Allahabad High Court
Jiya-Uddin (Minor) Thru. His Father ... vs State Of U.P. & Anr. on 25 February, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 ALL 1107
Author: Manish Mathur
Bench: Manish Mathur
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH ?Court No. - 17 Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 1234 of 2018 Revisionist :- Jiya-Uddin (Minor) Thru. His Father Jalaluddin Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. & Anr. Counsel for Revisionist :- Punit Kumar Shukla,Amitchaudharyamicuscuriae Counsel for Opposite Party :- Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Manish Mathur,J.
1. Heard Mr. Amit Chaudhary, learned amicus curiae, Mr. Punit Kumar Shukla, learned counsel for revisionist and Mr. Aniruddh Kumar Singh, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of State. As per report of Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 17.12.2018, notices were served personally upon Opposite Party no.2 but no one has put in appearance on his behalf.
2. Present criminal revision has been filed against order dated 04.05.2018 passed by Juvenile Justice Board, Sitapur in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No.57 of 2017 bearing Case Crime No.153 of 2017, under Section 376 IPC, Police Station Mishrikh, District Sitapur. Under challenge is also the order dated 25.08.2018 passed by IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Sitapur in Criminal Appeal No.42 of 2018 upholding the order of rejection. Present case is where the revisionist was aged between 16 to 18 years, i.e. revisionist was aged about 16 years one month and 21 days.
3. Learned AGA at the very outset has submitted that the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act has undergone a major change in the year 2015 specifically with regard to Sections 15 and 18 of the said Act which would have a bearing on consideration of bail application filed by a child in conflict with law under Section 12 of the said Act. It has been submitted that Section 15 now provides for a preliminary assessment into heinous offences by the Juvenile Justice Board and in case of a heinous offence alleged to have been committed by a child who has completed or is above the age of 16 years, a preliminary assessment regarding his mental and physical capacity and ability to understand consequences of offence which he allegedly committed is required prior to consideration of bail application of such a child i.e. filed under Section 12 of the Act. Learned counsel has drawn attention to Section 2(33) of the Act in which "heinous offences" have been described as those which include offences for which minimum punishment under the Indian Penal Code or any other law for the time being in force is imprisonment for seven years or more. The upshot of arguments raised by learned AGA therefore is that while considering a bail application of such a child who has completed or is over the age of 16 years as on the date of occurrence of incident, not only the factors indicated in Section 12 of the Act are required to be seen but a preliminary assessment as contemplated under Section 15 and consequent orders passed under Section 18(3) of the Act are also required to be considered by the Board prior to passing any final order on a bail application filed by such a child under Section 12 of the Act.
4. Learned counsel has relied upon judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Radhika (Juvenile) vs. State of U.P. in Criminal Appeal No.4418 of 2019 and other connected matters. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Mangesh Rajbhar vs. State of U.P. & Another reported in 2018(6) ADJ 60.
5. Mr. Amit Chaudhary, learned Amicus Curiae assisted by Mr. Punit Kumar Shukla, learned counsel for revisionist has refuted the submissions advanced by learned AGA with the submission that provisions of Sections 15 and 18(3) of the Act are completely different from provisions indicated in Section 12 of the Act. Attention is drawn to Section 18 Sub-section (3) whereby the Juvenile Justice Board after preliminary assessment under Section 15 is required to pass an order that there is need for trial of the child as an adult but the said provisions are not to be found in Section 12 which has been kept completely separate from the changed provisions incorporated in the Act. As such, it has been submitted that the bail application of a child in conflict with law who has completed or is over the age of 16 years as on the date of incident is required to be seen only in terms of provisions of Section 12 of the Act without any reference to Sections 15 and 18(3) of the Act. Learned counsel has relied upon the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Santosh vs. State of U.P. & Ors. rendered in Criminal Appeal No.5814 of 2018.
6. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of record, it is evident that in case of a child in conflict with law as defined under Section 2(13) of the Act who is alleged to have committed an offence and has either completed or is over the age of 16 years, application for bail is required to be filed under Section 12 of the Act which is as follows:-
"12. Bail to a person who is apparently a child alleged to be in conflict with law.?(1) When any person, who is apparently a child and is alleged to have committed a bailable or non-bailable offence, is apprehended or detained by the police or appears or brought before a Board, such person shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other law for the time being in force, be released on bail with or without surety or placed under the supervision of a probation officer or under the care of any fit person:
Provided that such person shall not be so released if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that the release is likely to bring that person into association with any known criminal or expose the said person to moral, physical or psychological danger or the person's release would defeat the ends of justice, and the Board shall record the reasons for denying the bail and circumstances that led to such a decision.
