Delhi District Court
Kshama Sharma vs Narayan Prasad Sharma on 29 July, 2025
IN THE COURT OF AASHISH GUPTA, DISTRICT JUDGE-01,
NORTH-EAST DISTRICT, KARKARDOOMA COURTS, DELHI
In the matter of
CS No. 194/18
CNR No. DLNE010032082018
Smt. Kshama Sharma
W/o Sh. Jatin Sharma
R/o H.No. 14, Gali No. 2,
Phase-7, Shiv Vihar,
Karawal Nagar, Delhi - 110094 ..... Plaintiff
versus
1. Sh. Narayan Prasad Sharma
S/o Not Known
2. Sh. Kamal Sharma
S/o Sh. Narayan Prasad Sharma
3. Smt. Geeta Sharma
W/o Sh. Sanjay Sharma
All R/o H.No. 33,
Gali No. 12, Phase-6, Shiv Vihar,
Karawal Nagar, Delhi ..... Defendants
Date of filing : 26.07.2018
Reserved on : 01.07.2025
Date of Decision : 29.07.2025
Digitally signed
by AASHISH
GUPTA
AASHISH Date:
GUPTA 2025.07.29
16:54:24
+0530
CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 1 of 19
JUDGMENT
1. Plaintiff has sued the defendants for the tort of defamation.
2. Plaintiff is sister-in-law (jethani) of D-3/Geeta Sharma. D-1 is father of Geeta Sharma and D-2 is her brother. One Sanjay Sharma is husband of D-3 and some matrimonial disputes are going on between him and his wife/D-3.
3. As per plaintiff, defendants, individually and collectively have made oral and written defamatory claims about purported relations between her and her brother-in-law viz. Sanjay Sharma (who is husband of D-3) and this has led to loss of her reputation in the eyes of public. The incidents alleged by the plaintiff are tabulated in Table-1 below.
TABLE-1
Serial Nature of defamatory statement Defamatory statement made Date Place
No. by
1. Oral claim made qua illicit relationship between D-1/father of D-3. 18.06.2017 House of plaintiff.
plaintiff and her brother-in-law/Sanjay Sharma in front of neighbours.
2. Oral claim made qua illicit relationship between D-2/brother of D-3. February, House of plaintiff. plaintiff and her brother-in-law/Sanjay Sharma in 2018 front of neighbours.
3. Oral claim made qua illicit relationship between D-3/wife of Sanjay Sharma. Not specified. CAW Cell. plaintiff and her brother-in-law/Sanjay Sharma in front of officials of CAW Cell.
4. Oral claim made qua illicit relationship between All defendants during Not specified. Women Cell. plaintiff and her brother-in-law/Sanjay Sharma in proceedings before Women front of officials of Women Cell. Cell.
5. Written pamphlets affixed qua illicit relationship Plaintiff does not say that March, 2018. Neighbourhood of between plaintiff and her brother-in-law/Sanjay which of the defendants was the plaintiff Sharma in the neighbourhood of the plaintiff. responsible for the said written pamphlets but the inference is sought to be drawn by the plaintiff that the said pamphlets were published and pasted at the instance of defendants.
6. Written police complaint made to SHO, Karawal D-1 and D-3. 19.06.2017 Complaint made to Nagar by D-1 and counter signed by D-3 inter SHO, Karawal alia alleging that plaintiff's brother-in-law/Sanjay Nagar. is having illicit relationship with his bhabhi.
CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 2 of 19
4. For the said oral and written defamatory claims, plaintiff has sought recovery of damages of Rs.8,50,000/- with interest from the defendants.
5. Plaintiff claims that Geeta Sharma/D-3 is married to her brother in law/Devar Sanjay Sharma and some matrimonial disputes took place amongst them leading to D-3 leaving her matrimonial house on 18.06.2017. At that time and at various instances noted in Table-1 above, the defendants have either individually or collectively defamed her by falsely claiming that she is having illicit relationship with D-3's husband/Sanjay Sharma. She also claims that the said false allegation was also published by way of pamphlets and stated in a police complaint made to police.
6. It is her case that this led to lowering of her reputation in society and thus, she has sued the defendants herein for the aforesaid amount.
7. In response to the allegations, defendants have denied making any defamatory statements by way of a written complaint or by pasting of any pamphlet. They also deny having made oral defamatory remarks detailed in Table-1 above. It is their case that D-3 was facing domestic violence and cruelty in her matrimonial house and the present case is an outcome of the action taken by D-3 inter alia against her in-laws/her husband. Thus, they pray for dismissal of the suit.
8. In replication, plaintiff reiterates her case and denies the allegations made by defendants.
CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 3 of 19
9. Based on pleadings, the following issues were framed :
(i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of damages of Rs.8,50,000/- on account of defamation? OPP
(ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for interest, as prayed for? OPP
(iii) Relief.
