the parties, at least that is the contention raised before us.
5. Be that as it may, subsequently on 7.2.1991 the same authority, the Authorised Officer and the Assistant Commissioner, Land Reforms, Tiruchirapalli seems to have passed another order dated 7.2.1991, whereby an arithmetical mistake committed in the earlier order was corrected by deducting 0.16 acre. Now the surplus land to be declared as on 15.2.1970 was 43.67 acres, that is equal to 11.433 Standard acres. It seems that the copy of this order was served on Muthu Reddiar and therefore the land holder woke up for the first time and found that the earlier order passed in his favour on 1.2.1973 was topsy-turvied and was substituted by a subsequent adverse order to him dated 18.11.1988. Without losing any further time, the landlord firstly filed an appeal against the order dated 18.11.1988 before the Land Tribunal under Section 78 of the Act, which appeal was obviously delayed. It is stated before us and not controverted that the delay in filing the appeal has been condoned by the Land Tribunal and the appeal is still pending before the Land Tribunal. Learned counsel for the appellant petitioner contends before us that in that appeal, the main question raised is as to the legality of the order dated 18.11.1988 on the ground that the said authority did not have any powers to pass a fresh order, after the matter was finally settled and disposed of by the order dated 1.2.1973.
6. However, against the order dated 7.2.1991, which was the subsequent order, the land holder chose to file a revision before the Land Commissioner, Land Reforms, Madras. This revision was filed under the provisions of Section 82, but it seems that the said authority dismissed the revision as not maintainable by his order dated 11.10.1991. Against this order dated 11.10.1991, the petitioner filed a revision before the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal under Section 83 of the Act. This Special Revision Petition was registered as Special Revision Petition No. 108 of 1992.
7. However, at the same time there was another application filed before the Tribunal by the Director, Land Reforms, Chepauk. He is styled as an applicant for revision. This revision seems to have been filed against the order dated 1.12.1973 passed by the Authorised Officer and Assistant Commissioner, Land Reforms. This revision seems to have been filed on 11.1.1993. The particulars of the lands of Muthu Reddiar are given therein and amongst the grounds, it is suggested that the order dated 1.12.1973 was erroneous in law as per the order of the Supreme Court in the case of Authorised Officer v. Muganatha Iyer, . It is reiterated that the settlement deeds and sale deeds having been made after the date of the commencement of the Act and before the notified date of the Act, the transfer was void under Section 22 of the Act and was liable to be ignored. In short, all the grounds on which the revision was filed by the Director of Land Reforms, Chepauk pertained to the merits of the matter. It is also seen that in the facts and more particularly in paragraph 2 of the Revision Memo, there is a clear cut reference made to the order dated 18.11.1988 passed by the Authorised Officer and Assistant Commissioner, Land Reforms. There is also a claim made in the Revision that in pursuance of the order dated 18.11.1988, a draft statement was issued under Section 10(1) of the Act, and an order under Rule 11(1)(h) of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Rules, 1962 was passed on 7.2.1991. It is then suggested that the said draft statement was published in the Government Gazette on 15.5.1991 and was served on the land owner on 10.7.1991 and an order came to be passed on 20.9.1991. There is a claim made in this revision that since there was no stay order passed in the appeal filed by the landlord before the Land Tribunal, the entire extent of land declared as surplus was also assigned to eligible persons according to the provisions contained in the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Disposal of Surplus Lands) Rules, 1965 through an order of the first respondent dated 30.9.1992. Be that as it may, this revision seems to have been diarised as Revision No.D.825 of 1993.
8. The Special Appellate Tribunal thereafter proceeded to decide these two revisions, one by the landlord Muthu Reddiar, who incidentally had expired by this time and was represented by the present petitioner and the other at the instance of the Director, Land Reforms. As regards the revision of the landlord, which was only against the dismissal of the revision, confirming the order dated 7.2.1991 the Tribunal found that there would be no question of interference because more or less that order was in favour of the petitioner. The Tribunal observes that the order under Rule 11 (1)(h) passed by the Authorised Officer on 7.2.91 is in favour of the landowner only and only to set right an arithmetical mistake. The Tribunal-found that there was no injustice caused to the landowner and on that ground dismissed S.R.P. No. 108 of 1992. One writ petition before us is filed in respect of that order,
9. In respect of D.No.825 of 1993, however, the Tribunal has made observations that the Order dated 1.2.1973 was patently wrong in the light of the provisions of Section 22 of the Act and the said order could not be sustained. Then Tribunal went on to discuss the question of delay, wherein it held, in exercise of the suo motu jurisdiction of the Tribunal, there was no time limit and therefore there was no injustice caused to the land owner since the appeal against the second order dated 18.11.1988 was pending and the Land Tribunal could go into all the arguments which can be put forward as regards [hat order. The Tribunal then observed as follows:
"In these circumstances, to overcome the technical objection and in the interests of justice, I hereby set aside the orders of the Authorised Officer, Land Reforms, Trichy, in his proceedings MRI, 11BM (144 Per.) 17-70 dated 1.12.1973 under the suo motu powers vested in this Tribunal under Section 83 of this Act. Hence, D. No.825 of 1993 is allowed."
