Meghalaya High Court
Shri Hori Satro Rabha vs . State Of Meghalaya & Ors. on 2 July, 2019
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2019 MEG 151
Author: Ajay Kumar Mittal
Bench: Ajay Kumar Mittal
Serial No. 07
Regular List HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WP(C) No. 444 of 2018
Date of order: 02.07.2019
Shri Hori Satro Rabha Vs. State of Meghalaya & Ors.
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Kumar Mittal, Chief Justice
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. M.F. Qureshi, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. A. Kharwanlang, GA (For R 1-3)
Mr. S.A. Sheikh, Adv. (For R 4 & 5) None for R 6
1. The petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the impugned order No. DDB.6/Apptt/MGNREGS/2018-19/73 dated 10.08.2018 (Annexure-II) issued by respondent No. 2 whereby, the new Village Employment Council (in short „VEC‟) of Kaimbatapara was approved without intimation to the petitioner.
2. As per the averments made in the writ petition, the petitioner was elected as the Secretary of the VEC, Kaimbatapara by the job card holders in the general meeting held on 20.11.2015 conducted by the Gram Sabha, which was approved by respondent No. 2. Vide Memo Order No. SEL.125/NREGS/ORDER/2015-16/957 dated 01.03.2016, the VEC had to implement the scheme known as "Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme" as per the guidelines formulated by the Government of Meghalaya Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MREGS)". The petitioner, as the elected Secretary of the VEC, had been discharging the functions and performing his duties. In the interest of the job card holders of the VEC, Kaimbatapara, West Garo Hills, the petitioner had successfully executed various works assigned to him. The petitioner claimed that surprisingly, the impugned order No. DDB.6/Apptt/MGNREGS/2018-19/73 dated 10.08.2018 (Annexure-II) was issued by respondent No. 2 whereby, the VEC where the petitioner was working as the Secretary has been discontinued and a new VEC was WP(C) No. 444 of 2018 Page 1 approved in contravention of the guidelines formulated by the Government of Meghalaya as the tenure of the VEC was approved for three years. According to the petitioner, Annexure-II passed by respondent No. 2 has violated his rights without affording any opportunity of hearing to him and by a non-speaking order.
3. Upon notice having been issued, the affidavits-in-opposition have been filed by the respondents No. 1 to 5 controverting the claim made by the petitioner.
4. A perusal of Annexure-II shows that no reasons had been assigned while passing the impugned order. Though the respondents No. 1 to 3 in their affidavit-in-opposition have sought to supplement the reasons for passing the order dated 10.08.2018 (Annexure-II) but it is noticed that no such reasons have been delineated in the impugned order by the respondents. Further, it was not disputed that the order was passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan: (2010) 9 SCC 496 had discussed the importance of passing a speaking order. It was noted that the need to give reasons in support of the decision/order, in all proceedings (whether administrative or quasi-judicial) which affect the rights of the parties involved is essential. The principles relating to recording of reasons can be summarised as follows:
"(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.
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(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-
making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence or reasons or "rubber- stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes them subject to broader scrutiny.
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence.
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process"."
6. Further, in Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy, AIR 2005 SC 2090, the Apex Court while dealing with the doctrine of principles of natural justice with regard to providing opportunity of hearing has noticed as under:-
WP(C) No. 444 of 2018 Page 3 "9. Natural justice is another name for common sense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form.
10. The expressions "natural justice" and "legal justice" do not present a water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigants' defence.
11. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. There principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be précised and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the "Megna Carta". The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to "vocate interrogate and adjudicate". In the celebrated case of WP(C) No. 444 of 2018 Page 4 Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, (1963) 143 ER 414, the principle was thus stated:
"Even God did not pass a sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. "Adam" says God, "where art thou has thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that though should not eat".
12. Since then the principles has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing of a diamond.
13. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing justice"
7. It is, thus, concluded that the impugned order dated 10.08.2018 (Annexure-II) is violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as it has been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and also at the same time is not a speaking order.
8. In view of the above, accordingly, Annexure-II is hereby set aside. However, it shall be open for respondents No. 1 to 3 to pass a fresh speaking order after hearing the concerned parties in accordance with law.
(Ajay Kumar Mittal) Chief Justice Meghalaya 02.07.2019 "Sylvana PS"
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