Debashish Pal vs The State Of Jharkhand on 12 January, 2024

[Cites 11, Cited by 0]

Jharkhand High Court

Debashish Pal vs The State Of Jharkhand on 12 January, 2024

Bench: Deepak Roshan

                                        1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                  (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
                  Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 3 of 2005
(Against the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence, both dated
04.12.20204, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track
Court No.1, Bermo at Tenughat, in Sessions Trial Case No. 200 of 1989)

Debashish Pal                                               .....    Appellant
                                 Versus
The State of Jharkhand                                       ..... Respondent
                               ---------

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN

---------

For the Appellant              : Mr. R.S. Majumdar, Sr. Advocate
For the Resp.-State            : Mr. Tarun Kumar, APP
                               --------
16/ 12.01.2024     Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. The instant appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence, both dated 04.12.2004, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.1, Bermo at Tenughat, in Sessions Trial Case No. 200 of 1989; whereby the appellant was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years under Section 304(B) of the Indian Penal Code.

3. The prosecution case in brief is that one Krishna Narayan Saha, gave his statement before the police on 20.12.1988, that the marriage of his sister Samanwita Paul was solemnized on 30.01.1983 at Kolkata with Dewashish Paul (appellant), who was employed as an Engineer at Bokaro Thermal. It is also stated that she often used to visit Kolkata but never appeared happy. It has been further stated that the accused applied pressure on his wife to bring costly gifts or article from her parents and as a result of such pressure his father was compelled to purchase N.S.C. worth Rs.20,000/-. Later on, Devashish Paul started putting pressure on his father for giving a plot of land at Kolkata, and started ill-treating his sister for the same. Further, it has been stated that the accused had gone to Kolkata on 12.07.1988 and demanded that the plot of land should be transferred. This plot of land was purchased by the informant‟s father in the name of his two daughters.

The further case of the prosecution is that on 22.07.1988, the informant received a message at Durgapur about the death of his sister at Bokaro thermal. At Bokaro thermal, on enquiry, the accused told him that his sister consumed rat poison and committed suicide and the body has 2 been sent to Giridih for post-mortem. At Bokaro thermal, Dewashish Paul insisted that his father should give the statement to the police supporting the earlier statement given by the accused regarding the incident. The informant has further stated that the accused told him and his family members should give the similar statement. Being under tremendous pressure, the informant did not understand the implications and gave the statement to police that cordial relationship existed between the husband and wife.

Later on, the dead body was taken to Kolkata. However, when the informant saw the dead body, he found several injuries on it. After seeing the body, the informant was also convinced that his sister was murdered. Soon, the information was given to police and prayer for re-postmortem report was made. Re-postmortem report was done and several ante-mortem injuries were found on her person. Thereafter, the informant was satisfied that his sister has been murdered and the accused has tried to make a different story.

On the basis of this report, a case was registered on 20.12.1988 against the accused person at Bokaro Thermal Police Station under Section 304 B of the Indian Penal Code.

4. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant assails the impugned judgment on following grounds:

(i) The learned trial court failed to take into consideration the relevant matters and based its findings on wholly extraneous and irrelevant matters not germane for the purpose of passing the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence.

(ii) The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence is bad in law and facts and is against the weight of evidence adduced.

(iii) The learned trial court has failed to appreciate the evidence properly and, therefore, has come to wrong findings.

(iv) The learned trial court passed the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence wholly on conjecture and surmises.

(v) The learned trial court failed to take into consideration that the case of the prosecution is full of doubt.

(vi) The learned trial court failed to take into consideration that the delay in lodging the first information has not been properly explained.

(vii) The learned trial court failed to take into consideration that the re-postmortem has been done after a long gap.

(viii) The learned trial court failed to take into consideration that the due weightage which ought to have been given to the defence witnesses is missing which is apparent on the face of the record as the same has been struck down on flimsy grounds or rather on a presumption looking legal inferences of the aspect alleged to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(ix) The learned trial court has committed an error by raising doubt with regard to the integrity of P.W.17 i.e., the Doctor of D.V.C. Hospital and moreover no request has been made on behalf of the prosecution to declare P.W17 hostile.

