Legal Document View

Unlock Advanced Research with PRISMAI

- Know your Kanoon - Doc Gen Hub - Counter Argument - Case Predict AI - Talk with IK Doc - ...
Upgrade to Premium
[Cites 29, Cited by 0]

Bombay High Court

Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd vs State Of Maharasthra & Anr on 13 August, 2010

Author: V.M. Kanade

Bench: V. M. Kanade

                                          1
                                                          (CRWP1961/2010)

            IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY




                                                                       
                 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                                               
              CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1961 OF 2010




                                              
    Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
    & Anr.                                     .... Petitioners.




                                       
                      V/s
                            
    State of Maharasthra & Anr.                ..... Respondents.
                           
    ----

    Mr. J.P. Cama, Senior Counsel along with Mr R.S. Pai i/b M/s
    Sanjay Udeshi & Co. for the Petitioners.
       


    Mr. Rajesh More, APP for the State.
    



    Mr. Suresh Pakale along with Mr. Sandeep Patil i/b Mr. V.K.
    Khatu & N.A. Shaikh for Respondent No.2.





    ----


                      CORAM: V. M. KANADE, J.

DATE : 13th August, 2010 P.C.:

1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith.

Respondents waive service. By consent of the parties Petition is taken up for final hearing.

::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 2

(CRWP1961/2010)

2. Heard Mr. J.P. Cama, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, Mr. Suresh Pakale, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No.2 and the learned APP appearing on behalf of the State.

3. By this Petition which is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Petitioners are challenging the order dated 1/2/2010 passed ig by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 41st Court, Shindewadi, Dadar, Mumbai as also the order of issuance of process dated 26/3/2010 on a complaint filed by Mumbai Municipal Corporation against the Petitioners herein for the offence punishable under section 394(1) of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 [For short "MMC Act"] read with section 471 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1962.

4. Brief facts are as under:-

5. Petitioner No.1 is a Public Limited Government Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and is engaged in the business of refining of crude oil and marketing / retailing of petrol, diesel, LPG, aviation fuel, etc. It is a Government of India Undertaking and is declared as a public utility service under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. One of the installations of the Petitioners is situated at Sewri, Fort Road, Mumbai and the Petitioner No.2 is the Installation ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 3 (CRWP1961/2010) Manager of Petitioner No.1. Petitioner No.1 - Company is required to provide a canteen exclusively for its employees in accordance with the standards prescribed under the Factory Rules, 1963. It is the case of the Petitioners that some time in April 2009, the Inspector of the Public Health Department, Mumbai Municipal Corporation, visited Sewri Installation and advised them to obtain the eating-house license in respect of the canteen maintained by the Factory. Accordingly, an application was made by the Petitioners dated 24/11/2009 for license for eating-house at Sewri Installation under section 394 of the MMC Act and, thereafter, a complaint was filed by the Respondent No.2 -

MMC in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, 41st Court, Shindewadi, Dadar, Mumbai and the learned Magistrate was pleased to issue process by an order dated 01/02/2010.

Petitioners, therefore, have filed this Petition challenging the order of issuance of process. Affidavit in reply has been filed by the Medical Officer of Health, F-South Ward, Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay.

