Jharkhand High Court
Upendra Kumar Rai vs The State Of Jharkhand on 27 February, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Civil Review No. 5 of 2025
1. Upendra Kumar Rai, aged about 43 years, S/o Shri Shivshank Ray, R/o
village-Gurura Gurra, Kaimur, (Bhabua), P.O. & P.S. Kudra, District-
Kaimur, Bihar-821108.
2. Md. Abrar, aged about 43 years, S/o Md. Abbas Ali, R/o village-
Khatanaga, Kanke, P.O.- Gagi, P.S- Kanke, District-Ranchi.
3. Maheshwar Mahto, aged about 56 years, S/o Late Jhariram Mahto, R/o
village- Edeldih, Janumpidih, Baredih, P.O-Janumpidig, P.S- Tamar,
District- Ranchi.
4. Bishu Oraon, aged about 49 years, S/o Jerku Oraon, R/o village-
Bargawh, Barwa Toli, Bankir, Gumla P.O.-Keshipara, P.S- Gumla,
District- Gumla.
5. Marwari Oraon, aged about 47 years, S/o Devna Oraon, R/o village-
Ghagra, Ghaghra, P.O.- Hatu, Ghaghra, P.S- Bedo, District- Ranchi.
6. Salan Paul Kerketta, aged about 44 years, S/o Late Lakhan Kerketta,
R/o village-Surhu Tola, Lohra Garha P.O.-Surhu, P.S- Kamdara,
District- Gumla.
7. Dhananjay Kumar Singh, aged about 50 years, S/o Late. Gopal Prasad
Singh, R/o village-Pandey Tola, Sono P.O.-Sono, P.S- Sono, District-
Jamui, Bihar-811314.
8. Sanjay Kumar Sharma, aged about 54 years, S/o Late Rajendra Sharma,
R/o village-Dhawan Nagar, Kanke, PO- Jawahar Nagar, P.S- Gonda,
District- Ranchi
9. Ramakant Rai, aged about 55 years, S/o Late Rampal Ray, R/o village-
Keshofarka, P.O. & P.S- Sono, District- Jamui, Bihar- 811314.
10.Bhutnath Singh Munda, aged about 49 years, S/o Late Chunilal Singh,
R/o village-Madhukama, Humta, P.O.-Humta, P.S-Bundu, District-
Ranchi.
11. Yodhya Oraon, aged about 53 years, S/o Atwa Oraon, R/o village-
Gurgurjari, Mandar, P.O.- Kaimbo, P.S-, District-Ranchi.
12. Sukhram Nag, aged about 48 years, S/o Kunjal Nag, R/o village-
Salga, P.O.- Khunti, P.S- Khunti, District- Khunti.
.........Respondents/Review Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Director General of Police, Jharkhand, P.O., P.S- Dhurwa and
District-Ranchi
3. The Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms
and Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand, P.O, P.S-Dhurwa and District-
Ranchi
4. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Ranchi, P.O, P.S-Dhurwa and
District- Ranchi .....................Respondents
5. Arun Kumar, aged about 68 years, S/o Late Ramrup Prasad, R/o
Krishna Apartment, Flat No.201, Near Jaipal Singh Stadium, P.O.-G.P.O,
P.S.-Kotwali, District- Ranchi ........................Appellant/Respondent
6. Sushmita Devi, W/o Late Amarnath, R/o Premchand Nagar, Police
Line, Dhanbad, P.O., P.S. Kotwali and District-Dhanbad
..... ... Respondent/Proforma Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
-------
For the Petitioners : Mr. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Advocate
Ms. Akriti Shree, Advocate
For the Respondent-State: Mr. Ranjan Kumar, AC to Sr. SC-I
---------
Order No.5/Dated: 27 February, 2025
th
Per, Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
I.A No.12171 of 2024
1. This Interlocutory Application has been filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of 627 days in preferring the present review petition.
2. The reason has been assigned as would be evident from paragraph no.6 onward that after the order dated 16.12.2022 was passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in L.P.A No.392 of 2019 thereafter the review petitioners approached the Hon'ble Apex Court to challenge the said order in S.L.P (C) No.3283 of 2023 but the same was dismissed in limine vide order dated 20.02.2023.
3. Thereafter, the review petitioners herein filed a review being R.P(C) No.1508 of 2024 (Diary No.12140 of 2024) on 14.03.2024 against the order dated 20.02.2023 passed in S.L.P (C) No.3283 of 2023 but the same was also dismissed vide order dated 07.08.2024. Thereafter, the present review petition has been filed.
