Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
The New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Rep. By ... vs Lodya Shankar And Ors. on 23 September, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2004(3)ALD400, [2004(102)FLR8]
JUDGMENT C.Y. Somayajulu, J.
1. Since all these appeals arise out of the orders in the claims made before the Commissioner under the Workmen Compensation Act (the Act), arising out of the same accident, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. Appellant and second respondent in all these appeals are the same. First respondents in these appeals are the petitioners-claimants in the petitions before the Commissioner.
2.CMA No.2149 of 2001 arises out of W.C.No.136 of 1999, which is a claim made by the driver, and CMA No.2150 of 2001 arises out of W.C.No.137 of 1999, which is a claim made by the cleaner of the lorry bearing No.AP-25-T-4785 belonging to the second respondent. The other CMAs arise out of the claims made by the persons, who were traveling as employees of the second respondent in the said lorry AP-25-T-4785 at the time of the accident.
3.The case, in brief, of the first respondents in their claim petitions is that on 08.08.1998 when they were proceeding in the lorry bearing No.AP-25-T-4785, belonging to the second respondent, during the course of their employment with him, the said lorry met with an accident resulting in injuries and consequent permanent disability to them. Second respondent in his counter admitted the relationship of employer and employee between him and the first respondents, and alleged that inasmuch as his lorry was insured with the appellant, it is the appellant that has to pay the compensation to the claimants. Appellant filed its counters putting the claimants to proof of their involvement in an accident said to have arisen out of and during the course of their employment with the second respondent. In support of their cases, claimants examined themselves as P.W.1 in their respective cases and the Doctor who issued the disability certificate to them was examined as PW.2. No evidence, either oral or documentary, was adduced on behalf of the appellant or the second respondent. The Commissioner held that the accident occurred out of and during the course of employment and that the claimants are entitled to the amounts arrived at by him in the orders under appeals and that appellant, as insurer, is also liable to pay the compensation awarded to the claimants.
4.The main contention of Sri Kota Subbarao, the learned counsel for the appellant is that since no notice under Section 10 of the Act was issued to the appellant, it was deprived of the opportunity to get investigated the accident, and the involvement of the claimants therein and the injuries received by them and their alleged disability as a result of those injuries. His other contention is that since there is no proof as to the age and earnings of the claimants and their employment by the second respondent in his lorry, the Commissioner was in error in awarding compensation to them against the appellant, and in any event since the risk of the coolies traveling in the lorry is not covered by the policy of insurance taken by the second respondent, appellant cannot be made liable for payment of the compensation payable to the coolies. Sri K.M. Mahender Reddy, learned counsel for the claimants, relying on UNION OF INDIA Vs. T.R. VARMA1, 1 A.A. haja muniuddin vs. indian railways, 1993 ACJ 235 RAJANNA Vs. UNION OF INDIA, 1995 (2) LLJ 824 G.Saramma vs. MD. Jabbar Sharif, Shyam Sunder vs. Ram Kumar, Rajastan State Road Transport Corpn. vs. Nand Kishore, AIR 2001 Rajastan 334 State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Uma Dutt, 1999 ACJ 447 Zubeda Bano & Others vs. S.R.T.C. & others, 1991 (1) LLJ 66 and Sohan Lal Passi vs. P. Sesh Reddy, 1996 ACJ 1044 contended that since the trial before the Commissioner is summary in nature, provisions of C.P.C and Evidence Act cannot be applied thereto. Relying on United India Insurance Co. Ltd., vs. Ramulu, O.T.P.S., U.P.S.E.B. vs. Workman Comp. Commr. & Lab. Commr., 1997 (2) LLJ 292 Managing Director, Orissa S.R.T.Corpn. vs. Surendra Kumar, 1986 Lab. I.C. 1997 and Bhagwandas vs. Pyarelal, AIR 1954 M.B. 59 he contended that notice under Section 10 of the Act is not a condition precedent for filing a claim petition before the Commissioner under the Act. Relying on L.A.O., Vijayawada Thermal Station vs. Nutalapati Venkata Rao, D. Venu vs. Senen Fernandez and others, 1995 (2) LLJ 1113 State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Uma Dutt (7 supra), and P.S.M. Ahamed Abdul Khader vs. T.K. Mohammed Abubucker, he contended that when an objection to the marking of a document was not taken at the time of trial, its admission in evidence cannot be questioned at a later stage. Relying on Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Koti