(2) When such person having been apprehended is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the officer-in-charge of the police station, such officer shall cause the person to be kept only in an observation home in such manner as may be prescribed until the person can be brought before a Board.
(3) When such person is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the Board, it shall make an order sending him to an observation home or a place of safety, as the case may be, for such period during the pendency of the inquiry regarding the person, as may be specified in the order.
(4) When a child in conflict with law is unable to fulfil the conditions of bail order within seven days of the bail order, such child shall be produced before the Board for modification of the conditions of bail."
7. Under Section 15 of the Act, a preliminary assessment into heinous offences is required to be made by Juvenile Justice Board and is particularly relevant in case of heinous offence alleged to have been committed by a child who has completed or is aged more than 16 years. In such a situation, the Board is required to conduct a preliminary assessment regarding his mental and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of offence and circumstances under which he has allegedly committed the offence. The said assessment is required to be made in order to ensure compliance of provisions of Section 18(3) of the Act. Sections 15 and 18 are as follows:-
"15. Preliminary assessment into heinous offences by Board.?(1) In case of a heinous offence alleged to have been committed by a child, who has completed or is above the age of sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a preliminary assessment with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he allegedly committed the offence, and may pass an order in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 18:
Provided that for such an assessment, the Board may take the assistance of experienced psychologists or psycho-social workers or other experts. Explanation.?For the purposes of this section, it is clarified that preliminary assessment is not a trial, but is to assess the capacity of such child to commit and understand the consequences of the alleged offence.
(2) Where the Board is satisfied on preliminary assessment that the matter should be disposed of by the Board, then the Board shall follow the procedure, as far as may be, for trial in summons case under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974):
Provided that the order of the Board to dispose of the matter shall be appealable under sub-section (2) of section 101:
Provided further that the assessment under this section shall be completed within the period specified in section 14.
18. Orders regarding child found to be in conflict with law.?(1) Where a Board is satisfied on inquiry that a child irrespective of age has committed a petty offence, or a serious offence, or a child below the age of sixteen years has committed a heinous offence, then, notwithstanding anything contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, and based on the nature of offence, specific need for supervision or intervention, circumstances as brought out in the social investigation report and past conduct of the child, the Board may, if it so thinks fit,?
(a) allow the child to go home after advice or admonition by following appropriate inquiry and counselling to such child and to his parents or the guardian;
(b) direct the child to participate in group counselling and similar activities;
(c) order the child to perform community service under the supervision of an organisation or institution, or a specified person, persons or group of persons identified by the Board;
(d) order the child or parents or the guardian of the child to pay fine: Provided that, in case the child is working, it may be ensured that the provisions of any labour law for the time being in force are not violated;
(e) direct the child to be released on probation of good conduct and placed under the care of any parent, guardian or fit person, on such parent, guardian or fit person executing a bond, with or without surety, as the Board may require, for the good behaviour and child's well-being for any period not exceeding three years;
(f) direct the child to be released on probation of good conduct and placed under the care and supervision of any fit facility for ensuring the good behaviour and child's well-being for any period not exceeding three years;
(g) direct the child to be sent to a special home, for such period, not exceeding three years, as it thinks fit, for providing reformative services including education, skill development, counselling, behaviour modification therapy, and psychiatric support during the period of stay in the special home:
Provided that if the conduct and behaviour of the child has been such that, it would not be in the child's interest, or in the interest of other children housed in a special home, the Board may send such child to the place of safety.
(2) If an order is passed under clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (1), the Board may, in addition pass orders to?
(i) attend school; or
(ii) attend a vocational training centre; or
(iii) attend a therapeutic centre; or
(iv) prohibit the child from visiting, frequenting or appearing at a specified place; or
(v)undergo a de-addiction programme.
(3) Where the Board after preliminary assessment under section 15 pass an order that there is a need for trial of the said child as an adult, then the Board may order transfer of the trial of the case to the Children's Court having jurisdiction to try such offences."
8. A conjoint reading of Sections 15 and 18(3) of the Act makes it evident that it is only when a heinous offence as defined under Section 2(33) of the Act is alleged to have been committed by a child who has completed or is above the age of 16 years that a preliminary assessment is required to be made. The wordings of said section make it apparent that such a preliminary assessment is required in order to enable passing of order in accordance with provisions of Section 18(3) of the Act. Proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 15 enables the Board to take assistance of experienced psychologists or psycho-social workers or other experts. Explanation thereof also clarifies the fact that the preliminary assessment is not a trial but is only in order to assess the capacity of such child to commit and understand the consequences of alleged offence.