4. The ground, therefore, has been taken that due to pending proceeding before the Hon'ble Apex Court the delay has been caused in filing the instant review petition.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the State has vehemently opposed the application for condonation of delay.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the ground referred in the instant interlocutory application for the purpose of condonation of delay of 627 days.
7. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of petition suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis.
28. Further it is settled position of law that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part.
9. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of "sufficient cause". The consideration of meaning of "sufficient cause" has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive".
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336], Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770], Parimal v. Veena[(2011) 3 SCC 545] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157].)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause"
and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that 3 of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible.
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: "605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what 4 was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such aninordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
10.Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
11.It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or notsufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment 5 rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-
"12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause"
or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can beimputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/orarguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way."
12.In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled legal proposition of law now this Court, adverting to the grounds referred in the instant interlocutory application, is of the view that the delay in filing of the instant review petition needs to be allowed on the ground that the litigation was pending before the Hon'ble Apex Court which was finally decided on 07.08.2024 and thereafter within two months from the date of the decision, the present civil review petition has been filed.
13.Considering the ground assigned in the interlocutory application and taking into consideration the purport of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the delay of 627 days in preferring the present review petition is hereby condoned.
614.Accordingly, I.A. No.12171 of 2024 stands allowed and disposed of as such.
Civil Review No. 5 of 2025Prayer
15.The jurisdiction conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been invoked for review of the order dated 16.12.2022 passed in L.P.A No.392 of 2019, whereby and whereunder, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court has held that the promotion granted to the review petitioners is illegal and the said promotion is being set at naught and further the review petitioners were directed to be reverted to their original post forthwith after 15 years of the said promotion.
Factual Matrix of the Case:
16.The brief facts of the case as pleaded in the instant review petition needs to refer herein which is being referred herein as under:
17.The present review petitioners are the respondents to the intra court appeal who have been granted promotion to the higher post of Sub-
Inspector of Police by giving out of turn promotion in view of the provisions of Rule 660 (C) of the Police Manual. The said rule provides to grant out of turn promotion on the basis of a citation. Their cases are that they have been conferred with the citation and after taking into consideration the same the State Government has exercised power to grant out of turn promotion in view of the provision of Rule 660 (C) of the Police Manual.
18.It is pleaded that the writ petitioner who has been denied out of turn promotion said to be in absence of any citation. The letters patent Court while hearing the learned counsel for the writ petitioner has gone into the issue to assess the propriety of the decision taken by the State in granting out of turn promotion to the review petitioners based upon the citation in order to consider the case of the writ petitioner/appellant.
19.The specific case of these review petitioners is that they have been granted promotion on the state of the citation but on consideration on the relevant documents said to be citation had found that those documents cannot be conceded to be a citation rather it were the 7 recommendation of the Superintendent of Police of the concerned districts and basis upon the same, the Departmental Promotion Committee has considered these review petitioners to be fit to be promoted by granting out of turn promotion.
20. It is evident from the record that L.P.A. No. 392/2019 was filed by the appellant/respondent no. 5 with a prayer to set aside the order dated 05.04.2016 passed by the learned writ Court by which the writ petition i.e. W.P.(S) No. 1458/2008 filed by the appellant/respondent no. 5 challenging the order dated 10.01.2008 passed by Departmental Promotion Committee which rejected the prayer of the appellant/respondent no. 5 for grant of out of turn promotion, has been dismissed.
21.As per the pleading in the writ petition when the appellant was posted at Runi Saidpur Police Station in Sitamarhi District in the month of October, 1992 a communal riot took place on the eve of immersion of the Goddess Durga which resulted in huge loss of life and property and the situation was quite alarming.
22.The appellant on 28.10.1992 was successful in apprehending two criminals, namely, Md. Nisar and Md. Abu Talib with huge quantity of arms and consequently arrested them and seized the arms. The Director General of Police having fully satisfied with the appellant's job, wrote a letter dated 18.01.1994 wherein the appellant's job was praised and had also at the same time recommended that the appellant should be awarded with a revolver, which was, however, never extended/given to the appellant.
23.The Joint Secretary, Government of Bihar, Home (Police Department) had also vide his letter dated 21.08.96 accepted the recommendation of the Director General of Police and had accorded permission to award the appellant with a revolver/pistol for his praiseworthy work.
24.Appellant was desirous of his case being considered under Rule 660 (C) of the Bihar Police Manual for out of turn promotion and for this the appellant made representations and reminders to the concerned respondents, but the same was not considered by the concerned respondents.