The Land Tribunal thereafter has been requested to dispose of the appeal expeditiously. It is this order which is very heavily assailed by the learned counsel in the present writ petition. Before approaching this Court, the petitioner had gone directly to the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition (S L P) wherein, a notice was issued. However, afterwards the said S L P was withdrawn as it was held in L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India, , a writ petition could be filed against the order of the Tribunal. The said S L P was, therefore, withdrawn and the Court was approached in the present writ petition.
10. Learned counsel urges that the special Appellate Tribunal has acted without jurisdiction in entertaining a hopelessly time-barred revision and then setting aside an order and deciding an issue which precisely was pending before the Land Tribunal. It was pointed out by the learned counsel that the very basis of the appeal pending before the Land Tribunal against the order dated 18.11.1988 was that in the wake of orders dated 1.12.1973, such order dated 18.11.1988 could not have been passed by the same authority without there being any provision of law. In fact, in the impugned order itself, there is a clear cut reference to the said Appeal in paragraph 2 (page 66):
"in any case an appeal against the order of the Authorised officer in 1983 is pending before the Land Tribunal. If the earlier order of 1973 is not set aside, it will lead to a technical objection that the Authorised officer cannot review his own orders. The petitioner can put in all these arguments before the Land Tribunal before whom the appeal is pending." (Italics added)
11. Now it is clear that the issue whether the subsequent order could be passed dated 18.11.1988 on the backdrop of the order dated 1.12.1973 was a substantial issue pending before the Land Tribunal. Under such circumstances, the Special Appellate Tribunal could not have wiped out the order dated 1.12.1973 much less using the so called suo motu powers. We are not able to understand the user of the suo motu powers by the special Appellate Tribunal. In fact, what was filed before the Special Land Tribunal was nothing but a revision by the Director, Land Reforms. In order to get out of the difficulty of limitation, it is mentioned that the suo motu powers were being activated. What was filed before the Tribunal was, in fact, nothing but a revision under section 83 of the Act. The Tribunal, therefore, could not have ignored the question of limitation as it did. But even if we can take the view, that the Special Appellate Tribunal could go into the merits or demerits of the revision, one fails to understand as to how the Tribunal could have straight-away wiped out the order dated 1.12.1973 which order was fait accompli, which was finally passed against which there was no appeal or revision and which remained on the record till it was set aside by the Tribunal by the impugned order dated 28.4.1998. It is liable to be seen that the said order was referred to in the order dated 18.11.1988 also and yet the order dated 18.11.1988 came to be passed. Taking a view that all the transactions entered into by Muthu Reddiar were hit by Section 22 of the Act and the land disposed of, had to be included in the holding of Muthu Reddiar.
12. We are not going to comment on the merits of the matter at all, for the simple reason that a proper appeal is pending against the order dated 18.11.1988. In that appeal, all the questions would be open including the propriety of that order as also whether the same could have been passed in the wake of there already being one order dated 1.12.1973 in which the question of surplus lands held by the petitioner was considered. In our opinion, the Special Land Tribunal could not have simply set aside the order dated 1.12.1973 and wiped it out of the record, so as to show that the order dated 18.11.1988 was afresh order passed for the first time by an Authority under Sec.10 of the Act. All these questions which are pending before the Land Tribunal should have been allowed to be decided by the Land Tribunal itself. We therefore feel that in the interest of justice, it would not be proper to allow the order of the Special Appellate Tribunal to be sustained. Instead we will set aside that order holding that the said order is sans propriety in law. The Tribunal erred in law in activating its suo motu powers under Section 83 in particular and decide the precise question which was pending before the Land Tribunal. In our opinion, the suo motu powers cannot be used to pre-empt a particular question and to bye-pass a decision which is legally due from the other Tribunal. In fact, the Special Appellate Tribunal has also given all the findings regarding the correctness or otherwise of the validity of the transactions by Muthu Reddiar. The propriety demanded that the Special Appellate Tribunal should not have entered into those questions, particularly when the matter was pending in an appeal before the Land Tribunal, much less such expression should not have come in a revisional and that too suo motu revisional jurisdiction.
13. We are, therefore, constrained to set aside that order. The writ petitions succeed to that extent in so far as the Special Appellate Tribunal's order against the order dated 7.2.1991 is concerned. It is really immaterial and the learned counsel does not very seriously press the same as all these questions are going to be considered in an appeal. We only observe that the appeal, which is pending before the Land Tribunal against thee order dated 18.11.1988 be disposed of as early as possible. Needless to say that the said appeal shall be disposed of on its own merits not being influenced by the observations made in the order of the Special Appellate Tribunal or in our judgment also.
14. Connected W.M.Ps. are closed. No Costs.