Gujarat High Court
Pravinbhai Babubhai @ Vrajlal Solanki vs Union Of India on 7 July, 2025
Author: Sunita Agarwal
Bench: Sunita Agarwal
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/13510/2015 ORDER DATED: 07/07/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13510 of 2015
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PRAVINBHAI BABUBHAI @ VRAJLAL SOLANKI & ORS.
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
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Appearance:
MS ARTI K BHIL(10522) for the Petitioner(s) No.
10,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,110,111,114,119,123,129,131,135,136,141,
142,3,5,53,57,59,6,60,69,7,70,77,78,79,81,84,89,90
MS. KRUTI M SHAH(2428) for the Petitioner(s) No.
1,100,101,109,11,112,113,115,116,117,118,12,120,121,122,124,125,126,127
,128,13,130,132,133,134,137,138,139,14,140,143,144,145,146,147,148,149,
15,150,151,152,16,17,18,19,2,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,
35,36,37,38,39,4,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,54,55,56,58,61,62,
63,64,65,66,67,68,71,72,73,74,75,76,8,80,82,83,85,86,87,88,9,91,92,93,94,9
5,96,97,98,99
MS. HETAL PATEL, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 2,3
MR. MAULIK J.NANAVATI, ADVOCATE FOR MS. MANVI DAMLE (6520) for
the Respondent(s) No. 4
NOTICE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE
SUNITA AGARWAL
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.N.RAY
Date : 07/07/2025
ORAL ORDER
(PER : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL)
1. Heard Ms.Kruti M. Shah, learned advocate for the petitioners, Mr. Maulik G. Nanavati and Ms.Manvi Damle, learned Counsels for the respondent-NHAI and Ms.Hetal Patel, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the State-Respondents.
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2. The relief prayed in the present petition are as under:
"(b) issue appropriate, writ, order or direction to declare Section 3(j) of the National Highways Act, 1956 as unconstitutional and ultra-virus to Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
(c) issue appropriate, writ, order or direction for quashing and setting aside the land acquisition proceedings in pursuance of notification dated 17.03.2009 published in the Gazette of India, Extra Ordinary, Part-II under Section 3 Sub Section (ii) of National Highways Act, 1956.
(d) issue appropriate, writ, order or direction for quashing and setting aside the awards daed 15.02.2011, 15.02.2012 and 26.12.2012 declared by the respondent No.2 herein and the order dated 02.01.2015 passed by the respondent No.3 in Arbitration Case No.1/2012 to 148/2012 and 1/2013 to 83/2013, on the ground of awarding lesser compensation then demanded by the petitioner.
3. With respect to the challenge to the validity of Section 3J of the National Highways Act, 1956, suffice it to note that, the issue has been adjudicated by the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh and others reported in (2019) 9 SCC 304. While holding Section 3J as ultra vires, the following observations have been made :-
"11. Before embarking on a discussion as to the constitutional validity of the Amendment Act, it is important to first understand what is meant by the Page 2 of 18 Uploaded by BINA SHAH(HC00353) on Fri Jul 11 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 11 23:03:36 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13510/2015 ORDER DATED: 07/07/2025 undefined expression "solatium". In Sunder v. Union of India [Sunder v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 211] , a Bench of five Judges of this Court laid down the nature of solatium as follows : (SCC p. 229, paras 21 and 22) "21. It is apposite in this context to point out that during the enquiry contemplated under Section 11 of the Act the Collector has to consider the objections which any person interested has stated pursuant to the notice given to him. It may be possible that a person so interested would advance objections for highlighting his disinclination to part with the land acquired on account of a variety of grounds, such as sentimental or religious or psychological or traditional, etc. Section 24 emphasises that no amount on account of any disinclination of the person interested to part with the land shall be granted as compensation. That aspect is qualitatively different from the solatium which the legislature wanted to provide 'in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition'.