6. Mr. J.P. Cama, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners invited my attention to the definition of the term "eating-house" and provisions of section 394 and more particularly section 394(1)(e)(i) of the MMC Act. He also invited my attention to Schedule-M, Part- IV of the MMC Act. He submitted that if the said provisions are taken into consideration, the canteen run by the Management for the benefit of its workers would not fall ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 4 (CRWP1961/2010) within the purview of definition of "eating-house". He, therefore, submitted that it was not necessary for Petitioner No.1 to obtain license under the said provisions. He further submitted that in view of the definition of "eating-house", only those premises in which public are admitted and where food is supplied for consumption for profit or gain, such premises would fall within the definition of the term "eating- house" He submitted that, in the present case, premises was used as canteen and was managed by the Petitioner No. 1 and it was required to be maintained in view of mandatory provisions of section 46 of the Factories Act. It is, therefore, submitted that the canteen maintained under section 46(1) of the Factories Act was neither a trade nor process or operation connected with trade. He further submitted that in view of other provisions of the Factories Act, a canteen has to be run on no profit basis and substantial subsidy was given by the employer. It is further submitted that, therefore, canteen could not be termed as a catering establishment since there was no sale of food stuff in the canteen which was run on no profit basis. It is, therefore, submitted that the complaint and the impugned order of issuance of process was illegal and contrary to law. He further submitted without prejudice to the said submissions that no averments were made in the complaint regarding role of Petitioner No.2. Further, there was no averment that he was in charge of or in control of the management of the canteen or Factory and, as such, the complaint filed against him was liable to be set aside. In support of the said ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 5 (CRWP1961/2010) submissions he relied upon the judgments of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Hotel Mazdoor Sabha and another vs. N.J. Alvares and another 1, Balkrishna Karkera vs. K.J. Mishra and another 2 and the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Sohrab Vakil (Lt. Col.) and another vs. B.G. Pimple and another 3 and lastly upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in M/s Tops Security Ltd. & Anr. vs. S.P. Apsingekar dated 3rd May 2010 in Criminal Writ Petition No.1773 of 2009. Mr. Cama, the learned Senior Counsel, also submitted that Petitioner No.1 had obtained license under section 390 of the MMC Act and, therefore, having obtained license under section 390 of the MMC Act it was not necessary to obtain license under section 394. He also invited my attention to section 392 of the MMC Act in support of his submissions.

7. Mr. Pakale, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No.2 submitted that the provisions of Factories Act, 1948 and MMC Act operate in different fields and, therefore, merely because the Petitioners had obtained license under the Factories Act, that would not absolve them from requirement of obtaining license for eating-house under section 394 of the MMC Act. It is then submitted that definition of "eating-house" is applied to the canteen which was run by the Petitioner Corporation. It is firstly submitted that term "public" is wide enough to include workers and 1 AIR 1965 Bombay 13 2 AIR 1979 Bombay 198 3 1992 Mh.L.J. 1498 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 6 (CRWP1961/2010) therefore the word "public" included any class of public or community. It is submitted that the dictionary meaning of the word "community" is very wide and, therefore, it is submitted that the workers, employees and the Officers of the Petitioner Corporation would also fall within the definition of the term "community". Secondly, it is submitted that meaning of the word "trade" was any occupation, employment or activity, business etc. It is submitted that, under the Factories Act, though the employer is expected to run a canteen on no profit no loss basis, he is not entitled to fix the price of the food stuffs which is sold in the canteen and, therefore, though the employer is not expected to earn any profit, he definitely stands to gain by providing facilities to the workers. It is thirdly submitted that, in any case, the canteen would fall within the definition of "catering establishment" since the employer used the facilities for providing food to its workers. Reliance was placed on the judgment in Balkrishna Karkera vs. K.J. Mishra and another 1

8. I have heard both the Counsel at length. In my view, there is much substance in the submission made by Mr. Cama, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner that if the owner of an industrial establishment is conducting a staff canteen on his own he is not required to obtain a license under the said provision.

1 AIR 1979 Bombay 198 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 7 (CRWP1961/2010)

9. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it would be necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the MMC Act. Section 3(ff) defines the term "eating-house" as under:-

            "3(ff)      "eating-house"           means          any
            premises     to   which       the        Public      are




                                                     

admitted and where any kind of food is prepared or supplied for consumption on the premises for the profit or gain of any person ig owning or having an interest in or managing such premises;"

Section 394 prescribes that certain trades, processes and operations cannot be carried out without license and provides the said trades, processes and operations in Parts I to IV of Schedule-M. In the present case the relevant provision is section 394(1)(e) which reads as under:-
"394. Certain articles [or animals] not to be kept, and certain trades, processes and operations not to be carried on, without a licence; and things liable to be seized, destroyed, etc., to prevent danger or nuisance.-(1) Except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence granted by the Commissioner, no person shall-
::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 8
(CRWP1961/2010)
(a) ............
(b) ............
(c) ............
(d) ............
(e) carry on or allow or suffer to be carried on, in or upon any premises;
(i) any of the trades specified in Part IV of Schedule M, or any process or operation connected with any such trade;
(ii) any trade, process or operation, which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, is dangerous to life, health or property, or likely to create a nuisance either from its nature or by reason of the manner in which, or the conditions under which, the same is, or is proposed to be carried on;"