(x) The non-examination of the Investigating Officer has caused a prejudice to the case of the appellant because the authenticity of the statement made by the prosecution witnesses could not be verified particularly the statements of P.W. 10 and 12 who have stated before the police about the cordial relationship between the appellant and his wife and the said two witnesses have also admitted during their depositions before the learned trial court that they have made statements before the police.

(xi) The learned trial court has also failed to take into consideration the admission of P.W. 6 (sister of the deceased) that her father has purchased the land for her and her sister (deceased) which is also corroborated by the P.W.7.

(xii) The allegation does not constitute offence of dowry death as defined under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and since essential ingredient to constitute an offence under Section 304 (B) of the Indian Penal Code is lacking, therefore, drawing of presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act is not proper and permissible.

Last but not the least, convicting this appellant on the basis of P.W. 9 (minor daughter aged about 2½ years at the time of occurrence) and whose 4 statement was recorded after a log gap when she was 16 years old before the Court.

5. Learned APP opposed the prayer for acquittal and contended that no error has been committed by the learned trial court and the daughter who has deposed the manner of occurrence at the age of 16, though she was 2½ years at the time of occurrence, cannot be ruled out or ignored because of the fact that she was the only eye witness and there is also statement of P.W.9 under Section 161 Cr. P.C.

6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. While arguing the instant appeal, learned Sr. counsel for the appellant has raised the following grounds:

"1. There is delay of 5 months in lodging of the FIR as the incident occurred on 22.07.1988 and the FIR has been registered on 20.12.1988.

2. The learned trial court has considered the 2nd postmortem report which is not permissible under law and has completely ignored the findings made in the 1st postmortem report conducted by P.W.2 who has not found any internal or external injury on the body of deceased.

3. The prosecution failed to prove that the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before her death.

4. The learned trial court has heavily relied upon the testimony of PW-9 who happens to be the daughter of the deceased and her testimony cannot be relied upon as at the time of occurrence she was only two and a half years old and no person will remember anything after a gap of 14 years."

7. With regard to the delay in lodging the FIR, it is evident from the Order of SDJM Alipur which clearly transpires that a specific Complaint was made by the father of the deceased as referred to in G.D entry dated 24.7.88 and in letter dated 24.7.1988 which reflects suspicion of victim being dare to death. From this order it is apparently clear that a complaint was made before Gariahat P.S. which was suppressed by the police in connivance with the accused.

The informant also gave the explanation that he was advised to lodge the complaint before Bihar Police and Kolkata police didn't have jurisdiction as the place of occurrence was Bihar, therefore he sent a registered letter to superior officers of Bihar Police. This fact receives support from the fact that S.P., Giridih directed D.S.P., Bermo to submit a supervision report within 10 days.

8. Further, regarding reliance upon 2nd postmortem report, it is seen in this case that two postmortems have been conducted but the net result of 5 both postmortem is almost same regarding the cause of death which was found to be suspected poisoning. The doctor in Kolkata also found marks of violence over the body and he opined that injury number 6 and 7 were caused by hard and blunt substance like lathi. It is settled law that when there is a conflict between two medical evidences, it is safe to rely upon that report which tallies with the ocular evidences. In this case P.Ws. 6, 7, 9, 10 and 12 have fully corroborated the second postmortem report.

9. The offence involved in this case is Section 304-B of IPC which is reproduced herein under:

"304-B. Dowry death.--(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation. --For the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."

Under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there is presumption of Section 113-B which is related to Section 304-B of IPC. For brevity, the same is also quoted herein under:

"113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.--When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, "dowry death"

shall have the same meaning as in section 304B, of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860)"

Further, by passing various decisions, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has summed-up the principle to constitute the offence under Section 304-B IPC. In the case of Kans Raj Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2000) 5 SCC 207, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has elucidated the following ingredients to prove dowry death -

"(a) the death of a woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or had occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances;

(b) such death should have occurred within 7 years of her marriage;

(c) the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by any relative of her husband;

(d) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry; and

(e) to such cruelty or harassment the deceased should have been subjected to soon before her death."

