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[Cites 8, Cited by 1]

Gujarat High Court

Sanatkumar J Joshi & 2 vs State Of Gujarat & 3 on 18 February, 2014

Author: Abhilasha Kumari

Bench: Abhilasha Kumari

         C/SCA/2644/2014                                    ORDER




         IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

              SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2644 of 2014

================================================================
                SANATKUMAR J JOSHI & 2 .... Petitioner(s)
                              Versus
                STATE OF GUJARAT & 3 .... Respondent(s)
================================================================
Appearance:
MR ASIM J PANDYA, ADVOCATE for the Petitioners
GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the Respondent(s) No. 1
MR PRASHANT G DESAI, SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH MR KAUSHAL D PANDYA,
ADVOCATE for the Respondent No. 2 (On Caveat)
================================================================
        CORAM: HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE ABHILASHA
               KUMARI

                            Date : 18/02/2014
                             ORAL ORDER

1. This   petition   under   Article   226   of   the  Constitution of India, has been preferred by the  petitioners, who are Doctors, serving under the  respondent   No.2   (Surat   Municipal   Corporation).  The grievance voiced by them in the petition is  that all of a sudden, by the impugned Resolution  No.326/2014,   dated   06.02.2014,   the   Standing  Committee   of   respondent   No.2   has   recommended  that   the   age   of   superannuation   of   Doctors,  including Class­I and Class­II Officers in the  Medical   College(s)   and   Health   Department   of  Page 1 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER respondent No.2, would be reduced to 58 years,  from 62 years.

2. In   the   above   background,   this   Court   has   heard  Mr.Asim   J.Pandya,   learned   counsel   for   the  petitioners   and   Mr.Prashant   G.Desai,   learned  Senior   Advocate   with   Mr.Kaushal   D.Pandya,  learned advocate for respondent No.2, appearing  on Caveat, at length. 

3. The submissions advanced by learned counsel for  the respective parties are briefly encapsulated  hereinbelow.

(1) It is submitted by learned counsel for  the   petitioners   that   the   State   Government,   by  Government Resolution dated 04.02.2009, decided  to   increase   the   age   of   superannuation   of   all  Class­I   and   Class­II   Medical   Officers   of   the  Colleges and Health Department of the State from  58 years to 62 years. Following this Government  Resolution, the respondent-Corporation passed a  unanimous Resolution dated 21.08.2010, taking a  policy decision, that the age of retirement of  Class­I and Class­II Officers serving in Medical  Page 2 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER Colleges   and   Health   Department   of   the  respondent-Corporation   would   be   increased   from  58   years   to   62   years.   The   reason   for   this   is  that in the medical profession, experience and  expertise   would   count,   therefore,   no   other  employees   or   officers   can   claim   parity   in   the  matter of increasing the retirement age. That,  after   the   passing   of   the   Resolution   by   the  General Board, increasing the age of retirement  to 62 years, the effect of the said Resolution  was   immediately   given   to   those   Class­I   and  Class­II   officers,   who   are   covered   by   it.   The  petitioners in the present petition have already  crossed   the   age   of   58   years   and   have   been  continued in service by implementing the policy  decision. In case of other Class­I and Class­II  officers who have not yet crossed the age of 58  years,   the   effect   of   the   Resolution   has   been  given   in   their   Pay­slips   where   the   date   of  superannuation   is   stated   to   be   62   years.   It,  therefore,   means   that   the   Resolution   dated  21.08.2010, has been fully implemented for all  practical   purposes,   by   the   respondent- Page 3 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER

Corporation.

(2) It is further submitted on behalf of the  petitioners   that   recently,   in   the   Medical  College   of   the   respondent-Corporation,   some  Junior Doctors resorted to a strike to implement  the   UGC   pay­scales.   The   present   petitioners,  being Senior Doctors, have in no way supported  or joined the strike. On the contrary, they have  rendered   services   during   the   period   of   strike  and   helped   the   respondent­Corporation   in  handling a situation  of crisis. It appears that  to   teach   the   striking   Doctors   a   lesson,   the  Mayor of the respondent­Corporation (respondent  No.3)   and   some   officers,   suddenly   moved   a  proposal to reduce the age of retirement of all  Class­I   and   Class­II   Officers   employed   in   its  Medical Colleges and Health Department. Several  news   items   to   this   effect   were   published   in  various newspapers.

