Jharkhand High Court
Yamuna Ram vs Union Of India Through The Secretary ... on 3 December, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:36573
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No.4175 of 2014
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Yamuna Ram, son of late Raghubir Ram, Resident of Village Aurangabad, P.O. Talwal Chak, Abdul Sattar, Tehsil Sadar, District-Gajipur (Presently working as Assistant Sub Inspector/Exe. No. 7533456/753320 CISF Unit, Head Quarter, BCCL, Dhanbad). ... ... Petitioner Versus
1. Union of India through the Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi.
2. Director General of CISF, Head Quarter, CGO Complex, New Delhi.
3. Inspector General of Central Industrial Services Forces, Head Quarter, Patna (Bihar).
4. Deputy Inspector General of Central Industrial Force, BCCL, Jharkhand.
5. Senior Commandant, CISF (Central Industrial Services Forces) Unit, BCCL, Dhanbad at Jharkhand.
... ... Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Rajendra Krishna, Advocate : Mr. Aayush Avant Srivastava, Advocate : Mr. Shubham Mayank, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Prashant Pallav, A.S.G.I. : Ms. Leena Mukherjee, CGC : Mr. Parth Jalan, Advocate
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Order No. 11/Dated 3 December, 2025 rd
1. The writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking therein the following reliefs:-
i. For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order (s)/direction(s) or a writ in nature of certiorari for quashing of the office order no. 44 dated 1.5.2014 issued from the office of the Deputy Inspector General, CISF (Respondent No.4) whereby and whereunder the representation of the petitioner dated 10.10.2013 has been rejected and further quashing of the office order no. 2703 dated 7.5.2013 whereby and whereunder the respondent no.5 has compulsorily retired the present petitioner with immediate effect without any reason assigning therein.1
2025:JHHC:36573 ii. For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) or a writ in nature of mandamus upon the commanding respondents to reinstate the petitioner on the post of ASI keeping in view that the impugned orders have been passed by the respondent authorities without following the due procedure of law and are violative of principle of natural justice as well as the petitioner has been awarded this punishment at the verge of his retirement I.e. at the age of 56 years.
iii. For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order (s)/direction(s) or a writ in nature of mandamus commanding upon the respondents not to give effect to the impugned Orders dated 01/05/14 and 07/05/13 during the pendency of the instant Writ petition."
Factual Matrix
2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, which are required to be enumerated read as under:-
The petitioner was appointed on the post of Security Guard/Constable on 02.09.1975 and promoted from the post of Constable to Lance Naik on 24.11.1993. He was further promoted from the post of Lance Naik to Naik on
03.12.1994 and further was promoted from the post of Naik to Head Constable/G.D. on 10.10.1997 and the last promotion granted to the present petitioner was on the post of ASI/EXE from Head Constable on 24.3.2011 and thereafter the present petitioner has not been given any promotion.
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2025:JHHC:36573 The date of birth of the present petitioner is 15.05.1956 and the petitioner will be superannuated in the year 2016 after attaining the age of 60 years as per the normal age limit prescribed in the CISF Rules.
The present petitioner after his promotion as ASI on 24.3.2011 has been performing his duties of the said post in the CISF unit, BCCL, Dhanbad.
The respondent authorities passed the impugned order dated 07.05.2013 whereby and whereunder the petitioner has been made to retire with immediate effect at the age of 56 years, and that too without giving any prior information to the petitioner and has not been permitted to perform his duty and has been restricted to superannuate prior to his superannuation age of 60 years.
Thereafter, the petitioner preferred representation against the premature retirement on 27.05.2013.
The petitioner was asked to submit a representation duly addressed to the DG/CISF being the Chairman of the Representative Committee and in compliance to the said instruction, the petitioner submitted reminder representation on 10.10.2013 stating his stand therein against the impugned order dated 07.05.2013.
The respondent no.4 Deputy Inspector General disposed of the representation of the present petitioner preferred on 10.10.2013 vide his order dated 01.05.2014 3 2025:JHHC:36573 bearing office order no. 44 based upon the finding of the superannuation review committee whereby and whereunder the review committee has found the present petitioner "unfit for further retention in service" only on the erroneous ground of in Public Interest.
Being aggrieved with the order dated 01.05.2014 and order dated 07.05.2013, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition.
3. It is evident from the factual aspect that the writ petitioner while working as Naib has been dealt with on the principle of deadwood by passing order on 07.05.2013 by which the writ petitioner was compulsorily retired after rendering 30 years of service.
Argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the aforesaid order has been challenged by the present writ petitioner mainly on the ground that the decision so taken by the authority is absolutely improper and suffers from the vice of arbitrariness since the order of compulsory retirement has been passed ignoring the fact that it is the respondents who have granted regular promotion from Constable to Lance Naik, thereafter from the post of Lance Naik to Naik. He was further promoted from the post of Naik to Head Constable/G.D. and the last promotion 4 2025:JHHC:36573 granted to the present petitioner was on the post of ASI/EXE from Head Constable.
5. It has been contended that once the writ petitioner has been promoted to the higher posts, meaning thereby, service of the petitioner has been found to be satisfactory on all counts otherwise promotion would not have been granted and once the promotion has been granted, it is not available for the respondents to take the ground that the service career of the writ petitioner was not found to be thoroughly unsatisfactory leading to decision of compulsory retirement.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the impugned order, therefore, suffers from error and, as such, needs interference by this Court.
Argument advanced on behalf of the respondent
7. Per contra, Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, appearing for the respondents, has submitted first by responding to the order dated 6th October, 2023 passed in this case showing the jurisdiction of the respondent who has taken decision in exercise of power conferred under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules/Rule 48 of CCS (Pension) Rules by putting reliance upon Fundamental Rule 2 and 3 read with Rule 77 of the CISF Rules, 2001.
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8. The learned A.S.G.I. has further submitted by showing the reason assigned in the order dated 01.05.2014 that all parameters have been followed which has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court while applying the principle of weeding out, as would be evident from the face of the order dated 01.05.2014 wherein the employer has considered the entire service career wherefrom it is evident that altogether 12 punishments have been imposed out of which one is major in nature and 11 are minor in nature for the misconduct said to be committed like misbehaving with seniors, sleeping on duty, absent from duty post, absent from unit line, refusal to proceed on duty, overstaying on leave, claiming false transport bill on regular posting, misbehaved with Coy. Commander after consuming liquor and other acts of indiscipline.
9. Learned counsel has further submitted that since the entire service career has been taken into consideration and, as such, it is incorrect on the part of the writ petitioner to take the ground that no mind has been applied said to be the satisfaction of the employer.
10. So far as the ground having been that the writ petitioner has been promoted and, as such, principle of weeding out will not be application, is incorrect notion as has been argued on behalf of the writ petitioner since granting promotion depends upon the rule for promotion 6 2025:JHHC:36573 wherein there is no requirement to consider the entire service career of one or the other public servant, rather, the promotion is to be granted as per the eligibility criteria as referred in the rule.
11. Learned counsel has relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das and Another v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and Another reported in (1992) 2 SCC 299.
Analysis
12. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleading made in the writ petition as also the counter affidavit.
13. This Court, before proceeding with the matter on merit, deems it fit and proper to pass order by considering the issue which has been pointed out to the learned counsel for the respondents as referred in the order dated 6th October, 2023, for ready reference, the aforesaid order is being referred herein :-
"Order No. 08/Dated 6th October, 2023 Learned Additional Solicitor General of India has submitted that he will assist this Court on the legal issue as to whether in absence of any power conferred under C.I.S.F. Act/Rules for separation of the member of the disciplined force in order to weed out the deadwood, can it be under the provision of Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules/Rule 48 of CCS (Pension) Rules.
Considering his submission, let this matter be posted on 03.11.2023 so that the matter be disposed of.7
2025:JHHC:36573 Let the name of Mr. Anil Kumar, learned Additional Solicitor General of India be reflected in the daily cause list."
14. This Court has raised the legal issue regarding lack of jurisdiction having with the respondent since the power has been exercised as conferred under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules/Rule 48 of CCS (Pension) Rules.
15. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the Fundamental Rule 2 and 3 as also Rule 77 of the CISF Rules, 2001.
16. The reliance of the aforesaid provision has been made in order to establish the jurisdiction of the respondent.
17. This Court, in order to appreciate the aforesaid argument, has gone through the provision of Fundamental Rule 2 and 3, for ready reference, the same are being referred herein :-
"F.R.2. The Fundamental Rules apply, subject to the provisions of Rule 3 to all Government servants whose pay is debatable to Civil Estimates and to any other class of Government servants to which the President may by general or special order, declare them to be applicable. F.R.3. Unless in any case it be otherwise distinctly provided by or under these rules, these rules do not apply to Government servants whose conditions of service are governed by Army or Marine Regulations."
18. The F.R. 2 provides that the rule will apply subject to the provisions of Rule 3 to all Government servants whose pay is debatable to Civil Estimates and to any other 8 2025:JHHC:36573 class of Government servants to which the President may by general or special order, declare them to be applicable.
19. The F.R. 3 provides that unless in any case it be otherwise distinctly provided by or under these rules, these rules do not apply to Government servants whose conditions of service are governed by Army or Marine Regulations.