825.The respondents on the ground of pendency of the two departmental proceeding refused to promote the appellant on out of turn basis under Rule 660 (C) of the Bihar Police Manual. The Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) which was held on 10.01.2008 (impugned order) has rejected the candidature of the appellant for out of turn promotion under Rule 660(C) (A) (ii) of the Police Manual.
26.Accordingly the writ petitioner preferred writ petition being W.P.(S) 1458 of 2008 for redressal of his grievances but the same was dismissed vide order dated 05.04.2016, consequently writ petitioner preferred intra court Appeal being LPA No. 392 of 2019.
27.The appellant states that the main ground for dismissing the writ petition of the appellant was that the Hon'ble Single Judge has given a finding that the petitioner claim for giving out of turn promotion by the DPC for not finding him to have been awarded any medal of bravery under the provision of Rule 660 of the Police Manual.
28. It needs to refer herein earlier to dismissal of said writ petition, another writ petition i.e. W.P.(S) No. 351/2004 which had also been preferred by the Respondent No.5/writ petitioner was disposed of vide order dated 22.01.2004, directing the respondent to consider the case of writ petitioner/ Respondent No.5 within a period of 6 weeks from the date of representation.
29.In compliance of the direction of the writ Court, a meeting was conveyed in the Police Headquarters which was presided by the Director General of Police, Jharkhand on 09.06.2004. All the relevant recommendation, facts, rules, circumstances, etc. were duly considered and it was found that due to pendency of Departmental Proceeding Nos.36/2004 and 45/2004 against the appellant as well as due to unsatisfactory services, the appellant was not entitled for out of turn promotion. The Committee, which deliberated the proposals for out of turn promotion, has issued speaking minutes of their meeting in respect of all the cases they deliberated upon.
30.Accordingly, the prayer of the writ petitioner/ appellant for out of turn promotion under rule 660(C) was dismissed by the DPC vide order dated 10.01.2008.
931. Further, it is the case of the respondents/review petitioners have been awarded out of turn promotion in view of the recommendation made in their favour on account of act of bravery in compelling the naxals to flee away while posted as Bansjor O.P. in Simdega District. The respondents/review petitioners have bravely contested the naxals compelling them to flee away even at the cost of serious damage to them. The respondents have been extended promotion in terms of Rule 660(C) of the Police Manual.
32.The case of the review petitioners/respondents herein is different to that of the Respondent No.5/appellant. In the case of the Respondent No.5/appellant he was involved in apprehending two hardened criminals whereas the review petitioners/respondents were involved in repelling a naxal attack. No comparison can be drawn between these two.
33.The Superintendent of Police, Simdega has recommended out of turn promotion to 13 Police Personnel and Police Officers in connection with Bansjora O.P. Naxal attack wherein the Police Officers demonstrated outstanding courage and bravery by putting their life in danger and attacked the naxals resulting in failure of plan by them (naxals) and they were forced to run away. Upon the recommendation made for out of turn promotion, promotion was granted in the meeting conveyed on 05.09.2009 for grant of out of turn promotion.
34. It has been stated that there was no discrimination against the petitioner while granting out of turn promotion to 13 Police Officers because the citation granted to the petitioner was not for outstanding operational work and therefore the order passed by the Departmental Promotion Committee (D.P.C) rightly rejected the prayer of writ petitioner/appellant for out of turn promotion vide order dated 10.01.2008.
35. It has been stated that regarding Rule 660-C vide notification no. 1463 dated 04.02.1989, amendment was carried out in gazette publication but not incorporated and published in Police Manual and as per amended Rule 660-C of Jharkhand Police Manual, out of turn promotion is granted for citation received for "outstanding 10 operational work and in the present case, the appellant was not granted citation for outstanding operational work and therefore, he is not eligible for out of turn promotion.
36.On 12.05.2022, the Director General of Police, Jharkhand appeared before the Hon'ble Court along with original documents and apprised the Hon'ble Court regarding the out of turn promotion considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee.
37. It is necessary to mention that the citation was issued to the petitioner for out of turn promotion but no citation was issued to the petitioner on operational duty, which is the requisite for consideration by the DPC for grant of out of turn promotion under Rule-660 (C) of the Police Manual.
38.The case of the writ petition/appellant was considered by the DPC meeting convened on 10.01.2008 and it was found that no citation has been issued to the petitioner on the ground of outstanding operational work and therefore he was not found fit for the grant of out of turn promotion under Rule-660 (C) of the Police Manual.
39.L.P.A. No. 392 of 2019 was heard by the Hon'ble Court and vide order dated 16.12.2022 passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench the promotion granted to the review petitioners is held illegal and the said promotion is being set at naught and further the review petitioners were directed to be reverted to their original post forthwith.