(3) It   is   submitted   that   a   meeting   of   the  Standing Committee of the respondent­Corporation  was convened for 06.02.2014, and the Agenda for  Page 4 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER that   meeting   was   circulated   on   03.02.2014.   In  the said Agenda, there was no item pertaining to  the reduction of the age of retirement of Class­ I and Class­II officers working in the Medical  Colleges/   Health   Department   of   the   respondent- Corporation. However, the petitioners have come  to know that respondent No.3, who was not well  received   when   he   went   to   meet   the   striking  Doctors,   has   initiated   the   proposal   for  reduction   of   the   retirement   age   in   order   to  teach the Doctors a lesson. Thus, the initiation  of   the   proposal   for   reduction   of   the   age   of  retirement is not based upon relevant or genuine  considerations   but,   on   the   contrary,   is   based  upon   extraneous   considerations   and   vitiated   by  arbitrariness   and  mala   fides.     The   impugned  Resolution   of   the   Standing   Committee,   itself,  mentions   that   this   proposal   should   be   adopted  urgently.   It   is   contended   that   there   was   no  urgency to move a proposal on the very day of  the Standing Committee meeting, especially as it  was   not   on   the   Agenda   for   discussion.   The  enhanced   age   of   retirement,   as   adopted   by   the  Page 5 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER respondent­Corporation   since   21.08.2010,   was  known to all concerned. It cannot, therefore, be  said that an urgent, or emergent situation, had  suddenly   arisen   so   as   to   necessitate   the  introduction   of   an   item   on   the   day   of   the  meeting   that   was   not   on   the   Agenda.   It   is  vehemently contended that the haste with which  this proposal has been taken up and the impugned  Resolution passed, shows that there has been no  application of mind. No deliberations have taken  place as no prior notice was given, therefore,  the decision is vitiated by arbitrariness.  (4) Learned   counsel   for   the   petitioners  would further contend that the Mayor is a formal  head   of   the   respondent­Corporation   and   has   no  power to direct the Standing Committee to take a  particular   decision.   That,   though   the  respondent-Corporation   is   entitled   to   take   a  policy decision, however, such a decision should  be fair, free from arbitrariness and should have  been taken in accordance with law. The Court can  certainly interfere in a policy decision, if it  is found that it is vitiated by  mala fides  and  Page 6 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER arbitrariness.

(5) Taking the Court through Rules 1 and 3  of   Schedule­A   of   the   Gujarat   Provincial  Municipal   Corporations   Act,   1949,   regarding  proceedings of the Corporation, learned counsel  for   the   petitioners   has   contended   that   no  discussion   could   have   taken   place   on   an   Item  that was not on the Agenda of the meeting of the  Standing   Committee.   Even   in   an   emergent  situation, prior information has to be given to  the   members   of   the   Committee   regarding  discussion   of   a   proposal.     It   is   further  submitted   that   the   Chairman   of   the   Standing  Committee can call a Special Meeting of the said  Committee upon an urgent requisition signed by  the   Commissioner,   within   24   hours   for   the  transaction   of   any   business.   In   the   present  case,   no   such   procedure   has   been   followed,  therefore, the impugned Resolution suffers from  procedural ultra­vires.

(6) That,   the   petitioners   have   crossed   the  age of 58 years and are still working and on the  Page 7 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER basis   of   the   Resolution   of   the   respondent­ Corporation dated 21.08.2010. A vested right has  accrued in their favour. They may have foregone  many lucrative employment opportunities, in the  knowledge that they would be retiring at the age  of 62 years. This vested right cannot be taken  away by another policy decision which has been  taken   in   haste,   without   following   proper  procedure and without taking into consideration  the   pros   and   cons   and   the   impact   of   the  decision. The petitioners have received no prior  intimation   regarding   this   decision,   therefore,  they   have   been   deprived   of   giving   their  objections before the decision was taken by the  Standing Committee. To this extent, the decision  is   in   violation   of   the   principles   of   natural  justice.

