Delhi High Court
Jamal Haji Jakaria vs Union Of India And Ors. on 1 December, 1988
JUDGMENT Charanjit Talwar, J.
(1) The detenu herein., Jamal Haji Jakaria challenges the legality of the order of detention dated the 17th August, 1988 passed under Section 3(2)(a) read with Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (hereinafter called the 'Act'). The impugned order was passed by the Collector and District Magistrate, East Godavari District, Kakinada (Andhra Pradesh) against the detenu herein, with a view to preventing him from further acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodity essential to the community.
(2) The central ground of detention stated in the grounds of detention, also dated the 17th August 1988 is that the detenu, who holds a license for doing business of sugar in whole sale and in retail, had indulged in diversion of levy sugar for pecuniary benefits and thus acted in a manner prejudocoa; to the maintenance of supplies of commodity essential to the commodity. In support of this ground, facts, which according to the detraining authority, stood proved, have been stated in paragraphs 2 to 33 of the grounds of detentions. Along with the grounds, a list of 43 documents relied upon (at pages 55 to 57) was annesed, It is admitted before us that copies of those documents (running into 128 pages) were also supplied to the detenu.
(3) From the documents which are no record, it appears that the detenu had made a representation of 26th August, 1988 seeking setting aside of the detention order, to the detaining authority. He also addressed similar representations to (1) the Advisory Board, (2) the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh and (3) the Central Government. All these representations are also dated the 26th August, 1988. By the order of 8th September, 1988, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure x-1 with rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner, the detenu was informed that: "HIS representation dated 26-8-88 against his detention has been considered by the Government and after careful examination, it has been rejected."
(4) However, before the issuance of this order, the detenu made further representations, two of which are dated the 12th September, 1988--one to the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh and the other to the District Magistrate, East Godavari District, Kakinada (the detaining authority). A week prior to the making of those two representations, his son had made one more representation to the Central government on 5th September, 1988. This representation was forwarded to the Minister concerned by a Member of Parliament.
(5) By the order dated the 29th September, 1988 (copy Annexure X-IV to the rejoinder affidavit), the detenu was informed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh that his second representation to he Chief Minister was a copy of his earlier representation dated the 26th August, 1988 and that the decision already taken is reiterated. The reference was to the order dated the 8th September, 1988 (Annexure X-I to the rejoinder affidavit, referred to above). He was further informed that his representation dated the 12th September, 1988 had been considered and rejected. In that representation dated the 12th September, 1988, the detenu had sought copies of further documents, which according to him had been relied upon and referred to in the grounds of detention by the detaining authority. It is admitted before us that a large number of documents were supplied to the detenu on 20th September, 1988 in accordance with his request.
(6) The detenu was produced before the Advisory Board on 22nd September, 1988, which reported to the Government that in its opinion there was sufficient ground for the detention of the detenu herein. By another order of 29th September, 1988, the Government of Andhra Pradesh, in exercise of the powers conferred on it under sub-section (1) of Section 12 read with Section 13 of the Act, confirmed the impugned detention order and directed that the detention of the petitioner be continued for the whole of the period of six months from the date of detention, i.e., 17th August, 1988.
(7) According to the detenu, his representation dated the 5th September, 1988 made to the Central Government had not been considered by the Central Govt. "till date", i.e., till the filing of the petition on 26th September, 1988. There is no reference in the petition to the representation dated the 26th August, 1988 made to the Government of India. From the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 1, it appears that the first representation was rejected on 16th September, 1988. According to respondents 2 and 3, a telegram, dated the 22nd September, 1988 to that effect, was received by the Andhra Pradesh Government from the Central Govt. A photo-copy of that telegram produced before us shows that the same was received in the said Secretariat on 27th September, 1988.
(8) The second representation dated the 5th September, 1988 made to the Central Government, which had been forwarded to the Minister for Food and Civil Supplies by Shri P.R.R. Mawani, M.P., was referred by the Minister to the Law Ministry for their opinion on that very day. That representation was eventually rejected by him on 24th October, 1988. The decision of the Central Government was conveyed to the Superintendent, Central Prison, Visakhapatnam on 26th October, 1988 with a direction to convey the same to the detenu.
