Bombay High Court
Lalbavta Hotel & Bakery Mazdoor Union ... vs Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. And Ors. on 11 December, 1992
Equivalent citations: (1993)IILLJ1179BOM
Author: B.N. Srikrishna
Bench: B.N. Srikrishna
JUDGMENT B.N. Srikrishna, J.
By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seek the following reliefs.
1. Issuance of a writ of certiorari or any writ of the same or similar nature to quash and set aside the order of the Central Government dated March 17, 1992 taking a decision not to abolish contract labour in the canteen of the 1st respondent Corporation and a writ directing the 1st and 2nd respondents to abolish the system of contract labour in the canteen of the 1st respondent's refinery at Chembur;
2. A declaration that the contract labourers employed in the canteen of the 1st respondent's refinery are regular employees of the 1st respondent;
3. Issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to give to the workmen working in the canteen of the 1st respondent's refinery the same wages and service conditions as granted to the workmen working in the two departmentally run canteens of the 1st respondents.
2. The petitioner is a registered Trade Union. It represents, inter alia, workmen of the contractors engaged by the 1st respondent Corporation, which is a Government company carrying on the business of the refining petroleum at its refineries at Mahul, Chembur. The 2nd respondent is the Director of the 1st respondent Corporation. The 3rd respondent is the Union of India and the 4th respondent is statutory Board under the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The 5th respondent is a contractor engaged by the 1st respondent to render catering services in the canteen located within the refinery at Mahul.
3. The 1st respondent's refinery at Mahul, Chembur, is registered as a factory under the Factories Act, 1948 and employs more than 3,000 workers in three shifts. In compliance with their statutory obligation under Section 46 of the Factories Act, the 1st respondent have provided canteen facility within the premises of the said factory. The said canteen is not run departmentally by the 1st respondent, but is managed by a contractor who, at the material time when the petition was filed, happened to be the 5th respondent. The canteen of the 1st respondent has been in operation from the inception of the refinery and operates round the clock on all the days of the year.
4. The petitioner contends that the 1st and the 2nd respondents have sought to discharge their statutory obligations by entrusting the work of running the canteen to a contractor. The canteen, being a statutory obligation, is an integral part of the manufacturing activity carried out in the factory (refinery) at Mahul. The work carried on therein is of a perennial nature and requires a permanent complement of workmen. The petitioner further alleges that, although the canteen within the refinery at Chembur has been managed by the contractor, all activities of the canteen are controlled, supervised, monitored and managed by the 1st respondent. The petitioner gives the details of such activities like menu planning, preparations, various services, operations of canteen stores, operation and deployment of man-power, accounting system and cost control, which are all alleged to be carried out by the 1st respondent's Officers and employees. The petition sets out in details extracts from the Operating Manual stated to have been issued by the 1st respondent. The petitioner, therefore, contends that the canteen within the refinery is entirely under the supervision, control and management of the 1st and 2nd respondents; the workmen working in the said canteen through the contractor are discharging statutory duties and obligations of the 1st and 2nd respondents, and hence they should be deemed and declared to be the direct employees of the 1st respondent; despite interposition of the middleman, namely, the canteen contractor, and the paper arrangements, the contract system in the Refinery canteen is merely a sham. In paragraph 13 of the petition are pointed out the following facts as indicative that the real control of the said canteen vests in the hands of the 1st and 2nd respondents :
(a) All workman working in the canteen, though nominally under the contractor, are employed after they meet with the eligibility, qualification and suitability criteria prescribed for particular jobs by the 1st and 2nd respondents;
(b) The 2nd respondent maintains an independent section known as A.S. & P. (Canteen Section) to supervise, manage and administer the canteen. This section is manner by 9 officers whose names have been set out.
(c) A separate Store Department (Canteen) is run by the 1st and 2nd respondents, the supervision, management and control of which is vested in the officers manning the A.S. & P. (Canteen Section);
(d) Employees who look after the Canteen Stores work attached to the canteen are also employees of the 1st respondent;
(e) Gate Passes issued in favour of the canteen workmen of the contractor are issued under the signature of the officers of the 1st respondent Corporation;
(f) Pay slips and payment of monthly salary to the canteen workmen are done by the 2nd respondent;
(g) The supply of materials and articles to the canteen is done by the 2nd respondent;
(h) The day-to-day menu, quality and other details of running the canteen are settled by the 2nd respondent;
(i) The 2nd respondent issues notices from time to time indicating what kind of food will be available and what kind of food will not be available in the canteen, and the reasons therefor,
(j) The 2nd respondent reimburses the salaries and wages paid to the canteen workmen.
5. The petitioner has annexed to the petition copies of several documents to prove the aforesaid facts and contends that the cumulative effect thereof is that though the canteen is run for name's sake by a contractor, it is really the hidden hand of the 1st and 2nd respondents which controls and runs the canteen.
6. The petitioner contends that the canteen contractor is really a dummy and exercises no control and has no voice in the management of the canteen in the factory. The petitioner points out the stand taken by the canteen contractor, in another proceeding, namely Complaint (ULP) No. 255 of 1989, before the First Labour Court at Bombay. The canteen contractor, the predecessor of the present 5th respondent, in terms stated in his affidavit in reply that he was merely a dummy and that the Bharat Petroleum (Refinery) Corporation Ltd., was the real employer. The petitioner has, in paragraph 15 of the petition, extensively quoted extracts from the relevant portions of the said affidavit.
7. The petitioner points out that, apart from the canteen which is run within the refinery premises, the 1st respondent has two more canteens, one each at its Wadi Bunder and Sewree installations where its marketing activities are carried out. The petitioner contends that there is wide disparity in the wages and other conditions of service granted to the workmen working in the departmentally run canteen and those of the workmen working under the contractor in the canteen at the refinery. The wide disparity in the wages and other service conditions is brought out, in stark reality, by a chart annexed at Exhibit I to the petition. It is the case of the petitioner that there is no difference in the nature of work done by the workmen in the departmentally run canteens at Wadi Bunder and Sewree installations and the one within the refinery premises, yet there is a wide discrimination with regard to the wages and other conditions of service.
