Karnataka High Court
Narayana Gowda vs K V Munivenkate Gowda on 24 November, 2022
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 24th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE M G UMA
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 1027 OF 2010 (DEC)
BETWEEN:
NARAYANA GOWDA
S/O VENKATASUBE GOWDA
MAJOR, RESIDING AT
KALKARE VILLAGE
MALUR TALUK
KOLAR DISTRICT - 563 103
... APPELLANT
(BY SRI: K. SRIHARI, FOR LEX JUSTICIA, ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. K.V. MUNIVENKATE GOWDA
S/O VENKATASUBE GOWDA
MAJOR
2. GANESHA
S/O VENKATASUBE GOWDA
MAJOR
3. SMT NARAYANAMMA
D/O SRINIVASAPPA
MAJOR
4. GOPAMMA
W/O SRINIVASA
MAJOR
5. MANJULA
D/O SRINIVASA
MAJOR
ALL ARE RESIDING AT
KALKARE VILLAGE
2
MALUR TALUK
KOLAR DISTRICT - 563 103
6. KRISHNAPPA
S/O THAYAPPA
MAJOR
KALKARE VILLAGE
MALUR TALUK
KOLAR DISTRICT - 563 103
7. NAGARAJA
S/O THAYAPPA
MAJOR
SINCE DEAD BY LR'S
7 A) MS. VARALAKSHMI
D/O LATE NAGARAJA
AGED 29 YEARS
7 B) AMBARISH
S/O LATE NAGARAJA
AGED 25 YEARS
7 C) MS. TANUJA
D/O LATE NAGARAJA
AGED 23 YEARS
RESPONDENT NO.7(A) TO 7(C)
RESIDING AT
KALKARE VILLAGE
MALUR TALUK
KOLAR DISTRICT
... RESPONDENTS
(BY MR: Y.R. SADASHIVA REDDY, SENIOR COUNSEL, A/W
MS. SUNANDA SARKAR, ADVOCATE FOR R7 (A TO C)
V/O DT. 21/10/2019 APPEAL AGAINST R1 AND
R2 STAND DISMISSED.
MR: LOKANATHA T.V., ADVOCATE FOR R3 TO R6)
THIS R.S.A. IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 OF CPC AGAINST
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 21.1.2010 PASSED IN
R.A.NO.105/2003 ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE
(SR.DN) KOLAR, DISMISSING THE APPEAL AND CONFIRMING THE
3
JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED:31.3.2003 PASSED IN
OS.NO.530/1997 ON THE FILE OF THE ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE (JR.DN)
MALUR.
THIS R.S.A. HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 21.09.2022 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF
ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff No.3 has approached this Court being aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree dated 31.03.2003 passed in OS No.530 of 1997 on the file of the learned Additional Civil Judge (Jr.Dn), Malur, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Trial Court' for brevity), dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiffs for declaration of their title and for permanent injunction against the defendants, which was confirmed vide judgment dated 21.01.2010 passed in RA No.105 of 2003 on the file of the learned II Additional Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) Kolar, itinerating at Malur.
2. For the sake of convenience, parties are referred to as per their status and rank before the Trial Court.
3. Brief facts of the case are that, plaintiff Nos.1 to 3 have filed the suit OS No.530 of 1997 against defendant Nos.1 to 3 seeking declaration that they are the absolute owners in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule 4 property i.e., the land bearing Sy.No.36 measuring 1 acre 12 guntas situated at Kalkere village, Lakkur Hobli, Malur Taluk with boundaries as stated in the plaint and to restrain the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property by granting permanent injunction. It is contended by the plaintiffs that the suit schedule property was belonging to their father. The same was belonging to one Kempaiah and Venkatamma who have jointly sold it in favour of one Venkatasubbegowda under the registered sale deed dated 07.11.1974. The said Venkatasubbegowda is the father of plaintiff Nos.1 to 3. He died leaving behind the plaintiffs as his legal heirs. The revenue records mutated in the names of the plaintiffs and they are in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property.