(9) As noticed above, the factum of rejection of the second representation by the Central Government was not known to the petitioner when the present petition was filed on 26th September, 1988. The petition was listed for preliminary hearing on 28th September, 1988 and was admitted to D.B. (10) The learned Addl. Advocate General of Andhra Pradesh has taken a preliminary objection. His plea is that the detention order having been passed by the- District Magistrate of East Godavari District, Kakinada and it having been confirmed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. He submits that a cause of action for the detenu to challenge the order arises exclusively and solely in the State of Andhra Pradesh. While admitting that as per the requirements of Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act, the State Government did forward to the Central Government the required report and the particulars having a hearing on the necessity of passing the impugned order, the submission was that by itself this fact would not change the legal position as the power of the Central Government was limited to that of revocation of the order or confirming the same.
(11) The objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in cases in which the detention orders were passed in other States, has been considered by this Court in various petitions. A similar contention raised was negatived in Harish Taneja Vs. Union of India & Ors reported in (24) 1983 Delhi Law Times 276 (1) by a Division Bench, of which, one of us (Talwar, J). was a member. In the said case the impugned order had been passed by the State of Maharashtra. It was held that : "IT is apparent from the facts of this case that the representation of the petitioner to the Central Government challenging the continued detention was rejected at Delhi. In view of this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court is not ousted although there is no doubt that the Bombay High Court would also have the jurisdiction to entertain this petition. The preliminary objection is thus rejected being misconceived."
(12) Another Division Bench while dealing with this very objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in Adattil Mohd. Vs. Union of India, (Cr. Writ Petition 593/87, decided on 22nd July 1988)(2) agreed with this view. In the said case, the distention order under Cofeposa had been passed by the State of Keraia. It was held that : "AGAIN under Section 3(2) of the Act when an order of direction is made by the State Government or by an Officer empowered by the State Government, the state Government shall within 10 days forward to the Central Govt. a report in respect of the order. The forwarding of this report, in our opinion is not a mere formality. The Central Government is required to apply its mind. This also gives jurisdiction to the Court at Delhi."
(13) Mr. Herjinder Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner in reply raised a further pica, which according to him had not been dealt with in earlier cases. He submitted that the power vested in the Central Government to revoke the detention orders passed by the State Governments under this Act and under other Acts relating to preventive detention, is supervisory. This power may be exercised on information received by it under Section 3(4) of the Act. This power is also exerciseable on receipt of a representation from the detenu for revocation of the detention. He, therefore, submitted that the cause of action in part arises in Delhi as the Central Government failed to exercise its power. His reliance is on Sub-Article (2) of Article 226 of the. Constitution of India, which reads as follows : "(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the scat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories."
Now it is settled that the power of the Central Govt. in this respect is supervisory. It has been so held in. Subir Ahmad Vs, Union of India, .
(14) After giving our careful consideration to the arguments advanced, we are of the view that this Court has Jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition for issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus. The preliminary objection is rejected.
(15) Now adverting to the submissions made by Mr. Herjinder Singh on merits of the case, the arguments urged before us arc four. According to him the detention order as also the continued detention arc vitiated because of the following .
(16) (1)The documents relied upon and referred to in para 30 of the grounds by the detaining authority were not supplied to the detenu Pari Pasu the grounds; (2) The grounds of detention are vague and non-existent; (3) Confirmation of the detention by the State Government was influenced by the report of the Advisory Board; (4) Inordinate delay by the Central Government in considering the representation of the detenu vitiates the continued detention. Contention No. 1 : In Re : Non-supply of documents referred to in Paragraph 30 of the grounds.
The said Paragraph 30 of the grounds of detention reads as follows: "30. Investigation regarding the sale of the remaining 500 quintals of sugar vide sale invoice Nos. 7, 11. 17, 18 and 21 revealed that there was no actual sales to the said firms. In fact the firms namely I. Tirumal Venkateswara Trading Co., with R. C. No. 4551 and C.L. No. 198 at Nellore and 2. Batchu Venkata Ramayya Company, with R.C. No. 1296 and C.L. No. 18 at Guntur, to whom 300 quintals of sugar was shown as sold vide invoice Nos. 7, 11 and 21, are not in eixstence. Confidential enquiries revealed that you sold 500 quintals of sugar locally and got false invoices issued."