10. Thereafter, plaintiff examined the following witnesses:
Particulars of Nature of witness Documents proved /relied witness PW-1/Kshama Sharma Plaintiff herself. She tendered
1)Original document of FIR 307/2017 PS her evidence by way of affidavit Karawal Nagar filed by plaintiff against Ex. PW1/A whereby she D-3 and her father dated 10.07.2017 reiterated the contents of his Ex.PW1/1.
plaint.
2)Medical documents of Kshama Sharma issued by IHBAS dated 08.06.2018 Ex.PW1/2(OSR);
3)Copy of defamatory poster Ex.PW1/3;
4)Reply of RTI along with copy of defamatory complaint Ex.PW1/4 (OSR);
5)Copy of police complaint dated 07.07.2018 addressed to DCP Ex.PW1/5;
6)Legal notice dated 12.07.2018 Ex.PW1/6;
7)Postal tracking along with postal receipts Ex.PW1/7; It is to be noted that at the time of exhibition of documents, the postal receipts have been inadvertently given exhibit no. Ex.PW1/8. In order to avoid confusion, the same shall be referred to as 'postal receipts' in the body of this judgment.
8)Photographs of poster Ex.PW1/8 (colly) ; It is to be noted that at the time of exhibition of documents, the postal receipts have been inadvertently given exhibit no. Ex.PW1/9. In order to avoid confusion, the same shall be referred to as 'photographs of defamatory poster (2 in no.) ' in the body of this judgment.
9)Copy of Adhaar Card of plaintiff Ex.PW1/9(OSR). It is to be noted that at the CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 4 of 19 time of exhibition of documents, the postal receipts have been inadvertently given exhibit no. Ex.PW1/10. In order to avoid confusion, the same shall be referred to as 'aadhar card of plaintiff' in the body of this judgment.
PW-2/Jatin Sharma He is husband of plaintiff. He tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. PW2/A. He supported the case of plaintiff.
11. The aforesaid witnesses were duly cross-examined by the Counsel for the defendants.
12. After plaintiff's evidence, defendants led their evidence and D-3 stepped in the witness box as DW-1 whereby she reiterated the averments made in the written statement. She placed reliance on following documents:
S.No. Nature of documents Exhibit Remarks
No./Mark
1. Copy of complaint bearing DD Ex.DW1/1 All the exhibited documents are objected to by
No. 50B, PS Karawal Nagar. the Counsel for plaintiff on the ground that the
2. Photographs showing injuries Ex. DW1/2 same are photocopies.
caused by plaintiff and his family
members to D-3. The said objection was ordered to be decided at the stage of final arguments. Since the originals
3. Copy of medical treatment of Ex. DW1/3 of the said documents were never produced D-3. before this court either by summoning the
4. Copy of FIR No. 0107/19 U/S Ex. DW1/4 relevant record or by indicating as to where the 498A/406/34 IPC PS Karawal original thereof are, the said documents cannot Nagar. be admitted in evidence and thus, the objection raised by counsel for plaintiff is decided accordingly.
13. The said witness was duly cross-examined by the counsel for plaintiff.
14. I have heard arguments advanced by Ld. Counsels for both the parties and carefully perused the records.
CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 5 of 19
13.Based on the evidence led before this court, the issue-wise finding in the matter is as under:
Issue No. (i) and (ii)
(i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of damages of Rs. 8,50,000/- on account of defamation?
OPP &
(ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for interest, as prayed for? OPP
14.At the outset, it may be noted that as per plaintiff's case, she has been defamed on three counts. Firstly, she claims that defendants on various occasions have orally defamed her and the details thereof are mentioned at serial no. 1 to 4 of Table-1. Secondly, as per her, she was defamed when certain defamatory pamphlets (Ex.PW1/3 and Ex.PW1/9 colly.) were affixed in the neighbourhood (as described at serial no. 5 of Table-1). Thirdly, as per her, she was again defamed when a written complaint (part of Ex.PW1/4) was made by D-1 to police (as described at serial no. 6 of Table-1 above).
15.Now, as far as the case of plaintiff on first count is concerned, plaintiff herself stepped in the witness box as PW1 to assert that oral defamatory statements that she has illicit relationship with Sanjay Sharma/D-3's husband were made by D-1, D-2 and D-3 at date and CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 6 of 19 time as described in Table-1 above. This contention of plaintiff is denied by D-3 in her evidence while deposing as DW-1.
16.The evidence of either of the two parties qua oral defamatory statements is on same footing and it is difficult to say from the evidence as to whether such oral claims were actually made or were never made at all.
