Delhi High Court
J.P. Gupta vs D.D.A. on 12 February, 1996
Equivalent citations: AIR1996DELHI195, AIR 1996 DELHI 195
Author: Lokeshwar Prasad
Bench: R.C. Lahoti, Lokeshwar Prasad
ORDER Lokeshwar Prasad, J.
1. The petitioner, in the present writ petition, filed by him under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, assails the demand-cum-allotment letter dated the 27th/31st May, 1991 (Annexure C-1), issued by the Delhi Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as 'the DDA'), in his favour allotting III category flat, situated to Sarita Vihar, Delhi to him.
2. The facts relevant for the disposal of the present writ petition lie in a narrow compass. The petitioner got himself registered for the allotment of a flat under the "Fifth Self Financing Housing Registration Scheme, 1982", floated by D.D.A. on 14-8-1982. Thereafter, in pursuance of a call in the daily newspapers to apply for flats, which had been constructed by the respondent DDA, the petitioner on 4-3-1991 applied to the respondent D.D.A. for allotment of a flat in Sarita Vihar. The petitioner received letter dated 27/31-5-1991 (Annexure C-1) from the DDA intimating that a flat on the ground and First floor under the aforesaid Scheme had been allotted to him. The main grievance of the petitioner is that the demand raised by the respondent D.D.A. vide demand cumallotmeant letter (Annexure C-1) on account of the cost of the flat allotted to him is illegal and arbitrary inter alia on the ground that similar flans of the same category, located in the same area, have been allotted by the respondent D.D.A. to other persons at a very low price as compared to the one, being charged from the petitioner. The petitioner has cited the example of one Shri Surendra Kumar Aggarwal by way of illustration to whom a similar flat has been allotted at a lesser cost. It is alleged that the above act of D.D.A. is discriminatory and is thus violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution. It has been prayed that the impugned demand-cum-allotment letter (Annexure C-1) be quashed and the respondent D.D.A. be directed to hand over the possession of the flat in question after charging the same cost as has been charged by it from the other allottees.
3. On behalf of D.D.A. it is contended that the cost of the flat in question has been finalised at Rs. 7,81,319-35 as per the demand letter (Annexure C-1), as per the policy of the D.D.A. It is also contended that the flat allotted to the petitioner is not similar to the flats allotted to the other allottees whose cost was Rs. 2,48,000/- because those flats were allotted during the year 1989 whereas the flat in question had been allotted to the petitioner in the year 1991. As regards charge of interest it is contended that the same is charged by the respondent D.D.A. on the capital investment made by it on behalf of the allottted petitioner to bring the petitioner at par with the original allottees of the Scheme. In nutshell it has been urged by the respondent D.D.A. that the demand raised by it on account of the cost of the flat in question, that the petitioner vide impugned letter is perfectly legal, valid and reasonable and that the petition filed by the petitioner is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed.
4. On 1-5-1992 the respondent D.D.A. was directed to file an additional affidavit giving the break up of the calculations demanded in demand-cum-allotment letter (Annexure C-1) and the amount calculated for demands made to other flat owners vide letter (Annexure F-1).
5. In compliance with the above orders an affidavit dated 22-10-1992, signed and sworn by Ms. Jay Shree Raghuraman, Director (Housing), was filed on behalf of respondent D.D.A. on 11-11-1992 explaining the calculations.
6. On 1-2-1994 the respondent D.D.A. was further directed to file an affidavit indicating the various factors involved in castings the flats. In compliance with the above orders a supplementary affidavit dated 9-2-1994 was filed on behalf of respondent D.D.A.
7. As the position with regard to the flat alleged to have been allotted to the petitioner by respondent D.D.A. was not clear in the affidavit dated 9-2-1994, filed on behalf of the respondent and the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was no pocket 'F & G' in existence, it was directed vide order dated 8-3-1994 that the respondent D.D.A. may ascertain the position and file an additional affidavit. In compliance with the above orders another additional affidavit dated 4-8-1994, signed and sworn by Ms. Asma Manjar, Director (Housing) was filed on behalf of respondent D.D.A. stating that the petitioner had been allotted Flat No. 122, Pocket F, Sarita, Vihar, which was in existence at the site. The above controversy with regard to the existence of the flat in question at site was set at rest on 25-7-1995 on which date the learned counsel for the petitioner made a statement before the Court that the petitioner had taken the possession of the above mentioned flat and the only question requiring consideration was as to whether any excess payment had been made by the petitioner to the respondent D.D.A. on account of the cost of the flat in question.
8. On the above point we have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have also gone through the material on record. During the course of arguments the learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the D.D.A. has charged the cost of construction from the petitioners @ Rupees 2217=69 per sq. meter as against Rs. 1884-55 charged from the other flat owners in the same area. He further argued that the D.D.A. was not justified in claiming escalation charges and also interest. According to his submissions since the D.D.A. has claimed an amount of Rs. 48,410/- on account of escalation, no interest could have been charged by the D.D.A. from the petitioner.
9. Assailing the 'land rate', charged from the petitioner it was submitted that the land for all the flats constructed in 'Sarita Vihar' in pockets 'F' 'G' 'H' 'J' was acquired sometime before 1982 and the D.D.A. has charged the land rate @ Rs. 62/- per sq. metr. from the other allottees and as such it was not justified in charging a much higher rate from the petitioner for the same land.