20. It is, thus, evident that the applicability of the Fundamental Rules has totally excluded the Army personnel or from the purview of the Marine Regulations.
21. Admittedly, the writ petitioner was a member of the Central Industrial Security Force which is governed under the provision as contained in Central Industrial Security Force, Act, 1968 (herein referred as Act 1968) and as per the definition of the "force" as contained in Section 2 as under 2(1)(ab) "Force" means the Central Industrial Security Force constituted under section 3.
22. The Section 3 of the Act 1968 provides that there shall be constituted and maintained by the Central Government [an armed force of the Union] to be called the Central Industrial Security Force for the better protection and security of industrial undertakings owned by that Government, joint venture or private industrial undertaking and to perform such other duties as may be entrusted to it by the Central Government.
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23. While on the other hand, the Army is governed under the Indian Army Act, 1950 and likewise the Indian Airforce and the Indian Navy are governed with the different Act having no bearing with the CISF Act, 1968, meaning thereby, when the provision as contained under F.R. 3 has stipulated about exclusion of the Army and Marine Regulation then the implied meaning would be, as per the provision of F.R.2, that the members of the disciplined force under the Central Industrial Security Force will govern from the provision of Fundamental Rules.
24. The aid of Rule 77 of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 2001 has also been taken wherein it has been provided the members of the Force shall, in respect of all matters regarding conditions of service for which no provision or insufficient provisions have been made in these rules be governed by the rules and orders for the time being applicable to officers holding corresponding posts in the Central Government in respect of such matters, meaning thereby, in absence of availability of any rule, the rule applicable to the Central Government employee will be applicable even for the members of the disciplined force working under the fold of Central Industrial Security Force Act, 1968.
25. This Court, by combined reading of the provision of F.R. 2 and 3 as also the provision of Rule 77 of the CISF 10 2025:JHHC:36573 Rules, 2001, is of the view that the power which has been exercised by taking recourse of the provisions of Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules/Rule 48 of CCS (Pension) Rules confers power upon the employer to pass an order of compulsory retirement.
26. The aforesaid issue having been answered, as such, this Court is now proceeding to consider the issue on merit.
27. This Court, before appreciating the legality and propriety of the impugned order by which the decision has been taken to weed out the writ petitioner on the principle of deadwood, is of the view that the compulsory retirement in the public interest is not punishment, as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das v. District Medical Officer, (1992) 2 SCC 299, for ready reference the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid paragraphs are being quoted as under:
10. In Shyam Lal v. State of U.P. [(1955) 1 SCR 26 : AIR 1954 SC 369 : (1954) 1 MLJ 730] a Constitution Bench of this Court held that an order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment nor is there any stigma attached to it. It said: (SCR pp. 41-42) "There is no such element of charge or imputation in the case of compulsory retirement. The two requirements for compulsory retirement are that the officer has completed twenty-five years' service and that it is in the public interest to dispense with his further services. It is true that this power of compulsory retirement may be used when the authority exercising this power cannot substantiate the misconduct which may be the real cause for taking the action but what is important to note is that 11 2025:JHHC:36573 the directions in the last sentence of Note 1 to Article 465-A make it abundantly clear that an imputation or charge is not in terms made a condition for the exercise of the power. In other words, a compulsory retirement has no stigma or implication of misbehaviour or incapacity."
11. In T.G. Shivacharana Singh v. State of Mysore [AIR 1965 SC 280 : (1967) 2 LLJ 246] another Constitution Bench re-
affirmed the said principle and held that "Whether or not the petitioner's retirement was in the public interest, is a matter for the State Government to consider, and as to the plea that the order is arbitrary and illegal, it is impossible to hold on the material placed by the petitioner before us that the said order suffers from the vice of mala fides."
19. In Gian Singh Mann v. Punjab and Haryana High Court [(1980) 4 SCC 226 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 527 : AIR 1980 SC 1894] a bench consisting of Krishna Iyer and Pathak, JJ. reiterated the principle that an order of compulsory retirement does not amount to punishment and that no stigma or implication of misbehaviour is intended or attached to such an order.
34. The following principles emerge from the above discussion:
(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour.
(ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government.
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28. Since the compulsory retirement is not an order punitive in nature and even then, the power has been conferred to take decision to weed out the person from the establishment who has been considered to be deadwood, 12 2025:JHHC:36573 meaning thereby, whose presence in the establishment is burden upon it.
29. Therefore, the requirement of consideration, as has been settled by Hon'ble Apex Court , that the entire service career is to be taken into consideration in order to reach to the conclusion that the service career of one or the other public servants is not satisfactory and, as such, in the public interest the decision is required to be taken for separating such public servant on compulsory retirement without casting any stigma since the compulsory retirement, in public interest, is not punitive in nature.