In clause (e) sub-clause (i) of Section 394(1) trades and processes are prescribed as specified in Part IV of Schedule M. Part IV of Schedule M also, therefore, will have to be taken into consideration since it is referred to in Section ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 9 (CRWP1961/2010) 394(1)(e)(i) of the MMC Act and the said Part IV of Schedule M reads as under:-

SCHEDULE M (See section 394) Part IV Baking Bhelpuri, Preparation or sale of Bleaching cloth or yarn, Keeping charcoal, coal, or coke shop Keeping cold storages.
Casting Metal, Keeping Chemist and Druggist Shop Dyeing of cloth, yarn or leather. Grinding or pounding of chillies or masala or (otherwise than by hand grinding).
Keeping a flour mill Keeping a laundry shop.
Keeping of an eating house or catering establishment.
Using or allowing to be used a premises for the preparation of eatables for the purpose of trade and for the profit or gain of any person owing or having an interest in or managing such premises."

10. It is a well settled position in law that while interpreting any section, provision, rule, regulation in any ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 10 (CRWP1961/2010) Act or Rules, whenever there is no ambiguity in the said provision, the plain grammatical meaning has to be given to the said provision. In the present case, the controversy which has arisen is, whether the canteen which is run by the employer in his establishment would fall within the definition of "eating-house" as defined in section 3(ff) of the MMC Act and would, therefore fall under Part IV of Schedule M of the said Act. From the perusal of the definition of eating-house reproduced hereinabove, for any premises to be termed as "eating-house", following requirements are to be fulfilled viz.

(i) any kind of food is prepared or supplied for consumption in the said premises. (ii) public are admitted to the said premises and (iii) the said activity of preparing and supplying food for consumption should be carried out for profit or gain. Part IV of Schedule M gives list of trade or processes or operations connected with traders and along-

with eating-house, there is also a reference to catering establishment. Though, "eating-house" is defined under section 3(ff), "catering establishment" has not been defined anywhere in the Act.

11. On the one hand, it has been argued that the establishment of the Petitioner is not an eating-house or catering establishment, firstly because public are not admitted to the said premises and it is only meant for workmen and officials working in the establishment. Secondly, the food which is prepared and supplied for consumption is for the benefit of their own establishment ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 11 (CRWP1961/2010) and it is not done for any profit or gain but in view of statutory requirement of maintaining canteen as laid down under the Factories Act and, therefore, the Petitioners' establishment need not obtain license under section 394 of the MMC Act. On the other hand, it has been urged that the term "public" includes community or various types of communities and, therefore, the workers and officials working in the establishment would be a community and, therefore, though the canteen is run on no profit no loss basis, the employer is profited or gained by catering these services to the workers and, alternatively, it has been urged that, in any case, it would definitely fall within the definition of "catering establishment". In this context, therefore, it will be profitable to see how these provisions and relevant terms have been interpreted by the Apex Court and this Court.

12. The Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to interpret the provisions of section 394(1)(e)(i) in Sohram Vakil (Lt. Col.) and another vs. B.G. Pimple and another 1. In the said case, Sports Club which carried on an activity of promoting Yachting was prosecuted since it did not have the requisite license for providing food in the said Club to its members. In the said case, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in M/s Northern India Caterers (India) vs. Ltd. Governor of Delhi2 The Division Bench observed that the Dining was maintained as facility to the members-participants in Yachting and, therefore, in that 1 1992 Mh.L.J. 1498 2 AIR 1978 SC 1591 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 12 (CRWP1961/2010) sense, it could not be treated as an eating-house carried out by way of trade and further held that a Dinning Room is domestic arrangement only for the members of the Club. It would be relevant to refer to the observations made by the Division Bench in para 4 of the said judgment in Sohrab Vakil (supra). Para 4 of the said judgment reads as under:-

