Bombay High Court
Sandip Kumar Chatterjee vs United India Insureance Company Ltd. on 25 March, 2026
Author: S.M. Modak
Bench: S.M. Modak
2026:BHC-OS:7551-DB
Megha 915_WP_1728_2023_fc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.1728 OF 2023
Sandeep Kumar Chatterjee ...Petitioner
V/s.
United India Insurance Company Ltd.
and Anr. ...Respondents
________________
Mr. Jitendra B. Mishra with Mr. Rupesh Dubey and Mr. Nilu Mishra for
the Petitioner.
Mr. V.Y. Sanglikar with Ms. Archana D. Gaware for the Respondents.
________________
CORAM: S.M. MODAK &
SANDEEP V. MARNE, JJ.
DATED: 25 MARCH 2026.
Judgment (PER: SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.)
1) The Petitioner has filed the present Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 4 June 2019 passed by the General Manager/Disciplinary Authority imposing the penalty of recovery of amount of Rs.50,000/-, order dated 7 May 2020 passed by the Appellate Authority, rejecting his appeal and order dated 18 November 2022 passed by the Board Sub-Committee rejecting the Memorial.
2) Briefly stated, facts of the case are that the Petitioner joined the services of Respondent-Insurance Company as Direct Recruit Officer Page No.1 of 17 25 March 2026 Megha 915_WP_1728_2023_fc (Specialist) on 18 August 1986. During the course of his service, the Petitioner was promoted on various posts. In the year 2013, the Petitioner was posted as Manager in regional office at Vadodara when he was issued communication dated 26 September 2013 by Manager (Vigilance) in connection with the claims raised by M/s. Vinod Chopra Films Pvt. Ltd. in respect of film- Three Idiots, M/s. Blockbuster Movies Entertainer in respect of film-Action Replay and M/s. Base Industries Group in respect of film-Fool & Final. The Petitioner submitted his response on 21 October 2013.
3) On 25 August 2014, Memorandum of Charge-sheet was issued to the Petitioner alleging four charges. All the four charges were in respect of the Petitioner functioning as Senior Divisional Manager, DO14, Mumbai. He faced four charges. The broad allegations against the Petitioner were that the Head Office had approved issuance of 'Cine Mitra' Policy, which had 'only risks of direct loss or damage to the property alone (with exceptions)' to the concerned Production Houses. However, the Petitioner had issued policies with cover similar to 'Cine Mukta' Policy, which enabled 'All Risk Cover'. Thus, it was alleged that the Petitioner issued policies to the Film Production Houses, which included terms and conditions beyond the ones approved by the Head Office, which enabled the producers to raise claims for cancellation of shoots, though the polices were intended to cover only loss of property.
4) Petitioner submitted Response dated 14 October 2014 to the charge-sheet denying the charges. The Disciplinary Authority appointed Inquiry Officer (IO) to conduct enquiry into the charges.
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Upon finalisation of the enquiry, IO submitted his report dated 23 February 2016 holding that none of the charges levelled against the Petitioner were proved. It appears that the Disciplinary Authority decided to concur with the Enquiry Authority and communicated the same to the Chief Vigilance Officer (CVO). The CVO disagreed with the opinion of the Disciplinary Authority and vide opinion dated 3 August 2016 submitted a Note to Chief Managing Director (CMD), who concurred with the opinion of the CVO. The file was accordingly sent to the Disciplinary Authority for taking decision. In the meantime, the Petitioner superannuated from service on 31 October 2016. The Disciplinary Authority had prepared a draft office order for closure of the disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner and observed that the Petitioner was a Provident Fund Optee and that under provisions of United India Insurance Company (CDA) Rules, 2014 (UIIC (CDA) Rules, 2014), there was no provision for continuing departmental proceedings in respect of superannuated employees. The draft office order dated 20 February 2017 was sent to the Vigilance Department. The CVO once again disagreed with the proposed order prepared by the Disciplinary Authority and advised him that there is provision under the UIIC (CDA) Rules, 2014 for continuation of the disciplinary proceedings even against Provident Fund Optee. This time, the Disciplinary Authority decided to act on the advice of the CVO and issued show cause notice for disagreement on 14 June 2017 and called upon the Petitioner to submit his response. The Petitioner responded to the show cause notice. The Disciplinary Authority has passed order dated 4 June 2019 imposing the punishment of recovery of Rs.50,000/- from terminal benefits as part of pecuniary loss caused to the Company. The Page No.3 of 17 25 March 2026 Megha 915_WP_1728_2023_fc Petitioner preferred appeal, which came to be rejected by the Appellate Authority on 7 May 2020. The Petitioner preferred a Memorial before the Board of Sub-Committee, which was rejected by order dated 18 November 2022. Petitioner has accordingly filed the present Petition challenging the order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 4 June 2019, order of the Appellate Authority dated 7 May 2020 and order of Board of Sub-Committee dated 18 November 2022.