22. Compulsory nature of acquisition is to be distinguished from voluntary sale or transfer. In the latter, the landowner has the widest advantage in finding out a would-be buyer and in negotiating with him regarding the sale price. Even in such negotiations or haggling, normally no landowner would bargain for any amount in consideration of his disinclination to part with the land. The mere fact that he is negotiating for sale of the land would show that he is willing to part with the land. The owner is free to settle terms of transfer and choose the buyer as also to appoint the point of time when he would be receiving consideration and parting with his title and possession over the land. But in the compulsory acquisition the landowner is deprived of the right and opportunity to negotiate and bargain for the sale price. It Page 3 of 18 Uploaded by BINA SHAH(HC00353) on Fri Jul 11 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 11 23:03:36 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13510/2015 ORDER DATED: 07/07/2025 undefined depends on what the Collector or the court fixes as per the provisions of the Act. The solatium envisaged in sub-section (2) "in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition" is thus not the same as damages on account of the disinclination to part with the land acquired."(emphasis supplied) Thus, the solatium that is paid to a landowner is on account of the fact that a landowner, who may not be willing to part with his land, has now to do so, and that too at a value fixed legislatively and not through negotiation, by which, arguably, such landowner would get the best price for the property to be sold. Once this is understood in its correct perspective, it is clear that "solatium" is part and parcel of compensation that is payable for compulsory acquisition of land.
12. As has been stated by us hereinabove, solatium and interest were awarded to landowners for compulsory acquisition of their lands for the purpose of National Highways until the 1997 Amendment Act. Interestingly, after the Land Acquisition Act has been repealed and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 has come into force, Section 105 of the said Act provides as under:
"105. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases or to apply with certain modifications.--(1) Subject to sub-section (3), the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule.
(2) Subject to sub-section (2) of Section 106, the Central Government may, by notification, omit or add to any of the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule.Page 4 of 18 Uploaded by BINA SHAH(HC00353) on Fri Jul 11 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 11 23:03:36 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13510/2015 ORDER DATED: 07/07/2025 undefined (3) The Central Government shall, by notification, within one year from the date of commencement of this Act, direct that any of the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in the Second and Third Schedules, being beneficial to the affected families, shall apply to the cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule or shall apply with such exceptions or modifications that do not reduce the compensation or dilute the provisions of this Act relating to compensation or rehabilitation and resettlement as may be specified in the notification, as the case may be. (4) A copy of every notification proposed to be issued under sub-section (3), shall be laid in draft before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in disapproving the issue of the notification or both Houses agree in making any modification in the notification, the notification shall not be issued or, as the case may be, shall be issued only in such modified form as may be agreed upon by both the Houses of Parliament."
13. The First Schedule to the said Act provides that solatium equivalent to 100% of the market value multiplied by various factors, depending on whether the land is situated in a rural or urban area, constitutes minimum compensation package to be given to those whose land is acquired. The Fourth Schedule to this Act, to be read along with Section 105, expressly includes under Item 7, the National Highways Act, 1956. In Item 9, this Schedule also includes the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952. By a Notification dated 28-8-2015 issued under Section 105 read with Section 113 of the 2013 Act, it is provided Page 5 of 18 Uploaded by BINA SHAH(HC00353) on Fri Jul 11 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 11 23:03:36 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13510/2015 ORDER DATED: 07/07/2025 undefined that the 2013 Act compensation provisions will apply to acquisitions that take place under the National Highways Act. The result is that both before the 1997 Amendment Act and after the coming into force of the 2013 Act, solatium and interest is payable to landowners whose property is compulsorily acquired for purposes of National Highways. This is one other very important circumstance to be borne in mind when judging the constitutional validity of the 1997 Amendment Act for the interregnum period from 1997 to 2015."
"19. It is well settled that in order that a law avail of the protection of Article 31-C, it is not necessary that any declaration be made in that behalf. (See State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan [State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan, (1986) 2 SCC 516] SCC at p. 530.) It is also important to remember that in order that a law be shielded by Article 31-C, the said law must have a direct and rational nexus with the principles contained in Article 39(b). (See Assam Sillimanite Ltd. v. Union of India [Assam Sillimanite Ltd. v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 692 : 1991 Supp (3) SCR 273] SCR at p. 290.)