"4. The predominant activity of the Club is to promote and to provide facilities to the members for a sporting activity known as Yachting. To carry out this activity successfully, the Club has incidentally provided the Dinning Room. It is exclusively meant for the members and is also managed by the members.
As such, they serve themselves. As required by defining clause (ff) of section 3 of the Act, it does not cater the needs of any outsider or members of the public. Apparently, Dining Room is a domestic device of the Club, which is incidental to principal activity of sport.
The Supreme Court in The Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club Employees' Union vs. The Management of the Gymkhana, AIR 1968 SC 554 held that -


              "the club was only a member's club



                                                ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 :::
                                        13
                                                         (CRWP1961/2010)

       and     a        member's            self-serving
institution and not an industry. No doubt the material needs or wants of a section of the community were catered for but that was not enough as it was not done as part of trade or business or as an undertaking analogous to trade or business."

The Dining ig Room is maintained as facility to the members-participants in Yachting. It could not be in that sense an eating house carried by way of trade which is considered to be unimpeachable character envisaged under the relevant provisions referred to hereinbefore. Since the Dinning Room is a domestic arrangement only for members of the Club, purport of maintaining any hygienic standard, etc cannot be solicited. Activity of Dinning Room does not represent any characteristic of trade, including profit motivation. Obtaining licence by or for such Dining Room cannot rationally be insisted. We, therefore, hold that the activity known as 'Dining Room' of the petitioner Club does not attract, in any ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 14 (CRWP1961/2010) manner, clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 394 of the Act. As such, the petitioner-Club is not liable to obtain the licence required for eating house under the relevant provisions." (Emphasis supplied) The Division Bench of this Court, therefore, while interpreting the aforesaid provisions has clearly observed that the Dinning Room in a Club was a domestic arrangement only for members of the Club and, therefore, could not be terms as trade.

In Hotel Mazdoor Sabha and another vs. N.J. Alvares and another 1, a Petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Petitioners - Trade Union registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act claiming to have a large number of employees of hotels; residential hotels, restaurants or eating-house as its members and in order to safeguard its activity had asked for writ of mandamus from the Court, directing that the provisions of Bombay Shops and Establishment Act should be applied to (i) Central Railway Staff Canteen, Victoria Terminus, Bombay-1, (ii) Bombay Police Canteen at Crawford Market (Police Headquarters) and (iii) Government Law College Canteen, Churchgate, Bombay-1. Though the issue raised in the said Petition was, 1 AIR 1965 Bombay 13 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 15 (CRWP1961/2010) whether the provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 could be made applicable to the said canteen, while deciding this issue the Court had an occasion to consider the meaning of "restaurant" or "eating-house" defined in the said Act and also to consider the meaning of the term "public" within the meaning of section 2(25) of the said Act. The learned Single Judge in the said judgment has observed in paragraphs 8, 10 & 12 as under:-

"(8) The first thing that strikes as important in regard to the true construction of sub-sec. (25) of S. 2 of the Act is that it was not intended that all premises where business of the supply of meals or refreshments is carried on were meant to be included in the phrase "restaurant or eating house". If that was the intention of the Legislature, it was entirely unnecessary to include in sub-section the phrase "the public or a class of the public".

The sub-section cannot be read to mean that "restaurant or eating house"

means "any premises in which is carried on wholly or principally the business of the supply of meals or refreshments for consumption on the premises". The ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 16 (CRWP1961/2010) question that at once arises is as to what premises in which business of supply of meals or refreshment for consumption on the premises is carried on were intended to be excluded from being "Restaurant or eating house"

within the meaning of sub-sec. (25) of S. 2 by including in that sub-section the phrase "the public or a class of the public". I asked Mr. Nargolkar as to what is the line that he indicates could be drawn for excluding certain restaurants and eating houses from the application of sub-sec. (25) by reason of the use therein of the phrase "the public or a class of the public". He has found it very difficult and failed to answer the question."