5) Mr. Mishra, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner submits that the Disciplinary Authority has grossly erred in reviewing its own order dated 20 February 2017 by which the disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner were closed. That in absence of any authority in law, the Disciplinary Authority erroneously reviewed his own order and has punished the Petitioner. Mr. Mishra relies on judgment of the Apex Court in Harshit Harish Jain V/s. State of Maharashtra1 in support of his contention that the Disciplinary Authority cannot review his own order. He submits that the Disciplinary Authority has acted under the dictates of the Vigilance Office. That the Disciplinary Authority was not permitted to exercise jurisdiction and discretion vested in it and was forced to punish the Petitioner. He submits that though procedure of placing the matter before the CMD was adopted in respect of earlier concurrence of Disciplinary Authority vide letter dated 8 July 2016, no such procedure was followed after Disciplinary Authority issued the order dated 20 February 2017. He submits that the order dated 20 February 2017 was actually signed and issued by the Disciplinary Authority and contests the position that 1 (2025) 3 SCC 365 Page No.4 of 17 25 March 2026 Megha 915_WP_1728_2023_fc same was merely a draft order. He submits that the said order was also addressed to the Petitioner though the same was never served on him. That once order dated 20 February 2017 was passed, the Disciplinary Authority became functus officio and could not have taken any further decision in the disciplinary proceedings.
6) Without prejudice, Mr. Mishra further submits that the Disciplinary Authority has rightly held in order dated 20 February 2017 that the disciplinary proceedings could not be continued after superannuation of the Petitioner on 31 October 2016. He submits that at the time of his retirement, Petitioner was a Provident Fund optee and he opted for pension scheme only in the year 2019. That therefore Disciplinary Authority was right in observing that UIIC (CDA) Rules, 2014 applied only to the employees governed by the pension scheme.
7) Mr. Mishra further submits that the Petitioner was exonerated by the Enquiry Officer after appreciation of the entire evidence on record. He takes me through the findings of the Enquiry Officer. That though Disciplinary Authority initially agreed with the view of the Enquiry Officer, he has subsequently changed his mind only on account of pressure put by the CVO. He submits that in the enquiry, the charges have been disproved. That the department did not place in the enquiry the so-called Cine Mukta Policy. He further submits that the Petitioner was not the only authority, who has issued the concerned policies and that therefore, he cannot be singularly held liable in the matter. He submits that the disagreement by the Disciplinary Authority in the show cause notice is on extraneous factors without quoting any Page No.5 of 17 25 March 2026 Megha 915_WP_1728_2023_fc relevant piece of evidence on record. He further submits that even Cine Mitra Policy is rightly held to be 'All Risk Policy'. That therefore imposing of punishment on the Petitioner is clearly unwarranted. That the Petitioner was made scapegoat in the entire incident and the disciplinary proceedings were initiated and kept pending for the sole purpose of harassing the Petitioner and denying him promotion. The Petitioner has lost several promotions on account of illegal disciplinary proceedings, which were kept pending till his retirement. He would accordingly pray for setting aside the impugned punishment orders and for grant of all due promotions.
8) Mr. Sanglikar, the learned counsel appearing for the Respondents opposes the Petition submitting that the three Authorities have concurrently held the charges levelled against the Petitioner to be proved. That this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence in exercise of limited power of judicial review.