20. An example of a law which claimed the benefit of Article 31-C, but was denied such benefit is set out in K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of T.N. [K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of T.N., (1996) 2 SCC 226] as follows : (SCC pp. 254-55, para 44) "44. The main object for which the Club was established is to carry on the business of race club, in particular the running of horse races, steeplechases or races of any other kind and for any kind of athletic sports and for playing their own games of cricket, bowls, golf, lawn tennis, polo or any other kind of games or amusement, recreation, sport or entertainment, etc. In the earlier part of this judgment, we have noticed the working of the Club which shows that apart from Page 6 of 18 Uploaded by BINA SHAH(HC00353) on Fri Jul 11 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 11 23:03:36 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13510/2015 ORDER DATED: 07/07/2025 undefined 5% commission from the totalizator and the bookmakers no part of the betting-money comes to the Club. The Club does not own or control any material resources of the community which are to be distributed in terms of Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India. There are two aspects of the functioning of the Club. One is the betting by the punters at the totalizator and with the bookies. The Club does not earn any income from the betting- money except 5% commission. There is no question whatsoever of the Club owning or controlling the material resources of the community or in any manner contributing towards the operation of the economic system resulting in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. The second aspect is the conduct of horse races by the Club. Horse racing is a game of skill, the horse which wins the race is given a prize by the Club. It is a simple game of horse racing where the winning horses are given prizes. Neither the "material resources of the community" nor "to subserve the common good" has any relevance to the twin functioning of the Club. Similarly, the operation of the Club has no relation or effect on the "operation of the economic system". There is no question whatsoever of attracting the directive principles contained in Articles 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. The declaration in Section 2 of the Act and the recital containing aims and objectives totally betray the scope and purpose of Articles 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. While Article 39(b) refers to "material resources of the community", the aims and objects of the Act refer to "the material resources of the Madras Race Club". It is difficult to understand what exactly are the material resources of the race club which are sought to be distributed so as to subserve the common good within the meaning of the directive principles. Equally, the reference to Article 39(c) is wholly misplaced. While Article 39(c) relates to "the operation of the economic system ... to the common detriment", the aims and objectives of the Act refer to "the economic system of the Madras Page 7 of 18 Uploaded by BINA SHAH(HC00353) on Fri Jul 11 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 11 23:03:36 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13510/2015 ORDER DATED: 07/07/2025 undefined Race Club". What is meant by the economic system of the Madras Race Club is not known. Even if it is assumed that betting by the punters at the totalizator and with the bookmakers is part of the economic system of the Madras Race Club, it has no relevance to the objectives specified in Articles 39(b) and (c). We are, therefore, of the view that reference to Articles 39(b) and (c) in the aims and objects and in Section 2 of the Act is nothing but a mechanical reproduction of constitutional provisions in a totally inappropriate context. There is no nexus so far as the provisions of the 1986 Act are concerned with the objectives contained in Articles 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. We, therefore, hold that the protection under Article 31-C of the Constitution cannot be extended to the 1986 Act."
This is despite the fact that the impugned enactment, namely, the Madras Race Club (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1986 contained a declaration that it was enacted to give effect to the policy of the State under Articles 39(b) and (c).
21. When we examine the Objects and Reasons which led to the 1997 Amendment of the National Highways Act, we do not find mentioned therein of any object relating to distribution of the material resources of the community. The object of the Amendment Act has no relationship whatsoever to the directive principles contained in Article 39(b), inasmuch as its limited object is to expedite the process of land acquisition by avoiding inordinate delays therein. The object of the Amendment Act was not to acquire land for the purpose of National Highways as, pre-amendment, the Land Acquisition Act provided for this. The object of the Amendment Act was fulfilled by providing a scheme different from that contained in the Land Acquisition Act, making it clear that the stage of offer of an amount by way of compensation is removed altogether; vesting takes place as soon as the Section 3-D notification is issued; and most importantly, the tardy court process is replaced by Page 8 of 18 Uploaded by BINA SHAH(HC00353) on Fri Jul 11 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 11 23:03:36 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13510/2015 ORDER DATED: 07/07/2025 undefined arbitration. Obviously, these objects have no direct and rational nexus with the directive principles contained in Article 39(b). Article 31-C is, therefore, out of harm's way. Even otherwise, on the assumption that Article 31- C is attracted to the facts of this case, yet, as was held by Bhagwati, J. in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India [Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625 :
(1981) 1 SCR 206] : (SCC p. 716, para 114 : SCR pp.