8. On the basis of the abovesaid averments the petitioner has taken up a two-fold stand. Firstly, it is contended that this Court should exercise its Constitutional powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and direct the 1st respondent, which is admittedly "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, to abolish the system of contract labour in the Refinery Canteen and to absorb all the concerned workmen as regular employees of the 1st respondent and to extend to them the same wages and service conditions as given to the workmen working in the departmentally run canteens. Alternatively, it is contended that even if the contract system is recognised as a real entity and not abolished, then atleast the discrimination in the wages and other service conditions between the workmen working in the departmentally run canteens and the contractor run canteen should be abolished by issuance of an appropriate writ to the employers.
9. As we shall presently see, the saga of struggle of the contract labour in the refinery for abolition of the invidious discrimination has been long and arduous. It is necessary that we set out below some of the milestones in their journey of travail to facilitate appreciation of the backdrop of the situation :
(a) The workmen working in the canteen at the refinery organised themselves and, through the agency of Trade Unions, started agitating for abolition of the discrimination meted out to them in the matter of emoluments and other service conditions. This elicited the reaction of the Corporation of termination of the contract of the previous contractor with the resultant prospect of termination of services of all canteen workers. At this stage, another Union, the Bharat Petroleum Employees' Union, filed Writ Petition No. 3494 of 1989, for abolition of the contract system in which there was a prayer made for a direction to the respondents to abolish the system of employment of contract labour in the refinery canteen. This writ petition was disposed of by an order dated December 21, 1989 made by a learned Single Judge of this Court (R. A. Jahagirdar, J.) who was of the view that it was a case where the 4th respondent, the Regional Labour Commissioner, should forthwith forward to the Union of India the letter addressed by the petitioner Union on the subject of abolition of contract labour system. The learned Judge directed the Government of India to take a decision on the demand of the workmen for abolition of contract labour in consultation with the Advisory Board as provided under the Act. The learned Judge concluded the order by saying "It is expected that the Government will take the decision expeditiously".
(b) Pursuant to the directions given by this Court in its order dated December 21, 1989 made in the Writ Petition No. 3494 of 1989, the Government of India, in its meeting of the Advisory Board on May 30, 1990, resolved to appoint a Committee to examine and study the issue in detail and submit a factual report, together with its recommendations. The Committee consisted of three members, one of whom was the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central Government), the others being representatives of workmen and employer respectively.
(c) Pending deliberations of the Committee, the workmen of the refinery canteen were apprehensive that their services were likely to be dispensed with. The present petitioner Union filed Writ Petition No. 3280 of 1990 in this Court. This petition came to be disposed of by a Division Bench (Per Bharucha, J., as His Lordship then was, and Sugla, J.) at the stage of admission by an order dated November 12, 1991. In view of the pendency of the matter before the Committee appointed by the Central Advisory Contract Labour Board (hereinafter referred to as "the Board"), the petition was allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh petition upon the same grounds, if it became necessary.
(d) Since the matter was hanging fire before the statutory authorities for quite some time, there was fresh apprehension in the mind of the workmen that their services would be dispensed with before any positive action was taken in the matter. This resulted in the petitioner filing another writ petition, being Writ Petition No. 1400 of 1991, in which the same reliefs were sought for.
(e) On August 18, 1991, when Writ Petition No. 2400 of 1991 came up for hearing before the Division Bench of Kurdukar and Sukumaran, JJ., the respondents applied for time on the ground that the matter was still under consideration before the Committee. Accordingly, adjournment was sought for and obtained upto August 20, 1991. On August 21, 1991, when the writ petition came up for hearing before another Division Bench (Mrs. Sujata Manohar and Patankar, JJ.), a further request for adjournment of six weeks was sough to enable the Committee to submit its report. This request was also granted by the Court.
(f) The writ petition once again came up before another Division Bench P. D. Desai, C.J. and V. P. Tipnis, J. on October 31, 1991 when it was stated to the Court that the Committee had submitted its report on or about September 24, 1991. The Court directed that a copy of the report of the Committee be produced for perusal of the Court on November 20, 1991. The Court also observed.
"In a case of this nature, decision must be taken expeditiously. It is the statutory duty of the appropriate Government to arrive at a proper decision within a reasonable time.
Under the circumstances, time for arriving at a decision in accordance with law after consideration of the report of the Committee is granted upto December 31, 1991. The Court makes it clear that no application for extension of time shall be entertained or granted."
The Court then adjourned the writ petition to November 20, 1991.
(g) As stated earlier, the Committee has submitted its report to the Board on September 24, 1991 in which the Committee, by a majority of 2 to 1, concluded that the canteen facilities were made available by the management of the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (Refinery) to discharge their statutory obligation and that the said activity was not a casual, non-statutory welfare measure. After taking note of the nature of the work carried out in the canteen of the refinery, the Committee, by a majority of 2 to 1, recommended that the system of contract labour in the canteen of the 1st respondent refinery be abolished. Despite division on the issue of abolition of contract labour in the refinery canteen, all three members of the Committee were unanimous in their recommendation that there was no valid basis for the wide disparity in the wages and other benefits of the workmen of the canteen in the refinery, as compared to those of the departmentally run canteens, and that this discrimination should be removed.
(h) Despite the report made by the Committee, the Board did not act promptly in the matter nor did the Central Government take any steps in that regard. By its order dated February 6, 1992, after making detailed reference to the terms of reference and the recommendations of the Committee, this Court was of the view that neither the Board nor the Central Government was moving in the mater with the promptitude which was expected and required and, therefore, a peremptory direction was issued to the Board to take up the said subject as the first item on the agenda of its meeting scheduled to be held on February 19, 1992 and to take a decision with regard to the recommendations to be made for the abolition or otherwise of the contract labour in the canteen of the establishment of the 2nd respondent. In view of the fact that the concerned authorities were dragging their feet in the matter, and after taking notice of the wide disparity in the wages and other service conditions between the two sets of canteen workers, the 1st and 2nd respondents were directed to state on affidavit whether there was any genuine dispute as to the nature of work done by the canteen workers in the departmentally run canteens as compared to the work of the contractor-run-canteen workers in the refinery.