4. It is contended that the defendants have no right whatsoever over the suit property, but they attempted to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property by the plaintiffs on 04.11.1997. Therefore, the plaintiffs approached the Court for declaration and injunction. 5
5. During the pendancy of the suit, defendant No.1 died and his legal representatives were brought on record. The legal representatives of deceased defendant No.1 and defendant Nos.2 and 3 filed the written statement denying the contentions taken by the plaintiffs and also contending that there is no cause of action for the suit. It is also contended that the boundaries of the suit property is not as given in the sale deed dated 07.11.1974. The plaintiffs have shown the boundaries to suit their purpose only with an intention to make wrongful gain. The boundaries mentioned in the sale deed dated 07.11.1974 do not tally with the boundaries mentioned in the plaint.
6. It is contended that the plaintiffs have filed the suit OS No.236 of 1999 against the defendants suppressing the material facts. Subsequently, the said suit came to be withdrawn. The averments made in the plaint are entirely different than the contention taken by the plaintiffs in OS No.236 of 1999.
7. It is submitted that the suit schedule property was originally belonging to one Venkatappa and he had three sons 6 by name Venkataronappa, Lakshmana and Munivenkatappa. Venkataronappa died while he was a bachelor. Lakshmana and Munivenkatappa being the sons of Venkatappa succeeded to his interest. Lakshmana had no male issue. He had a daughter by name Venkatamma who married Kemapanna. Defendant No.1 is the son of Venkatappa. During the life time of Lakshmana and Munivenkatappa, the suit property was divided and shared equally. The northern portion of the suit property was allotted to the share of defendant No.1 and southern side to the share of Lakshmana i.e., the father-in- law of Kempanna. Father of Venkatamma executed a registered sale deed in their favour with respect to the southern half portion of the suit property. In the said sale deed, there is a mention that the remaining half portion in Sy.No.36 was sold by Lakshmana in favour of Kempanna and Venkatamma. In the said deed dated 07.11.1974 executed by Kempanna and Venkatamma in favour of the plaintiffs' father, the boundaries disclose that the defendants are the adjoining owners. The khata stands jointly in the name of Lakshamana and defendant No.1. Therefore, it is stated that the plaintiffs are having only half portion in the property and 7 remaining half portion belongs to defendant No.1. It is also stated that the plaintiffs' father was a deed writer and with an intention to make wrongful gain, instead of getting the registered sale deed in respect of half portion of the suit property, showed the entire property as purchased from Kempanna and Venkatamma. The boundaries mentioned in the sale deed dated 07.11.1974 prevail over the extent and the plaintiffs are entitled for only 26 guntas.
8. It is further contended that defendant No.1 is the absolute owner in respect of the remaining 26 guntas of land on the southern side. Defendant No.1 had raised crop loan in VSSN, Chikkatirupathi and defendant No.3 being the son-in- law of defendant No.1 cleared the loan. It is also contended that defendant No.1 during his life time, executed the Will dated 12.10.1996 much earlier to filing of the suit, bequeathing half portion of the suit property in favour of Narayanamma, Manjula and also defendant No.3. They are the beneficiaries under the Will and the plaintiffs are not having any right over the said portion of the property. Therefore, they pray for dismissal of the suit. 8
9. On the basis of these pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues and additional issue:
"1. Whether plaintiffs prove that suit schedule property is the ancestral property which has been purchased by their father on 7-11-1974?
2. Whether plaintiffs prove that they are inherited and continuously in possession of suit schedule property after the death of their father Venkatasubbegowda?
3. Whether defendants prove that suit schedule property belongs to one Venkatappa, first defendant and one Laxmana being the sons of venkatappa partitioned the property?
4. Whether defendants prove that Laxmana had sold his share to Kempanna and Venkatamma, in turn they have sold to plaintiffs father, hence, plaintiffs are having right only to Laxmana's half share?
5. Whether defendants prove that first defendant's LRs are in lawful possession towards northern half property?
6. Whether plaintiffs are entitled for the relief as prayed?9
7. What order or decree?"
Additional issue:
"Whether defendants prove that plaintiffs have given the wrong boundaries including the first defendant's share?"
