Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
(Shyonath & Anr. vs . Rajasthan Board Of Revenue Ajmer & ... on 27 May, 2015
Author: Alok Sharma
Bench: Alok Sharma
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR BENCH JAIPUR O R D E R IN S.B. CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.1137/2010 (Shyonath & Anr. Vs. Rajasthan Board of Revenue Ajmer & Ors.) Date of Order : May 27th, 2015 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK SHARMA Mr. R.K. Goyal ] Mr. Peush Nag ] Mr. Raghvendra Singh ], for the petitioners-defendants. Mr. Reashm Bhargava, for the respondents-plaintiffs. BY THE COURT
The petitioners-defendants (hereinafter the defendants) challenge the judgment and decree dated 10.09.2009 passed by the Board of Revenue, Ajmer (hereinafter the Board). Thereby the Board has set aside the judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997, passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Ajmer (hereinafter RAA) upholding the judgment and decree date 08.02.1979, passed by the Assistant Collector (U/N), Ajmer dismissing the respondents-plaintiffs' (hereinafter the plaintiffs) suit for permanent injunction under Section 188 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter the Act of 1955).
The facts relevant to the case are that the plaintiffs filed a suit bearing No.38/1978 in the Court of the Assistant Collector, Ajmer on 01.09.1975 stating that they by way of an oral sale purchased land ad measuring 4 bishwa 10 biswa 10 biswansi in khasra No.802 from one Nauratmal on 26.08.1970 and came into possession. It was submitted that consequently in the khasra girdawari of samvat 2030 & 2031 (1974 & 1975) the plaintiffs' possession was reflected. And that possession continued thereafter and yet the defendants were bent upon dispossessing the plaintiffs from the land in issue. A decree of permanent injunction was therefore sought against the defendants. On service of notice, a written statement of denial was filed by the defendants stating that they were the recorded khatedar of the suit land and had been in its possession in all times. The plaintiffs' possession was denied. It was submitted that the very foundation of the plaintiffs' case of having purchased the suit land from Nauratmal under an oral sale or otherwise, was baseless as he at no point of time had any khatedari therein, nor was even otherwise authorized to make the sale as alleged. The trial court i.e. Assistant Collector, Ajmer found the plaintiffs and the defendants at odds on six issues on the basis of their respective pleadings. Issue No.1 was as to whether the plaintiffs were in cultivatory possession of the suit land. Issue No.2 was as to whether the suit land was entered in the name of the plaintiffs in the revenue records. Issue No.3 was as to whether on 24.08.1975 the defendants had, as alleged by the plaintiffs, sought to damage standing crops tended by the plaintiffs. Issue No.4 was as to whether the suit land was ancestral property of the defendants and in their cultivatory possession. Issue No.5 was as to whether Nauratmal had any right, title or authority of the defendants to sell the suit land to the plaintiffs as alleged. Issue No.6 related to relief.
On consideration of the evidence laid by the respective parties, the Assistant Collector found that in khasra girdawari of samvat 2030 & 2031, even though first recorded in the name of Shyonath and Anr., the defendants, had been changed in column 24 and the name of the plaintiffs, Madhu and others entered. The plaintiffs were thus found by the trial court in possession of the suit land as the contra oral evidence of the defendants was found insufficient to displace the entry in favour of the plaintiffs in the khasra girdawari. On issue No.2, the trial court however held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that they were the khatedar-tenant of the suit land. On issue No.3 it was found that there was no evidence on record to establish the plaintiffs' case that on 24.08.1997, the defendants had sought to damage the standing crops of the plaintiffs. On issue No.4, reiterating that the defendants had failed to prove that they were in cultivatory possession of the suit land, the Assistant Collector noted that however the revenue receipt produced by the defendants showed that they i.e. Shyonath had been paying the rent for the suit land covered under khata No.263 and had also earlier recorded as its khatedar in the jamabandi of samvat 2023 to 2026 and would be deemed to have so continued as there was no subsequent alteration in the jamabandi by an order of a competent court or sale/assignment in accordance with law. The suit land was found to be ancestral property. On issue No.5, the trial court held that on the basis of statement of Nauratmal himself as DW-2, it was clearly established that the plaintiffs' case of having purchased the land from Nauratmal under an oral sale for a consideration of Rs.99/- was disproved for reasons of Nauratmal's denial and also the fact that Nauratmal had no right, title or interest over the suit land or authority to convey the land to the plaintiffs by an oral sale or otherwise. In the circumstances, the suit was dismissed with costs on 08.02.1979.