Koti Reddy, he contended that minimum wages of the workmen have to be adopted for the purpose of determining the compensation payable to the claimants. Relying on M.S. Grewal vs. Deep Chand Sood, P. Galireddy and Anr. vs. Chinna Ramaswamy Goud, and National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. S. Das, 2000 (1) LLJ 463 he contended that the orders under appeals need no interference. He, relying on United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Nizamabad vs. Mekala Advaiah, 2001 (6) ALD 447 United India Insurance Co. Ltd., vs. Ramulu (10 supra), State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Uma Dutt (7 supra) and D. Venu vs. Senen Fernandez and Ors. (15 supra) contended that non-examination of Doctor that actually treated the claimants is not of much consequence. Relying on Ballari Rajendra vs. G. Gurumurthy and Others, Pasupuleti Ramarao vs. Pothinaboina Durgarao, Lingampalli Rajam vs. Colliery Manager, M.P.S.C. Co. Ltd., National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. S. Das (20 supra), 1991 (2) APLJ 337 United India Insurance Co. Ltd., vs. Ramulu (10 supra), State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Uma Dutt (7 supra), New India Assurance Co. Ltd., vs. K. Appa Rao, National Insurance Co. vs. MD. Saleem Khan, 1991 (2) APLJ 337 and Pratap Narain Singh vs. Shrinivas, he contended that the claimants' inability to discharge their normal duties amounts to total disability and so they should be awarded compensation as if they suffered total disability, but not on the basis that they have a partial disability only, as done by the Commissioner. He, relying on Ved Prakash Garg vs. Premi Devi, State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Uma Dutt (7 supra), Pratap Narain Singh vs. Shrinivas (27 supra) and Maghar Singh vs. Jashwant Singh, contended that claimants are entitled to interest from the date of accident till the date of realization. He contended that since the Commissioner did not award the compensation which is legally due to them under the provisions of the Act claimants preferred cross-objections claiming higher compensation, and so the cross-objections may be allowed and the appeals have to be dismissed.
5.The points for consideration in these appeals are:
(i) Whether notice of the accident to the Insurer is mandatory for entertaining a claim under the Act? And
(ii) To what amount of compensation are the claimants entitled to and against whom?
6.POINT No.1: Section-10 of the Act reads:
"10. Notice and claim:- No claim for compensation shall be entertained by a Commissioner unless notice of the accident has been given in the manner hereinafter provided as soon as practicable after the happening thereof and unless the claim is preferred before him within two years of the occurrence of the accident or, in case of death within two years from the date of death.
Xx xx xx Xx xx xx Xx xx xx Provided further that the want of or any defect or irregularity in a notice shall not be a bar to the entertainment of a claim-
(a) if the claim is preferred in respect of the death of a workman resulting from an accident which occurred on the premises of the employer, or at any place where the workman at the time of the accident was working under the control of the employer or of any person employed by him, and the workman died on such premises or at such place, or on any premises belonging to the employer, or died without having left the vicinity of the premises or place where the accident occurred, or
(b) if the employer or any one of several employers or any person responsible to the employer for the management of any branch of the trade or business in which the injured workman was employed had knowledge of the accident from any other source at or about the time when it occurred:
Provided further that the Commissioner may entertain and decide any claim to compensation in any case notwithstanding that the notice has not been given, or the claim has not been preferred in due time as provided in this sub-section, if he is satisfied that the failure so to give the notice or prefer the claim as the case may be, was due to sufficient cause.
(2) Every such notice shall give the name and address of the person injured and shall state in ordinary language the cause of the injury and the date on which the accident happened, and shall be served on the employer or upon any one of several employers, or upon any person responsible to the employer for the management of any branch of the trade or business in which the injured workman was employed.
(3)The State Government may require that any prescribed class of employers shall maintain at their premises at which workmen are employed a notice-book, in the prescribed form, which shall be readily accessible at the reasonable times to any injured workman employed on the premises and to any person acting bona fide on his behalf.