40.The respondents/ review petitioners preferred Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 3283/2023 before the Hon'ble Apex Court, however, the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to dismiss the appeal in limine vide order dated 20.02.2023.
41.Thereafter, the respondents/ review petitioners preferred review of the order dated 20.02.2023 passed in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 3283/2023, but the same was also dismissed vide order dated 07.08.2024.
42.The review petitioners were given out of turn promotion to the post of Assistant Sub Inspector vide Order contained in memo no. 212 dated 25.01.2008 w.e.f. 02.01.2008, however, they were to be given monetary benefits after passing PTC.
1143.Review petitioners were further given promotion to the post of Sub Inspector in the year 2013 and since then till 22.07.2024, when they were reverted to their original post of Constable vide memo no. 701 issued by the Office of Director General and Inspector General of Police.
44.The order of promotion has been granted by the State Government and merely on the basis of recommendation made by the Superintendent of Police of the concerned district the same having been constituted with the citation if the promotion was granted, hence, this Court has come to the conclusive findings that the recommendation cannot be constituted to be citation made by the Superintendent of Police of the concerned district rather the said recommendation only if accepted by the State for the purpose of issuance of citation will only be said to be citation in the eyes of law for the purpose of consideration of out of turn promotion. Argument by the learned senior counsel for the review petitioner:
45.Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the review petitioners has submitted that the "citation" word has not been defined by making any stipulation that too with the competent authority to issue citation and, hence, the basis of out of turn promotion will only be said to be the documents issued by the Superintendent of Police of the concerned district and, thus, error has been committed by this Court.
46. Further without appreciation that the review petitioners had been promoted to the post of ASI on the basis of citation which may be not in a specified format but is certainly in the form of commendation/recommendation for gallant and outstanding performance. By the impugned order the review petitioners have been punished and reverted to the original post of Constable on which they were appointed way back in the year between 1999 to 2005 for no fault of their own.
47.Hence, the present review petition has been filed.
Analysis 12
48.Before considering the aforesaid ground for filing review this Court needs to refer herein that the review petitioners after the order dated 16.12.2022 passed in L.P.A No.392 of 2019 having been passed by this Court which has been sought to be reviewed has preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Apex Court being S.L.P (C) No.3283 of 2023, but the same was dismissed vide order dated 20.02.2023. The review petitioner, thereafter, have again filed a review before the Hon'ble Apex Court being R.P(C) No.1508 of 2024 (Diary No.12140 of 2024) on 14.03.2024 against the order dated 20.02.2023 passed in S.L.P (C) No.3283 of 2023, but the same was also dismissed vide order dated 07.08.2024. Thereafter, the present review petition has been filed.
49.The ground has been taken that merely because the S.L.P (C) No.3283 of 2023 has been dismissed there is no embargo in exercising of power of review.
50.We are not in dispute to the aforesaid proposition of law due to the reason that if the Special Leave Petition was dismissed in limine, then the power of review can be exercised by the High Court. However, the matter would have been different if the Special Leave Petition has been converted into an appeal and if the appeal would have been dismissed, then based upon the merger principle the order passed by the High Court will be said to be merged in to the order passed in the Special Leave to Appeal and the said order will be said to be the binding effect.
51.But herein, the factual aspect is different to the extent that after dismissal of the Special Leave Petition vide order dated 20.02.2023 the review petitioners have again preferred review which was also dismissed vide order dated 07.08.2024, meaning thereby, the Hon'ble Apex Court has not found any reason to reconsider the order already passed in Special Leave Petition which was dismissed.
52.This Court, before appreciation of the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties with respect to the issue as to whether the power of review is to be exercised in the factual background of the present case, needs to be referred to underlying principle to invoke the power of review.
1353.The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Ors., [AIR 1954 SC 526], particularly, at paragraph-32 has observed as under:
"32. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XL VII, Rule I of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified, grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason."
54.Likewise, in the case of Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon Vrs. Union of India (1980) Supp. SCC 562, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be done unless the Court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest on the face of the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The observations made are as under:
"12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib 1975 1 SCC 674 this Court observed: 'A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. ..... The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality."
55.Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320 has observed that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only 14 because an alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized as under:
"20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v.
Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasiusto mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.,.
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:--
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived."
56.It is evident from the aforesaid judgments that the power of review is to be exercised if there is any error occurred on the face of the order or the factual aspect could not have been brought to the notice of this Court in spite of the due diligence having been taken in the matter of making available the factual aspect of the relevant documents.