10. The plaintiffs got examined PWs.1 to 4 and got marked Exs.P1 to P42 in support of their contention. Defendants got examined DWs.1 to 3 and got marked Exs.D1 to 22. The Commissioner appointed in the case is examined as CW1 and his report is marked as Ex.C1. The Trial Court after taking into consideration all these materials on record answered issue Nos.1, 2 and 6 in Negative and issue Nos.3 to 5 and the additional issue in Affirmative and accordingly, suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed with costs.
11. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiffs have preferred RA No.105 of 2003. The First Appellate Court after re-appreciation of the materials on record concurred with the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal with costs. Therefore, plaintiff No.3 is before this Court.
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12. Heard Sri K Srihari, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Y R Sadashiva Reddy, learned senior counsel for Miss Sunanda Sarkar, learned counsel for respondent No.7(a to c) and Sri T V Lokanatha, learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 to 6. Perused the materials including the Trial Court records.
13. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that admittedly the suit schedule property was owned by Venkatappa. After the death of Venkatappa, the property was inherited by his son Lakshmana, who sold it in favour of Kempanna and Venkatamma under the registered sale deed and in turn the said Kempanna and Venkatamma sold the property in favour of the father of the plaintiffs under the sale deed dated 07.11.1974. The possession of the suit property was handed over to the father of the plaintiffs and after his death, the plaintiffs have succeeded to the suit property. Therefore, the plaintiffs are the absolute owners in possession of the suit property. The defendants are strangers to the property and they have not proved their right, title or interest over the suit property. Under such circumstances, the Trial 11 Court and the First Appellate Court committed an error in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs.
14. Learned counsel further submitted that Ex.P1 is the sale deed dated 07.11.1974 executed in favour of the father of the plaintiffs, Ex.P29 is the sale deed 14.09.1959 executed by Lakshmana, the son of Venkatappa. The khata in respect of the suit property stands in the name of the plaintiffs. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court made much of the fact that there is difference between the northern boundary mentioned in the sale deed Ex.P1 and in the plaint. Even if the northern boundary is not correctly mentioned, the extent of the land mentioned in the sale deed prevails. He placed reliance on the decision in Devikarani Vs Venkatesha Sastry1, in support of his contention. Learned counsel submitted that in Ex.P29, the northern boundary is mentioned as Thoti Inamthi land and in the plaint, it is mentioned as Kote Muniyamma land. It must have been the land of Thoti Muniyamma and by mistake it must have been mentioned as Kote Muniyamma. But anyhow the extent of 1 ILR 1994 KAR 1444 12 land is properly mentioned and the Courts below should have decreed the suit of the plaintiffs.
15. Learned counsel further submitted that the defence taken by the defendants that there was partition between Lakshmana and Munivenkatappa is not proved. The genealogical tree produced as per Ex.D2 is also not proved in accordance with law. Ex.P29 is the sale deed of the year 1959 which was executed during the life time of defendant No.1. He never challenged the said sale deed. Therefore, it is binding on the defendants. Even the sale deed of the year 1974 i.e., Ex.P1 is also not challenged by the defendants. The record of rights as per Exs.P2 to 8, 13 and 14 refers to the sale deed and names of the purchaser mutated in it. All these documents which are clinching the issue are ignored by both the Courts. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in The Chairman, State Bank of India and Others Vs M J James2, to contend that the defendants have acquiesced and there is delay and latches in claiming the right over the schedule property which cannot be entertained. He also placed reliance on the decision in Durgappa Vs A K 2 (2022) 2 SCC 301 13 Mallappa3, to contend that Ex.D2 - the genealogical tree cannot be accepted as the author of the same is not examined.