"(10) It is clear that premises where supply of meals or refreshments for consumption on the premises is made, but the supply is not for carrying on business, can never be held to be "restaurant or eating house" within the meaning of sub-sec. (25) of Sec. 2 of the Act. The carrying on of the business of supply of meals or refreshments is ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 17 (CRWP1961/2010) the first essential of the premises being "restaurant or eating house" under this sub-section. In the result, staff canteens where an employer makes arrangements for supply of meals or refreshments without intending to carry on business thereof cannot be held to be "restaurant or eating house" within the meaning of the Act. It is also obvious that the premises where the employer makes arrangements for supply of meals or refreshments neither for the general public not for any one other than its own employees, were not meant to be "restaurant or eating house" within the meaning of the Act.

The obvious intention of the Act was to make provisions for regulating conditions of work and employment in restaurants and eating houses, the owners whereof carried on wholly or principally the business of supply of meals or refreshments. These restaurants and eating houses were meant to be establishments which openly invited the public or a class of the public for the purposes of carrying on the business that is mentioned in ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 18 (CRWP1961/2010) sub-sec. (25). If the Railway administration made arrangements for running its own staff canteen for Railway servants, it is difficult to say that the Railway administration carried on a business of supply of meals or refreshments. Similarly, if the Government Law College made arrangements for the supply of meals or refreshmentsig to law students, it is difficult to say that the canteen run at the Government Law College is run for the business of supply of meals or refreshments. Similarly, if the Department of police ran a canteen at the Police Headquarters for supply of meals or refreshments, it is difficult to find that the Department carried on the business of supply of meals or refreshments. It appears to me that wherever an employer makes merely arrangements for supply of meals or refreshments to its employees and does not carry on wholly or principally the business of supply of meals or refreshments, the premises would not be "restaurant or eating house" within the meaning of the Act. The provisions ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 19 (CRWP1961/2010) of the Act would not be applicable to such establishments."

"(12) It appears that the Courts have found it difficult to arrive at correct interpretation of the phrase "a class of Public". It is, however, clear that for finding out whether a certain group of people can be described as "a class of the public", two ingredients must be considered; (i) The group of persons must possess certain degree of numerical importance and must be a substantial body of the public. The persons constituting this body must have a common attribute or characteristic. "A class of the public" is to be distinguished from a mere group of persons. (2) The group of persons claiming to be "a class of the public"

must not for its classification as such depend on any relationship with a third party."

Similarly, another learned Single Judge of this Court in Balkrishna Karkera vs. K.J. Mishra and another 1 also had an occasion to consider the definition of the expression "eating-

1 AIR 1979 Bombay 198 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 20 (CRWP1961/2010) house" or "catering establishment" in Schedule M of the BMC Act. In the said case, Petitioner has filed a Revision Petition challenging his conviction by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 29th Court, Dadar, Bombay under section 394(1)(e)(i) read with section 471 of the BMC Act. In that case, accused No.1 was the Personnel Officer of Messrs Indian Tools Manufacturers which had its factory at Sion. The accused No.2 was caterer running a canteen by an agreement dated 16/03/1974. Accused No.2 agreed to operate canteen in the factory premises of the said Company at Sion. Prosecution was launched against them since they did not have the requisite license under section 394(1)(e)(i). The learned Magistrate acquitted the Personnel Officer of the Company, the accused No.1. He, however, convicted accused No.2 who was a caterer running the canteen. The learned Single Judge held that the canteen would not be termed as an eating-house. He, however, held that so far as the caterer is concerned, it could be said that the canteen clearly falls within the expression "catering establishment" occurring in the relevant entry in Part IV of Schedule M. The learned Single Judge, however, clearly made distinction between the caterer and the Personnel Officer of the establishment. The learned Single Judge, therefore, in the said judgment, has firstly observed that the staff canteen would not be an eating-house. Secondly, he has not held that when the canteen is run by Personnel Officer of the establishment, it would be a catering establishment. The learned Single Judge, however, held that ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 21 (CRWP1961/2010) if such a staff canteen is run by the caterer then it would definitely fall within the definition of the expression "catering establishment". The learned Single Judge also did not accept the submission of the Counsel for the Petitioner that in view of provisions of Factories Act, it was not necessary to obtain a license under section 394(1)(e)(i).

Lastly, another learned Single Judge of this Court in Vardhaman Spinning & General Mills Ltd. vs. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & another 1 ig also has held that the activity of a Company carrying on business in manufacturing of sewing threads, yarns and other goods, of keeping an electric hot plate in Small Branch Office for preparation of tea and coffee and for warming the lunch boxes of the staff members could not be termed as catering business.