57.The position of law is well settled, as would appear from the reference of the judgment made hereinabove that the review of the judgment can only be made if the new fact has come which could not have been brought to the notice of the Court in spite of the due 15 diligence, as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose (supra).
58. Now adverting to the fact of the instant case it is evident that this Court has dealt with in the impugned judgment regarding the meaning of citation and who is the authority to confer citation. The reason for doing that was since the issue was of grant of out of turn promotion and, as such, the eligibility required to be considered and the eligibility as per the Rule 660 (C) of the Police Manual is that the citation if available with one or the other candidates they can be considered for out of turn promotion. For ready reference the Rule 660 (C) of the Police Manual as it is after its amendment by Notification No. GSR 1463 dated 04.02.1989 reads as under:
"660-C Out of turn promotion.- The following criteria and procedure will be adopted for giving out of turn promotion: (i)The officer concerned should not have been awarded any major punishment till the date of consideration and order of out of turn promotion. (ii) Should have very good entries in permanent character roll. (iii) Should have received citations for high standard of investigation, supervision of cases and for excellence in intelligence work. (iv) Should have ability for shouldering higher responsibilities consonant with the proposal promotion. OR should been awarded President's medal or Medal for gallantry. OR should have received citation for outstanding operational work. (b) Out of turn promotion will be decided, by committee which will be constituted as follows:
(i) Director General and I.G. of Police, Bihar, Patna Chairman
(ii) Senior Officer-in-Charge of CID, Bihar Member
(iii) Senior Most Officer in-charge of Special Branch, Bihar Member
(iv) Senior Most officer-in-charge (personnel) of Bihar Member
(v) Senior most regional I.G. of Police Member
(vi) Special Secretary/ Addl. Secretary Home (Police) Department Member Secretary."
59.This Court adverting to the factual aspect so far as the ground taken for review is concerned the question of recommendation has been said to be accepted to be citation, but the same cannot be a ground for review, since, this Court has already discussed the aforesaid issue in several paragraphs of the order dated 16.12.2022 passed in L.P.A No.392 of 2019 which is sought to be reviewed, reference of the said paragraphs have been quoted as under:
1618. It is not in dispute that making recommendation for citation is one thing which is to be done by the local authority depending upon the performance of one or the other police personnel/officials for getting out of turn promotion or the police medal or any other bravery award but either „citation‟ or police medal or any bravery award is the domain of the State/Central Government to issue on the basis of such recommendation.
As such, the recommendation, according to our considered view, cannot be construed to be citation unless accepted by the Government. The State respondents, in spite of several opportunities being granted by this Court, neither came out with the notification pertaining to definition of citation nor produced any document. However, in course of argument it has been confessed that the recommendation cannot be construed to be citation.
19. This Court, after considering the confession of the State respondents that the recommendation cannot be construed to be citation then posed a pinpointed question upon the State respondents that how and under what authority Departmental Promotion Committee so constituted for the purpose of consideration of out of turn promotion, has considered the recommendation made by the District Superintendent of Police to be citation. Learned counsel appearing for the State respondents has not replied to the aforesaid query. To that effect specific direction has been passed on 11.05.2022 directing the State to file proper affidavit regarding issuance of directly or indirectly citation in favour of the persons who have been given promotion, for ready reference the order dated 11.05.2022 is quoted hereunder :-
"23/Dated: 11.05.2022 Heard.
On the last occasion, learned counsel for the State took time to take instruction in this matter as to whether the petitioner should also be granted promotion from the date due when his contemporary or junior were given promotion then it was said that since the petitioner has already retired then only consequential benefit would be given and as such they are contemplating to take such decision. Now again an affidavit has been filed bringing on record the recommendation of the Superintendent of Police regarding grant of citation with respect to the earlier persons to whom promotion was already given.
We are unable to understand this action of the State and it is regretted that in place of taking such decision they have again filed this affidavit.
We have made it clear that admittedly since there is no order passed by the State authorities on the recommendation of the Superintendent of Police granting, directly or indirectly, citation in favour of the persons who have been given promotion and it is also further admitted that promotion was given on the basis of that. That had led this Court to issue notice to all such persons who have been granted promotion by the State on that ground.
If the State does not take such decision or file proper affidavit then this Court would be left with no option than to decide the matter on its merit. Then the fate of the persons 17 who have already been granted promotion would also be decided.
It appears that by repeating all the earlier statements, the State authorities are trying to mislead this Court without answering the issue.
Learned counsel has not been able to show the rules regarding grant of citation. They have not appended any annexure showing grant of citation in favour of the persons who were promoted rather some order with respect to some other persons have been brought on record perhaps only for the purpose of misleading this Court.