16. Learned counsel further submitted that Ex.D21 is the Will said to have been executed by Munivenkatappa - defendant No.1, but the recitals found in the said Will is quite contrary to the contention taken by the defendants. The Will states that Munivenkatappa had no male issues, but even according to the defendants, Srinivasa is the son of Munivenkatappa. Moreover, Ex.D21 is not proved in accordance with law. No attesting witnesses were examined. Under such circumstances, the said document cannot be looked into. When apparently the findings recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are perverse as it was rendered ignoring the clinching material on record, the same are to be set aside. Accordingly, he prays for allowing the appeal and decree the suit of the plaintiffs as prayed for.
17. Per contra, learned senior counsel for respondent No.7 (a to c), opposing the appeal submitted that as per Ex.P1 dated 07.11.1974 the northern boundary is the land 3 RFA No.1421/2011 DD 03.09.2014 14 belonging to Munivenkatappa. Therefore, admittedly the defendants are having the land on the southern side of the land said to have purchased under the sale deed. Lakshmana has never sold the entire property in favour of Kempanna and Venkatamma as contended by the plaintiffs. After the death of Venkatappa, his two sons Lakshmana and Munivenkatappa i.e., defendant No.1 have succeeded to the half share in the suit property and the said half share was acquired by the defendants. The RTC - Exs.D15 and D19 disclose that it stands in the name of Lakshmana and the property was mortgaged in favour of VSNN, Chikkatirupathi. Ex.D22 is the letter issued by the VSNN Society confirming that defendant No.1 had mortgaged his half share in the suit property. Ex.D21 is the Will executed by defendant No.1 at an undisputed point of time i.e., on 12.10.1996, bequeathing his half share in favour of his grand daughters. In the southern boundary, it is mentioned as the land belonging to Venkatasubbegowda which refers to the plaintiffs' father.
18. Learned senior counsel however submits that even though there is a mention that defendant No.1 had no male issues, it must be for the reason that by the time the 15 Will was executed by defendant No.1, his son Srinivasa must have already been died. The Will was never questioned by the plaintiffs and both the Courts have relied on the said document. Moreover, the genealogical tree produced as per Ex.D2 was never disputed by the plaintiffs.
19. Learned counsel further submitted that a Court Commissioner was appointed by the Trial Court and he submitted his report which is marked as per Ex.C1. The Commissioner was also examined as per CW1. The evidence of this witness coupled with the report supports the contention of the defendants. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are right in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs. However, learned senior counsel submits that the defendants are not having any objection for granting the decree in respect of half portion of the suit property, over which the defendants have not claimed any right. It is also contended that the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court recorded a concurrent findings on facts. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed as devoid of merits. 16
20. The appeal was admitted on 20.10.2010 to consider the following substantial question of law:
"Whether the judgments of the Courts below could be sustained in the absence of specific finding of facts which they were required to record regarding the partition of the properties propounded by the defendants and also failing to consider in such circumstances, to what extent the property is transferable?"
21. It is the specific contention of the plaintiffs before the Trial Court that their father Venkatasubbegowda purchased the entire extent of 1 acre 12 guntas of land in Sy.No.36 from Kempanna and his wife Venkatamma under Ex.P1. As per Ex.P1, the northern boundary is mentioned as the land belonging to Munivenkatappa. Defendant No.1 is Munivenkatappa and he claims that he is the owner in possession of half extent of the land in Sy.No.36. Even though, the plaintiffs made an attempt to deny the claim of defendants to any extent of the schedule property, the fact remains that defendant No.1 is Munivenkatappa. Ex.P29 is the registered sale deed executed by Lakshmana in favour of Kempanna and Venkatamma in respect of the schedule 17 property and the sale deed is dated 14.09.1959. The northern boundary to the schedule property is mentioned as Thoti Inamthi. As per Ex.P1, the northern boundary is the land belonging to Munivenkatappa. But as per the schedule appended to the plaint, the northern boundary is the land belonging to Kote Muniyamma. In this regard, the defence taken by the defendants is to be considered.