13. From the conspectus of the judgments referred to hereinabove and after taking into consideration the relevant provisions of the MMC Act and the Factories Act, the said submission of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners that having obtained the license under section 46(1) of the Factories Act, it was not necessary to obtain license under section 394(1)(e)(i) of the MMC Act cannot be accepted. It has to be noted that section 46 of the Factories Act, 1948 casts an obligation on the employer of a Factory wherein more than 250 workers 1 1999 (4) Bom. C.R. 506 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 22 (CRWP1961/2010) are employed to provide a canteen or canteens for the use of workers. It must be remembered that the said obligation is cast on the employer for the protection and benefit of the workers and the said provision and provisions in the MMC Act operate in different fields. The provisions under the MMC Act and particularly the said Chapter is clearly meant for maintaining public hygiene and for preventing nuisance and in order to ensure that the lives of community or public at large are not endangered on account of such activity.

The provisions of the two Acts, therefore, are meat to protect the interest of different and distinct group of people. The provisions of Factories Act are meant to protect the interest of workers. On the other hand, provisions of MMC Act are meant to protect the interest of public at large.

14. Similarly, the second submission made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners that having obtained license under section 390 of the MMC Act, it is not necessary to obtain license under section 394 also is without any substance. It would be relevant to see the provisions of section 390 and 392 of the MMC Act which read as under:-

390. Factory of not to be newly established without permission of the Commissioner.
(1) No person shall newly establish in any premises any factory, workshop or ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:29 ::: 23 (CRWP1961/2010) workplace in which it is intended that stream, water [electrical] or other mechanical power shall be employed, without the previous written permission of the Commissioner, [nor shall any person work, or allow to be worked, any such factory, workshop, or workplace without such permission.] (2) The Commissioner may refuse to give such permission if he shall be of opinion that the establishment of such factory, workshop or workplace in the proposed position is objectionable by reason of the density of the population in the neighbourhood thereof, or will be nuisance to the inhabitants of the neighbourhood.
(3) If any written permission for the establishment of a factory, workshop or work place granted under sub-section (1) be revoked by the Commissioner in the exercise of his powers under sub-section (3) of section 479, no person shall continue or resume the working or use of such factory, workshop or workplace until such written permission is renewed or a fresh written permission is granted by the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:30 ::: 24 (CRWP1961/2010) Commissioner.]"
"392. Sanitary regulation of factories, etc. (1) Whenever it shall appear to the Commissioner that any factory, workshop or work place, or any building or place in which steam, water or other mechanical power is employed, is not kept in a cleanly state or is not ventilated in such a manner as to render harmless, as far as practicable, any gas, vapour, dust or other impurity generated in the course of the work carried on therein, which is a nuisance, or is so overcrowded while work is carried on as to be dangerous or injurious to the health of the persons employed therein, or that any engine, mill gearing, hoist or other machinery therein is so fixed or so insecurely fenced as to be dangerous to life or limb;

the Commissioner may, by written notice, require the owner of such factory, workshop, work place or other building or place to take such order for putting and ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:30 ::: 25 (CRWP1961/2010) maintaining the same, in a cleanly state, or for ventilating the same or for preventing the same from being overcrowded or for preventing danger to life or limb from any engine, mill gearing, hoist or other machinery therein, as he shall think fit.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any provision of the Bombay Boiler Inspection Act, 1887, and nothing in this section which relates to the fixing or fencing of any engine, mill gearing, hoist or other machinery shall apply on any factory to which the provisions of the Indian Factories Act, 1881, are applicable."