9. Sub-section (2) of Section 15 provides that where the Board is satisfied on a preliminary assessment that the matter should be disposed of by the Board, then the procedure, as far as may be for trial in summons case under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is required to be followed.
10. The entire purpose of a preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the Act is only to enable the Board to pass relevant orders under Section 18 (3) of the Act which provides that the Board after preliminary assessment may pass an order that there is need for trial of the said child as a result and consequently may order transfer of trial of case to the Children's Court having jurisdiction.
11. It is a relevant factor that the preliminary assessment required to be made under Section 15 of the Act is only as a guide for the purposes of passing of relevant orders by the Board under Section 18(3), which in its turn is only to enable the Board to pass an order that there is need for trial of the said child as an adult. In case such an order is passed treating the child as an adult, the Board is required to order transfer of the trial of the case to Children's Court. It is thus evident that the entire purpose of passing an order by Board under Section 18(3) is for the purposes of trial. Neither Section 15 nor Section 18(3) of the Act indicates that such provisions are to be followed even in case of consideration of an application for bail under Section 12 of the Act. It is also a relevant fact that despite aforesaid provisions having been incorporated in Sections 15 and 18, there is no such consequential provision in Section 12 of the Act pertaining to grant of bail to such a child.
12. With regard to interpretation of statute, it is settled law that statute is an edict of the legislature and where the words of statute are clear without any ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or take upon itself the task of altering the statutory provisions by breathing into the provisions, words which have not been expressly incorporated by the legislature.
13. It is only in case where the words of statute are ambiguous or a reading of which clearly indicates that it is a case of 'casus omissus' that the court can interpret the provisions incorporated in statute. Hon'ble the Supreme court referring to various pronouncements in the case of Bharat Aluminium Company versus Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. reported in (2012) 9 SCC 552 has held that the court must proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said. Even where there is a 'casus omissus' it is for the others than the courts to remedy the defect. The relevant paragraph in the case of Bharat Aluminium Company (supra) is as follows:-
"65. Mr Sorabjee has also rightly pointed out the observations made by Lord Diplock in Duport Steels Ltd. [(1980) 1 WLR 142 : (1980) 1 All ER 529 (HL)] In the aforesaid judgment, the House of Lords disapproved the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in discerning the intention of the legislature; it is observed that: (WLR p. 157 C-D) "... the role of the judiciary is confined to ascertaining from the words that Parliament has approved as expressing its intention what that intention was, and to giving effect to it. Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the Judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral. In controversial matters such as are involved in industrial relations there is room for differences of opinion as to what is expedient, what is just and what is morally justifiable. Under our Constitution it is Parliament's opinion on these matters that is paramount." (emphasis supplied) In the same judgment, it is further observed: (WLR p. 157 F) "... But if this be the case it is for Parliament, not for the judiciary, to decide whether any changes should be made to the law as stated in the Acts...." (emphasis supplied)"
14. The principles with regard to 'casus omissus' and its implementation have also been dealt with by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Shakti Cooperative Housing Society in which the relevant paragraphs are as follows:-
"19. It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse [(1997) 6 SCC 312 : AIR 1998 SC 74] .) The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moo PCC 1 : 4 MIA 179] courts cannot aid the legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel [(1998) 3 SCC 234 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 737 : JT (1998) 2 SC 253] .) It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. [See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd. [(1978) 1 All ER 948 : (1978) 1 WLR 231 (HL)] ] Rules of interpretation do not permit courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of a doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn, L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans [1910 AC 444 : 1910 WN 161 (HL)] , quoted in Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Deviah [AIR 1962 SC 847] .)"
"23. Two principles of construction -- one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole -- appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danckwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou [(1966) 1 QB 878 : (1965) 3 All ER 539 : (1965) 3 WLR 1011 (CA)] (All ER p. 544 I), "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result", we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC [1963 AC 557 : (1963) 1 All ER 655 : (1963) 2 WLR 559 (HL)] where at AC p. 577 (All ER p. 664 I) he also observed: "This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges."
15. As per Maxwell's interpretation of statutes, the four main rules to interpret a statute are the literal, golden, mischief and the integrated approach, known as the purposive approach. While the literal rule uses plain ordinary meaning of words, the golden rule is an extension thereof and is brought into play only where the literal rule creates an absurdity.