(i) The writ petition once again came up before the Bench on March 6, 1992 at which time it was noticed that the directions given in its earlier order dated February 6, 1992 had not been complied with by the Union of India and the Board. Notice was issued to the Board to show cause why action should not be taken against it in contempt jurisdiction for non-compliance with the Court's directions. The notice was served on the Secretary of the said Board. (The Contempt Notice was subsequently discharged on April 20, 1992 accepting the unconditional apology tendered by the Secretary of the Board and the Union of India).
(j) On March 23, 1992 when the writ petition appeared again before the Bench, Union of India and the Secretary of the board, appeared through the learned Additional Solicitor General and tendered unconditional apology. They also filed an affidavit of the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Labour, the Secretary of the Board, dated March 21, 1992, which was taken on record. The minutes of the 24th Meeting of the Board held on February 28, 1992 were placed on record. The said minutes showed that, with regard to the issue on which the Board was directed to take a decision, after discussion the Board had noted that the report of the Committee was not unanimous on the issue with regard to recommendation of abolition of the contract labour in the canteen of the 1st respondent refinery and that consequently the Board had decided to leave the matter for decision by Government of India, keeping in view the view expressed in the said meeting.
(k) When the writ petition again came up for hearing on March 30, 1992, the respondents made available to the Court a letter dated March 17, 1992 issued by the Deputy Secretary and Secretary of the Board, in which it had been stated "In pursuance of the recommendations of the Board, the matter has been considered in detail by the Central Government and it has been decided not to prohibit employment of contract labour in the canteens of the establishment of Bharat Petroleum Corporation (Refinery), Bombay, for which the appropriate Government under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 is the Central Government". The letter requested the Government Counsel to place the above facts appropriately before the Court for its consideration.
(l) On March 30, 1992, Writ Petition No. 2400 of 1991 was allowed to be withdrawn by the petitioner with liberty reserved to it to institute a fresh writ petition challenging the decision taken by the Central Government on March 17, 1992 not to prohibit employment of contract labour in the canteen of the 1st respondent's refinery and raising therein all contentions and seeking all reliefs including those which were the subject matter of the earlier Writ Petition No. 2400 of 1991.
(m) The present Writ Petition No 891 of 1992 has been filed by the writ petitioner pursuant to the liberty so reserved in its favour. Rule was issued in this Writ Petition on April 20, 1992 and the petition was posted for interim reliefs on April 29, 1992. On April 29, 1992, this Court took up the writ petition for hearing as to interim relief. After perusing the record and hearing the learned Counsel, this Court was of the view that the question as to whether the work done by the contract labour in the canteen of the refinery was the same as done by the workmen in the departmentally run canteens had to be left to the decision of the Chief Labour Commissioner. Detailed directions were given with a time schedule for different stages of the inquiry by the Chief Labour Commissioner, who was directed to decide the question within the time specified and to make his report thereupon. In the interregnum, pending such inquiry by the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), the 1st respondent was directed to pay Rs. 750/- per month per workman, as interim relief, to bridge the gap of disparity, and an order was passed restraining respondents No. 1 and 2 from terminating the services of the workmen engaged as contract labour.
(n) The 1st respondent challenged the interim order of this Court dated April 29, 1992, before the Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 744 of 1992. By an order of the Supreme Court dated October 19, 1992 made therein, this Court was requested to finally dispose of this writ petition within four weeks.
(o) The Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) has made an order dated August 26, 1992 which has been placed on the record of this Court. Curiously, the Chief Labour Commissioner was persuaded to accept the contention of the 1st and 2nd respondents that the comparison of conditions of service, require to be made for the purpose of Rule 25(2)(v)(a) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules 1971, had to be restricted only to the workmen employed in the same establishment of the principal employer. The Chief Labour Commissioner was of the view that the departmentally run canteens of the 1st respondent at its installations at Sewree and Wadi Bunder were totally different establishments from refinery establishment, as the principal employers in both the cases were different. On this reasoning, he held that it was not permissible to compare the wages and service conditions of the two sets of canteen workmen, one working in the canteens in the marketing establishments at Sewree and Wadi Bunder and the other in the canteen in the refinery. In purported exercise of his power under Rule 25(2)(b) of the said Rules and the Explanation thereto, the Chief Labour Commissioner has compared the emoluments of the contract labour in the refinery canteen with those prescribed under the Statutory Minimum Wages Notification and came to the conclusion that the concerned workmen were better off. The petitioners have filed a detailed affidavit objecting to the findings made by the Chief Labour Commissioner in his order dated August 26, 1992.
It is against the backdrop of this long-drawn sequence of events that the contentions urged in this writ petition need to be appreciated.
10. Mr. Singhvi, the learned Counsel for the petitioners raised three principal contentions : (i) the canteen run in the refinery of the 1st respondent is pursuant to a statutory obligation under Section 46 of the Factories Act and, therefore, it is an incidental work of the factory itself. Since the factory works round the clock on all the days of the year, the canteen works accordingly; the work in the canteen is of a perennial nature. He submitted that following the law laid down by the Supreme Court in M. M. R. Khan v. Union of India, 1990 Supp Supreme Court Cases 191, this Court should take the view that workmen employed in the refinery canteen of the 1st respondent-Corporation should be declared to be the regular workmen of the said Corporation by holding that the interposition of the contractor as a sham intended to defeat the legitimate rights of the concerned workmen, (ii) in the alternative, even if the concerned workmen working in the canteen in the refinery of the 1st respondent are held to be employed through a contractor, the contract and the contractor being assumed to be legally valid, this Court should hold that the concerned workmen are entitled to the same benefits with regard to wages and other service conditions as are available to the workmen in the departmentally run canteens of the 1st respondent Corporation by relying on the provisions of Rule 25(v)(a) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules and Sections 17 and 18 of the Act and (iii) lastly, that the order of the Central Government dated March 17, 1992 (factually no such order has been placed on record but only letter addressed by the Central Government to its advocate on record conveying that such a decision has been taken on March 17, 1992 is placed on record) is bad and vitiated for non-application of mind to the factors required to be considered before passing an order under Section 10 of the Act. He, therefore, submits that the said order dated March 17, 1992 should be quashed and set aside and that in view of the persistent default on the part of the Central Government in acting promptly in the matter of abolishing of contract labour system and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this is a fit case where this Court should not remand the matter to the Central Government for reconsideration but, instead, issue a writ of mandamus to the respondents directing the abolishing of the contract labour system in the refinery canteen of the 1st respondent. As consequential relief, he sought a declaration from this Court that all workmen presently working in the refinery canteen of the 1st respondent-Corporation be directed to be given the same wages and other conditions of service as the workmen in the two departmentally run canteens at Sewree and Wadibunder establishments.