9) He submits that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are not binding on the Disciplinary Authority, who has proceeded to differ with the same. That the Respondents have followed all due processes in consultation with the CVO. That the disagreement note of the CVO was put up before the CMD, who has concurred with the opinion of the CVO. That consultation with the CVO is mandatory in vigilance cases. That the disciplinary enquiry is initiated on account of preliminary enquiries conducted by the Vigilance Department. That therefore mere consultation with the CVO does not mean that the Disciplinary Authority has acted on dictates of CVO.
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10) Mr. Sanglikar further submits that no order was ever issued by the
Disciplinary Authority on 20 February 2017 though the same was prepared. That the draft of the said order was shared with CVO for the purpose of his concurrence. However, the draft order proceeded on erroneous footing that there was no provision for continuation of disciplinary proceedings after Petitioner's superannuation. That the CVO did not concur with the erroneous opinion of the Disciplinary Authority and correctly advised him. That proviso to Rule 25(3) of UIIC (CDA) Rules, 2014 permitted continuation of Disciplinary Enquiry against every employee. That the prohibition is only on initiation of fresh enquiry against non-pension optee. However, the enquiry was already initiated as per UIIC (CDA) Rules, 2014 could be continued after retirement of officer. That once misconception of Disciplinary Authority was cleared, he rightly proceeded to issue show cause notice for disciplinary findings of the Enquiry Officer. That the Disciplinary Authority has duly applied his mind to the entire evidence on record and has rightly disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. That the findings of the Disciplinary Authority are upheld by the Appellate Authority and Board Sub-Committee. He therefore submits that there is no warrant for interference in the impugned orders. He submits that the Respondent-Insurance Company suffered severe losses due to the actions of the Petitioner. He prays for dismissal of the Petition.
11) Rival contentions of the parties now fall for our consideration.
12) The Petitioner is found guilty of misconduct alleged in the charge-sheet dated 25 August 2014. Petitioner faced four charges. In the Page No.7 of 17 25 March 2026 Megha 915_WP_1728_2023_fc first charge, it was alleged that the Petitioner issued insurance policy to M/s. Vinod Chopra Films Pvt. Ltd. for the film ' 3 Idiots' with risk coverage as per 'Cine Mukta' Policy whereas in fact Head Office approved insurance of 'Cine Mitra' Policy. It was alleged that the insured raised claim for Rs.1.13 crores (which was recommended for settlement in the sum of Rs.1.09 crores) for cancellation of shooting due to severe snow storm, which was not admissible under Cine Mitra Policy but was covered under Cine Mukta Policy, because of which the Respondent-Company suffered loss of Rs.1,09,72,586/-. In the second charge, it was alleged that the Petitioner issued insurance police to M/s. Blockbuster Movies Entertainer for the movie- 'Action Replay', by changing the terms and conditions of the policy without concurrence from the regional office /head office. That the insured preferred claim for cancellation of shooting due to rains and claim amount of Rs.7,61,824/- was paid to the insured causing corresponding loss to the Respondent-Company. In the third charge, it was alleged that Petitioner issued policy to M/s. Illuminati Films Pvt. Ltd. for the film- ' Breakup', which was later renamed as ' Love Aaj Lal' with risk cover as per Cine Mukta Policy even though the Head Office had approved issuance of Cine Mitra Policy. That it was alleged that insured preferred claim for cancellation of shooting due to prediction of rain at Luton, UK, and the Company was forced to pay claim of Rs.23,30,233/- causing corresponding loss to the Company. In the fourth charge, it was alleged that the Petitioner issued letters to (i) Headstart Films Pvt. Ltd. & Headstart Films U.K. Ltd, (ii) M/s. Idream Production Pvt. Ltd. and (iii) M/s. Walker Media Pvt. Ltd. extending the conditions beyond the standard policy conditions and breached its authority with malafide Page No.8 of 17 25 March 2026 Megha 915_WP_1728_2023_fc intentions. It was alleged that though no claim was made under the policy, unwarranted liability could have been fastened on the Company because of the acts of the Petitioner.