(17) The argument is that the material documents referred to, i.e., the sale invoices No. 7, 11, 17, 18 and 21 have been made the basis of the preventive detention and, therefore, ought to have been supplied Pan Pasu the grounds of detention. The plea is that the. failure to supply the same vitiates the detention.
(18) As noticed earlier, the detenu has been detained as he had indulged in acts prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodity. In paragraph I of the detention order, it is stated so by the District Magistrate, East Godavari as follows : "WHEREAS information is placed before me that Shri Jamal Haji Jakaria S/o Haji Jakaria, aged 58 years, resident of House No. 37-1-15, Subhash Road, Kakinada, Partner of M/s Haji Jakaria Haji Ebrahim, Kakinada, has been indulging in acts prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodity, i.e., levy sugar essential to the community by abetting the diversion and selling the levy sugar in the open market and thus contravening clause 9(1) of the sugar (Control) Order, 1966 and clause 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities Dealers (licensing and Distribution) Order 1982 r/w Section 8 of the B.C. Act, 1955."
It is further noticed in paragraph 2 thereof that the detaining authority was satisfied from the material placed before him that the provisions of the Act should be invoked to detain the detenu with a view to preventing him from further acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodity essential to the community, and therefore the central ground stated in the grounds of detention is that the detenu : "INDULGED in diversion of levy sugar for pecuniary benefits and thus acted in manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodity essential to the community."
(19) The facts in support of the allegation have been spelled out from paragraph 2, onwards in the grounds of detention. As per those facts, stated to have been proved, the detenu had indulged in diversion of levy sugar of a huge quantity totalling 1900 quintals. In paragraph 30 (quoted above), the details of 500 quintals out of the said 1900 quintals of sugar have been given. The learned Addl. Advocate General of Andhra Pradesh, appearing on behalf of respondents 2 and 3 submitted that the five invoices referred to in the said paragraph cannot be said to be the basis of the detenues, it is the information contained therein which was being referred to. He has pointed out that nowhere in the grounds it has been mentioned that those five invokes had been forged or prepared by the detenu. The case. spelled out therein was that 300 quintals of sugar was sold to two non-existing firms. The learned counsel submitted that the facts mentioned in that paragraph have been stated merely as "narration of facts".
(20) It is argued that what was being relied upon was that vide invoices namely 7, Ii and 21 sale had been made in favor of non-existing firms. As far as the re remaining two invoices mentioned therein, i.e., invoices 17 and 18 are concerned, Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities Dealers (licensing and D'stribution) Order 1982 r/w Section 8 of the E.G. Act, 1955."
It is further noticed in paragraph 2 thereof that the detaining authority was satisfied from the material placed before him that the provisions of the Act should be invoked to detain the detenu with a view to preventing him from further acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodity essential to the community, and therefore the central ground stated in the grounds of detention is that the detenu : "INDULGED in diversion of levy sugar for pecuniary benefits and thus acted in manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodity essential to the community."
(21) The facts in support of the allegation have been spelled out from paragraph 2, onwards in the grounds of detention. As per those facts, stated to have been proved, the detenu had indulged in diversion of levy sugar of a huge quantity totalling 1900 quintals. In paragraph 30 (quoted above), the details of 500 quintals out of the said 1900 quintals of sugar have been given. The learned Addl. Advocate General of Andhra Pradesh, appearing on behalf of respondents 2 'and 3 submitted that the five invoices referred to in the said paragraph cannot be said to be the basis of the detenues, it is the information contained therein which was being referred to He has pointed out that nowhere in the grounds it has been mentioned that those five invoices had been forged or prepared by the detenu. The case spelled out therein was that 300 quintals of sugar was sold to two non-existing firms. The learned counsel submitted that the facts mentioned in that paragraph have been stated merely as "narration of facts".
(22) It is argued that what was being relied upon was that vide invoices namely 7, Ii and 21 sale had been made in favor of non-existing firms. As far as the re raining two invoices mentioned therein, i.e., invoices 17 and 18 are concerned, That paragraph of the representation reads as follows: "24. The allegations in paragraph 30 of the Grounds of Detention are not correct. It is alleged that the transaction relating to invoices numbers 7, 11, 17, 18 and 21 revealed that there were no actual sales for the said firms and some of the firms are not in existence. I never sold any of these stocks, nor the invoices were prepared by me. The Oriental Food Industries Private Limited, Valasapakalu, Kakinada, might have sold those stocks or manipulated the things of which I cannot be held responsible."