11. Turning to the first submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner, though we agree that the work carried out in the refinery canteen of the 1st respondent is of a perennial nature and can even be said to be incidental to be manufacturing activity as it is in discharge of the statutory obligation under Section 46 of the Factories Act, 1948, there are several difficulties in accepting the first contention urged by the petitioner.
12. The 2nd respondent has filed a detailed affidavit in the present writ petition and has also relied upon the affidavits filed in the withdrawn Writ Petition No. 2400 of 1991, which have also been placed on record of the present petition. In the affidavits the respondents have controverted several factual averments made in the writ petition. They have denied that day-to-day work of the refinery canteen was carried out directly under the supervision of the 1st respondent's officers; they had also denied that there existed or exists any Operating Manual as extensively quoted by the petitioner. In our view, it would not be possible to resolve these factual controversies and disputed questions of facts without a trial by a competent forum. At any rate, they cannot be satisfactorily resolved in writ jurisdiction. Despite Mr. Singhvi's reliance upon judgment of the Supreme Court in M. M. R. Khan's case (supra) we are unable to accede to the first contention raised by the petitioner. The facts of the present case are distinguishable from those in the case of M. M. R. Khan. In M. M. R. Khan's case, the Administrative Instructions on Departmental Canteens and Railway Establishment Manual set out detailed rules with regard to running of canteens and the canteens in question were being run in accordance with those instructions. Those instructions and the undisputed facts placed on record led the Supreme Court to take the view that the in the case of employees of the statutory and non-statutory recognised canteens, the workmen were entitled to the declaration that they were railway servants. However, in the case of non-statutory non-recognised canteens, the railway administration having no control over their working, such a declaration was not given. The fact that the workmen in the first two categories of canteen had been treated as railway employees by the Railway Board in some of the canteen also contributed to the decision. We are of the view that the decision in M. M. R. Khan's case will not be of avail to the petitioner herein as it turned on the peculiar facts of that case. We are, therefore, unable to accept thee first contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners.
13. The second contention of the petitioner is advanced on the assumption and footing that the workmen in the canteen in the refinery are employed under a real and valid contract between the 1st respondent and the canteen Contractor. The contention is that the refinery and the other two installations where the departmentally run canteens are located should, together, be treated one establishment of the 1st respondent- Corporation for the purpose of a comparison of the emoluments and service condition of the canteen workmen. It is contended that it is legitimate to compare the emoluments and conditions of service of the canteen workmen in the departmentally run canteens with those of the canteen workmen in the refinery and that such comparison would show wide disparity for which there is no justification. In view of the regulatory provisions of the Act, particularly Rule 25 of the Rules framed thereunder, it would be impermissible for the contractor to give the workmen of the refinery canteen emoluments and service conditions different from those given to workmen of the departmentally run canteens.
14. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in (i) (F.C.I. Worker's Union v. Food Corporation of India , (2) Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of India 1974-I-LLJ-489 and (3) S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees Union v. S. G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Ltd., and Another 1986 I-LLJ-490. DR. Chandrachud, the learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 however, forcefully contended that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India (supra) unmistakably shows that "establishment" would be the site where the work is carried on particularly in the context of the definition of the said expression in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. Relying on another judgment of he Supreme Court in Messrs. Alloy Steel Project v. The Workmen 1971-I-LLJ-217, he contends that the concept of an establishment integrally related to a distinct situs of industrial activity was well recognised even under other cognate statutes like the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965. He, therefore, contended that the Chief Labour Commissioner, in his order dated August 26, 1992, rightly took the view that there could be no comparison between the workmen of the departmentally run canteens at Seweree and Wadibunder and the workmen of the refinery canteen for the simple reason that they were two distinct and different establishments. Counsel emphasised that under Rule 25 (2)(v)(a) of the Rules there was an obligation to give the same conditions of service only in the cases where the workmen employed by the contractor performed the same or similar kind of work as the workmen directly employed by the 'principal employer' of the 'establishment' The refinery which is recognized as a factory, is a separate 'establishment' within the meaning of the definition of the said terms in Section 2(1)(e)(ii) of the Act. The expression "Principal employer" is also defined in section 2(g) and, taking the relevant portion from Clause (ii) of section 2(1) applicable to a factory, it would be clear that the 'principal employer" in respect of the refinery establishment would be the person named as Manager of the factory. He submits that the principal employers in the case of Sewree and Wadibunder establishment and the refinery are different and therefore, there could be no question of invocation of Rule 25(2)(v)(a) of the Rules.