The plaintiffs followed up with an appeal before the RAA i.e. Appeal No.47/83. They then in appeal moved for an amendment of the pleadings under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC inter alia stating that (contrary to their specific case in the plaint) they had indeed purchased the land from Nauratmal but on Shyonath's authority. The amendment was allowed. Aside of the aforesaid, the RAA also allowed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and took on record the additional evidences at the instance of the both the parties in view of it being necessitated by the amendment to the pleadings. However, on consideration of the matter the RAA vide its judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997 affirmed the judgment and decree of the Assistant Collector, Ajmer and dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal. The plaintiffs thereupon approached the Board, which vide its judgment dated 10.09.2009 decreed the plaintiffs' suit and set aside the judgment and decree of the Assistant Collector as affirmed by the RAA primarily on two counts. (i) that the plaintiffs' possession over the suit land having been established on the basis of khasra girdawari of samvat 2030 & 2031 and there being no contra record thereafter with regard to their dispossession over the suit land, they were entitled to protection by way of permanent injunction and that (ii) as on the date of the matter before the Board, the plaintiffs' name had been entered into the revenue records as the khatedar of the suit land. Noting that the defendants had not taken any legal proceedings for seeking a declaration of the illegality of the conferment of khatedari rights of the plaintiffs, the Board held that the plaintiffs thus being both in possession of the suit land and recorded khatedar thereof were entitled to permanent injunction as prayed for in the suit under Section 188 of the Act of 1955.
Hence this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the defendants.
Mr. R.K. Goyal appearing with Mr. Peush Nag and Mr. Raghvendra Singh, for the defendants has emphatically submitted that the Board has committed a gross legal error in holding that by the mere factum of the plaintiffs having been recorded as khatedar in the revenue record subsequent to their laying the suit for permanent injunction, the suit at their instance was maintainable. He submitted that when the suit was filed, it was not even the case set up by the plaintiffs that they were the khatedars of the suit land. They had claimed right and interest in respect of the land only on the basis of a purported oral sell/purchase in the year 1970 and possession. It has been submitted that the plaintiffs had only produced the khasra girdawari for samvat 2030 & 2031 wherefrom the name of the defendants first recorded was scratched out and that of the plaintiffs interpolated. It has been submitted that in the circumstances entry in the name of the plaintiffs in the khasra girdawari of samvat 2030 & 2031 was of no event by itself as a khasra girdawari is not a record of rights as has been held by the Full Bench of the Board in the case of Panne Singh Vs. Guman Singh [1964 RLW (Revenue Supplement) 38]. Counsel pointed out that no application for correction of a khasra girdawari lies in law and nothing at all can be made out therefrom more so as it was an isolated entry for one year rendered suspicious by the admitted fact of it being recorded after crossing out Shyonath's (defendant's) name therein. It has been submitted that thereafter the settlement authority had no jurisdiction or authority to make changes in the record of rights based on such a khasra girdawari and any action on its part seeking to confer khatedari rights on the plaintiffs is ab initio void. In any event this was subsequently after the filing of the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. Reference has been made to the judgment of the Board in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Jogaram [1994 RRD 266] wherein with reference to Section 135 of the Act of 1955, it has been held that the Assistant Settlement Officer does not have any authority to make changes in the record of rights and any action on his part to confer khatedari rights is void ab initio. It has been further submitted that this aspect of the matter was considered in great detail by the RAA in his judgment and decree dated 19.09.1997 but was arbitrarily circumvented and overlooked by the Board in erroneously holding contrary to the settled law that the plaintiffs were khatedars of the suit land merely because of entries unauthorizedly made subsequently in their name in the record of rights by the settlement authority.