338-39) "114. ... it is not every provision of a statute, which has been enacted with the dominant object of giving effect to a directive principles, that is entitled to protection, but only those provisions of the statute which are basically and essentially necessary for giving effect to the directive principles are protected under the amended Article 31-C."
"24. Even if the 1997 Amendment Act be regarded as an Act to carry out the purposes of Article 39(b), the object of the Amendment Act is not served by removing solatium and interest from compensation to be awarded. It is obvious, therefore, that the grant of compensation without solatium and interest is not basically and essentially necessary to carry out the object of the 1997 Amendment Act, even if it is to be considered as an acquisition Act pure and simple, for the object of the said Amendment Act as we have seen is to obviate delays in the acquisition process of acquiring land for National Highways. On application of this test as well, it is clear that the grant of compensation without solatium and interest, not being basically and essentially necessary to carry out the object of the Amendment Act, would not receive the protective umbrella of Article 31-C and, therefore, any infraction of Article 14 can be inquired into by the Court."
4. The Apex Court while holding Section 3J as ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India, made the Page 9 of 18 Uploaded by BINA SHAH(HC00353) on Fri Jul 11 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 11 23:03:36 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13510/2015 ORDER DATED: 07/07/2025 undefined following observations:-
"25. The sheet anchor of the case of the respondents is the Constitution Bench judgment in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. LAO [P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. LAO, (1965) 1 SCR 614 : AIR 1965 SC 1017] and Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao [Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao, (1973) 1 SCC 500] . It is, therefore, most important to advert to these two decisions in some detail."
"29. Both, P. Vajravelu Mudaliar [P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. LAO, (1965) 1 SCR 614 : AIR 1965 SC 1017] and Nagpur Improvement Trust [Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao, (1973) 1 SCC 500] clinch the issue in favour of the respondents, as has been correctly held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Golden Iron and Steel Forging [Golden Iron and Steel Forging v. Union of India, 2008 SCC OnLine P&H 498 : (2011) 4 RCR (Civil) 375] . First and foremost, it is important to note that, as has been seen hereinabove, the object of the 1997 Amendment was to speed up the process of acquiring lands for National Highways. This object has been achieved in the manner set out hereinabove. It will be noticed that the awarding of solatium and interest has nothing to do with achieving this object, as it is nobody's case that land acquisition for the purpose of National Highways slows down as a result of award of solatium and interest. Thus, a classification made between different sets of landowners whose lands happen to be acquired for the purpose of National Highways and landowners whose lands are acquired for other public purposes has no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Amendment Act i.e. speedy acquisition of lands for the purpose of National Highways. On this ground alone, the Amendment Act falls foul of Article
14."
"31.Nagpur Improvement Trust [Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao, (1973) 1 SCC 500] has clearly held that ordinarily a classification based on public purpose is not permissible under Article 14 for the purpose of Page 10 of 18 Uploaded by BINA SHAH(HC00353) on Fri Jul 11 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 11 23:03:36 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13510/2015 ORDER DATED: 07/07/2025 undefined determining compensation. Also, in para 30, the seven- Judge Bench unequivocally states that it is immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act or another Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired, as, if the existence of these two Acts would enable the State to give one owner different treatment from another who is similarly situated, Article 14 would be infracted. In the facts of these cases, it is clear that from the point of view of the landowner it is immaterial that his land is acquired under the National Highways Act and not the Land Acquisition Act, as solatium cannot be denied on account of this fact alone."
"46. It is worthy of note that even in acquisitions that take place under the National Highways Act and the 1952 Act, the notification of 2015 under the new Acquisition Act of 2013 makes solatium and interest payable in cases covered by both Acts. In fact, with effect from 1-1-2015, Amendment Ordinance 9 of 2014 was promulgated amending the 2013 Act. Section 10 of the said Amendment Ordinance states as follows:
"10. In the principal Act, in Section 105--
(i) for sub-section (3), the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely--
'(3) The provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement in accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructure amenities in accordance with the Third Schedule shall apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule with effect from 1-1-2015;'
(ii) sub-section (4) shall be omitted."