22. It is specifically contended that Lakshmana and defendant No.1 are brothers and they are the son of late Munivenkatappa. When Lakshmana sold the property in favour of Kempanna and Venkatamma under Ex.P29, which was in turn sold in favour of Venkatasubbegowda i.e., the father of the plaintiffs, it is the contention of the defendants that the half portion of the schedule property was retained by defendant No.1 and therefore, in Ex.P1 the northern boundary is mentioned as land of Munivenkatappa. The said contention taken by the defendants appears to be more probable as the plaintiffs have no other better explanation. The submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that in all probabilities, the northern boundary mentioned in Ex.P29 is Thoti Inamthi is mentioned in the plaint as Kote Muniyamma 18 by mistake cannot be accepted at this stage as it was never the contention of the plaintiffs before.
23. It is admitted by the plaintiffs that their vendor is very much alive and is staying at Jalahalli. The plaintiffs could have examined the vendors under Ex.P1 and such evidence could have thrown much light over the controversy in question. The vendor/s under Ex.P1 could have been the best evidence to explain as to whether the entire extent of 1 acre 12 guntas in Sy.No.36 was sold in favour of father of the plaintiffs and if that is so, why there is mention about the northern boundary as the land belonging to Munivenkatappa. They could have also explained the relationship, if any, between their vendor Lakshmana and Munivenkatappa. Non examination of the vendors under Ex.P1 is fatal to the case of the plaintiffs.
24. The defendants have relied on the documents which came into existence at an undisputed point of time to contend that deceased defendant No.1 had raised loan on the security of the land bearing Sy.No.36. Even as per Ex.D22, deceased defendant No.1 had availed loan from Chikkatirupati 19 Vyavasaya Sahakara Sangha, Lakkur Hobli, wherein, there is clear reference to the half share of defendant No.1 in Sy.No.36 which totally measures 1 acre 12 guntas.
25. Admittedly, the plaintiffs filed the suit OS No.236 of 1999 before the Trial Court against deceased defendant No.1 and others seeking perpetual injunction in respect of very same schedule property measuring 1 acre 12 guntas in Sy.No.36. It is alleged that the defendants in the said suit tried to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff and therefore, sought for perpetual injunction. However, admittedly, the said suit was not prosecuted by the plaintiffs and it came to be dismissed as not pressed. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed the present suit for declaration and injunction.
26. The defendants have produced Ex.D15 - the record of rights in respect of the schedule property for the years 1975-76, 1976-77, Ex.D16 for the years 1985-86, 1886-87 and Ex.D17 for the years 1981-82, 1982-83 and in all these documents, there is reference to availing of loan from VSNN, Chikkatirupati which could be related to the 20 documents that are produced by the defendants, such as Ex.D20 to show that Venkatasubbegowda and Munivenkatappa have availed loan on the charge over the property.
27. Admittedly, the Taluka Surveyor, Malur is appointed as Court Commissioner to survey the land and to submit his report. He is examined as CW1. This witness specifically stated that there is a fence on the western side of Sy.No.36 and only in the northern half portion there are pipe lines. The southern half portion of the land is on a lower level. He has submitted his report as per survey and showing the fence, standing trees etc., This report of the Commissioner along with his evidence supports the contention of the defendants that the plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of only 26 guntas of land and not the entire extent of 1 acre 12 guntas.
28. It is also pertinent to note that Ex.D21 is the registered Will dated 12.10.1996 executed by defendant No.1 much prior to filing of the suit by the plaintiffs in the year 1996. Therefore, it could be stated that this document came 21 into existence much prior to the cause of action stated by the plaintiffs. Under this document, defendant No.1 has bequeathed his half portion in Sy.No.36 which measures 26 guntas. This document assumes importance in the light of defence taken by the defendants.