(7) An   extraordinary   situation   has   been  created   by   the   respondent-Corporation   which  affects   the   fundamental   rights   of   the  petitioners, enshrined under Articles 14 and 21  of   the   Constitution   of   India,   inasmuch   as   the  petitioners, who have been working for the past  Page 8 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER more   than   22   to   32   years,   would   stand  immediately   retired   by   the   decision   of   the  respondent­Corporation. The impugned Resolution  passed   by   the   Standing   Committee   is   on   the  Agenda of the General Board Meeting to be held  on   19.02.2014.   Looking   to   the   manner   in   which  the impugned Resolution has been passed, it is a  foregone conclusion that the General Board would  ratify the decision of the Standing Committee,  therefore, this Court may interfere.  (8) Learned counsel for the petitioners has  placed reliance upon the following judgments in  support   of   the   submission   that   where   a   policy  decision is arbitrary and  mala fide, the Court  can interfere: 

(a) Union   of   India   and   another   v.  

International   Trading   Co.   and   another   -   AIR   2003 SC 3983.

(b) Federation   of   Railway   Officers   Association and others v. Union of India - AIR   2003 SC 1344.

(c) Directorate of Education and others v.   Educomp  Datamatics  Ltd. and others - AIR 2004   SC 1962.

(9) In   support   of   the   submission   that   a  Page 9 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER vested   right   has   accrued   to   the   petitioners,  reliance has been placed upon a decision of the  Supreme   Court   in  Union   of   India   &   Ors.   v.   M/s.Asian Food Industries - AIR 2007 SC 750.

4. The   petition   has   been   strongly   opposed   by  Mr.Prashant   G.Desai,   learned   Senior   Advocate  with   Mr.Kaushal   D.Pandya,   learned   advocate   for  respondent No.2, who is appearing on Caveat, by  making the following submissions: 

(i) It   is   submitted   that   the   petitioners  were well aware on the date on which they were  appointed, that their age of retirement was 58  years. They have accepted the appointments with  open   eyes.   Therefore,   now   when   the   Standing  Committee   of   the   respondent­Corporation   has  recommended   that   the   age   of   retirement   be  reduced   from   62   years   to   58   years,   the  petitioners cannot have any grievance regarding  the same. 
(ii) That,   the   allegations   made   by   the  petitioners   against   respondent   No.3   are   not  borne   out   from   the   record,   as   the   impugned  Page 10 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER Resolution   itself   makes   it   clear   that   the  Standing Committee considered the letter of the  Commissioner   dated   06.02.2014,   and   passed   the  Resolution reducing the age of retirement from  62   years   to   58   years,   for   well­considered  reasons. That, a perusal of the Resolution makes  it clear that the factors that weighed with the  Standing Committee were that there was no parity  in the age of retirement between the petitioners  and other Officers working in other Departments,  who   would   retire   at   the   age   of   58   years.   It  cannot,   therefore,   be   said   that   the   impugned  Resolution   has   been   taken   without   any   valid  reasons. 

(iii) It is next contended that the petition  is   premature   as   the   decision   of   the   Standing  committee is only a recommendation which has to  be ratified / approved by the General Board of  the respondent­Corporation in its meeting to be  held on 19.02.2014. It is only after the General  Board approves the Resolution will it come into  effect,   therefore,   the   petition,   being  premature, may not be entertained at this stage.  Page 11 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER

(iv) It   is   further   submitted   that   the  contentions   raised   by   the   learned   counsel   for  the petitioners, to the effect that the decision  was a result of the dictates of respondent No.3  are   disputed   questions   of   fact   that   cannot   be  agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the  Constitution of India. There is no arbitrariness  in the decision taken by the Standing Committee,  as is clear from the Resolution itself. 

(v) Lastly,   it   is   contended   that   the  impugned decision of the Standing Committee is a  policy decision and this Court may not interfere  with   the   same.   In   support   of   this   submission,  reliance has been placed upon a judgment of this  Court   in  I.H.Otha   v.   Gujarat   State   Seeds   Corporation Ltd. & Anr. ­ 1999(3) GLR 2699.

5. In   rejoinder,   learned   counsel   for   the  petitioners   has   submitted   that   the   petitioners  have learnt that the impugned decision has been  taken at the behest of respondent No.3, who gave  a note to the Commissioner, which is numbered as  MN242. It was on the basis of this note that a  Page 12 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER proposal   was   prepared   and   taken   up   as   an  additional item. 

6. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the  petitioners   and   learned   Senior   Counsel   for  respondent No.2, and upon consideration of the  rival submissions, the following aspects emerge  for consideration:

(I) The   State   Government   has   issued   a  Government   Resolution   dated   04.02.2009,  enhancing   the   age   of   Class­I   and   Class­II  Officers   and   all   Officers   in   the   Medical  Colleges/ Dental Colleges and Health Department  of   the   State   Government,   from   58   years   to   62  years. 
(II) Following   the   said   Government  Resolution, the General Board of the respondent­ Corporation   unanimously   passed   a   Resolution  dated   21.08.2010,   enhancing   the   age   of  retirement   of   Class­I   and   Class­II   Medical  officers   working   under   the   respondent­ Corporation, in its Medical Colleges and Health  Department,   from   58   years   to   62   years.   This  Page 13 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER situation   has   prevailed   from   21.08.2010   upto  06.02.2014.

(II) A meeting of the Standing Committee of  the   respondent­Corporation   was   convened   on  06.02.2014, and the Agenda for the said meeting  was circulated on 03.02.2014. A perusal of the  said   Agenda   makes   it   clear   that   there   are   33  items therein. None of these items pertains to  the reduction of the age of retirement of Class­ I   and   Class­II   Medical   officers   working   under  the   respondent­Corporation   in   its   Medical  Colleges   or   Health   Department.   Without   there  being   any   Agenda   item   to   this   effect,   the  Standing   Committee,   by   its   impugned   resolution  dated 06.02.2014, took the impugned decision of  reducing   the   age   of   superannuation   of   the  Medical cadre of the respondent­Corporation and  the officers working in its Health Department.  This decision has purportedly been taken upon a  letter   by   the   Commissioner   of   the   respondent­ Corporation   dated   06.02.2014,   that   is   on   the  date of the meeting of the Standing Committee. Page 14 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER

7. A   decision   regarding   reduction   of   the   age   of  superannuation   of   its   employees   is,  understandably,   a   weighty   decision.   Before  taking   such   a   decision,   the   respondent­ Corporation,   or   any   other   employer   for   that  matter,   would   be   required   to   take   into  consideration all relevant aspects and the pros  and cons that would flow from such a decision in  addition to the impact it would have. Certainly,  a decision of this nature would entail detailed  deliberations   and   cannot   be   taken   with   undue  haste.   However,   the   above   necessary   aspects  prima facie appear to be missing in the present  case. A proposal has been suddenly moved on the  basis   of   a   letter   of   the   Commissioner   dated  06.02.2014,   in   the   meeting   of   the   Standing  Committee of the same date. One does wonder what  urgency could have arisen for such a sudden and  abrupt   introduction   of   an   important   decision,  and   that   too,   with   unprecedented   haste,  especially when this proposal did not figure on  the Agenda for the meeting. 

8. It is well settled law that normally, the Court  Page 15 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER may not lightly interfere with a policy decision  of   the   State.   However,   it   is   equally   well  settled   that   the   State   (in   this   case,   the  respondent­Corporation) must Act reasonably and  not   whimsically   while   taking   the   policy  decision,   which   must   be   free   from   extraneous  considerations   and   arbitrariness.   To   this  extent,   interference   in   policy   matters   by   the  Court is permissible. 

9. In Union of India and another v. International   Trading   Co.   and   another   (supra),   the   Supreme  Court has held thus:

"16.  While   the   discretion   to   change   the  policy   in   exercise   of   the   executive   power,   when not trammelled by  any statute  or rule   is   wide   enough,   what   is   imperative   and  implicit in terms of Art.14 is that a change   in policy must be made fairly and should not   give   impression   that   it   was   so   done   arbitrarily on by any ulterior criteria. The  wide sweep of Art.14 and the requirement of  every   State   action  qualifying   for   its  validity on this touchstone irrespective of  the   field   of  activity   of   the   State   is   an   accepted   tenet.  The   basic   requirement   of  Page 16 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER Art.14 is fairness in action by  the state,   and   non­arbitrariness   in   essence   and  substance   is   the   heart   beat   of   fair   play.   Actions   are   amenable,   in   the   panorama   of  judicial review only to the extent that the   State   must   act   validly   for   a   discernible  reasons,   not   whimsically   for   any   ulterior   purpose.  The   meaning   and   true   import   and   concept   of   arbitrariness   is   more   easily   visualized   than   precisely   defined.   A  question   whether   the   impugned   action   is   arbitrary   or   not   is   to   be   ultimately   answered on the facts and circumstances of a   given   case.  A   basic   and   obvious   test   to  apply in such cases is to see whether there  is   any   discernible   principle   emerging   from   the   impugned   action   and   if   so,   does   it   really satisfy the test of reasonableness."