(4)A notice under this section may be served by delivering it at, or sending it by registered post addressed to the residence or any office or place of business of the person on whom it is to be served, or where a notice-book is maintained, by entry in the notice-book."
So, it is clear that the Act does not contemplate a notice being issued by a victim-workman to the insurer of the employer before making a claim under the Act. Notice is required to be issued only to the employer. From proviso (a) to Sub Section (1) of Section 10 of the Act extracted above it is seen that want of, or defect or irregularity in, notice is not a bar to the Commissioner entertaining the claim, if the accident had occurred in the premises of the employer or if it took place when the employee was under the control of himself or any person employed by him, or if he i.e., the employer had knowledge of the accident from any other source. In this case second respondent, who is the owner of the lorry involved in the accident and employer of all the claimants, admitted the accident and its knowledge and also their status as his workmen. When Section 10 does not contemplate a notice to the insurer of the employer, non-issuance of a notice under section 10 of the Act to the appellant by the claimants is not, and cannot be, a bar for the Commissioner entertaining the claims of the claimants. So, I hold that the claim petitions are maintainable in spite of the claimants not serving a notice of the accident on the appellant-insurer. The point is answered accordingly.
7.POINT No.2: First I would like to decide the question of liability of the appellant to the claimants. Lorry A.P.25T 4785 belonging to the second respondent, involved in the accident, admittedly, is a 'goods vehicle'. The cover note(s) produced and marked by the claimants as their documents show that appellant, having received a premium of Rs.30/- from the second respondent, undertook to cover the risk of the driver and cleaner only. Second respondent did not pay any premium to cover the risk of his other employees or coolies being carried in his lorry AP 25 T 4785. Section 79 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (1988 Act) contemplates the Regional Transport Authority grating goods carriage permits, subject to the Rules made under the Act. Rule 252 of the A.P. Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 (The Rules) reads:
"Carrying of persons in goods vehicle carriage:- No person shall be carried in the cab of a goods vehicle beyond the number for which there is seating accommodation at the rate of 284 millimeters measured along the seat, excluding the space reserved for the driver for each person and not more than seven persons in all shall be carried in any goods vehicle.
(2)No person shall be carried in a goods vehicle upon the goods or otherwise in such a manner that such person is in danger of falling from the vehicle and in no case shall any person be carried in a goods vehicle, in such a manner that any part of his person when he is in sitting position is at a height exceeding 3 meters from the surface which the vehicle rests.
(3) No person other than a person connected to the conveyance of goods shall travel in a goods vehicle.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-rule (1) the Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority, may subject to such conditions as it thinks fit allow a large number of persons to be carried in a goods vehicle;
(5) Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to authorize the carriage of any person for hire or reward on any goods vehicle, unless there is in force in respect of the vehicle a permit authorizing the use of the vehicle for such purpose, and save in accordance with the provisions of such permit."
From the above rule it is clear that including the driver and cleaner, seven persons only can be carried in a goods vehicle either as coolies or persons connected with goods that are being transported in the lorry. In this case since there are eight claims, it is clear that eight persons, including the driver and cleaner, were being carried in the lorry at the time of accident in violation of the Rule quoted above. Chapter XI of the 1988 Act, containing Sections 145 to 165, makes insurance against third party risk mandatory, for use of any motor vehicle in a public place. Section 196 of the 1998 Act lays down the penal consequences for breach of that provision. But as per proviso to Sub Section (1) of Section 147 of 1988 Act, the owner of a Motor vehicle is not required to take out a policy to cover the risk of (i) his employees being carried in a goods vehicle, (ii) his driver driving the vehicle and (iii) his conductor or examiner of tickets, if the vehicle is a 'Public Service Vehicle'. So, even if a owner of