Mr. R.K. Goyal has emphatically submitted that any change in the Jamabandi / record of rights can only be made by way of mutation and the provisions relevant thereto are contained in the Land Revenue (Land Record) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter the Rules of 1957). It has been submitted that it was not the plaintiffs' case, nor in fact there was any mutation in the name of the plaintiffs on the basis of the alleged oral sale as claimed by the plaintiffs. It has been submitted that under Rule 132 of the Rules of 1957, in case of transfer of khatedari rights by gift, sale (including oral sale), bequeath or mortgage, the Patwari concerned is under a statutory duty to ascertain whether the transaction was made, the deed registered or not and in case it is not so found, mutation cannot be opened in the name of the alleged vendee. It has been submitted that in the case at hand as the plaintiffs' case was of purported ownership of the land on the basis of their alleged oral purchase, without the endorsement of the jurisdictional Patwari, no mutation could have been opened in their name, nor in fact was with reference to Rule 132 of the Rules of 1957. The Sequitur is, counsel submitted, that without any mutation having been opened in favour of the plaintiffs, existing entries in the name of the defendants could not have been replaced and substituted for that of the plaintiffs. Referring to Rule 133 of the Rules of 1957, it has been submitted that it is further provided thereunder that the mutation following transfer by sale (this will include oral sale) is not to be attested unless the possession is proved to have been passed thereunder and the parties have agreed either before the Attesting Officer that the possession has passed or the registered document evidences/records that possession has passed. Counsel submitted that none of these conditions was proved by the plaintiffs, nor in fact set up in the suit as laid. No mutation in the defendants' name was admittedly attested and no khatedari rights could subsequently have been conferred on them as held by the Board. It has been submitted that consequently the jamabandi in samvat 2023 to 2026 being in the name of the defendants and not altered in accordance with law, they alone were the khatedars of the suit land in issue in the eye of law.
Mr. R.K. Goyal, counsel for the defendants then submitted that in the case of Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad & Ors. [(1999) 8 SCC 266], the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in this manner and in no other manner. And if so done is of no effect. It has been submitted that the procedure for alteration of record of rights having been provided under the Rules of 1957, such procedure not having followed, the plaintiffs could not under any circumstances whatsoever claim any khatedari right in terms of the purported entries made unauthorizedly in their name in the record of rights more so subsequent to the filing of their suit for permanent injunction. Counsel submitted that the entries in the record of rights in the name of the plaintiffs thus being of no legal worth, the Board committed a gross legal error in proceedings to base its impugned judgment thereon.
It was further submitted that thus the suit for permanent injunction laid by the plaintiffs under Section 188 of the Act of 1955 was itself not maintainable as such a suit can only be brought by a tenant and the plaintiffs admittedly were not tenants as defined under Section 5(43) of the Act of 1955 on the date of filing of the suit. Referring to the judgment of the Board in Ladu Lal Vs. Mangu [1985 RRD 487] counsel has submitted that where a plaintiff fails to establish his status as a tenant under Section 5(43) of the Act of 1955 without seeking declaration as to his status as a tenant, a suit for injunction simplicitor will not be maintainable. It has been submitted that as the plaintiffs were seeking a permanent injunction on the basis of a purported oral sale of land ad measuring 4 bigha 10 biswa 10 biswansi (total 15 thousand sq. mtr.) for a sum of Rs.99/- only, it was for them to seek a declaration of their tenancy rights in the suit before the trial court. They did not. Hence the suit itself was not maintainable and liable to be dismissed at the outset for lack of plaintiffs' locus. It has been submitted that as found both by the Assistant Collector as also RAA the plaintiffs on the date of the filing of the suit were not recorded as tenant in the revenue record. It has been submitted that the Board committed a gross error in failing to appreciate the correct legal position and relying upon the void and wholly legally unsustainable subsequent conferment of khatedari rights on the plaintiffs in the course of the settlement proceedings, after the suit was laid.