13) Though the IO held the charges to be disproved, the Disciplinary Authority has disagreed with the findings of the IO and has held the charges to be proved. Since claims were raised by the Film Production Houses for cancellation of shoots and were required to be settled, the Petitioner is held responsible for the losses suffered by the Respondent- Insurance Company. The Petitioner had already retired from service on 31 October 2016 and by order dated 4 June 2019, he has been punished with recovery of Rs.50,000/- from the terminal benefits. The punishment is upheld by the Appellate Authority and also by the Memorial Authority.
14) The first point raised by the Petitioner is that the Disciplinary Authority has reviewed its own order. It is Petitioner's case that the Disciplinary Authority had exonerated the Petitioner vide order dated 20 February 2017. Reliance is placed on copy of office order dated 20 February 2017, relevant portion of which reads thus:
Shri S K Chatterjee, who is opted for Provident Fund, had superannuated from service on 31.10.2016. The departmental proceeding has not concluded on the date of his retirement. The provision of the Rule 1(4) of UIIC(CDA) Rules, 2014 as mentioned "These Rules shall also apply to a person governed by General Insurance (Employees") Pension Scheme 1995 to the extent provided under the said Scheme". The UIIC (CDA) Rules, 2014 has no provision of departmental proceeding for superannuated employees who had opted for Provident Fund. In the absence of any provision under United India Insurance Company (CDA) Rules, 2014, there is no scope for proceeding further in this case.
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Therefore, the departmental proceeding against Shri S K Chatterjee shall be treated as closed.
15) However, it is the stand of the Respondents in the affidavit-in- reply that though the order dated 20 February 2017 was prepared by the Disciplinary Authority, the same was never issued or served on the Petitioner. It is contended that the order was prepared only for the purpose of consultation with the CVO. There is substance in the contention of the Respondents since the Petitioner himself admittedly did not receive order dated 20 February 2017. He has secured copy of the said order through Right to Information Act, 2005. This shows that though the order was supposed to be dispatched to the Petitioner (after clearance by CVO), the same was never issued from the office of the Disciplinary Authority and was only sent to CVO for consultation purposes. Since order dated 20 February 2017 was never issued, it has no existence in law. It is otherwise a well settled law that an order prepared but not communicated to or served on the employee, does not take effect. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika 2 . The Constitution Bench has held that an order of dismissal passed by the appropriate authority and kept with itself, cannot be said to take effect unless the officer concerned knows about the same. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the subsequent order passed by the Disciplinary Authority on 4 June 2019 was in exercise of power of review by the Disciplinary Authority. Since the order dated 20 February 2017 was never issued or communicated to the Petitioner, it cannot be concluded that the Disciplinary Authority has reviewed its decision. Therefore 2 AIR 1966 (SC) 1313 Page No.10 of 17 25 March 2026 Megha 915_WP_1728_2023_fc reliance by Mr. Mishra on the judgment of the Apex Court in Harshit Harish Jain (supra) is inapposite.
16) The next point contended on behalf of the Petitioner is that the Disciplinary Authority has acted on the dictates of the CVO and has changed the earlier order of exoneration of the Petitioner. In the present case, the initiation of the proceedings was through Vigilance Department as the initial show cause notice dated 26 September 2013 was issued by the Vigilance Department. After conduct of vigilance enquiry, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the Petitioner vide Memorandum of Charge-sheet dated 25 August 2014. Since this was a vigilance case, the Disciplinary Authority was required to consult the Vigilance Officer at various stages. After receipt of IO's report dated 23 February 2016, the Vigilance Department was consulted. It appears that the Disciplinary Authority initially expressed its opinion to concur with the findings of the IO vide letter dated 8 July 2016. The CVO however gave advice /recommendation vide Note dated 3 August 2016. The CVO recommended that the charges are proved and since there was difference of opinion between the Disciplinary Authority and CMD, the matter was placed before the higher authority i.e. the CMD as per the procedure.