16. Regarding, the purposive approach, Lord Denning in the case of Notham vs London Borough of Barnet (1978)1 WLR 220 has held the purposive approach being one that will promote general legislative purpose underlying the provisions.
17. In addition to aforesaid statutory interpretations, three rules are also required to be kept in mind which are; ejusdem generis- meaning of same kind, Noscitur a sociis- meaning a word is known by the company it keeps, and expressio unius est exclusio aterius - meaning where express mention of one thing excludes other.
18. With regard to literal and purposive interpretation of statute, it is seen that statement of objects and reasons of the Act indicate that the legislation was required to be enacted in view of several issues such as incidence of abuse of children in institutions, inadequate facilities, quality of care and rehabilitation measures in homes, high pendency of cases etc. due to which enactment of the legislation was required to ensure proper care, protection, development, treatment and social integration of children in difficult circumstance by adopting a child friendly approach keeping in view the best interest of the children in mind.
19. Upon applicability of the literal rule of interpretation of statute read with the purposive intention, it is clear that the legislation was enacted keeping in view the best interest of the child in mind in order to ensure their proper care and social re-integration, which cannot be served by keeping the child interminably under custody while awaiting the result of detailed evaluation under Section 15 and consequent order under Section 18(3) of the Act.
20. Considering the fact that provisions of Section 15 read with Section 18(3) of the Act are not to be found in Section 12 of the Act, it cannot be said that the provisions incorporated in Section 15 and Section 18(3) are ejusdem generis with that of Section 12.
21. In the present case, it is easily seen that the wordings of all the three sections separately are quite clear and unambiguous therefore not requiring any additional supplement of words. The legislature in its wisdom has clearly not amended Section 12 of the Act as a consequence to provisions incorporated in Sections 15 and 18(3) of the Act. As such, the provisions of Sections 15 and 18 (3) cannot be read into Section 12 of the Act. As a consequence, it cannot be said that a preliminary assessment under Section 15 is required to be made at the time of consideration of bail application under Section 12 of the Act.
22. This Court in the case of Santosh (supra) has also held as follows:
"9. It is pertinent to mention here that Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act has not been amended so far as the parameters and yardstick for granting bail to the juvenile-accused is concerned. Therefore, while rejecting the bail application of such juvenile, it cannot be the criteria that the alleged offence is of serious and heinous nature. The order must show that the grant of bail to the juvenile accused is against his interest as there is possibility of his being associated with known criminals, or there is some sort of moral, physical or psychological danger to him or there is likelihood of end of justice being defeated. All these conditions have been incorporated in law in order to ensure justice to the juvenile."
23. In the case of Radhika (Juvenile) (supra), this Court was considering the question as to whether appeal filed under Section 101(5) of the Act is an appropriate remedy for appellants after getting their respective bail application rejected by Children's Court/ Special Sessions Judge, Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act. Second question pertained to whether while deciding application of a juvenile between the age group of 16 to 18 years, the seriousness, gravity of offence and respective role in commission of crime would also be a determining factor while releasing them on the proceedings opted by them. Learned Single Judge while deciding the second question has clearly held that while deciding bail of such a delinquent ranging between the age group of 16 to 18 years, it would be discretionary upon the Court to take into account factors regarding his mental, physical capacity, ability to understand the gravity of a heinous offence and respective participation in crime and circumstances for the particular grave and serious offence in addition to grounds provided under Section 12 (proviso) of the Act. It has been held that all these factors too are determinative factors while adjudicating the bail applications of juvenile offenders in the age group of 16 to 18 years since not considering the said factors would reduce the object of present legislation to naught.
24. This Court in the case of Mangesh Rajbhar (supra) after considering provisions of Sections 15 and 18 of the Act has also held that (gravity of offence is certainly relevant though not decisive. It is this relevance amongst the other factors where gravity of offence committed works and serves as a guide to grant or refuse bail in conjunction with other relevant factors mentioned in proviso to Section 12(1) of the Act particularly on the ground that release of such a juvenile would defeat the ends of justice). It has further been held that orders under Section 18 although are concerned with final orders to be made while dealing with the case of juvenile can serve as a guide to exercise of power for grant of bail to juvenile.
25. The aforesaid two judgments have clearly taken into account the conditions required to be considered while adjudicating the bail application of juvenile under Section 12 of the Act. Particular emphasis has been laid upon the third condition that release of such a juvenile would defeat the ends of justice. It is under this provision of the proviso that both the judgments have held that gravity of charges and circumstances, under which a juvenile has allegedly committed an offence, has been held to be required to be seen at the time of consideration of bail application.