30. It is evident from the proposition as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the entire service career is to be seen including the entries made in the Annual Confidential Report of the concerned employee for the purpose of reaching to the satisfaction before applying the principle of deadwood to compulsory retire the concerned public servant.
31. Adverting to the factual aspect in order to assess as to whether the respondent has applied its mind in order to reach to the satisfaction that whatever decision has been taken is in the public interest by taking into consideration the entire service career.
32. The consideration has been made by the respondent as has been dealt with at paragraph 5 of the impugned 13 2025:JHHC:36573 order dated 01.05.2014 wherefrom it is evident that on scrutiny of the service record of the Assistant Sub-
Inspector, the Representation Committee has found one major and 11 minor punishments during entire service for various acts of serious misconduct like misbehaving with seniors, sleeping on duty, absent from duty post, absent from unit line, refusal to proceed on duty, overstaying on leave, claiming false transport bill on regular posting, misbehaved with Coy. Commander after consuming liquor and other acts of indiscipline.
33. The Representation Committee has also observed that during his entire service career, the writ petitioner has been graded as 'BELOW AVERAGE' three times and 'AVERAGE' nine time in his Annual Confidential Reports.
34. It has also been found by the Representation Committee that the writ petitioner was appointed in CISF as Security Guard on 02.09.1975 and right from very beginning of his career, he was inflicted with one major and 08 minor punishments for various acts of misconduct and graded 03 'Average' and 03 'Below Average' in his ACR upto the year 1987 i.e., within a span of 12 years of service.
35. The writ petitioner, even thereafter, has not taken any sincere endeavour to mend himself, rather, the casual approach was taken. However, the Government has granted him promotion sometime in the year 1994 but even after 14 2025:JHHC:36573 getting two promotions he did not mend himself and awarded with one minor punishment in the year 1995 that is minor in nature for claiming false transport bill on regular posting. He was also graded as 'Average' in his ACR in the year 1995. However, again he has been promoted as Head Constable in the year 1997 but again, while working as Head Constable/GD he did not mend himself, rather, his misdemeanor continued unabated even after becoming ASI in the year 2011 and 2012. He was again inflicted with inflicted with the minor penalty for serious misconduct of consuming liquor and misbehaving with Coy. Commander in an inebriated condition. His ACR was also graded as 'Average' in 2012.
36. All the materials as has been referred in the impugned order does clarify that the entire service record of the writ petitioner has been taken into consideration and even the issue of promotion has also been considered.
37. The grant of promotion does not mean that the concerned employee, that too, a member of the disciplined force, will be allowed to continue with the misdemeanor and indiscipline as the case as has been reflected in the impugned order.
38. This Court, applying the aforesaid consideration on the basis of the judgment pronounced by the Hon'ble Apex Court, as referred hereinabove, is of the view that the 15 2025:JHHC:36573 respondent authorities while taking decision by taking into consideration the entire service record of the petitioner and thereafter decision has been taken, the said decision cannot be said to suffer from an error.
39. Further this Court is dealing with the issue for issuance of writ of certiorari and the principle which has been laid down for issuance of writ of certiorari is very limited, i.e., if it is found from the face of the order that the order is without any jurisdiction or the order is perverse in nature, then only writ of certiorari is to be issued.
40. In the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph no.21 as under:-
"With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the 16 2025:JHHC:36573 Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari."
41. In Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as hereunder:-
"12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra).
13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice."
42. In the case of West Bengal Central School Service Commission & Others Vs. Abdul Halim & Others reported in (2019) 18 SCC 39 their Lordships have been 17 2025:JHHC:36573 laid down pleased to hold at paragraph no. 30 that the power of the judicial review must be exercised by the Court after determining that the impugned is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record and not the same has been established by a process of reasoning, Para-30 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:-
"30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the fact of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the fact of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan Vs. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960 SC
137. If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ Court. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari."
43. In the case of T.C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa reported in (1955) 1 SCR 250, their Lordship hold that the patent error in a decision can be corrected by writ of certiorari, when it is manifested by the error apparent on the face of the proceedings. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereunder: - 18
2025:JHHC:36573 "10. ... ... An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the fact of the proceedings, e.g. when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision. ..."
44. This Court, considering the fact in entirety as well as settled proposition of law as discussed and referred hereinabove, is of the view that it is not a case where interference is to be shown in the impugned order.
45. Accordingly, the instant writ petition fails and is dismissed.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) Date : 3rd December, 2025 Birendra/ A.F.R. Uploaded on 06.12.2025 19