Further, in the case of Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana reported in (2011) 11 SCC 359, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed as under:

"19. It may be mentioned herein that the legislature in its wisdom has used the word "shall" thus, making a mandatory application on the part of the court to presume that death had been committed by the person who had subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of dowry. It is unlike the provisions of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act where a discretion has been conferred upon the court wherein it had been provided that court may presume abetment of suicide by a married woman. Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the accused to rebut the presumption and in case of Section 113-B relatable to Section 304-B IPC, the onus to prove shifts exclusively and heavily on the accused. The only requirements are that death of a woman has been caused by means other than any natural circumstances; that death has been caused or occurred within 7 years of her marriage; and such woman had been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in connection with any demand of dowry.

20. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such death have been established by the prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death............"

Bare reading of the above referred provisions and verdicts given by the Hon‟ble Apex Court, it appears that when death of a married woman is caused by burns or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within a period of seven years of her marriage and the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband and such cruelty of her husband should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry and such cruelty or harassment, the deceased should have been subjected to soon before her death be called as dowry death and the woman‟s husband or his relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Section 304-B of IPC does not categorize death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental.

10. Further, two things have to be seen in respect of offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC; first, to make sure whether the ingredients of the Section have been made-out against the accused and if the findings are affirmative, then secondly, to ascertain that the accused is deemed to have caused the death of the woman.

Further, when a married woman dies of unnatural death either suicidal or homicidal, due to harassment or cruelty made in connection to any dowry demand soon before her death by her husband or relative of husband, presumption of Section 113-B comes into effect and under such circumstance, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Once the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC are fulfilled by the prosecution, the onus shifts to the defence to produce evidence to rebut the statutory presumption and to prove that the death was in the normal course and the accused was not connected.

11. On perusal of record, it is undisputed that marriage of the deceased was solemnized with the appellant and she died of unnatural death within seven years of her marriage. Since, the deceased succumbed to poisoning that too within seven years of marriage under other than normal circumstances, it clarifies that first two ingredients of Section 304-B are satisfied.

As far as demand of dowry is concerned it is an admitted fact that the appellant accepted NSC worth Rs. 20,000 /- and the material witnesses are categorical that due to pressure made by the accused P.W. 12 had to part with NSC and was forced to give it to the appellant. From the deposition of P.W. 7 and P.W. 10 it is clear that accused had gone to Kolkata on 12.07.1988 and made the demand of transfer of plot in Kolkata.

12. Learned Sr. counsel has also argued that there is no evidence to show that any demand of dowry was made soon before the death of the deceased. In this context, in the case of Kans Raj (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has defined the meaning of phrase „soon before‟ used in the provision of Section 304-B of IPC, relevant para is quoted as under:-

"15. It is further contended on behalf of the respondents that the statements of the deceased referred to the instances could not be termed to be cruelty or harassment by the husband soon before her death. "Soon before" is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term "soon before" is not synonymous with the term "immediately before" and is opposite of the expression "soon after" as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer 8 to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be "soon before death" if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough."

Therefore, now it becomes clear that the phrase „soon before her death‟ in Section 304-B IPC does not mean „immediately prior to death of deceased‟. However, the prosecution must establish the existence of "proximate and live link" between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.

In the case at hand, it has come to light that the accused went to Kolkata on 12.07.1988 and made the demand of transfer of the plot in Kolkata and when the demand was not met the incident took place on 22.07.1988. Applying the test of proximity, it can be easily observed that the incident of demand had taken place "soon before death".

Therefore, looking to the evidence as discussed above, this Court is of the considered view that learned trial Court rightly found that the appellant/accused was demanding dowry from the father of deceased.

13. Now, the only issue which arises to be decided by this Court is as to whether learned trial Court was right in presuming that the appellant/accused caused dowry death of the deceased. From the above analysis, it is clear that the prosecution was able to successfully prove that the death of deceased occurred due to bodily injuries within seven years of her marriage under other than normal circumstances. It has further been proved that soon before her death, she was subjected to harassment and cruelty pursuant to demand of dowry by the appellant.

Since, the ingredients of Section 304-B of IPC stand satisfied, the presumption under 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act operates against the appellant, who is deemed to have caused the offence specified under Section 304-B of IPC, therefore, the burden shifts on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption.

14. Learned Sr. Counsel for the appellant questioned the credibility of P.W. 9 being child witness. In this regard, the law is very clear that a child 9 witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one, such evidence could be the basis of conviction. In other words, even in absence of oath, the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the questions and able to give rational answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the Court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanor must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored.