(23) Thus in his earlier representation, apart from slating that he had never sold 500 quintals of sugar, he did not ask for the- copies of the same. Mr. Herjinder Singh's plea, however, was that the case of the detenu was not that he had sought the copies of those documents and that they were not supplied to him. His argument is that the said five invoices having been relied upon, copies of the same were mandatorily to be given to the detenu Along with the grounds of detention so that he could make an effective representation against the detention order.
(24) We have given our careful consideration to this contention. We are of the view that in the facts of this case, it cannot be held that the said five invoices had been relied upon by the detaining authority. What has been relied upon are the facts regarding the disposal of levy sugar. In paragraph 30 of the grounds, the details of illegal sale of 500 quintals of levy sugar have been noticed. The details relating to the alleged bogus sale have been given in the F.I.R.
(25) There is no merit in this contention and it is rejected. Contention No. 2 in Re : Vague and non-existent ground (26) This contention is based on the facts mentioned in paragraph 30 of the grounds (quoted above). It is submitted that the ground is not only vague but qua the sale invoice Nos. 17 and 18, it is non-existent. A number of authorities have been cited in support of this contention, in Moti Lal v. State of Bihar, , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court quashed the detention order passed against one Moti Lal, who, it was alleged, had indulged in black marketing of essential commodities. The impugned order was passed under the provisions of Preventive Detention Act, 1950. It was noticed that amongst other two grounds of detention were : "(A) On 10th March, 1967 he sold match boxes and soap to a shopkeeper of Purnea Court compound at a price higher than that fixed for these commodities and did not grant any receipt for the same. (b) On 7th May, 1967 he sold kerosene oil to one Kishun Bhagat of Gulab Bagh at Rs. 12 per tin (excluding cost of tin) which was higher than the price fixed by the Government."
(27) After analysing the case law on the point, it was held that ground (a) was vague as well as irrelevant and ground (b) was non-existing. Dealing with the first mentioned ground, it was observed : "THE name of the shopkeeper to whom the appellant was said to have sold match boxes and soap at a price higher than that fixed for these commodities was not mentioned. Neither the price fixed nor the price at which the detenu was said to have sold the match boxes and soap was mentioned. The futility of making representations against an unknown man in respect of an unspecified price could easily be imagined. There was no opportunity to the detenu to satisfy the Advisory Board that the alleged purchaser was a fictitious figure or that he was an enemy of his or that the information given by him should otherwise be not accepted. As things stood the detenu was left to attack a shadow. That was not all Government had neither fixed the sale price of the match boxes or soap."
(28) As far as the other ground which was held to be non-existing, it was noticed that the Government accepted the fact that there was no person as Kishun Bhagat of Gulab Bagh (as mentioned in the grounds) to whom the detenu was said to have sold kerosene. In that view of the matter, it was held that this ground was non-existing.
(29) In the present case, as we have noticed above, complete details of the five invoices namely, 7, 11, 17, 18 and 21 have been mentioned in the F.I.R., a copy of which was admittedly handed over to the detenu Along with the grounds of detention. Paragraph 30 of the grounds only relates to the sale of 500 quintals of sugar out of the 1900 quintals. The names of the two non-existent firms to whom 300 quintals out of the 500 quintal is were sold, have been mentioned in that paragraph. As far as the bogus sale to existing firms is concerned, the details of all the invoices which are 22 in number and which collectively from the subject matter of the detention, have been mentioned in the F.I.R.
(30) We do not agree with Mr. Herjinder Singh that in the present case it can be said that there was no opportunity to the detenu to make an effective representation. It is not a case where the detenu "was left to attack a shadow". This is borne out from the fact that in his various representations, he did not raise any issue that he had been deprived from making an effective representation, as copies of the five invoices had not been handed over or that he was unaware of the details mentioned in those invoices. This contention also fails and is rejected.
Contention No. 3. In Re : Confirmation of the detention by the State Government was influenced by the report of the Advisory Board.