47. It is only when this Ordinance lapsed that the Notification dated 28-8-2015 was then made under Section 113 of the 2013 Act. This notification is important and states as follows:
"MINISTRY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT Page 11 of 18 Uploaded by BINA SHAH(HC00353) on Fri Jul 11 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 11 23:03:36 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13510/2015 ORDER DATED: 07/07/2025 undefined ORDER New Delhi, 28-8-2015 S.O. 2368(E).--Whereas, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013) (hereinafter referred to as "the RFCTLARR Act") came into effect from 1-1-2014;
And whereas, sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the RFCTLARR Act provided for issuing of notification to make the provisions of the Act relating to the determination of the compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement applicable to cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act;
And whereas, the notification envisaged under sub- section (3) of Section 105 of the RFCTLARR Act was not issued, and the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014 (9 of 2014) was promulgated on 31-12-2014, thereby, inter alia, amending Section 105 of the RFCTLARR Act to extend the provisions of the Act relating to the determination of the compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement to cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act; And whereas, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015) was promulgated on 3-4-2015 to give continuity to the provisions of the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014;
And whereas, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) was promulgated on 30- 5-2015 to give continuity to the provisions of the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015); And whereas, the replacement Bill relating to the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015) was referred to the Joint Committee of the Houses for examination and report and the same is pending with the Joint Committee;
And whereas, as per the provisions of Article 123 of Page 12 of 18 Uploaded by BINA SHAH(HC00353) on Fri Jul 11 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 11 23:03:36 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13510/2015 ORDER DATED: 07/07/2025 undefined the Constitution, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) shall lapse on the 31st day of August, 2015 and thereby placing the landowners at the disadvantageous position, resulting in denial of benefits of enhanced compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement to the cases of land acquisition under the 13 Acts specified in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act as extended to the landowners under the said Ordinance;
And whereas, the Central Government considers it necessary to extend the benefits available to the landowners under theRFCTLARRAct to similarly placed landowners whose lands are acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule; and accordingly the Central Government keeping in view the aforesaid difficulties has decided to extend the beneficial advantage to the landowners and uniformly apply the beneficial provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, relating to the determination of compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement as were made applicable to cases of land acquisition under the said enactments in the interest of the landowners;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 113 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), the Central Government hereby makes the following Order to remove the aforesaid difficulties, namely:
1. (1) This Order may be called the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2015.
(2) It shall come into force with effect from the 1st day of September, 2015.
2. The provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation Page 13 of 18 Uploaded by BINA SHAH(HC00353) on Fri Jul 11 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 11 23:03:36 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13510/2015 ORDER DATED: 07/07/2025 undefined and Resettlement Act, 2013, relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement in accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructure amenities in accordance with the Third Schedule shall apply to all cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act.
[F. No. 13011/01/2014-LRD] K.P. Krishnan, Addl. Secy."