15. In our view, this contention advanced on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 which has found favour with the Chief Labour Commissioner as seen from his order dated August 26, 1992, is hypertechnical and flies in the face of the criteria for determination of integrality of the establishments which have been evolved by judicial precedents of the Supreme Court. Criteria like unity of management and finance functional integrality, proximity of geographical location, intertransferability of workmen and supervisory staff cannot be overlooked or ignored while deciding this question. In fact, the judgment in S.G. Chemical's case (supra) is a classic cases where the Supreme Court pointed out that the Head Office of the Company had been established for the purpose of carrying out the manufacturing activities at the factory and therefore, there was every reason to treat both the factory and head office as integral parts of one establishment. Observed the Supreme Court in 1986-I-LLJ-490 at 503, "A factory cannot produce or process goods unless raw materials required for that purpose are purchased. Equally, there can no be a factory manufacturing or processing goods unless the goods so manufactured or processed are marketed and sold. The one without the other is a practical impossibility. Similarly no factory can run unless salaries and other benefits are paid to the workmen nor can a factory functions without the necessary accounting in statistical data being prepared. These are integral parts of the manufacturing activities of the factory." Had we been required to decide the issue of integrality of establishments, these judgments of the Supreme court would have made it for midably difficult to accept the contentions advanced on behalf of the 1st and 2nd respondents. However in the view that we ultimately are inclined to take, it is unnecessary for us to decide the second contention which has been raised within the matrix of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder particularly Rule 25(2)(v)(a). We shall however, have occasion to rely on the observations of the Supreme Court for another purpose. It is unnecessary to decide the second contention raised by Mr. Singhvi as in our view, the petition is bound to succeed on the last contention which appears irresistible.
16. The last contention of Mr. Singhvi is that even if it is assumed that there is a valid contract in operation under the which the employees in the refinery canteen are employed by the contractor, the facts and circumstances placed on record show that there was a justifiable case for abolition of the system of contract labour in the canteen; despite opportunities, the Central Government not having done so, this is a fit case where this Court should issue a writ of the mandamus directing abolition of contract labour in the refinery canteen of the 1st respondent Corporation.
17. We have already set out the history of the long drawn out and definitely unequal, struggle of the canteen contract labour to have the system of contract labour in the canteen abolished. It is somewhat surprising that though the Act was brought of the statute book in the year 1970, the appropriate Government, wedded to the theory of a welfare State did not wake up to the realities of the situation. It also did not take any steps to the effectively discharge its Constitutional obligations particularly those under Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) of the constitution. It was not disputed by the learned Counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2, that under the Article of Association of the 1st respondent Corporation, the Central Government has ample powers to issue directions to the 1st Respondent in regard to its management. We have been informed that this power was not exercised, nor were any instructions given with regard to the abolition of contract system of the labour in canteens. More surprisingly, even after the concerned workmen litigated the matter by filing successive writ petitions, at each stage the petitions were opposed with increasing vehemence not only by the 1st respondent Corporation, but also by the Union of India. Even before us, the learned Counsel for Union of India did not advance any independent arguments but rest content with adoption of the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2. These are some of the peculiar and significant facts of this case, which we have noticed.
18. It was repeatedly contended by the learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 that, in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Dena Nath and others v. National Fertilisers Ltd. & Others 1992-I-LLJ-289 and B.H.E.L. Workers' Union v. Union of India 1985-I-LLJ-428, the decision to abolish contract labour could only be taken by the appropriate Government and that this area was totally out of bounds for this Court. It was implied that the High Court was even precluded from examining the argument and that the contention must be off-hand rejected, as if in blind obedience. Without meaning any disrespect, we deem it our duty to clear the air of this misconception in the realm of Constitutional duty. It is critique, not mystique; doctrine not dogma, which reigns in the discharge of Constitutional functions; we are unable to subscribe to the suggestion implict in the contention that the moment a judgment of the Supreme Court is cited before the High Court all ratiocinative process must be sus-pended. True, that Constitutional prescription and judicial comity require highest respect be paid to decision of the Supreme Court. But that does not mean abrogation or abolition of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. We are of the clear and firm view that discharge of our Constitutional duty requires us to examine these two decisions,, extract therefrom the ratio and if application, apply them. We shall do so.
19. The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, as its preamble suggests was brought on the statute Book "to regulate the employment of contract labour in certain establishments and to provide for its abolition in certain circumstances and for matters connected therewith." The judgment of the Supreme Court in B.H.E.L. Workers Association (supra) traces out the historical background leading to passing of this Act by the Parliament. The Supreme Court, in paragraph 32 of the said judgment, has pointed out as follows : (pp 430-432) "32. It is true that for a long time, a maleficent nature of the system of the contract labour and the destructive results which flow from it had been noticed by various committees appointed by the Government, including the Planning Commission, and that as a result of the reports and discussions etc. that the took place, the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 was passed. According to the Statement of objects and Reasons :
"The system of employment of contract labour lends of itself of the various abuses. The question of its abolition has been under the consideration of Government for a long time. In the Second-Five Year Plan, the Planning of Commission made certain recommendations, namely, undertaking of studies to ascertain the extent of the problem of contract labour, progressive abolition of system and improvement of service conditions of contract labour where the abolition was not possible. The matter was discussed at various meetings of Tripartite Committee at which the State Governments were also represented and general consensus of opinion was that the system should be abolished wherever possible or practicable and that in cases where this system could not be abolished altogether, the working conditions of contract labour should be regulated so as to ensure payment of wages and provisions of essential amenities.
2. The proposed Bill aims at abolition of contract labour in respect of such categories as may be notified by appropriate Government in the light of certain criteria that have been laid down, and at regulating the service conditions of contract labour where abolition is not possible. The bill provides for the setting up of Advisory Boards of a tripartite character, representing various interests, to advice Central and State Governments in administering the legislation and registration of establishments and contractors. Under the Scheme of the Bill the provision and maintenance of certain basic welfare amenities for contract labour, like drinking water and first aid facilities and in certain cases rest rooms and canteens, have been made obligatory. Provisions have also been made to guard against defaults in the matter of wage payment."
It is against this historical background that the Act came to be passed, under the which a salutary provision was made vesting the appropriate Government with the power to abolish contract labour. This the Government has to do in consultation with the Board. Sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act also lays down detailed guidelines for taking a decision on this matter. The sub-section reads thus :
"10. (2) Before issuing any notification under sub-section (1) in relation to an establishment, the appropriate Government shall have regard to the conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in that establishment and other relevant factors such as-
(a) Whether the process, operation or other work is incidental to, or necessary for the industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation that is carried on in the establishment;
(b) Whether it is perennial nature, that is to say, it is of sufficient duration, having regard to the nature of industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation carried on in that the establishment;
(c) Whether it is done ordinarily through regular workmen in that establishment or an establishment similar thereto;
(c) whether it is sufficient to employ considerable number of whole-time workmen."
