Punjab-Haryana High Court
Gram Panchayat Majra vs Tikka Parduman Singh & Others on 4 October, 2010
Author: Rajan Gupta
Bench: Ranjan Gogoi, Rajan Gupta
LPA No.1918 of 2001 1
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB &
HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH.
LPA No.1918 of 2001 (O&M)
Date of decision : October 04, 2010
Gram Panchayat Majra ...Appellant
Versus
Tikka Parduman Singh & others ...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJAN GUPTA
Present: Mr. I.K. Mehta, Senior Advocate with
Mr. M.S. Kohli, Advocate for the appellant.
None for respondents No.1 & 2.
Mr. Indersh Goel, Addl. Advocate General, Haryana
for respondent No.3.
Rajan Gupta, J.
The appellant Gram Panchayat has challenged the order passed by a Single Bench of this court on July 01, 1997, whereby Regular First Appeal preferred by it was dismissed.
The claim of the appellant Gram Panchayat Majra (Shahzadpur) is that it is entitled to a part of the compensation awarded in lieu of acquisition of land in village Majra (Shahzadpur), Tehsil Naraingarh, District Ambala for public purpose vide Notification dated 20th May, 1971 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") followed by declaration under Section 6 thereof. After compensation was awarded by the Collector vide its LPA No.1918 of 2001 2 order dated 23.1.1973, Gram Panchayat Majra (Shahzadpur) preferred an application under Section 30 of the Act making certain claims as regards apportionment. The said application was referred by the Collector to District Judge, Ambala. After considering the rival claims, the District Judge came to the conclusion that Gram Panchayat was not entitled to any compensation, as owner was Rao Pirthi Singh, father of respondents No.1 and 2 and thus, rejected its claim. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred Regular First Appeal before this court. Having failed in the same, present appeal by way of Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred before us.
Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the land in question was kept for Charand for Malkan and Gair Malkan Bashindgan Deh. According to him, the said land had been in possession of Bashindgan Deh and it was still in its possession when notification under Section 4 was issued. According to learned counsel, way back in 1943, a suit with regard to grazing rights in the said land was filed and the same was decreed by the civil court. According to him, an injunction was also granted regarding non-interference in the land by third parties. He, therefore, submits that Gram Panchayat was entitled to compensation to the extent of its rights in the said land. He has also relied upon judgment of this court reported as Dayalo and others Vs. Smt. Dhano and others, VOL.CXL-(2005-2) P.L.R. 620.
The respondents No.1 & 2 have remained unrepresented before us. However, we have perused the stand taken by the said LPA No.1918 of 2001 3 respondents before the District Judge as well as in the appeal preferred (by Gram Panchayat) before the learned Single Judge. While rebutting the claim of the Gram Panchayat, respondent No.1 took the plea that even if it was assumed that the land was Gair Mumkin Charand, grazing rights therein would not bestow any right or title in any person as said person would be mere licensee. This apart, he (respondent No.1) had given possession of the land to the forest department being the owner thereof. He further pleaded that Bashindgan Deh, who is said to have remained in possession of the land in question, was an indeterminate body and on that basis Gram Panchayat Majra (Shahzadpur) could not be said to have any interest in the land. In fact, even the locus standi of the Gram Panchayat to maintain the application was questionable.
We have considered the rival stands of the parties and have perused the record available on the paper book with the assistance of the learned counsel.
There has been no serious dispute throughout the course of proceedings that the record does not reveal any where that Gram Panchayat was at any stage recorded as owner of the land in question or the same was vested in it. On the other hand, it is sought to be contended that the land in question being Charand, vested in the Gram Panchayat in view of Section 2 (g) of the Punjab Village Common Lands Act and thus, Gram Panchayat would be entitled to compensation in lieu of acquisition thereof. After perusal of the record including the judgment passed by the civil court in the year 1943 and execution LPA No.1918 of 2001 4 proceedings initiated pursuant thereto, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that Gram Panchayat could not possibly be said to be owner of the land which was subject matter of acquisition. In fact, the said judgment only reveals that the residents of the village had been permitted to graze their cattle in the said land. They were, however, not permitted to remove grass, cut branches or trees or do any other act in the said land. It was also noticed by the learned Single Judge that Gram Panchayat was neither a party at that time nor any right was claimed by it. We have no reason to differ with the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge as no argument has been addressed by learned counsel for the appellant to point out any infirmity with this finding. We are also not impressed with the argument advanced that land in the nature of Charand would vest in the Gram Panchayat in view of Section 2 (g) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 and thus, Gram Panchayat could be entitled to compensation in lieu of acquisition. Admittedly, there is no order, Jamabandi or any other document on record to show that land in question was vested in the Gram Panchyayat. We cannot loose sight of the fact that present application has been preferred under Section 30 of the Act, scope of which is limited to apportionment of compensation in lieu of the land acquired. This court would, thus, be loath to first examine the title or vested right of the Gram Panchayat in the land in question and thereafter to consider its claim under Section 30 of the Act, particularly when no such exercise is envisaged by Section 30. Merely because certain LPA No.1918 of 2001 5 Bashindgan Deh kept on grazing their cattle on the land in question and had declaration/injunction in their favour in respect thereof, cannot lead us to the conclusion that any right would be vested in the Gram Panchayat to claim compensation on acquisition of said land. Neither any application was moved by the Bashindgan Deh nor any of its members is party before us. In the Jamabandi, which was produced before the District Judge, it appears that Gram Panchayat was shown as Gair Marusi (tenant at will). It is, therefore, inexplicable how any right would be vested in it to claim compensation. The judgment relied upon by appellant's counsel in Dayalo's case (supra), in our considered view, is not applicable to the facts of the instant case as no vested right, whatsoever, in Gram Panchayat, has been shown to exist at any stage which would entitle it to compensation awarded under the Act.
In view of the fact that learned counsel has not been able to point out any infirmity legal or otherwise, with the impugned judgment, we do not find it a fit case to interfere in appellate jurisdiction vested in us by way of Letters Patent Appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
(Rajan Gupta) Judge (Ranjan Gogoi) Judge October 04, 2010 'rajpal' To be referred to the Reporters or not: Yes / No