a motor vehicle does not take out an insurance policy to cover the risk of the above three categories of employees (workmen), he would not be liable for prosecution under Section 196 of the 1988 Act. Insurance to those employees is not made compulsory obviously because they would be covered by the provisions of the Act. It is well known that contract of insurance is but a contract of indemnity, and so the insurer is liable only to the extent of the liability it undertakes. When the second respondent chose to insure the risk of his driver and cleaner only, by paying Rs.30/- as premium, and when he did not pay any premium to cover the risk of his coolies being carried in his lorry, appellant is not bound to indemnify the second respondent for the risk that occurred to his workers or coolies that were being carried in the lorry and appellant has to indemnify him for the risk of his driver and cleaner only. Even assuming that it was mandatory for the second respondent to take out insurance to cover the risk of the coolies being transported in the lorry, unless he takes out such insurance, appellant cannot be made liable for payment of the compensation payable to workers or coolies, because there is no such contract in this case. To elucidate, if in spite the mandatory provision a owner of a motor vehicle failed to take out insurance to cover third party risk, he can only be prosecuted under Section 196 of 1988 Act, but one out of the four public sector insurance companies cannot be made liable for the compensation payable to the victim, or in case of his death to his legal representatives, merely because third party insurance, though mandatory under 1988 Act, was not taken out by the owner. Unless there is a contract between the owner of the motor vehicle and the insurer, the insurer cannot be made liable for payment of compensation due from the owner of the motor vehicle to a third party. So, unless the owner of the vehicle pays premium to cover the risk of the coolies being transported in his lorry, the insurer cannot be made liable for payment of the compensation due to them from their owner. When second respondent insured his vehicle with the appellant to cover the risk of his driver and cleaner only, it cannot be made liable for payment of the compensation payable by the second respondent to his coolies being transported in his lorry, who are not covered by the policy issued by it. So, appellant need indemnify the second respondent in respect of the claims made in C.M.A.Nos.2149 and 2150 of 2001, which arose out of W.C.Nos.136 and 137 of 1999 filed by the driver and cleaner of the lorry respectively, and it is not liable to indemnify the second respondent in respect of the claims made by his coolies traveling in his lorry at the time of the accident and so C.M.As.2120, 2151, 2152, 2156, 2157 and 2188, arising out of the claims made by the coolies traveling in the lorry at the time of accident, have to be allowed and the claim against the appellant has to be dismissed.
8.C.M.A.2149 of 2001:- The evidence of the claimant as P.W.1 that he was getting a salary of Rs.3,000/- per month besides a batta of Rs.50/- per day, is not supported by any documentary evidence. Mere admission by the employer without his producing the record relating to payment of salary to the employee cannot be the basis for fixing the salary of the employee. For various reasons, including the reason that he would not be paying the compensation payable, the employer may admit that he is paying the salary as stated by his employee. In the absence of reliable documentary evidence relating to salary, in this type of cases, it is always safe to take the minimum wage fixed by the government as the salary of the victim workman.
9.The evidence of P.W.1 is that he sustained multiple grievous injuries on the head, legs and a fracture to his hand. The evidence of P.W.2, the Civil Assistant Surgeon, is that he examined the claimant on 17.03.2001 and found a mal-united fracture of both bones of the right forearm with wasting of muscles, and restricted movements, and so he assessed the permanent disability at 70%, and issued Ex.A.8-disability certificate, in his individual capacity, after going through the old records, i.e., medical certificate issued by the Government Hospital, Nizamabad and after examining the first respondent clinically. He admitted that he is not a member of the Medical Board at Nizamabad. During cross-examination he stated that the injury on the claimant was more than 11/2 year old, that he did not treat the claimant, and that basing on the clinical examination he assessed the disability of the claimant at 70%. He admitted that the Medical Board at Nizamabad Headquarters Hospital is the competent authority to issue disability certificate to an injured workman.