20. The discretion exercisable by the appropriate Government under Section 10 in arriving at a decision to abolish or not to abolish contract labour in any establishment is hedged in by several requirements. The first is the obligatory consultation with the Central Board or, as the case may be, the State Board. Sub-section (2) requires the appropriate Government to have regard "to the conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in that establishment and other relevant factors" Which are indicated in detail in Clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (2) of section 10. It is for this reason that even in the BHEL Workers Association case (supra) although the Supreme Court itself noticed that there was invidious discrimination against contract labour and was of the view that the contract labour was entitled to same wages and service conditions as the workmen directly employed by the employer, the Supreme Court refrained from issuing a direction in the regard, leaving it to the appropriate Government with a direction to consider whether the employment of contract labour should not be prohibited under section 10 of the Act in any process, operation of other work in the establishment of BHEL. There was also a direction to the Chief Labour Commissioner to inquire whether the work done by the workmen employed by the contractor was the same type of the work as was done by the workmen directly employed by the principal employer.
21. Even in Dena Nath's case (supra), after analysing provisions of the Act, the Supreme Court pointed out that the Act serves two purposes : (1) regulation of the conditions of service of the workers employed by the contractor who is engaged by a principal employer, and (2) provision for the appropriate Government abolishing contract labour altogether in certain cases. The question before the Supreme Court in Dena Nath case, however, was whether merely because of a violation of the provisions of the said Act on the part of either the principal employer or the contractor, the workmen engaged by the contractor would per se become the direct workmen of the principal employer. This issue was answered in the negative by the Supreme court. The Supreme Court also considered its earlier judgment in Standard Vacuum Refining Co. of India v. Workmen 1960-II-LLJ-238. It was then pointed out that parliament, taking notice of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Standard Vacuum's case (supra), while giving power to the appropriate Government to abolish employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment, had laid down guidelines in Clauses (a) to (d) of the sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act, which were practically based on the guidelines given by the Supreme Court in the Standard Vacuum's case.
22. The Report of the Committee set up by the Board "to study the working of contract labour system in the working of canteens of the establishment of Bharat Petroleum Corporation (Refinery) Bombay, and keeping in view the provisions of section 10 of the Act, to make suitable recommendations whether or not the employment of contract labour in the work of canteens of the establishments of the said Corporation should be prohibited", has been placed on record. We have carefully perused the said Report. The Committee took notice of the fact that the canteen in the Refinery was admittedly being run pursuant to the statutory obligations cast upon the 1st respondent under Section 46 of the Factories Act, 1948. Two Members of the Committee also noticed that from the duration and the magnitude of the canteen services, it is evident that the canteen services are not only incidental and connected with main activities of refining crude oil but also of perennial and permanent nature. The first objection put forward before the Committee by the 1st and 2nd respondents was that the refinery had been established for carrying on the work of refining and marketing crude oil and that the canteen work was not incidental or ancillary thereto. Secondly, it was contended that the 'principal employers' in the case of refinery and the marketing installations being different, no valid comparison could be made of the work of the workmen employed in the refinery canteen with that of the workmen employed in the departmentally run canteens at the marketing installations. The Committee has noticed that the refinery engaged two officers in the nomenclature Administrative Officer (Canteen), for supervising the canteen services during the general shift and one Officer each in two other shifts. It noticed that the management of the 1st respondent procures and provides raw materials and provisions for preparation of food in the canteen, and these are being done not for one or two years but for more then 35 years. Out of the three Members of the Committee, two Members came to the conclusion that it was necessary to prohibit contract labour in the works of the canteens in the establishment of Bharat Petroleum Corporation (Refinery) at Mahul keeping in view of the basic consideration for prohibition of contract labour in any process as laid down under Section 10 of the Act. The 3rd Member was of the view that by applying the test laid down in the Section 10(2)(a) and (c) of the Act, the canteen services were neither incidental nor necessary to refine crude oil and that canteens in most of he refineries are not ordinarily run by the department labour. However, all three members were unanimous and strongly felt that the disparities in wages and other benefits received by the contract labour in the canteens and the junior-most unskilled labour engaged by the BPCL (Refinery) management should be reduced. It would thus appear that the Committee was, by the majority of 2 of 1, of the clear view that the system of contract labour should be abolished in the refinery Canteen of the 1st respondent while it unanimously felt that the wide disparity between the conditions of service of contract labour in canteens and the workmen in the departmentally run canteen should be removed, or, at any rate, substantially reduced. Looking to the statutory guidelines prescribed in Section 10(2) of the Act, we are of the view that the work in the canteens being in discharge statutory obligations under Section 46 of the Factories Act, 1948 is very much incidental to or connected with the work in the refinery. Then again, the facts show that the canteen in the refinery has been running on all the days in a year from the day the refinery was established. It is therefore of a perennial nature. The work is full-time. We also notice that while the work in the refinery canteen is carried out by the engaging contract labour, the same type of work is carried out in the marketing installations through departmentally employed labour. Finally, it is seen that there is enough work to the employ a large number of full-time workmen. Thus, all the consideration specified in Clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 10, of the Act are fulfilled. We have already noticed that these considerations have been culled out from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Standard Vacuum Oil's case (supra) wherein the Supreme Court has pointed out that if these factors are present, then there is no justification for engaging contract labour. We are thus of the view that if there had been bona fide and careful application of mind of the factors contained in the guidelines specified under Section 10(2) of the Act and the recommendations of the Committee appointed by the Board, it would have been impossible for the Central Government to arrive at the conclusion that the contract labour should not be abolished in the refinery canteen. It is, however, unfortunate that there was no application of mind either to the statutory guidelines or to the Committee's recommendations and the decision is not arrived at fairly justly. We have already pointed out that the Central Board chose not to make any recommendations and, merely on the fallacious ground that the Committee's Report was not unanimous, it left the entire matter to the decision of the Central Government. The Central Government, however, chose not to act in accordance with law in discharge of its statutory functions and duty.