Counsel for the defendants also submitted that the conclusions of the Board with regard to the validity of the oral sale in respect of the suit land for a sum of Rs.99/- are wholly perverse and perfunctory as the Board has proceeded to uphold such a sale contrary to the well considered conclusions of the two courts below even without as much as a reference to the evidence/lack of it in that regard. Counsel submitted that albeit an oral sale under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act for a consideration of less than Rs.100/- can be made with reference to Section 9 of the Transfer of Property Act, yet the fact remains that even for proof of oral sale, delivery of possession by the vender and the receipt of consideration by him have to be established from evidence on record. It was submitted that in the instant case, the case of the plaintiffs before the courts below in the first was that the land was sold to them by Nauratmal and thereafter, subsequent to amendment before the RAA, that the land was sold by the defendants through Nauratmal. That case was not substantiated from the plaintiffs' evidence and in fact negated on Nauratmal himself appearing as a witness for the defendants (as DW-2) and denying the alleged sale of the defendants' land to the plaintiffs or ever having made delivery thereof to them or received consideration. Mr. R.K. Goyal also submitted that there was even otherwise no evidence on record that the alleged agreed consideration of Rs.99 ever passed from the plaintiffs to the defendants. Counsel submitted that the conclusions of the Board with regard to the oral sale are therefore perverse being based on no evidence and are liable to be quashed and set aside.
Mr. R.K. Goyal, counsel for the defendants then submitted that there is also no substance in the case of the plaintiffs that their suit under Section 188 of the Act of 1955 was a suit simplicitor for permanent injunction wherein the question of title was not required to be gone in. He submitted that a bare look at the issues framed by the trial court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties makes it evident that the issues framed related to the question of the plaintiffs' right to injunction as also their khatedari rights over the suit land. It has been submitted that in the circumstances, the question of title in the suit for permanent injunction was a material issue struck on the pleadings of the parties and was necessary to be decided. And unless the court found that the plaintiffs had khatedari of the suit land, the plaintiffs could not on the mere basis of their alleged possession have been entitled to a permanent injunction against the defendantsthe recorded khatedars. Reference has been made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Durga Vs. Milkhi Ram [U.J. (S.C.) 10 (1969)] wherein it has been held that without there being an order of a competent revenue authority showing how change from a preexisting record of rights was made, there could be no presumption in law in favour of latter entries made in the record of rights for the reason that a presumption on the basis of entries in the record of rights was rebuttable and would ipso facto so stand rebutted on the fact of subsequent entries not being lawfully recorded. Reference has also been made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Premji Ratansey Shah & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1994) 5 SCC 547] wherein in the context of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 it has been held that injunction being a discretionary and equitable remedy, it cannot be issued in favour of a trespasser or a person in unlawful possession as against the true owner of the suit land. It has been finally submitted that even otherwise the Board exceeded its jurisdiction in cursorily setting aside the judgment of the RAA as also the Assistant Collector as if acting not as the second appellate court on a question of law but as a court of first instance, without appreciating the reasons for the conclusions of the trial court as affirmed by the first appellate court on each of the six issues for consideration.
Per contra, Mr. Reashm Bhargava, appearing for the plaintiffs has submitted that this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 or for that matter Article 226 of the Constitution of India should restrain itself from interfering with the impugned judgment dated 10.09.2009, passed by the Board inasmuch as it is neither perverse nor vitiated by any misdirection in law. It has been submitted that the conclusion that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit land is a conclusion arrived at right through from the stage of the trial court as per its judgment dated 08.02.1979, passed by the Assistant Collector, upheld by the RAA as also by the Board. It has been submitted that in a suit for injunction the courts are merely concerned with the fact of possession, not of title nor is the nature of possession relevant. Reference has been made to the judgment of Fakirbhai Bhagwandas & Anr. Vs. Maganlal Haribhai & Anr. [AIR (38) 1951 Bombay 380], Maravakulath Alavi Vs. Palarakkat Kallingal Mohammedkutty Haji & Ors. [AIR 1974 Kerala 100], Gone Rajamma & Ors. Vs. Chennamaneni Mohan Rao [2010 (3) ALT 225] and Urumula Yellamma Vs. Pullapati Raja Rao & Ors. [2013 (2) Andra Law Times 228]. It has been further submitted that in the circumstances, the plaintiffs were entitled to the injunction as granted by the Board in its impugned judgment dated 10.09.2009 as the Assistant Collector as also RAA had failed to address the issue of injunction in its correct perspective and misdirected themselves in addressing irrelevant collateral issues. It has been submitted that the entries in favour of the plaintiffs in the record of rights as now obtain have not been challenged by the defendants in any lawful proceedings and as held by the Assistant Collector as also the RAA the defendants had failed to prove their possession over the suit land. Counsel emphatically submitted that if at all the defendants had/have any right qua the suit land, they were/are free to resort to a suit for declaration of their khatedari rights, correction of entries and possession. They cannot be allowed to contest the plaintiffs' suit for permanent injunction and seek to re-enter the land on its dismissal. It has been submitted that assuming without admitting that the suit under Section 1988 of the Act of 1955 was not maintainable, yet the Court is not powerless to grant appropriate relief with reference to Section 92A of the act of 1955 as the facts on record warrant the plaintiffs' protection at the hands of the Court because the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land for the last over 40 years.