To appreciate this contention, some more facts may be noticed. Vide his representation of 12th September, 1988, the detenu had sought copies of certain documents to enable him to make a representation to the Advisory Board. He had also reiterated his plea for revocation of the detention order. Mr. Herjinder Singh admitted that the documents were provided to the detenu on 20th September, 1988 and that he was produced before the Advisory Board, on 22ad September, 1988. It was in the meeting of the said date that the Advisory Board considered the case of the detenu herein and reported that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for his detention. Thereafter the Government of Andhra Pradesh passed two separate orders on 29th September, 1988 (copies of those two orders have been Annexed with the rejoinder affidavit of the detenu/petitioner).
(31) By Memo No. 1143/General/A/88-15, dated the 29th September, 1988 (Annexure X-IV at page 23), the detenu was informed that his second representation dated the 12th September, 1988 addressed to the Chief Minister was a copy of his earlier representation dated the 26th August, 1988 and that : "THE decision of the Government already communicated in the reference 1st cited is, hereby, reiterated."
(32) The detenu was further informed that his representation of the 12th September, 1988 made to the detaining authority so far as it related to the revocation of the detention order, had been carefully considered and rejected. As noticed, the prayer for supply of documents had already been acceded to and the detenu had been handed over the copies asked for. In the other order of 29th September, 1988 (at pages 24 & 25) confirming the detention of the detenu, in the recitals, the opinion of the Advisory Board has been mentioned and also the fact that the detenu's representations dated the 26th August, .1988 and 12th September, 1988 after having been duly considered, were rejected. By the said order, the detention of the detenu has been confirmed.
(33) Mr. Herjinder Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the said order, i.e., the second order of 29th September, 1988 shows that the decision to confirm the detention order was influenced by the opinion of the Advisory Board and, therefore, vitiates the continued detention of the detenu. We do not agree. In the first paragraph of that order, the detention order dated the 17th August, 1988 passed by the District Magistrate. East Godavari finds mention. The second paragraph recites that the Government had approved of that order. In the third pararagph, it is stated that: "WHEREAS the Advisory Board constituted under Section 9 of the said Act consisting of Sri Justice K. Jayachandra Reddy, Judge, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Chairman. Advisory Board and two others, duly considered the case of the detenu on 22-9-88 and has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of the said Sri Jamal Haji Jakaria son of Haji Jakaria".
Thereafter in the fourth paragraph, the fact of the detenu's representations having been rejected, has been noticed. The plea raised is thus sought to be based on the fact that in the order confirming the detention, the State Government mentioned that the Advisory Board had considered the case and opined that there was sufficient cause for detention, thereby confirming that the Government was influenced by that fact.
(34) As we have noticed, there are two orders of 29th September, 1988, one rejecting the second set of representations and the other confirming the detention. In our view, it cannot be said that it was the opinion of that Board, which influenced the mind of the State Government in cither rejecting the representations against the detention (vide the first order of that date) or in confirming the detention (vide the second order). As the second representation to the Chief Minister was merely a copy of the earlier representation, the first order passed reiterating the earlier decision, is valid. That representation to the detaining authority for supply of copies of documents had been admittedly accepted. The documents were supplied earlier to the meeting of the Board. The consideration by the Government was obviously un-influenced by the opinion of the Board. It had already been decided, prior to its meeting, not to revoke the detention order. The detenu had been informed about it vide letter of the 8th September. 1988. After obtaining the opinion, while confirming the detention, the Government was obliged to inform the detenu that the Advisory Board has also not recommended revocation of the order.
(35) There is no merit in this contention also and it is rejected.
Contention No. 4 In re : Inordinate delay by the Central Government in considering the representation of the detenu vitiates the continued detention.
(36) The pica urged in the petition is that it was the representation dated the 5th September, 1988 made to the Central Government which had not been decided by it till the filing of the writ petition. It is, however, averred in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. I that the said representation was dismissed on 26th October, 1988. Thus the period between 8th September, 1988 and 26th October, 1988 is being termed as inordinate delay by Mr. Herjinder Singh.
(37) As noticed above, the representation dated the 5th September, 1988 by the detenu was forwarded by Shri P. R. R. Mavani, M.P. to the Minister for Food & Civil Supplies. Government of India on that very day. Mr. S, K. Mishra, learned counsel for that respondent submitted that it was the second representation, the earlier having been already considered. According to the learned counsel, under law the Central Government is not obliged to consider or deal with successive representations from a detenu unless the second representation brings out new facts and circumstances, which have come to the detenu's knowledge, after he had filed the first representation. At any rate, he submitted that there was no inordinate delay in dealing with the second representation, which was rejected on 26th October, 1988. The plea is that the petitioner has not even referred to his first representation dated the 5th September, 1988, which representation, after careful consideration was rejected by the Government on 16th September, 1988.