10.Ex.A.2, the injury certificate dated 08.08.1998, i.e., immediately after the accident, shows that the claimant suffered a simple injury on the right hand and fracture to the right forearm and was treated as an out-patent. In Ex.A.8 (disability certificate issued by P.W.2) the photograph of the first respondent showing the nature of the injury on his person is not affixed, and the basis on which the disability is arrived at 70% also is not indicated therein. It is significant to note that as per Schedule-I, Part II of the Act, for the loss of hand, or of the thumb and four fingers of one hand, or amputation from 11.43 cms below tip of olecranon, the percentage of disability is fixed at 60%. When amputation from 11.43 cm below the tip of olecranon causes a disability of 60%, how a mal-union of a fracture, with (alleged) wasting of muscle of the forearm, causes 70% permanent disability, is not explained by P.W.2. The reason for not affixing the photograph showing the injury that is found on the claimant, when he examined him, is also not explained by P.W.2. Significantly, the Commissioner also did not note in the deposition of P.W.1 that he found wasting of muscle or deformity in the forearm of the claimant. P.W.2 issuing Ex.A.8 certificate in his private capacity, but not as Assistant Professor, though he is working as Civil Assistant Surgeon in the Government Hospital, also gains significance. The reason for the claimant going to P.W.2 in his private capacity, but not as Civil Assistant Surgeon, when there is a Medical Board at Nizamabad, which is the competent authority to fix the disability, though he is residing at Nizamabad, is not explained by him. Since P.W.2 is said to have examined the claimant on 17.03.2001 i.e., about a week before he was examined as P.W.1 before the Commission on 24.03.2001, either P.W.1 or P.W.2 should have produced the record relating to the treatment undergone by P.W.1, perused by P.W.2 before issuing Ex.A.8 certificate. But, for the reasons best known to him, claimant did not produce the record relating to the treatment undergone by him. Claimant was treated in the Government Hospital, Nizamabad for one day and later he took treatment under a private doctor. If claimant underwent an operation for the fracture, there should be some record in the Hospital where he underwent treatment. The documentary evidence adduced by the claimant does not disclose that he underwent any operation for the fracture, or the treatment that was given to him. Non-production of the record relating to the treatment undergone by the claimant entails an inference being drawn against him. When a reliable and authentic record relating to the treatment undergone by a Victim workman is produced, in claims under the Act non-examination of a doctor to prove that record may not be of consequence. But in cases where a victim workman suppresses the medical record available with him, and chooses to examine a doctor who did not actually treat him and who merely issued a disability certificate, the IPSI DIXIT of such doctor regarding disability, which is in a way contrary to the disability mentioned for a scheduled injury in the Act, cannot form the basis for fixing the disability of the victim workman. So, the plethora of case law relied on by the learned counsel for the claimant on the aspect of non-examination of doctor, has no relevance to this case.
11.Since Ex.A2 shows that claimant was treated as an outpatient, it can prima facie be taken that the fracture was a simple fracture. Since the claimant, in spite of availability of the medical record, said to have been perused by P.w.2, failed to produce the same, an inference can be drawn that he failed to produce the said record because it would not support Ex.A.8 certificate issued by P.W.2. If there really is a mal-union of fracture resulting in a permanent disability, nothing prevented the claimant from going to the Medical Board and obtaining a certificate from it. Therefore, it is easy to see that P.W.2 gave Ex.A.8 certificate only with a view to help the claimant in claiming higher compensation, and so merely basing on Ex.A.8 and the ipsi dixit of P.W.2, it cannot be said that the claimant has 70% permanent disability.
12. As per the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the first respondent provisions of Evidence Act do not apply to the proceedings before the Commissioner. But that does not mean that each and every document which ex facie appears unacceptable, and could have been brought into existence to buttress the claim of a victim workman has to be accepted to be true. Basic and fundamental rules of evidence cannot be ignored merely because the Act is welfare legislation, more so because the intendment of the Act is not to make a victim workman a 'rich man' overnight immediately on his involvement in an accident, irrespective of the intensity or the nature of the injuries received by him in that accident. If really there is wasting of muscle, since the photograph of the injuries found on him is not affixed to Ex.A.8, nothing prevented the claimant from showing the same to the Commissioner, while recording his evidence, and making a request to him to note the same in his deposition. He did not do so. In spite of all these lacunae, since claimant did suffer a fracture, and since the evidence of P.W.2 is unacceptable, I fix the disability of the claimant due to the fracture received by him in the accident as 20%.
13.The Commissioner took the salary of the claimant as Rs.2,000/- per month as per the ceiling fixed by the Act, and the relevant factor as 211.79 taking his age as 28 years. Since the accident occurred in 1999 the minimum wage of a driver with batta would have been more than Rs.2,000/- p.m. So, I do not wish to interfere with the wage and age fixed by the Commissioner. Therefore, the compensation payable to the first respondent would be 1200 x 211.79 x 20/100 = Rs.50,830/-.