Heard the counsel for the defendants and the plaintiffs.
Section 188 of the Act of 1955 provides as under :
188. Injunction against wrongful ejectment (1) Any tenant whose right to or enjoyment of the whole or a part of his holding is invaded or threatened to be invaded by his landholder or any other person may bring a suit for the grant of a perpetual injunction.
(2) The court may after making the necessary enquiry grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, namely
(a) if there exist no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused or likely to be caused by the invasion;
(b) if the invasion is such that pecuniary compensation does not afford adequate relief;
(c) where it is probable that pecuniary compensation cannot be got for the invasion.
(d) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings.
It is thus evident that to lay a suit for permanent injunction, the plaintiff has either to be tenant or a sub-tenant. Section 5(43) of the Act of 1955 defines tenant and sub-tenant as under :
Section 5(43) : Tenant shall mean the person by whom rent is, or but for a contract, express or implied, would be payable and, except when the contrary intention appears, shall include
(a) in the Abu area, permanent tenant or a protected tenant
(b) In the Ajmer area, an ex-proprietary tenant or an occupancy tenant or a hereditary tenant or a non-occupancy tenant or a Bhooswami or a Kashtkar,
(c) In this Sunel area, an ex-proprietary tenant or a pakka tenant or an ordinary tenant.
(d) a co-tenant,
(e) a grove-holder,
(f) a village servant, (ff) a tenant holding from a land owner
(g) a tenant of Khudkasht,
(h) a mortgagee of tenancy rights, and
(i) a sub-tenant, but shall not include a grantee at a favourable rate of rent or an ijaredar or thekadar or a trespasser.
It is admitted that the defendants were recorded as khatedar tenants in samvat 1923 to 1926. There is no order of any competent court or a duly executed and registered assignment whereby the tenancy in respect of the suit land was transferred from the defendants to the plaintiffs. There is no evidence on record of a valid oral sale with delivery of possession to the plaintiffs and receipt of consideration by the defendants. The plaintiffs' case at best is, as laid in their suit, that they had purchased the suit land from one Nauratmal by way of an oral sale for a sum of Rs.99/- in 1970 in terms of Section 9 of the Transfer of Property Act. The fact to be noted is that the land to an extent of 4 bighas 10 biswas 10 biswansi (total 15 thousand sq. mtr.) first claimed by the plaintiffs to have been sold for a sum of Rs.99/- by Nauratmal and then after the amendment before the RAA by Nauratmal authorized by the defendant Shyonath (which both Nauratmal and Shyonath denied), as also the fact that the plaintiffs' suit was not for declaration of khatedari rights based on their purported oral purchase from the defendants, but one for injunction simplicitor. A Division Bench of the Board in the case of Ladu Lal (Supra) has held that in view of Section 5(43) of the Act of 1955, before one can be said to be a khatedar (tenant), he must be one within Section 5(43). Thus, where there was no material on record as to the tenancy of the plaintiff while laying the suit for permanent injunction, a suit for declaration also ought to have been sought. It was held that the plaintiff has to prove his status as tenant on the date of the suit and then only he can be heard by a revenue court to say in a suit for permanent injunction that the defendants were seeking to invade or threaten or invade his rights or enjoyment of the suit land. Reliance placed by Mr. Bhargava on subsequent entries in the record of rights in the name of the plaintiffs qua the suit land is of no avail as the said entries were void, having been unauthorizedly made in the course of settlement operation contrary to the provisions of the Rules of 1957. The judgment in the case Shri Gir Raj. Vs. Shri Ram Lal [1974 RRD 209 (DB)] relied upon by the counsel for the plaintiffs is of no avail. That was a case where the sub-tenancy of the plaintiff was admitted by the defendant and it was held that by mere efflux of time a sub-tenant did not transform into a trespasser but remained a tenant holding over entitled to lay a suit under Section 188 of the Act of 1955 seeking injunction against wrongful ejectment.