Perusal of the aforesaid provisions will clearly reveal that only for the purpose of maintaining Factory the said license is required under the provisions of section 390 and 392 whereas under section 394 for carrying on various trades, processes and operations which are enumerated in Schedule M, the license is required from the Corporation. The objects and reasons of the MMC Act is for the purpose of seeing that certain trades are not carried out in a dangerous manner or are likely to create nuisance or endanger the lives. The learned Single Judge in Balkrishna Karkera (surpa) in para 11 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:30 ::: 26 (CRWP1961/2010) also has observed as under:-

"11. Finally, Mr. Shrikrishna submitted that the provisions of S. 394 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act were repetitive of the provisions of the Factories Act. Mr. Shrikrishna urged that the provisions of the Factories Act as also the Rules igsufficiently protected the canteens being run in a hygienic and on an economical basis safeguarding the welfare of the workers. Mr. Shrikrishna stated that the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act so far as they relate to eating houses and catering establishments also provided for eating houses and catering establishments being run hygienically and efficiently. He, therefore, submitted that if the same purpose was served by both the Statutes, then it was unnecessary to compel Accused No.2 to obtain a licence under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. It may be pointed out that so far as the Factories Act was concerned, the provisions therein as also the Rules made thereunder were meant for protection of ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:30 ::: 27 (CRWP1961/2010) the workers and with a view to benefit them. So far as the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act were concerned, they are enacted according to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of that Act for the purpose of seeing that certain trades are not carried out in a dangerous manner or are likely to create a nuisance or to endanger life. It, therefore, cannot ig be stated that the provisions of the two Acts overlap each other. Assuming, however, that the purpose of the two Acts was similar, even then there could be no reason why an obligation cast upon a party to obtain a licence under the provisions of one of such Acts should be complied with. I, therefore, see no substance in this argument of Mr. Shrikrishna."

15. The third contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, which has some substance, is that if the owner of an industrial establishment is conducting a staff canteen on his own, he is not required to obtain a license under the said provision. Reliance, therefore, was placed by Mr. Pakale, the learned Counsel for Respondent No.2 on the judgment in Balkrishna Karkera (supra). It has to be noted here that the learned Single ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:30 ::: 28 (CRWP1961/2010) Judge has made a clear distinction in the said judgment between the caterer running a staff canteen and an employer. In the said case, admitted position was that the staff canteen was being run by the caterer. The Personnel Officer of the Company was accused No.1. He was, therefore, acquitted and the caterer was convicted.

Therefore, the submission of Mr. Pakale, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No.2 cannot be accepted. In the said case, the learned Single Judge has firstly held in para 8 that the staff canteen is not an eating-

house and, secondly, the learned Single Judge held that it is a catering establishment since it was run by a caterer. On the second aspect, the learned Single Judge has observed as under in para 10 of the judgment:-

"10 .............. The argument urged by Mr. Shrikrishna that since the staff canteen was conducted on a non-profit basis, it could not be termed as a catering establishment cannot be accepted. Now it is true that so far as the employer is concerned, the staff canteen has to be run on a non-profit basis. However, the same could not be stated so far as Accused No. 2 was concerned. Accused No.2 conducted the staff canteen of the said Company for the purpose of making a profit....." (emphasis supplied) ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:30 ::: 29 (CRWP1961/2010) Thus, the learned Single Judge, therefore, has clearly held that so far as employer is concerned, he has to maintain the canteen on no profit basis and, therefore his activity of supplying food to his workers cannot fall under the definition of catering establishment. The Division Bench of this Court, in para 4 of its judgment in Sohrab Vakil (supra) also, after following the judgment of the Apex Court in M/s Northern India Caterers (India) vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi 1, has taken the same view. The learned Single Judge of this Court in Vardhaman Spinning ig (supra) has also considered the definition of catering business and has held that it is not required to obtain a license to keep hot plate in small Branch Office for preparing tea and coffee. In para 4 of the said judgment the learned Single Judge has observed as under:-
"4. I have heard Mr. H.S. Murthy for petitioners. It is very apparent from the summons itself, that the allegation of the respondent No.1 is about the staff canteen and preparation of tea and coffee. He submits that section 394 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act does not require a licence to be acquired, if a hot plate is kept in a small branch office like theirs for warming the lunch boxes of their staff employees and for preparing tea and coffee exclusively for 1 AIR 1978 SC 1591 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:30 ::: 30 (CRWP1961/2010) them. They are engaged in the business of sewing threads yarns, and not in catering business. He further submits that on the face of it, the complaint is without any substance, and hence, the issuing of process was erroneous. Mr. Mirza, the learned A.P.P. concedes to this position."

