Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Karanna V.R. vs Om Prakash G. on 16 September, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1998(6)ALT63, 1999CRILJ551, (1999)ILLJ843AP
Author: Umesh Chandra Banerjee
Bench: Umesh Chandra Banerjee
JUDGMENT Umesh Chandra Banerjee, C.J.
1. Observance of obedience to an order of Court is the rule of law and any disobedience shown to the order of the Court is to be taken with utmost seriousness since Law-Courts would not permit compliance with the directions of the Law-Courts in its breach rather than in its observance. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has conferred on the Law-Courts the power to punish an offender in the event there is a violation of the mandate of the Court, the majesty of the Court and the orders of the Court shall have to be observed in no uncertain terms. While it is true that the power is absolute, but some amount of self-restraint ought to be imposed on the Law-Courts itself by reason of the user of the language "wilful disobedience". The word "wilful" has a special significance and connotation. In common English parlance, it means a deliberate violation or a deliberate disobedience and it is only then and in that event the Law Courts are authorised to deal with the situations as is envisaged in the Act. It is a powerful weapon in the hands of the Court. But that weapon ought to be exercised on the basis of reasonable certainty as regards the violation of the order of the Court. In the event of there being any doubt, question of taking recourse to the provisions of the Act and punishing an offender would not arise. It is a quasi- criminal offence and as such, even the doctrine of benefit of doubt is made applicable to a contempt proceeding. The law is well settled and we need not dilate much except recording that the contextual facts ought to be gone into and the action ought to be taken on the basis thereof. Therefore, no 'stretch a point' formula can be evolved in the matter of punishing an offender and the same depends on the facts and circumstances, of each matter.
2. Turning on to the contextual facts, it appears that on February 21, 1997, the learned single Judge has been pleased to pass an order to the following effect:-
"There shall be stay of operation of award of the Labour Court, Hyderabad dated June 21, 1996 passed in I.D. No.599 of 1993 subject to payment of last drawn wages in accordance with Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. This order shall come into force with effect from thirty days from the date of publication of the award. The wages directed shall be paid on 10th of every month. The WPMP is disposed of."
The said order, however, stands amended on April 24, 1997. The learned Judge thought it fit to incorporate the words "current wages" in the place of the words "last drawn wages".
3. On the factual score, it further appears that some moneys were paid for some period of time, but subsequently the payment stopped. A contempt application by reason therefor has produced an undertaking to pay but subsequently there was stoppage of such a payment as well. This time, however, the explanation is that in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Dena Bank v. Kirit Kumar T. Patel, (1998-I-LLJ-l) question of payment in the same rate does not arise and by reason of the factum of payments being made in excess of the entitlement in terms of the law as declared by the Supreme Court and there is no further obligation to make any payment. It is this stand of the appellant which did not find favour with the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge has been pleased to record.
"........... Even, after hearing the arguments, when this Court expressed its view, the learned counsel would not hear. The learned counsel vehemently reiterated that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the order of this Court stands overruled and that he was not liable to obey theorder.........."
The language used by the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant and as recorded by the learned single Judge is not forensic and probably some amount of sobriety could be expected from the Advocates by this Court. Be that as it may, the issue that falls for consideration is whether by reason of the order of the Supreme Court and in the event a litigant deems it fit to proceed on the basis thereof whether it can be termed to be any wilful violation.
4. Incidentally, be it noted that no exception can be taken to the proposition of law as submitted by Mr. Vidyasagar appearing for the respondent-applicant before the learned single Judge that even an order which is utterly wrong and irregular deems its compliance and we do not think there is any infraction of law on that score. But the fact remains to be considered in the instant matter is whether there was any direction to pay a particular wage or wages per month. Unfortunately, we do not find such an order as is stated to have been violated. The learned Judge has been categorical and emphatic in regard to the payment of wages in terms and in accordance with the provisions of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and this section has been interpreted by the Supreme Court. The defence of the appellant-company is that payment has in fact been made in terms of the ratio decidendi of the Supreme Court Judgment in Dena Bank's case. Mr. Vidya Sagar, however, very emphatically contended that the interpretation put forth by the appellant herein cannot be said to be correct interpretation of the law as laid down by the Supreme Court. Assuming that be so, but does that change the situation; in the matter of committal of an act of contempt, it is well settled law that if the act or omission is not wilful then in that event question of committal of any act of contempt does not arise. It is an interpretation of the law which has resulted in the stoppage of payment. It may be due to misapprehension or misinterpretation or wrong interpretation of the judgment. But it cannot, however, be said to be a wilful effort to misread the judgment of the Supreme Court. Mr. Sridharan, learned Advocate on this wake has contended in support of the appeal that unless the alleged violation is a wilful violation or a deliberate violation, question of committal of an act under the Contempt of Courts Act does not and cannot arise. We do lead our concurrence to such a submission. Without expressing any opinion as regards the true and correct interpretation of law as laid down by the Supreme Court and as contended by Mr. Sridharan, we do deem it fit and expedient to record that an error of judgment or an error of interpretation cannot by itself involve the consequences of an act of contempt and as such, question of punishment under Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 does not and cannot arise. In that view of the matter, the finding and observations of the learned single Judge as regards the committal of fact of contempt in terms of the provisions of the Act does not and cannot arise. At best, it can be an error of judgment in the matter of interpretation of the Supreme Court judgment but not a deliberate act warranting punishment under the Act.
5. The appeal, therefore, succeeds. The order of the learned single Judge stands set aside and quashed. The punishment of simple imprisonment for a period of three months with a fine of Rs.2,000/- to be paid within one month from the date of the order and in default of payment of fine further simple imprisonment for fifteen days stands set aside and quashed.
6. The appellant, however, is directed to reconsider the matter and act in accordance with law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of payment of wages under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.