The legal position concerning the testimony of child witness has been a subject matter of discussion in catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as of the various High Courts of India and abroad. It would be apt to refer to some of the important decisions on the subject.

The Hon'ble Apex Court in Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 9 SCC 129 held that the evidence of child witness cannot be rejected per se, but the court, as a rule of prudence, is required to consider such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality of the statements and its reliability, base conviction by accepting the statement of the child witness. The fact that the witness being a child witness would require the court to scrutinize her evidence with care and caution. If she is shown to have stood the test of cross-examination and there is no infirmity in her evidence, the prosecution can rightly claim a conviction based upon her testimony alone. Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence. Some discrepancies in the statement of a child witness cannot be made the basis for discarding the testimony. Discrepancies in the deposition, if not in material particulars, would lend credence to the testimony of a child witness who, under the normal circumstances, would like to mix-up what the witness saw with what he or she is likely to imagine to have seen. While appreciating the evidence of the child witness, the courts are required to rule out the possibility of the child being tutored. In the absence of any allegation regarding tutoring or using the child witness for ulterior purposes of the prosecution, the courts have no option but to rely upon the confidence inspiring testimony of such witness for the purposes of holding 10 the accused guilty or not. Relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is quoted herein below:

"5. Admittedly, Bhavya (PW 2), who at the time of occurrence was about four years of age, is the only solitary eyewitness who was rightly not given the oath. The time and place of the occurrence and the attending circumstances of the case suggest no possibility of there being any other person as an eyewitness. The evidence of the child witness cannot be rejected per se, but the court, as a rule of prudence, is required to consider such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality of the statements and its reliability, base conviction by accepting the statement of the child witness. The evidence of PW 2 cannot be discarded only on the ground of her being of tender age. The fact of PW 2 being a child witness would require the court to scrutinise her evidence with care and caution. If she is shown to have stood the test of cross-examination and there is no infirmity in her evidence, the prosecution can rightly claim a conviction based upon her testimony alone. Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence. Some discrepancies in the statement of a child witness cannot be made the basis for discarding the testimony. Discrepancies in the deposition, if not in material particulars, would lend credence to the testimony of a child witness who, under the normal circumstances, would like to mix- up what the witness saw with what he or she is likely to imagine to have seen. While appreciating the evidence of the child witness, the courts are required to rule out the possibility of the child being tutored. In the absence of any allegation regarding tutoring or using the child witness for ulterior purposes of the prosecution, the courts have no option but to rely upon the confidence inspiring testimony of such witness for the purposes of holding the accused guilty or not."

Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Krishna Master (2010) 12 SCC 324 has observed that a witness Madan Lal was six years old at the time of occurrence and he was examined in chief, during trial, when he was about 16 years old. The High Court rejected his testimony on the ground that a child of six years would not have been in a position to recapitulate the facts in his memory when he is examined after such a gap. Overturning the reasoning given by the High Court, it was observed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that when a child of tender age witnesses gruesome murder of his mother, father, brothers etc., he is not likely to forget the incident for his whole life and would certainly recapitulate the facts in his memory, when asked about the same at any point of time, notwithstanding the gap of about 10 years between the incident and recording of his evidence.

15. At this stage, it is also profitable to refer the judgment of the Delhi High Court rendered in the case of Baljeet Singh & Anr. V. State 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1797 wherein the Court relying upon the work of Dr. Hans Gross had observed that testimonial abilities of children of tender 11 years and children being innocent are held to be more suspectable to all kinds of influence, threats, false representations and such external factors influencing the children to speak in a particular manner and on the tutored lines but at the same time it was opined that the children being innocent would speak especially that part of the truth which they themselves have visibly seen. Relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is quoted herein below:

"95. Dr. Hans Gross in his authoritative work on criminal investigation has extensively dealt with the subject of child psychology and the testimonial abilities of children of tender years and children being innocent are held to be more suspectable to all kinds of influence, threats, false representations and such external factors influencing the children to speak in a particular manner and on the tutored lines but at the same time it was opined that the children being innocent would speak especially that part of the truth which they themselves have visibly seen."