10. The learned counsel for the respondent D.D.A. justifying the cost of the flat, being charged from the petitioner, submitted that the difference in the cost as reflected in demand-cum-allotment letter (Annexure C-1) (relating to the petitioner) and Annexurc F-1 (relating to Shri Surendra Kumar Aggarwal) was due to the fact that allotment to Mr. Aggarwal was made in 1984 whereas in the case of the petitioner the allotment was made in the year 1991; that the flat allotted to the petitioner was a ground floor + first floor category III Duplex type, having more area as compared to the flat allotted to Mr. Aggarwal which was on First Floor Second Floor with lesser area and no court yard. It was further submitted by him that the major difference between the cost of the flat of the petitioner and the other flat(s), referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, was due to the revision of 'land rates' (pre-determined rate of land) between the period from 1984 to 1991. Justifying the charge of interest Ihe learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the houses under the 'Scheme' known as 'Self Financing Scheme', under which the petitioner got himself registered, were to be constructed with the funds made available by the allottees but in the present case the petitioner was inducted at a much later stage by which time the D.D.A. had already made investment for the construction of the fiat on behalf of the allottted petitioner and thus the respondent D.D.A. was well within its right to charge a nominal interest @ 10% p.a. on the capital investment made by it. It was submitted by him that the demand raised by D.D.A. on account of the cost of the flat and the land underneath, was perfectly legal, justified and cannot be stated to be unreasonable, discriminatory or violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
11. The question of the costing of the flats by D.D.A. was referred to a Full Bench, consisting of Y. K. Sabharwal, K. Shiva-
shankar Bhat and D. K. Jain, JJ. in case Smt. Sheelawanti v. D. D. A., . The Full Bench in the above mentioned case, after considering practically all the contentions which have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the present writ petition too and relying on various decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court in case Shri Sita Ram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India ; Gupta Sugar Works v. State of U. P. ; Bareili Development Authority v. Ajay Pal Singh ; Veena Saxena v. D.D.A. ; Abhimanyu Kumar Sethi v. D.D.A. (1992) 47 Delhi LT 295; Mahanand Sharma v. D.D.A. (C.W. No. 1327/91); Vinod Kumar Gupta v. D.D.A. (C.W.P. 778/92); J. K. Dhingra v. D.D.A. (C.W.P. No. 2787 of 1990) and Puran Chand v. Union of India (C.W.P. 3876 of 1992) held:--
"From the above it is clear that the scope of judicial review in the cases involving costing and fixation of prices is very much limited. Apart from the observations and the findings recorded in B.D.A.'s case (page 126), extracted above, that a public body entering in the realm of contract acts merely in its executive capacity and thereafter the relations are no longer governed by constitutional provisions but by contract, which apply in this case as even otherwise, what has to be seen and examined by the writ Court is whether the pricing of flats demanded by the D.D.A. for different categories of allottees is whimsical or arbitrary. The date placed on record by the D.D.A. prima facie, does not warrant so. There are of course some contentious points, like formula and basis for working out the land rate, cost of development, construction and inclusion of certain expenses which could only be decided on evidence, which we do not propose to do in writ jurisdiction. Merely, because the method of valuation suggested by the petitioners would be more fairer or logical, the method or the basis adopted by the D.D.A. cannot be struck down as arbitrary or whimsical."
"We find that the facts of the present case are akin to the facts in B.D.A.'s case, except that in that case the registrants, except some of them, had, after the revision in the price of flats, accepted the same. There is no such acceptance of the final price of the flats intimated to the petitioners before us. Nonetheless, the registrants under the present scheme having accepted the terms and conditions in the brochure, including Clauses 13 and 14, were put on notice that the prices quoted in the brochure were tentative and are liable to be revised. They having applied for registration under the scheme paid the requisite registration deposit, did enter into a contract with the D.D. A. cannot now make a grievance of the revised rates. In the instant case, the flats have been allotted under the scheme; reflected in the brochure, which contains no particular formula to arrive at the price of the flats nor has any statutory provisions, enumerating any criteria or the principles to fix such a price been pointed out. As such, this Court cannot examine whether the price fixed is astronomical, exorbitant, or unreasonable, etc. This Court having no expertise knowledge or wherewithal to evaluate the cost aspect is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the price fixed and will not interfere."
"We may now advert to the questions referred to the Full Bench. In keeping with our observations and findings recorded above, we are of the opinion that, in view of clauses (13) and (14) of the brochure and the transaction being contractual, this Court cannot interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution in the matter of pricing/costing of fiats, including escalation of cost of land, etc. The answer to the first question has to be in the negative."
12. Regarding the question of the charge of land rates, underneath the flats, which was also in dispute as in the present case, the Full Bench observed:--
"As regards the second question referred to the Full Bench, as noticed above, we are of the view that the impugned revision of cost of land by the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi is neither illegal nor arbitrary."
13. Thus, the controversy, requiring adjudication in the present case, stands fully covered by the Full Bench decision in Sheelawanti's case and nothing services for adjudication.
14. In view of the above discussion the petition merits dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.
15. Petition dismissed.