17) At this stage, the Disciplinary Authority ought to have issued show cause notice to the Petitioner, but committed a mistake of preparing a draft order dated 20 February 2017 for closure of the disciplinary proceedings against him. The reason for preparing the draft order dated 20 February 2017 was because the Disciplinary Authority Page No.11 of 17 25 March 2026 Megha 915_WP_1728_2023_fc was under impression that Rules did not provide for continuation of disciplinary proceedings against a non-pension optee. Disciplinary Authority's draft order was not on merits but on technical ground of impermissibility to continue disciplinary proceedings after retirement. The CVO was again required to intervene and apprised the Disciplinary Authority with the correct legal position, under which the disciplinary proceedings could be continued even after retirement, if the same were initiated during continuation of officer in the service. Once the Disciplinary Authority got the misconception cleared, he followed the procedure of issuance of show cause notice and has thereafter issued the penalty order dated 4 June 2019.
18) Considering the above position, it cannot be concluded that the real decision in the matter is taken by CVO or that the Disciplinary Authority has acted merely on the dictates of the CVO. The correct manner of understanding the course of action adopted by the Disciplinary Authority is to hold that though there was initial agreement with the Enquiry Officer by the Disciplinary Authority, finally it has disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer by issuance of show cause notice. The events that transpired in the interregnum were on account of the Disciplinary Authority's misconception and misreading of the UIIC (CDA) Rules, 2014. The Disciplinary Authority has otherwise taken independent decision in the matter.
19) The next issue for consideration is whether passing of penalty order against the Petitioner was warranted in view of his retirement on Page No.12 of 17 25 March 2026 Megha 915_WP_1728_2023_fc 31 October 2016. Copy of UIIC (CDA) Rules, 2014 is placed before us. Proviso to Rule 25(3) reads thus:-
Provided where departmental action has been initiated by framing of charge and the same is pending & continuing on the date of retirement or superannuation of an employee, the departmental inquiry shall not deemed to be concluded on exit from the Company due to retirement or superannuation of an employee and shall be continuing as if the employee continues in service. However, continuation of departmental inquiry under this rule shall not give per se right for extension of services beyond retirement age or age of superannuation prescribed under service rules. Provided further where departmental inquiry is continuing/pending after retirement, the same shall be concluded within three months of retirement or superannuation of the employee. However, any departmental inquiry cannot ipso-facto deemed to be concluded on expiry of three months of time from retirement/superannuation.
20) Thus, if departmental action is initiated against an employee before his retirement, the same does not automatically terminate on the date of retirement and can be continued even after the retirement.
The Disciplinary Authority, while preparing draft order dated 20 February 2017, had erroneously assumed that UIIC (CDA) Rules, 2014 did not have provision for continuation of disciplinary action in respect of a superannuated employee. This assumption on the part of the Disciplinary Authority is wholly incorrect. It appears that there is a prohibition on initiation of departmental enquiry against non-pension optee after his retirement. However, if enquiry is already initiated by issuance of charge-sheet, the disciplinary proceedings can be continued under Proviso to Rule 25(3) even after retirement of the officer and therefore contention raised by the Petitioner in this regard deserves rejection.
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21) It is sought to be contended on behalf of the Petitioner that the
Disciplinary Authority has erroneously disagreed with the findings of the IO. We have gone through the findings recorded by the IO in his enquiry report. The broad nature of charges levelled against the Petitioner was that he issued insurance policies to the concerned Film Production Houses containing terms and conditions in variance with the policies approved by the Head Office. The Petitioner was supposed to issue policies having 'limited risk cover' relating to loss or damage to property. However, what was found to have been issued was 'All Risk Policy'. It was alleged that on account of issuance of 'All Risk Policies', the insured raised claims for losses suffered due to cancellation of shooting due to various reasons and the Respondent -Company was required to settle the said claims. It was therefore necessary for the Petitioner to demonstrate that the policies that he actually issued were the ones approved by the Head Office. However, instead of undertaking this simple exercise, the Enquiry Officer travelled beyond the scope of enquiry and had taken into consideration the extraneous material for the purpose of holding that Cine Mitra Policy was primarily an 'All Risk Policy'. He unnecessarily laid emphasis on nomenclature 'Cine Mitra' and 'Cine Mukta' Policies. This exercise of semantics was unnecessary. The simple remit of inquiry before the IO was whether the Petitioner had issued the policies and whether the same contained the same terms and conditions as approved by the Head Office. By holding that even the Cine Mitra policy was also an All Risk Policy, the IO had misdirected himself. On the other hand, in the show cause notice issued to the Petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority recorded following reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the IO:
Page No.14 of 1725 March 2026 Megha 915_WP_1728_2023_fc The policies which are referred in Memorandun dated 25/8/2016 issued by you are Cine Mitra policies in Genisys Software with wider coverage of perils. It is to be noted that the Company had filed the Cine Mitra policy with IRDA on 24.11.2006 with coverage and exclusions similar to what was incorporated in the Genisys software.