26. Once seen in the light of proviso to Section 12 of the Act, particularly the conditions indicated in Section 12 that the release of a juvenile between the age of 16 to 18 years and accused of a heinous offence would defeat the ends of justice, definitely the gravity of charges leveled against the person would be required to be seen since the words would 'defeat the ends of justice' cannot be seen in isolation or in a vacuum. In order for the Board or the Court of competent jurisdiction to arrive at a conclusion that release of a juvenile accused of heinous offence would defeat the ends of justice, necessarily the gravity of charges and circumstances, surrounding involvement of juvenile in the alleged heinous offence would be a material factor.
27. Keeping the aforesaid in mind, however it is made clear that the aforesaid factors that are to be required to be kept in mind would be completely different from the preliminary assessment required to be made under Section 15 of the Act. The factors regarding gravity of charge and circumstances surrounding a heinous offence is only for the purpose of understanding whether release of such a juvenile would defeat the ends of justice. For consideration of a bail application under Section 12 of the Act, a complete preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the Act is neither required to be done nor considered.
28. In the backdrop of aforesaid, present criminal revision is being adjudicated in the absence of any such report under Section 15 of the Act.
29. In the present case, the juvenile has been accused under Section 376 IPC. Learned counsel for revisionist has submitted that as per reading of the first information report, incident is said to be of 24.5.2017 when the revisionist is said to have outraged the modesty of daughter of complainant. Learned counsel for revisionist submits that medical examination was conducted on the very same day but does not corroborate the allegations levelled under Section 376 IPC. It has also been submitted that in the trial, the prosecutrix has already turned hostile. It has been submitted that revisionist is in custody since 26.5.2017 and more than two and half years have passed since then.
30. Learned AGA appearing on behalf of State has opposed the bail application on the ground that a perusal of medical report will make it apparent that the medical examination was conducted on the very same day and clearly indicates injuries upon the prosecutrix. It has also been submitted that revisionist was named in the FIR which was corroborated in the statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
31. Upon consideration of factual situation and submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties, it is apparent that revisionist at the time of occurrence of alleged incident was aged more than 16 years. Although the charge levelled against revisionist is quite grave being under Section 376 IPC but it is also a relevant factor that trial has not yet concluded and evidence is ongoing. Revisionist has been in custody for more than two and half years since 26.05.2017.
32. The report of District Probation Officer, states that the revisionist does not have any criminal history and has studied uptill Class IX. Nothing adverse regarding his social behaviour has been indicated in the said report upon questioning of villagers.
33. A perusal of orders impugned indicates that bail has been rejected only considering the gravity of charges levelled against revisionist without seriously adverting to the provisions of Section 12 of the Act required to be considered for purposes of bail. There is no material on record to indicate that upon release from bail, the revisionist would be brought into association with any known criminal or would be exposed to moral physical or psychological danger. That his release would defeat the ends of justice cannot be seen in isolation only with regard to gravity of charges but has to be considered in terms of the report of District Probation Officer as well. Neither of the orders impugned nor any material on record indicate that release of revisionist would defeat the ends of justice.
34. In view of fact that there is no material on record to indicate that release of revisionist would bring him into association with any known criminal or would expose him to moral physical psychological danger or would defeat the ends of justice, the revision is allowed and order dated 04.05.2018 passed by Juvenile Justice Board, Sitapur in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No.57 of 2017 bearing Case Crime No.153 of 2017, under Section 376 IPC, Police Station Mishrikh, District Sitapur rejecting bail application of Revisionist and judgment and order dated 25.08.2018 passed by IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Sitapur in Criminal Appeal No.42 of 2018 are hereby set aside.
35. Let revisionist Jiya-Uddin be enlarged on bail in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No.57 of 2017 bearing Case Crime No.153 of 2017, under Section 376 IPC, Police Station Mishrikh, District Sitapur subject to executing personal bond by his father/ guardian along with two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the court/board concerned. The father/ guardian shall also furnish an undertaking that he will keep the revisionist-applicant under his effective control and shall make every endeavour to ensure that the revisionist should not commit any illegal or immoral act and the revisionist should not join the association with any known criminal.
36. Before parting with the case, this Court would like to appreciate the assistance rendered by Mr. Amit Chaudhary, learned counsel, who was appointed amicus curiae in this matter vide order dated 21.1.2020. Registry is directed to pay Rs.20,000/- as fee to him for rendering assistance to this Court. Senior Registrar, High Court shall ensure compliance of same.
Order Date :- 25.2.2020 Subodh/-