Accordingly, let the Director General of Police appear before us tomorrow (12.05.2022) to explain the conduct of the Police Department before us.
Put up this case tomorrow (12.05.2022) at 10.30 A.M."
Accordingly, the Director General of Police appeared on 12.05.2022 but it has been admitted that no citations have been issued, rather on the basis of recommendation, out of turn promotion has been granted in favour of the private respondents.
20. This Court has perused the recommendation so made by the District Superintendent of Police in favour of the private respondents wherefrom it is evident that the recommendations have only been made by narrating the work performed by the private respondents and the said recommendations have been treated to be citations by the Departmental Promotion Committee basis upon which the due recommendation was made for granting out of turn promotion in favour of the private Respondent Nos. 5 to 17, which was subsequently accepted by the competent authority by issuance of appropriate order in this regard.
This Court has perused such recommendation having been made by the Senior Superintendent of Police, as has been appended in the affidavit filed on 22.11.2022, wherein recommendation has been for out of turn promotion from the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police to Inspector of Police, so far as writ petitioner is concerned. Such recommendation is also there as would appear from the minutes of the meeting of Departmental Promotion Committee wherein while treating the recommendation made by the Superintendent of Police, Simdega as was made vide letter No.3 dated 09.01.2008 for out of turn promotion in favour of Shri Dhananjay Kumar Singh, Respondent No.6, such recommendation has also been made in favour of Shri Ramakant Rai, Respondent No.7, as contained in letter No.3 dated 09.01.2008. It appears that such recommendation has been made by the Superintendent of Police, Simdega in respect of all the newly impleaded respondents in the same letter.
21. The question arose for consideration, as has been agitated by the writ petitioner that if such recommendation has also been made by the Senior Superintendent of Police recommending the name of the writ petitioner for out of turn promotion, as would appear from the recommendation made by Senior Superintendent of Police vide letter dated 10.07.2004, then why the writ petitioner has been discriminated. This Court is of the view that in filling up of the public post, all similarly situated employees are required to be treated equally in order to maintain equality of opportunity which has been enshrined under 18 Article 16 of the Constitution of India subject to exception carved out therein. But this Court is also considering the factual aspect with the legal issues that if the employees who have been granted out of turn promotion are not eligible for such promotion as per the eligibility criteria prescribed under Rule 660(C) of the Police Manual, are they entitled to hold the post?
Position of law is settled that the eligibility criteria is required to be fulfilled by one or the other candidates and there cannot be any deviation therefrom. It is also equally settled that there cannot be any relaxation in the eligibility criteria, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in Bedanga Talukdar v. Saifudaullah Khan & Ors. [(2011) 12 SCC 85], wherein at paragraph 29 has observed, which is being quoted hereunder :
"29. We have considered the entire matter in detail. In our opinion, it is too well settled to need any further reiteration that all appointments to public office have to be made in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In other words, there must be no arbitrariness resulting from any undue favour being shown to any candidate. Therefore, the selection process has to be conducted strictly in accordance with the stipulated selection procedure. Consequently, when a particular schedule is mentioned in an advertisement, the same has to be scrupulously maintained. There cannot be any relaxation in the terms and conditions of the advertisement unless such a power is specifically reserved. Such a power could be reserved in the relevant statutory rules. Even if power of relaxation is provided in the rules, it must still be mentioned in the advertisement. In the absence of such power in the rules, it could still be provided in the advertisement. However, the power of relaxation, if exercised, has to be given due publicity. This would be necessary to ensure that those candidates who become eligible due to the relaxation, are afforded an equal opportunity to apply and compete. Relaxation of any condition in advertisement without due publication would be contrary to the mandate of equality contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India."
It is also equally settled that if any appointment/promotion has been granted dehors the rule, the incumbent who has been granted promotion, is not entitled to hold the post. This is on the basis of the proposition that illegality cannot be allowed to be perpetuated and the moment the illegality comes to the notice, it has to be set at right. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Orissa and Anr. v. Mamata Mohanty, [(2011) 3 SCC 436], wherein, at paragraphs 56 and 57, Their Lordships have been pleased to hold:-
"56. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equality. Thus, even if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order does not confer any legal right on the petitioner to get the same relief.