23. The facts of the present case indicate total inaction of the part of the Central Government in the first instance, in the matter of abolition of the contract labour of the 1st respondents canteen, at its refinery, which led the workmen to file successive writ petitions in this Court. Even after constitution of a Committee by the Board to the consider the abolition of contract labour in the refinery canteen of the 1st respondent, there was considerable delay in dealing with the matter despite the fact that Writ Petition No. 2400 of 1991 was pending before this Court. This led this Court to give directions to the Union of India, the Central Board and the Committee thereof to expeditiously complete the deliberations on the issue of abolition of contract labour. It was only then that the concerned authorities were energised into acting. The Committee submitted a majority report to the Central Board recommending abolition of Contract Labour, but on the fallacious ground that there was a dissent in the Sub-Committee, the Central Board chose to leave the matter entirely to the Central Government, without making any recommendation in the matter. The Central Government thereafter took a decision, by its order dated March 17,1992, not to the abolish contract labour in the refinery canteen of the 1st respondent Corporation, which is seriously impugned in the present petition.
24. The order dated March 17, 1992 has been communicated to this Court only in an unusual fashion, without being placed on the record. The text of the order is not placed on the record of Court; we do not have the benefit of the knowing the reasons behind it. What we have on record is the letter dated March 17, 1992 addressed to the Central Government Advocate on record by the Deputy Secretary, Government of India, and Secretary to the Advisory Board, Communicating the decision of the Central Government. We have already quoted paragraph 2 of the said letter in the earlier part of this judgment. Since this by itself does not not indicate whether the statutory guidelines mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 10 had been kept of the in mind while issuing the order, we expected that the Union of India would indicate them atleast in the affidavit in its reply. The affidavit in reply dated March 21, 1992 filed by the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Secretary of the Central Advisory and Contract Labour Board, merely states as follows :
"The deponent submits that it is the view of the Government that Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 does not completely prohibit or outlaw contract labour. The Government has to take an overall view in the interest of the efficiency of the organisation and the peculiar facts and circumstances of each organisation and thereafter balance the interest of efficiency with the interest of labour. In the instant case, after taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case, the Government has taken a conscious decision not to abolish contract labour in the aforesaid case."
In our view, this is nothing but paying lip service to the statutory guidelines. Not only is there no application of mind to the factors indicated in Clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act, but there is advertance to "interest of the efficiency of the organisation" which was not germane. There is also no indication, whatsoever, as to why the report of the Committee, recommending abolition of contract Labour, by a majority of 2 to 1, was not accepted. We find no reasons whatsoever anywhere on the record as to why the Central Government has chosen to accept the minority view of the Committee not to abolish contract labour in the refinery of the 1st respondent. In the face of these glaring lacunae, we expected the learned Counsel for respondent No. 3, Union of India, to make some serious submissions in the matter. Unfortunately, in this case we notice greater opposition from respondents No. 1 and 2 to the abolition of the contract labour, than there is from respondent No. 3. In fact, after the learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 had concluded his arguments and we called upon the learned Counsel for respondent No. 3, he merely adopted the submissions of respondents No. 1 and 2 without adding anything thereto. We are thus of the view that the discretion of the appropriate government under Section 10 of the Act, to decide whether contract labour should be abolished or not, has not been exercised in conformity with the guidelines prescribed in the said section. The order of March 17, 1992 is, therefore, illegal and is liable to be set aside. The said order is, therefore, hereby quashed and set aside.
25. We specifically called upon the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents to address us on the question, what course should be adopted in case this Court decides to quash the impugned or order of the Central Government deciding not to abolish contract labour in the canteen of the 1st respondent's refinery. The learned Counsel replied that, in such an event, this Court should send back the matter to the Central Government for reconsideration, without deciding the matter for itself. Under normal circumstances we might have probably acceded to this suggestion. The glaring facts of this case, however, leave us with a distinct impression that the statutory authority, which is vested with the power of abolition of contract Labour under Section 10 of the Act, is not having an open mind and has already decided not to abolish the contract Labour in the canteen of the 1st respondent's refinery, perhaps because it is an Undertaking of the Central Government. We have arrived at this conclusion by considering the conduct of the Central Government, the lack of response shown by it to the said burning issue repeatedly being agitated by the concerned workmen and the apparent and inexplicable failure to act in accordance with law when left with no alternative but to decide the issue. The failure of the Government to remedy the situation by invoking its powers under the Articles of Association of the 1st respondent, also strengthens our conclusion. By acting in time, and promptly, avoidable litigation and continued agitation by the concerned workmen could have been averted.
26. In a situation like the present, is this Court helpless and bound to remand the matter to an authority, who, in the considered opinion of the Court, has prejudged the issue and failed to act fairly and justly and in accordance and due conformity with law, is the question that arises for consideration. Mr. Singhvi contends that, the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and the delay in resolution of the dispute since 1988 despite intervention of this Court from time to time, show that this is a fit case where the Court ought to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and direct the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 to abolish the system of contract labour in the refinery canteen of the 1st respondent. Relying on the judgments of the Supreme Court in (Nirmal Singh v. State of Punjab, 1984-II-LLJ-396 and (V. Veerarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 1987-I-LLJ-209 and (Sankari C.A.T.M. Sangham v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, 1983-I-LLJ-460, he contended that in exceptional situations, it is perfectly legitimate for the Court to decide the question for itself and issue a writ of mandamus. These cases arose under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which also vests the discretion, for making a reference for adjudication, in the appropriate Government. Considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in these cases, the Supreme Court set aside the order of Government not to make a reference and directed the appropriate Government, by a mandamus, to make the reference of the industrial disputes for adjudication. Although Dr. Chandrachud attempted to distinguish the judgment in Veerarajan's case (supra) by pointing out that in that case it was not the first order that was being set aside, but a second or third order, we are not impressed by this distinction. The principle to be culled out from these judgments is that, even where the discretion to act vests in a statutory functionary, if the Court is satisfied that, under the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the statutory authority is not likely to discharge its statutory functions in an unbiased manner in accordance with the statutory guidelines or there is likely to be undue delay, it is permissible for a Constitutional Court to direct a writ of mandamus to the said authority to act in a particular manner. We are of the view that in the instant case it would be of no use remanding the matter for consideration of the Central Government which seems to be pre-determined in the matter. We are, therefore, satisfied that it is permissible for us to issue a direction to the respondents with regard to abolition of contract labour. We are also satisfied that this is a fit case where we should exercise our Constitutional powers and issue a writ of a mandamus to the respondents to abolish the system of contract labour in the refinery canteen of the 1st respondent with effect from the date specified hereafter. The abolition is made prospective in order to give sufficient time to the respondent to make necessary arrangements.