All policies issued in the Genisys software under the title Cine Mitra had specifically mentioned that the peril covered is "Only risks of direct loss or damage to property alone (with exceptions)". This would clearly mean that any other peril other than loss or damage to property is not covered under the policy. And also all the approvals given by HO are for Cine Mitra polices only.
Wherein by attaching special conditions to the policy and by giving separate letters to the insureds covering additional perils in deviation from the approved terms and conditions you have violated the underwriting norms resulting in financial loss to the Company.
Thus the Charges are proved
22) In our view, the reasons for disagreement recorded by the Disciplinary Authority in the show cause notice were cogent. The Disciplinary Authority held that the Respondent -Company had filed the Cine Mitra Policy with Insurance Regulatory Development Authority (IRDA) on 24 November 2006 with coverage and exclusions similar to what was incorporated in the Genisys Software and that the said policy covered only direct loss or damage to the property alone (with exceptions). However, in the policies issued by the Petitioner special conditions were incorporated and, in some cases, additional letters were found to have been issued covering additional perils.
23) Considering the above position, in our view the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority about the proof of charges do not warrant any interference. The said findings are upheld by the Appellate Authority and by the Board of Sub-Committee. We are unable to trace Page No.15 of 17 25 March 2026 Megha 915_WP_1728_2023_fc any element of perversity in the findings concurrently recorded by the three Authorities. In exercise of limited power of judicial review, this Court is not expected to re-appreciate the evidence on record and is required to show due deference to the evidence appreciation process undertaken by the authorities below. Therefore, finding of guilt recorded against the Petitioner does not warrant any interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court.
24) Though the Petitioner faced somewhat serious charges, however, he is ultimately punished with insignificant penalty of recovery of amount of Rs.50,000/- from his terminal benefits, forming a small part of pecuniary loss caused to the Company. The punishment does not have any recurring effect on pension or other retirement benefits of the Petitioner. If the Petitioner was punished before retirement, the punishment may have affected quantum of pension and other retirement benefits. The fourth charge clearly alleged malafide intention on the part of the Petitioner. Luckily for the Petitioner, the concerned Production Houses did not raise claims in respect of the policies for which Petitioner unauthorisedly issued letters for covering additional perils. The punishment therefore cannot be treated as harsh or disproportionate to the misconduct proved.
25) So far as the grievance of the Petitioner relating to non-grant of promotions is concerned, the affidavit-in-reply filed by the Respondents indicates that the Petitioner was considered for promotion for the post of Chief Manager Scale V in promotion exercise of 2011-12, but he could not pass the written test. In the promotion exercises in the year 2012-
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13, 2013-14 and 2014-15, the Petitioner could not secure sufficient marks for clearing the cut offs and therefore could not fit either under List-A (with written test) or List B (without written test). By the years 2015-16 the disciplinary proceedings remained pending against the Petitioner and by the time promotional exercise 2015-16 was initiated, memorandum of Charge-sheet dated 25 August 2014 was issued to the Petitioner and his name was placed in sealed envelope. He has been ultimately punished in the disciplinary proceedings and therefore there was no question of opening of the sealed envelope.
26) Considering the overall conspectus of the case, we are not inclined to grant any relief in favour of the Petitioner. Impugned orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and Board Sub-Committee are unexceptionable. Writ Petition is devoid of merits and it is accordingly dismissed without any orders as to costs.
[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.] [S.M. MODAK, J.]
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Signed by: Megha S. Parab
25 March 2026
Designation: PA To Honourable Judge
Date: 27/03/2026 20:44:47