57. This principle also applies to judicial pronouncements. Once the court comes to the conclusion that a wrong order has been passed, it becomes the solemn duty of the court to rectify the 19 mistake rather than perpetuate the same. While dealing with a similar issue, this Court in Hotel Balaji v. State of A.P. [1993 Supp (4) SCC 536] observed as under: (SCC p. 551, para 12) "12. ... „2. ... To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of judicial conscience. In this, we derive comfort and strength from the wise and inspiring words of Justice Bronson in Pierce v. Delameter [1 NY 3 (1847) : A.M.Y. p. 18] at p. 18: "a Judge ought to be wise enough to know that he is fallible and, therefore, ever ready to learn: great and honest enough to discard all mere pride of opinion and follow truth wherever it may lead:
and courageous enough to acknowledge his errors".‟ [As observed in Distributors (Baroda) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 43, p. 46, para 2.] "
It is also required to refer herein about the position of law that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not envisage negative equality, rather it envisages positive equality, as has been held in State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Anr., [AIR 2000 SC 2306] at paragraph 30, which is quoted hereunder:
30. The concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution is a positive concept which cannot be enforced in a negative manner. When any authority is shown to have committed any illegality or irregularity in favour of any individual or group of individuals, others cannot claim the same illegality or irregularity on the ground of denial thereof to them.
Similarly wrong judgment passed in favour of one individual does not entitle others to claim similar benefits. In this regard this Court in Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee [(1996) 2 SCC 459] held that citizens have assumed wrong notions regarding the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law to all citizens. Benefits extended to some persons in an irregular or illegal manner cannot be claimed by a citizen on the plea of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the High Court. ... ... ..."
22. In the given facts of the case, the writ petitioner is claiming parity with the Respondent Nos. 5 to 17 on the ground that the writ petitioner is having similar recommendation made by Senior Superintendent of Police, Ranchi and the same is also the case with the private respondents wherein Superintendent of Police, Simdega has made recommendation for their out of turn promotion. The writ petitioner has never claimed that he is holding citation making him eligible for out of turn promotion, rather his case is that why he has differently been treated while he is also having the recommendation of Senior Superintendent of Police, Ranchi.
But the question is that whether any relief can be granted in favour of the writ petitioner on the basis of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India when the parity against whom is being claimed by the writ petitioner are themselves not fulfilling the eligibility criteria as per Rule 660(C) of the Police Manual. If the respondents will be directed to grant promotion to the writ petitioner for the purpose of maintaining parity, the same will be nothing but it will be a case of granting relief on the basis of negative equality which is not permissible as per the position of law and after taking into 20 consideration the spirit of Article 14 of the Constitution of India which does not envisages negative equality as has been held by Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of Orissa and Anr. v. Mamata Mohanty (Supra) and State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Another (Supra). Therefore, according to our considered view, since the writ petitioner is not fulfilling the criteria as laid down under Rule 660(C) of the Police Manual, having not received citation or any police/gallantry award, there cannot be any direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India commanding upon the respondents to consider the case of the writ petitioner for out of turn promotion.
23. The further question required to be decided is as to whether the private respondent Nos. 5 to 17 who are also not possessing the citation and not fulfilling the eligibility criteria as prescribed under Rule 660(C) of the Police Manual and can they be allowed to retain the post? Will it not allow the illegality to be perpetuated?
This Court is of the view on the basis of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the public posts cannot be allowed to be retained by such candidates who are not eligible as per the Rules of Appointment/Promotion.
It is equally settled that there cannot be any relaxation in the rule although it is not a case of any relaxation as would appear from the fact of the given case, rather it is a case of wrong consideration by the competent authority deviating from the statutory rule by considering the recommendation as citation and merely on the basis of recommendation, the private respondents have been granted promotion in absence of citation or any Police/President medal, as per the eligibility criteria provided under Rule 660(C) of the Police Manual.
24. This Court, after taking into consideration the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the illegality cannot be allowed to be perpetuated and public posts cannot be allowed to be filled up from ineligible candidate, is of the considered view that the promotion granted in favour of private respondent Nos. 5 to 17 requires interference by this Court in order to set the act of the State authority right.
25. Accordingly, the promotion granted in favour of Respondent Nos. 5 to 17 is being set at naught. Their promotion is held to be illegal and they be directed to be reverted to their original post forthwith.
26. Accordingly, Issue Nos. (i) to (iii) have been answered.
27. Now the last issue that why the competent authority, even though there is no ambiguity in the rule governing the field, i.e., Rule 660(C) of the Police Manual, has granted promotion in favour of the private respondents?
The competent authorities who have been assigned with the power to grant such promotion are required to strictly and scrupulously follow the statutory rule to fill up the public posts.
Herein, the Superintendent of Police of the district has made recommendations for promotion but the competent authority, without giving due adherence to the eligibility criteria, as stipulated under Rule 660(C) of the Police Manual, has granted out of turn promotion to the private respondents causing financial loss to the State exchequer which, according to our considered view, is not allowed to be done and is not expected from the competent authority who have been conferred with the power to appoint or promote to fill up the public posts.