(emphasis supplied)

10. In   Federation of Railway Officers Association   and   others   v.   Union   of   India   (supra),    the  Supreme Court has held as below:

"12. In examining a question of this nature   where a policy is evolved by the Government   judicial   review   thereof   is   limited.   When   policy according to which or the purpose for   which   discretion   is   to   be   exercised   is  clearly expressed in the statute, it cannot   Page 17 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER be said to be an unrestricted discretion. On   matters   affecting   policy   and   requiring  technical   expertise   Court   would   leave   the   matter   for   decision   of   those   who   are   qualified to address the issues.  Unless the  policy   or   action   is   inconsistent   with   the   Constitution   and   the   laws   or   arbitrary   or   irrational or abuse of the power, the Court   will not interfere with such matters."

(emphasis supplied)

11. In    Directorate   of   Education   and   others   v.   Educomp Datamatics Ltd. and others (supra), the  Supreme Court has held as below:

"12. ... The Courts would interfere with the   administrative policy decision only if it is  arbitrary,   discriminatory,   mala   fide   or  actuated   by   bias.   It   is   entitled   to   pragmatic   adjustments   which   may   be   called   for   by   the   particular   circumstances.   The   Courts cannot  strike down  the terms of the   tender prescribed by the Government because   it feels that some other terms in the tender   would have been fair, wiser or logical. The   Courts   can   interfere   only   if  the   policy  decision   is   arbitrary,   discriminatory   or  mala fide."  

12. On   the   aspect   of   vested   rights,   the   Supreme  Page 18 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER Court   has   held   in  Union   of   India   &   Ors.   v.   M/s.Asian Food Industries (supra), as below:

"48. ...  By reason of a policy, a vested or   accrued right  cannot be taken away. Such a   right, therefore, cannot a fortiori be taken   away by an amendment thereof."

(emphasis supplied)

13. On the other hand, the judgment cited on behalf  of   the   learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the  respondent­Corporation may be considered at this  stage.   In  I.H.Otha   v.   Gujarat   State   Seeds   Corporation Ltd. & Anr. (supra), this Court was  considering a case wherein the age of retirement  of the employee was reduced from 60 years to 58  years.   In   that   context,   it   was   held   that   the  decision to reduce the age of superannuation has  been taken by the Corporation and it is clearly  an amendment in service rules of the Corporation  which   is   within   its   competence   and   authority.  The  Corporation   has   all   the   right   to  unilaterally   change   the   service   conditions   as  provided   under  the   Rules.   A   fact   situation  similar to the one in the present case did not  Page 19 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER exist in the case of I.H.Otha v. Gujarat State   Seeds Corporation Ltd. & Anr. (supra).

14. Considering the above submissions and judgments,  at this stage, the Court is not called upon to  decide the petition on merits, but to adjudicate  whether   the   petitioners   have   made   out   a  prima  facie  case for the grant of interim relief, or  not.   Considering   the   aspects   discussed  hereinabove, the haste with which the impugned  resolution   appears   to   have   been   passed   in   the  absence   of   an   Agenda   item   and,   further,  considering   the   importance   and   impact   of   the  impugned   decision,   this   Court   considers   it   in  the   interest   of   justice   to   pass   the   following  order:

Issue notice returnable on 19.03.2014. By   way   of   interim   relief,   it   is   directed  that   the   General   Board   of   respondent   No.2- Corporation shall not take any decision upon  Agenda Item No.10 in its meeting to be held  on   19.02.2014,   regarding   the   recommendation  made   by   the   Standing   Committee   vide   the  impugned   resolution   dated   06.02.2014,   till  further orders. 
Page 20 of 21 C/SCA/2644/2014 ORDER

15. Learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the   respondent­ Corporation shall produce the original record of  the   Minutes   of   the   Standing   Committee   meeting  held   on   06.02.2014,   and   any   other   record  pertaining   to   the   said   meeting,   including   the  notes   of   any   concerned   authority,   on   the   next  date of hearing. 

16. This   order   may   be   communicated   to   respondent  No.2-Corporation by the learned Senior Counsel.

(SMT. ABHILASHA KUMARI, J.) sunil Page 21 of 21