"48. It is thus clear that the Ordinance as well as the notification have applied the principle contained in Nagpur Improvement Trust [Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao, (1973) 1 SCC 500] , as the Central Government has considered it necessary to extend the benefits available to landowners generally under the 2013 Act to similarly placed landowners whose lands are acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule, the National Highways Act being one of the aforesaid enactments. This being the case, it is clear that the Government has itself accepted that the principle of Nagpur Improvement Trust [Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao, (1973) 1 SCC 500] would apply to acquisitions which take place under the National Highways Act, and that solatium and interest would be payable under the 2013 Act to persons whose lands are acquired for the purpose of National Highways as they are similarly placed to those landowners whose lands have been acquired for other public purposes under the 2013 Act. This being the case, it is clear that even the Government is of the view that it is not possible to discriminate between landowners covered by the 2013 Act and landowners covered by the National Highways Act, when it comes to compensation to be paid for lands acquired under either of the enactments. The judgments delivered under the 1952 Act as well as the Defence of India Act, 1971, may, therefore, require a re-look in the light of this development. [ The Defence of India Act, 1971, was a temporary statute which remained in force only during the period of operation of a proclamation of emergency and for a period of six months thereafter -- vide Section 1(3) of the Act. As this Act has since expired, Page 14 of 18 Uploaded by BINA SHAH(HC00353) on Fri Jul 11 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 11 23:03:36 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13510/2015 ORDER DATED: 07/07/2025 undefined it is not included in the Fourth Schedule of the 2013 Act.] In any case, as has been pointed out hereinabove, Chajju Ram [Union of India v. Chajju Ram, (2003) 5 SCC 568] , has been referred to a larger Bench. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that the view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 6036] , [Jang Bahadur v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 6034] , [Union of India v. Abhinav Cotspin Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 19319] is correct, whereas the view of the Rajasthan High Court [Banshilal Samariya v. Union of India, 2005 SCC OnLine Raj 572 : 2005-06 Supp RLW 559] is not correct."
4.The ultimate relief granted by the Apex Court is :-
"52. There is no doubt that the learned Solicitor General, in the aforesaid two orders, has conceded the issue raised in these cases. This assumes importance in view of the plea of Shri Divan that the impugned judgments should be set aside on the ground that when the arbitral awards did not provide for solatium or interest, no Section 34 petition having been filed by the landowners on this score, the Division Bench judgments that are impugned before us ought not to have allowed solatium and/or interest. Ordinarily, we would have acceded to this plea, but given the fact that the Government itself is of the view that solatium and interest should be granted even in cases that arise between 1997 and 2015, in the interest of justice we decline to interfere with such orders, given our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. We therefore declare that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating to solatium and interest contained in Sections 23(1-A) and (2) and interest payable in terms of Section 28 proviso will apply to acquisitions made under the National Highways Act. Consequently, the provision of Section 3-
J is, to this extent, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, declared to be unconstitutional. Accordingly, appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 9599 of 2019 is dismissed."
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4. With respect to the relief seeking for quashing of the Notification dated 17.03.2009 for appointment of the competent authority under Section 3(a) of the National Highways Act, 1956, suffice it to note that after conclusion of the acquisition proceedings with the making of the award in the year 2011-12, with respect to the lands of the petitioners herein, we cannot permit the petitioners to challenge the appointment of the competent authority in this writ petition filed after a period of six years from the date of the Notification and three years after the conclusion of the acquisition proceedings.
5. As regards the third relief for seeking of quashing of awards passed under Section 3G and orders passed by the Arbitrator under Section 3G(5), on the premise that lesser compensation than what was demanded by the petitioners had been fixed, nothing can be done in the writ petition within the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as, factual inquiry with respect to the valuation of the land in question cannot be made by this Court.
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6. With the above, we dispose of the present petition with the following directions :-
1. The benefits as admissible to the land holders towards solatium and interest under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 at the rate of 9% and 15%, shall be payable. It is clarified that the interest amount of 9% and 15% shall be computed on the unpaid amount towards Solatium which is to be computed by preparing an additional award, from the date of taking possession of the land in question till the date of deposit of the amount under the award, before the competent authority. The additional award shall include Solatium as well as interest thereon and the computation shall be made strictly in accordance with law. The disbursement of the amount determined under the additional award shall be made after due verification of the entitlement of each land holder(s)/petitioners herein on production of relevant documents pertaining to the same.
2. The entire exercise of computation by making of the additional awards with respect to each of the land holding shall be completed within the period of six Page 17 of 18 Uploaded by BINA SHAH(HC00353) on Fri Jul 11 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 11 23:03:36 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13510/2015 ORDER DATED: 07/07/2025 undefined weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order after providing due notice and opportunity to the National Highways Authority of India and also the land holders. The present set of petitions stand disposed of, accordingly.
(SUNITA AGARWAL, CJ ) (D.N.RAY,J) BINA SHAH Page 18 of 18 Uploaded by BINA SHAH(HC00353) on Fri Jul 11 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 11 23:03:36 IST 2025