29. On consideration of the oral and documentary evidence relied on by the plaintiffs and the defendants, it is clear that the plaintiffs even though relied on Ex.P1 the registered sale deed, failed to explain about the discrepancy in the boundaries mentioned in the plaint, when compared to boundaries mentioned in Ex.P1 and Ex.P29. There is no reasonable explanation as to how in Ex.P1, the northern boundary is mentioned as the land belonging to defendant No.1. When the plaintiffs contended that the defendants are strangers to the schedule property and when the plaintiffs seek for declaration of their title over the schedule property, it is incumbent on them to prove their ownership over the land. When serious doubt arises about the subject matter of the sale under Ex.P1, the plaintiffs should have made an attempt to examine the vendors and to expel the reasonable doubt 22 that has arisen in the mind of the Court. No such attempt was made by the plaintiffs for the reason best known to them.
30. When the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court on appreciation and re-appreciation of the materials, recorded a concurrent finding of facts, the scope under Section 100 of CPC to interfere with such findings would be very limited. The jurisdiction of the High Court under this section to entertain the second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction to interfere with pure questions of fact, while exercising its jurisdiction. Since there is concurrent finding of facts by both the Courts below, the scope of this appeal is very limited. It is the settled proposition of law that only when the findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are against the materials that are available on record or when it is against the settled proposition of law or the findings appear to be perverse, this Court can definitely interfere with such concurrent findings of the facts.
31. It is relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Thiagarajan and Others v. Sri 23 Venugopalaswamy B. Koil and Others4, where the scope and ambit of Section 100 was discussed at length and it is held that existence of substantial question of law is sine-qua- non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended provisions of Section 100 of CPC. It is re-iterated that where findings of fact by the First Appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of evidence, merely on the ground that another view was possible.
32. In Narayan Rajendran and Another v.
Lekshmy Sarojini and Others5, the Hon'ble Apex Court discussed at length about the scope and ambit of Section 100 CPC both prior to the amendment to CPC in 1976 and after it and held that the second appeal can lie only on one or the other grounds specified in the section. It is also held that even before the amendment, interference under Section 100 CPC was limited and after the amendment the power has been further curtailed. The amendment Act 1976 has introduced drastic changes in the scope and ambit of this section which is now confined to cases where a question of 4 (2004) 5 SCC 762 5 (2009) 5 SCC 264 24 law is involved and such question must be a substantial one. The Court has referred to several such judgments after amendment to Section 100 of CPC and re-iterated that the jurisdiction of the High Court under this section to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction to interfere with pure question of fact while exercising its jurisdiction.
33. The Hon'ble Apex Court referred to its earlier decision in Madhavan Nair Vs Bhaskar Pillai6, to hold that the High Courts are not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. Even if the First Appellate Court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground that the High Court to upset the same.
34. Referring to the Fifty Fourth report of the Law Commission of India submitted in 1973, the legislative background which led to amendment of Section 100 CPC was highlighted that 'the question could perhaps be asked, why the litigant who wishes to have justice of the highest court of the State should be denied the opportunity to do so, atleast 6 (2005) 10 SCC 553 25 where there is a flaw in the conclusion of facts reached by the Trial Court or by the Court of first appeal. The answer is obvious that, even litigants have to be protected against too persistent a pursuit of their goal of perfectly satisfactory justice. An unqualified right of first appeal may be necessary for the satisfaction of the defeated litigant; but a wide right of second appeal is more in the nature of a luxury'. Thus, the Hon'ble Apex Court once again crystallized the legislative intention by referring to its several other decisions to caution the High Courts to refrain from interfering with the concurrent findings of fact without there being a substantial question of law. Thus, the position of law is very well settled with regard to interference under Section 100 of CPC.
35. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, which was confirmed by the First Appellate Court do not call for any interference and the appellant is not entitled for any relief. The substantial question of law formulated is answered against the appellant and in favour of the respondents. 26
36. In the result, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The appeal is dismissed with costs.
(ii) The judgment and decree dated 31.03.2003 passed in OS No.530 of 1997 on the file of the learned Additional Civil Judge (Jr.Dn), Malur, which was confirmed vide judgment dated 21.01.2010 passed in RA No.105 of 2003 on the file of the learned II Additional Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) Kolar, itinerating at Malur, are hereby confirmed.
Registry to send back the Trial Court records along with copy of this judgment.
Sd/-
JUDGE *bgn/-