(38) According to the affidavit of Shri A. Chandrasekhran, Under Secretary, Ministry of Food & Civil Supplies, the second representation was perused by the Minister on the day it was received i.e., 5th September, 1988 and was sent for the opinion of the Ministry of Law. Mr. Mishra, submitted that in that representation, as a number of authorities had been cited in support of the legal grounds urged therein, it was necessary to get the opinion of the Law Ministry.
(39) It is averred by Mr. Chandrasekhran that after the receipt of the opinion of the Law Ministry, on 27th September, 1988, parawise comments of the State Government were called for on that very day. The comments were received on 10th October, 1988 and after detailed examination of the representation, it was again forwarded to the Ministry of Law for their advice on 11th October, 1988. It is further averred that : "THE file was received back from Ministry of Law on 12-10-1988. The file was submitted to the Minister through Secretary(CS) on 13-10-88. The Secretary (CS) submitted the file to the Deputy Minister on 14-10-88 who in turn submitted the file to the minister of Food & Civil Supplies on 20-10-88. The Minister rejected the representation on 24-10-88 and the file was received back through Sccretary(CS)/ Joint Secretary on 26-10-88. The decision of the Central Government was conveyed to the Superintendent, Central Prison, Visakhapatnam on 26-10-88 with a direction to convey the same to the detenu. The State Government was also informed accordingly."
(40) Mr. Herjinder Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner during arguments submitted that although the writ petition conveys that the representation dated 5th September, 1988 was the first representation to the Central Government but in view of the facts brought out on record, it ought to have been considered as a supplement to the first representation as that was still pending. He, however, admitted that there is no mention in the second representation that there was in continuation of the first representation.
(41) We have carefully gone through the representations and the averments contained in the counter-affidavit of the respondent No. 1. The second representation having been forwarded to the Minister of Food & Civil Supplies. Government of India directly by an M.P., could not have been considered by the Minister as a supplementary or additional representation to the first representation. It has to be held that the representation dated the 5th September, 1988 was a second representation.
(42) In this view of the matter, the argument of Mr. Mishra that the said representation dated the 5th September, 1988 in which no new or relevant facts and circumstances had been brought to light, was not required to be expeditiously disposed of, has considerable force. His reliance is on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in K. Aruna Kumari vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, Air 1988 Sc 277,(5) in support of his argument that a successive representation based on the same facts, is not required to be formally disposed of. In paragraph 9 of the said judgment, it has been held as follows : "SO far as the second representation filed by Madhava Rao's cousin Lakshmana Rao is concerned, it has, in fact, been disposed of by the Central Government but about 3 months later after its filing. It was argued that S. 14 of the Act clothes the authority with the power of revoking the detention order, and such a power carries with the duty to exercise it whenever and as soon as changed or new factors call for the exercise of that power. Reliance was placed on the observations of this Court at page 786 in Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal and those in para 9 of the judgment in Sat Pal v. State of Punjab, . It is true that such a power coupled with the duty exists but the duty to exercise it arises only where new and relevant facts and circumstances come to light. This was not so here, and as observed in para 13 of the judgment in State of U.P. v. Zavad 262 Zama Khan , there is no right in favor of the detenu to get his successive representations based on the same grounds rejected earlier to be formally disposed of again. In any event no period of limitation is fixed for disposal of an application under S. 14 and as we have seen earlier, the second representation filed by Lakshamana Rao indeed, was considered and rejected."
(43) The cases cited by Mr. Harjinder Singh relate to the expeditious disposal of the first representation. We agree with Mr. Mishra that the said second representation does not bring out any new facts and circumstances. It did contain legal arguments which were not urged in the earlier representation and therefore, it was referred to the Law Ministry. The delay taken in its disposal cannot be termed as inordinate.
(44) Following the law laid by the Supreme Court, we hold that this contention has also no force. It is rejected.
The petition fails and is dismissed. The Rule is discharged.