14. C.M.A.No.2150 of 2001:- The evidence of the claimant as P.W.1 is that he suffered an injury on the head and multiple fractures to both legs and hands and was taken tot Government Hospital, Nizamabad for treatment and thereafter he took treatment in a private hospital and later obtained a certificate from P.W.2. The evidence of P.W.2 is that on 15.03.2001 he examined the claimant and found that he has a functional disability of 50% because of the mal-united facture of ulna.
15.Ex.A.2, injury certificate issued by the Government Hospital issued to the claimant after the accident, shows that he suffered fractures of ulna and radius of the left forearm and a simple injury on the left leg and was treated as an outpatient for one day. Ex.A.8, disability certificate, is issued by P.W.2, without the photograph of the fractured arm of the claimant. Though P.W.2 is said to have issued Ex.A.8 after going through the old record, no record relating to the treatment undergone by the claimant is brought on record. For the same reasons mentioned while dealing with Ex.A.8 disability certificate in C.M.A.No.2149 of 2001 relating to the driver of the lorry, non-production of the record relating to the treatment undergone by the claimant in this case entails an adverse inference being drawn and it has to be taken that P.W.2 obliged the first respondent in his attempt to get higher compensation, and so merely on the basis of the IPSI DIXIT of P.W.2 and Ex.A.8, I do not accept that claimant has 50% permanent disability. In the circumstances of the case, the disability of the claimant can be taken as 20%.
16. Since the claimant is a cleaner, his salary will be less than the salary of the driver and on that basis the Commissioner fixed his salary at Rs.1800/- per month and the relevant factor as 216.91 taking his age as 25 years. Obviously the wage fixed by the Commissioner was the minimum wage fixed by the government for a cleaner. So, I do not wish to interfere with the wage and age of the claimant fixed by the Commissioner. So, the compensation payable to the claimant should be Rs.1,080/- x 216.91 x 20/100 = 46,852/-.
17.Finding on Point No.2:- For the above reasons, I hold that the appellant is liable to pay Rs.50,830/- to the first respondent in C.M.A.No.2149 of 2001 and Rs.46,852/- to the first respondent in C.M.A.No.2150 of 2001, and is not liable to pay any compensation to the first respondents in the other six C.M.As. The point is answered accordingly.
18.Cross objections filed by the first respondent: In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Panna Lal vs. State of Bombay30 first respondents in these appeals have a right to prefer cross-objections. But, they can do so only if their employer had preferred those appeals, but not against his insurer, who is disputing its liability to pay the compensation payable to them. It is well known that until the liability of the insured (second respondent) is known or fixed, the liability of his insurer (appellant) would not arise. Appellant cannot be made liable to pay more amount than that is payable by the second respondent. If the claimants were dissatisfied with the compensation awarded to them, they ought to have preferred an appeal. They cannot in an appeal preferred by the insurer, by filing cross-objections, seek enhancement of compensation, because in the event of its being held that they are entitled to higher compensation than that was granted by the Commissioner, appellant only cannot be asked to pay that enhanced amount. Second respondent cannot be made liable because he is not the appellant. Hence all the cross-objections are dismissed.
19.Since the claim of the six workmen traveling in the lorry against the appellant and their cross objections are dismissed, it is not necessary to decide their entitlement to interest on the compensation awarded against the second respondent. With regard to the claims of the driver and cleaner, they, no doubt, are entitled to interest, because compensation falls due on the happening of the accident. But the liability of the appellant to pay compensation to the victim-workmen, who it covered by the policy, arises only after it has knowledge of the accident. In this case since the driver and cleaner did not give notice of the accident to the appellant, appellant can be made liable to pay interest only from the dates of their petitions.
20.In the result, C.M.A.Nos.2120, 2151, 2152, 2156, 2157 and 2188 of 2001 are allowed and the claims of the first respondents (claimants) against the appellant are dismissed. They can recover the compensation awarded by the Commissioner to them from their employer (second respondent). C.M.A.Nos.2149 and 2150 of 2001 are allowed in part and the first respondents in those appeals are entitled to compensation of Rs.50,830/- and Rs.46,852/- respectively with interest at 9% p.a. from the date of petition till the date of deposit from the appellant. They can recover the amount awarded to them by the Commissioner from the second respondent. Parties are directed to bear their own costs in these appeals.