In Hotel Mazdoor Sabha (supra), the Apex Court has observed in paras 8 and 10 of its judgment as under:-

"(8) The first thing that strikes as important in regard to the true construction of sub-sec. (25) of S. 2 of the Act is that it was not intended that all premises where business of the supply of meals or refreshments is carried on were meant to be included in the phrase "restaurant or eating house". If that was the intention of the Legislature, it was entirely unnecessary to include in sub-section the phrase "the public or a class of the public".

The sub-section cannot be read to mean that "restaurant or eating house"

::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:30 ::: 31
(CRWP1961/2010) means "any premises in which is carried on wholly or principally the business of the supply of meals or refreshments for consumption on the premises". The question that at once arises is as to what premises in which business of supply of meals or refreshment for consumption on the premises is carried on were intended to be excluded from being "Restaurant ig or eating house"

within the meaning of sub-sec. (25) of S. 2 by including in that sub-section the phrase "the public or a class of the public". I asked Mr. Nargolkar as to what is the line that he indicates could be drawn for excluding certain restaurants and eating houses from the application of sub-sec. (25) by reason of the use therein of the phrase "the public or a class of the public". He has found it very difficult and failed to answer the question."

"(10) It is clear that premises where supply of meals or refreshments for consumption on the premises is made, but the supply is not for carrying on business, can never be held to be ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:30 ::: 32 (CRWP1961/2010) "restaurant or eating house" within the meaning of sub-sec. (25) of Sec. 2 of the Act. The carrying on of the business of supply of meals or refreshments is the first essential of the premises being "restaurant or eating house" under this sub-section. In the result, staff canteens where an employer makes arrangements for supply of meals or refreshments without intending to carry on business thereof cannot be held to be "restaurant or eating house" within the meaning of the Act. It is also obvious that the premises where the employer makes arrangements for supply of meals or refreshments neither for the general public not for any one other than its own employees, were not meant to be "restaurant or eating house" within the meaning of the Act.

The obvious intention of the Act was to make provisions for regulating conditions of work and employment in restaurants and eating houses, the owners whereof carried on wholly or principally the business of supply of meals or refreshments. These restaurants and eating houses were ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:30 ::: 33 (CRWP1961/2010) meant to be establishments which openly invited the public or a class of the public for the purposes of carrying on the business that is mentioned in sub-sec. (25). If the Railway administration made arrangements for running its own staff canteen for Railway servants, it is difficult to say that the Railway administration carried on a business of supply of meals or refreshments. Similarly, if the Government Law College made arrangements for the supply of meals or refreshments to law students, it is difficult to say that the canteen run at the Government Law College is run for the business of supply of meals or refreshments. Similarly, if the Department of police ran a canteen at the Police Headquarters for supply of meals or refreshments, it is difficult to find that the Department carried on the business of supply of meals or refreshments. It appears to me that wherever an employer makes merely arrangements for supply of meals or refreshments to its employees and does not carry on wholly or principally the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:30 ::: 34 (CRWP1961/2010) business of supply of meals or refreshments, the premises would not be "restaurant or eating house" within the meaning of the Act. The provisions of the Act would not be applicable to such establishments."

16. In my view, therefore, if the owner of the estalishment through his Officer runs and maintains a staff canteen for benefit of his workmen as mandated by statutory obligation under section 46(1) of the Factories Act, 1948 it cannot be said that he is either running an eating- house or catering establishment and, therefore, he is not required to obtain a license under section 394(1)(e)(i) of the MMC Act. It is, however, clarified that if he maintains the staff canteen and it is run by a caterer who runs it for profit then he will have to obtain a license under the said provision. Apart from that, in the present case, no allegation is made that the said canteen is run by caterer and not by the employer and, therefore, it cannot be said that this question is disputed question of fact which requires adjudication at the time of trial.

17. In my view, therefore, this is a fit case where prosecution launched by MMC under the aforesaid provision is liable to be quashed and set aside.

::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:30 ::: 35

(CRWP1961/2010)

18. Writ Petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a). Rule is made absolute accordingly.

(V.M. KANADE, J.) ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 16:17:30 :::