I am also not persuaded by Mr. Bhargava to treat the plaintiffs' suit as one under Section 92A of the Act of 1955. For one such a suit is one of a different genre requiring its own specific pleadings. Pleadings in a suit under Section 188 of the Act of 1955 cannot stand for relief under Section 92A of the Act of 1955. And in any event the defendant should have the right to contest such a suit when laid under Section 92A and pleadings in respect thereof. Mr. Bhargava has not even attempted to argue that the pleadings in a suit under Section 188 of the Act of 1955 and one under Section 92A of the said Act would be identical. The defendant cannot be required to meet a new case in the course of this writ petition. I am also unable to hold that the specific statutory requirement of a plaintiff being a tenant in a suit for injunction against wrongful ejectment under Section 188 of the Act of 1955 can conveniently be sidestepped by resorting to Section 92A of the Act of 1955 for the same relief. Section 92A aforesaid deals with suit for injunction. The said Section of was inserted by Section 19 of the Act of 1956 effective 22.09.1956 to allow for suits for injunction for the protection of rights conferred by the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. No reference has been made either in the plaint or any stage of the proceedings as to which right under the Act of 1955 inhering in the plaintiffs was / is sought to be protected. No reference to any specific provision vesting a right on the plaintiff under the Act of 1956 has been adverted to. A bare look at the object of introducing Section 92A in the Act of 1955 in 1956 shows that it was to allow grantees at a favourable rate of rent or an Ijaredar of a landholder, not covered within the definition of tenant under Section 5(43) of the Act of 1955, to bring a suit for injunction for the protection of their rights. Further while Section 188 of the Act of 1955 allowed only for grant of perpetual injunction, Section 92A allowed for grant of a mandatory injunction also. It is thus evident that Section 92A of the Act of 1955 cannot be resorted to for a perpetual injunction against wrongful ejectment. The conclusion is also imperative. Also for the basic legal proposition that what cannot be done directly cannot be also done indirectly. To accept Mr. Bhargava's submission in effect would mean that while a non-tenant may not file a suit for injunction against wrongful ejectment under Section 1988 of the Act of 1955, he may do so under Section 92A thereof. The contention, untenable as it is, is liable to be rejected. It is thus rejected.
I am therefore of the considered view that the suit for injunction against wrongful ejectment filed by the plaintiffs without seeking a declaration of their khatedari rights on the basis of their purported purchase of the property under the oral sale was not maintainable. Besides I am also of the considered view that the issue of oral sale was perfunctory addressed by the Board, on the basis of mere say of the plaintiffs and khasra girdawari of samvat 2030 & 2031. A khasra girdawari does not partake character of substantive evidence and can only be used as corroborative evidence and not being a record of rights carries no presumption. The Board overlooked the specific case and statement of Nauratmal (DW-2) that he had neither sold the suit land to the plaintiffs in his individual capacity, nor was authorized to do so. The Board also overlooked the fact of the defendants being the recorded as khatedars in the record of rights (jamabandi) of samvat 2023-26 which rights were never transferred in accordance with law. Aside of the above even in respect of oral sale under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, delivery of possession is a sine-qua-non. There was no proof or evidence on record on the aforesaid aspect before the Board to set aside the judgments and decree of the Assistant Collector and the RAA on this count. Nor was there any evidence of any probative worth that the sale consideration even of Rs.99/- for purchase of 4 bighas, 10 biswa and 10 biswansi of land (15,000 sq. mtr.) was paid to the defendant Shyonath or any of them.
I am therefore of the considered view that the impugned judgment passed by the Board is perverse to the evidence on record and vitiated by misdirection in law. Interference with the judgment of the Assistant Collector rendered on 08.02.1979 as upheld by RAA on 19.09.1997 was made by the Board without any legal justification wholly in excess of its jurisdiction under Section 224 of the Act of 1988.
Consequently, the judgment dated 10.09.2009, passed by the Board is liable to be quashed and set aside for the reasons detailed hereinabove. It is accordingly so.
The writ petition is therefore allowed.
(ALOK SHARMA), J MS/-
All corrections made in the judgment/order have been incorporated in the judgment/order being emailed.- Manoj Solanki, P.A.