27. Although we had indicated earlier that, the question as to whether the establishments of the 1st respondent, consisting of the refinery and the marketing division installations at Sewree and Wadibunder, could be treated integral parts of one establishment was being left open, we are of the view that once a direction for abolition of contract labour is given, the difficulties projected by learned Counsel for the respondents, based upon the peculiar definitions of the expressions "establishment", and "principal employer" in the Act and the limitations on the invocation of Rule 25(2)(v)(a) of the Rules, need not cramp us. The workmen presently employed as contract labour in he canteen of the 1st respondent's refinery, upon abolition of contract labour, would become regular workmen of the 1st respondent and it would be a case of application of the general criteria laid down by the Supreme Court for integrality of establishments (Associated Cement Company's case 1960-I-LLJ-1, S. G. Chemicals (supra) and other cases. On the application of the said criteria, there is no difficulty in holding that for the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, atleast, the establishments of the 1st respondent could be treated as one. The material placed on record with regard to the work in the refinery canteen does not show that there is any real distinction or difference between the work of the refinery canteen workers and the workmen of the departmentally run canteens. Articles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution would preclude discrimination in the matter of emoluments and conditions of service of the workmen in the departmentally run canteens at the three places, when their work is the same. The logical conclusion would be that the workmen employed in the departmentally run canteen within the refinery premises would be entitled to the same emoluments and conditions of service as the workmen in the departmentally run canteens at Sewree and Wadibunder establishments on and from the date the contract labour system is abolished. Meanwhile, they will continue to draw wages as per the interim order.
28. The next question to be considered is whether the respondents have absolute discretion in appointing workmen in the canteen of the refinery, after abolition of contract labour system and whether they are free to jettison the existing contract labour altogether. Mr. Singhvi relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court in (Sankar Mukherjee v. Union of India, 1990-II-LLJ-443 to contend that the respondents be directed to continue the present workmen even after abolition of contract labour in the canteen in the refinery. Sankar Mukherjee's case was also one under the Act. The appropriate Government had issued a notification prohibiting employment of contract labour in the work of 'cleaning and stacking of bricks', but excluded the workmen of the same department doing the jobs of 'loading and unloading' from the purview of the notification. The Supreme Court took the view that the purchase of bricks, transportation to the factory, unloading, stacking and use in the furnance were all jobs in one continuous process and therefore they are incidental or allied to each other. That being so, all the workmen performing the said jobs were required to be treated alike. The Supreme Court therefore saw no justification for excluding the jobs of loading and unloading of bricks from wagons and trucks from the purview of the abolition notification. Consequently, the exclusory words "except loading and unloading of bricks from wagons and trucks", used in paragraph 9 of the concerned notification, were struck down by the Supreme Court as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court then directed that the writ petitioners and other workers doing the job of loading and unloading of bricks from wagons and trucks in the brick department be treated on par with effect from the date of the notification with those who were doing the jobs of cleaning and stacking in the said department. The Supreme Court went a step ahead and directed that the workmen doing the job of loading and unloading who had already been retrenched during pendency of writ petition should also be put back in service with all back wages and consequential benefits. Relying on this judgment Mr. Singhvi contended that we should not rest content with directing the abolition of contract labour, for then it would merely be a pyrrhic victory for the concerned canteen workmen, who would lose their jobs forthwith unless they are protected in their employment, as was done in Sankar Mukherjee's case. The contention appeals to us. However, we are also cognisant of the fact that some discretion must be left to the 1st respondent and if, for good and valid reasons, all the existing workmen working in the refinery canteen are not required for absorption as regular workmen, such decision should be on the basis of some guidelines for discharge of the surplus labour.
29. In the result, the writ petition is allowed, rule is made absolute, and the following orders are made :
(1) The respondents are directed to abolish the system of contract labour existing in the canteen of the refinery of the 1st respondent with effect from April 1, 1993;
(2) Before the aforesaid date, the 1st respondent and 2nd respondent shall determine the complement of different categories of workmen required for running the canteen within the refinery departmentally;
(3) With effect from April 1, 1993 such number of workmen from amongst the present canteen labour working in the refinery, determined as the required complement, shall stand absorbed as regular workmen in employment of the 1st respondent.
(4) Upon absorption into service of the 1st respondent, the concerned workmen shall be extended all emoluments and conditions of service as are applicable to the workmen of corresponding categories in the canteens at Sewree and Wadibunder installations;
(5) If any workmen from amongst the existing contract labour are found surplus to the requirement in any category, the 1st and 2nd respondents shall discharge such workmen after complying with the provisions of Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Even while doing so, however, those respondents shall keep in view the fact that the workmen concerned have been rendering service in the refinery canteen for over a period of time and that, therefore, ordinarily they have a right to continue in employment.
(6) With effect from today until April 1, 1993, each of the workmen employed under the contractor shall be paid the additional amount of Rs. 750/- as directed under the order dated April 29, 1992;
(7) In the interregnum, between the date of this order and April 1, 1993, the respondents are restrained from discharging any of the workmen presently engaged as contract labour, except on grounds of misconduct;
(8) The respondents shall pay to the petitioner costs of this petition which are quantified at Rs. 5,000/-.
30. An oral application for stay of the directions given in the judgment made on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 is rejected since about 3-1/2 months are to elapse before the directions regarding abolition of contract labour becomes effective.
31. Certified copy of the judgment, if applied for on payment of requisite charges, to be supplied within a week of the case papers reaching the Department.