The position was concisely stated by BREWER, J. in Wheeler v. United States, 159 US 523 (1895) wherein the objection was raised to the action of the court in permitting the son of the deceased to testify. The homicide took place on June 12, 1894, and this boy was five years old on the 5th of July following the case was tried on December 21, at which time he was nearly five and a half years of age. The boy, in reply to questions put to him on his voir dire, said, among other things, that he knew the difference between the truth and a lie; that if he told a lie, the bad man would get him, and that he was going to tell the truth. When further asked what they would do with him in court if he told a lie, he replied that they would put him in jail. He also said that his mother had told him that morning to „tell no lie‟. And in response to a question as to what the clerk said to him when he held up his hand, he answered, „Don't you tell no story.‟ Other questions were asked as to his residence, his relationship to the deceased, and as to whether he had ever been to school, to which latter inquiry he responded in the negative. The Hon'ble convicting the accused held as under:

"As the testimony is not all preserved in the record, we have before us no inquiry as to the sufficiency of the testimony to uphold the verdict, and are limited to the question of the competency of this witness.

5. That the boy was not by reason of his youth, as a matter of law, absolutely disqualified as a witness is clear. While no one should think of calling as a witness an infant only two or three years old, there is no precise age which determines the question of competency. This depends on the capacity 12 and intelligence of the child, his appreciation of the difference between truth and falsehood, as well as of his duty to tell the former. The decision of this question rests primarily with the trial judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices his manner, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence, as well as his understanding of the obligations of an oath. As many of these matters cannot be photographed into the record, the decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed on review, unless from that which is preserved it is clear that it was erroneous. These rules have been settled by many decisions, and there seems to be no dissent among the recent authorities. In Brasier's Case, 1 Leach, Crown Cas. 199, it is stated that the question was submitted to the 12 judges, and that they were unanimously of the opinion „that an infant, though under the age of seven years, may be sworn in a criminal prosecution, provided such infant appears, on strict examination by the court, to possess a sufficient knowledge of the nature and consequences of an oath; for there is no precise or fixed rule as to the time within which infants are excluded from giving evidence, but their admissibility depends upon the sense and reason they entertain of the danger and impiety of falsehood, which is to be collected from their answers to questions propounded to them by the court.‟

6. These principles and authorities are decisive in this case. So far as can be judged from the not very extended examination which is found in the record, the boy was intelligent, understood the difference between truth and falsehood, and the consequences of telling the latter, and also what was required by the oath which he had taken. At any rate, the contrary does not appear. Of course, care must be taken by the trial judge, especially where, as in this case, the question is one of life or death. On the other hand, to exclude from the witness stand one who shows himself capable of understanding the difference between truth and falsehood, and who does not appear to have been simply taught to tell a story, would sometimes result in staying the hand of justice."

16. In the case at hand, P.W. 9 Ushani Paul is daughter of the deceased deposed that at the time of occurrence she was about 2 and a half years old and she had given statement to the police that her father had assaulted her mother with lathi and burnt her. It is admitted fact that no person can remember what she saw 14 years back. It is true that there is every possibility of the child being tutored especially when she has lived and grown up in the company of her grandparents. However, it is also a fact that her statement was recorded by the police immediately after the incident and the deposition of this witness after 14 years in Court was not contrary.

Further, though it is not safe to rely upon the statement of such child witness, but in the instant case the fact remains that other P.Ws. have supported that there were marks of violence on the body of deceased. This is in corroboration with the statement of P.W.9 Ushani Paul. This fact also receives support from the postmortem report and the photographs which are part of record.

Therefore, the presumption given under Section 113-B of Evidence Act goes against the appellant and he failed to rebut the same. Accordingly, the finding given by the trial Court regarding conviction under Section 304- B of IPC, is hereby, affirmed.

17. So far as the sentence is concerned, the trial Court has imposed the minimum sentence under section 304-B of the I.P.C. Thus, the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court is affirmed.

18. As a result, the instant appeal sans merit and is hereby dismissed. Impugned judgment of conviction and sentence, as passed by the learned trial Court is affirmed. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds are, hereby, cancelled and he is directed to immediately surrender before the learned trial Court for undergoing the remaining jail sentence.

19. Let a copy of this judgment and the lower court record be sent to the court concerned forthwith.

(Deepak Roshan, J.) Pramanik/ AFR

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