21Since it is a case of out of turn promotion and, as such, the decision in that respect ought to have been taken with more care but the competent authority, without taking into consideration that none of the private respondent have citation or other eligibility criteria for consideration of their cases for out of turn promotion and in absence thereof, the member of the Departmental Promotion Committee have recommended names of the private respondents for promotion which finally has culminated into the final decision passed by the competent authority.
28. This Court, since is exercising the jurisdiction conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, deems it fit and proper in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case to direct the Chief Secretary of the State to conduct an enquiry against the Members of the Departmental Promotion Committee and the authorities who have granted promotion on the basis of recommendation made by the local authorities treating it to be citations.
Such enquiry is necessary since the State exchequer has been overburdened by disbursement of salary by extending the benefit of promotion illegally.
The Chief Secretary of the State of Jharkhand is to conduct an enquiry for the purpose of fixing accountability so as to compensate the loss caused to the State exchequer.
Needless to say that while fixing accountability, the officers concerned will be dealt with under the applicable Conduct Rules/Pension Rules, as applicable.
29. The Chief Secretary, State of Jharkhand is directed to complete such exercise by conducting proper enquiry, in accordance with law, within stipulated period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
30. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands disposed of with the above observation and direction.
60.Since the aforesaid aspect of the matter is given due consideration by this Court at length and, hence, the ground which has been taken for review of the order dated 16.12.2022 passed in L.P.A No.392 of 2019 sought to be reviewed, i.e., the recommendation has been submitted to be accepted as a citation. But the same has been considered at length in the order passed by the Letters Patent Court as is being evident from the extracted portion of the order quoted hereinabove, hence, the same cannot be ground for review.
61.The scope of review is only that if there is any error apparent on the face of the order or the fact could not have been brought to the notice in spite of due diligence, but it cannot be in the garb of an appeal or merely by change of an advocate there can be a ground for review by advancing an argument by giving the different interpretation of the consideration already made.
2262.Further, the law is well settled that a review petition, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise", as has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715, for ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is quoted as under:
9. Under Order 47 Rule 1CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1CPCit is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise"."
63.Similarly, in S. Murali Sundaram Versus Jothibai Kannan and Others 2023 SCC OnLine SC 185 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:
15. While considering the aforesaid issue two decisions of this Court on Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC are required to be referred to? In the case of Perry Kansagra (supra) this Court has observed that while exercising the review jurisdiction in an application under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC, the Review Court does not sit in appeal over its own order.
It is observed that a rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It is further observed that review is not appeal in disguise. It is observed that power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. It is further observed that it is wholly unjustified and exhibits a tendency to rewrite a judgment by which thecontroversy has been finally decided. After considering catena of decisions on exercise of review powers and principles relating to exercise of review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC this Court had summed upon as under:
"(i) Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1.
(ii) Power of review may be exercised when some mistake or error apparent on the fact of record is found. But error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably by two opinions. (iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. (iv) Power of review can also be exercised for any sufficient reason which is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. (v) An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit."23
64.Review can also be sought when the order discloses some error apparent on the face of record or on grounds analogous thereto. These are all grounds which find mention in various judicial pronouncements right from the earliest time as well as in the Rules of Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code as permissible grounds of review.
65.The term "mistake or error apparent" by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
66.Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
67. In the very recent judgment in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal Vrs. State Tax Officer (1) & Anr., (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court while interpreting the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. the proposition has been laid down to entertain the review, as has been held at paragraph 16.1 to 16.7 which reads as under:-
"16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.
16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. 16.3. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record e justifying the court to exercise its power of review.
16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected".
16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".
16.6. Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.
2416.7. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.--"
68.Thus, on the basis of aforesaid discussion it is evident that while power of review may be inherent in the High Court to review its own order passed in a writ petition, the same has to be exercised on well- recognized and established grounds on which judicial orders are reviewed. For example, the power may be exercised on the discovery of some new and important matter or evidence which was not within the knowledge of the parties seeking review despite due exercise of diligence when the order was made.
69.The term "mistake or error apparent" by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of review. Further an error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review.
70.This Court, in view of the aforesaid discussions and taking in to consideration that there is no error apparent on the face of the record and further the contention as raised by respondent/ review petitioners has already been considered by the appellate Court is of the view that it is not a fit case where the power of review is to be exercised.
71.Accordingly, the instant review petition being Civil Review No.5 of 2025 stands dismissed.
72.Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) Sudhir AFR 25