17.Plaintiff has not produced any public witness or any other independent witness to probablize the fact that the alleged defamatory statement was actually made by D-1, D-2 or D-3 at the time and place indicated in Table-1 above. The onus to prove that such statement(s) were actually made by the defendants was of the plaintiff to discharge and since she has failed to probablize the same from her evidence, therefore, the burden of proof has not been discharged by her.
18.Thus, it cannot be said from the record that any oral defamatory statements were made by either of the defendants individually or together to make them liable for the tort of defamation qua the said oral statements.
19.With respect to the pasting of pamphlets in neighbourhood, it is not alleged by the plaintiff in her evidence that she actually saw either of the defendants pasting any such pamphlets. Thus, it is difficult to connect the pamphlets in question to the defendants. It cannot be said from the record that the pamphlets Ex.PW1/3 or Ex.PW1/9 (which are photographs of pamphlets claimed to be pasted in the CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 7 of 19 neighbourhood) were the handiwork of the defendants and therefore, on the said count also, defendants cannot be held liable for the tort of defamation.
20.Lastly, Plaintiff has alleged that D-1 had made a written police complaint dated 19.06.2017 (part of Ex.PW1/4) alleging that plaintiff is having illicit relationship with D-3's husband. As per plaintiff, this complaint was counter-signed by D-1. Counsel for plaintiff argued that this complaint fell in the hands of plaintiff on filing of an RTI application before the concerned police authorities (with the application made by Sanjay Sharma/D-3's husband).
21.As per plaintiff, this complaint is admitted by the defendant to have been made by her father during her cross-examination and thus, it is for the defendant to prove that either the said allegation is true (to escape liability) or is exempted in law as a priviliged communication.
22.On the other hand, counsel for defendants argued that since Ex.PW1/4 dated 19.06.2017 is a police complaint informing the police authorities about the genuine grievances of the defendants against in-laws of D-3 and her husband, the same cannot be treated to be a defamatory publication.
23.At the outset, I may note that on 19.06.2017, a written complaint was made by D-1 wherein he has inter alia stated as follows:
"I beg to submit that I had married my daughter Geeta on 25.11.2016 to Sanjay Sharma, son of Daya Shankar, resident of Shiv Vihar. Soon after marriage, my daughter has been harassed and tortured for more CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 8 of 19 dowry. Dowry is demanded; and car is demanded; Geeta's husband Sanjay has illicit relationship with his bhabhi and for the said reason they often fight. Our life and property is threatened; that we will not be left. Our life and property should be given due protection."
(emphasis supplied)
24.It has come in the cross-examination of DW-1/Geeta Sharma that the said complaint bears her signatures at point X. Again, it is not disputed in the written statement by the defendants that the said complaint was actually given by D-1 (with D-3 counter-signing it) to police on 19.06.2017.
25.Thus, it is proved on record that D-1/D-3 had actually made the aforesaid police complaint inter alia alleging that D-3's husband had illicit relationship with his bhabhi.
26.Now, as far as the contention of defendants that since D-3 was having matrimonial disputes with her husband; and the present case has been filed to pressurize them to settle the said dispute is concerned, suffice is to say that in law, reputation of a given individual is considered property of that person and the same is to be guarded against any frivolous/false statements which tend to harm the reputation of an individual. A reputation of a human individual takes a lifetime to build and any frivolous/false statement cannot be allowed to destroy such lifetime savings of an individual and if made, the maker of such statements shall have to compensate for the damage caused by him.
CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 9 of 19
27.Now, if I consider the statement contained in Ex.PW1/4, that D-3's husband Sanjay is having illicit relationship with her bhabhi (with plaintiff being bhabhi of Sanjay), such statement is essentially a statement which has a tendency to injure the reputation of the person to whom it refers. The said statement is sufficient to excite adverse opinions/feelings of other person against her and thus, are per se, defamatory.
28.Now, if the said statement is treated as defamatory in nature, the defendants, to escape liability must show that either the said statement is true or under some privilege (either absolute or qualified), the same is not actionable. At the same time, it has to be seen as to whether the action brought by the plaintiff is within the period of limitation.
29.Before proceeding further, I may take note of the ratio of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Patna High Court in the case titled as Pandey Surendra Nath Sinha And Anr. vs Bageshwari Pd. AIR 1961 PATNA 164 which elucidates the law of defamation. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:
"14. A defamatory statement is one which has a tendency to injure the reputation of the person to whom it refers; which tends, that is to say, to lower him in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally and in particular to cause him to be shunned or avoided or regarded with feelings of hatred, contempt, ridicule, fear, dislike or disesteem, or to convey an imputation on him disparaging or injurious to him in his office, profession, calling, trade or business. Defamation, therefore, is the wrong done by a person to another's reputation by words, signs, or visible representations.
15. The test of the defamatory nature of a statement, therefore, is its tendency to excite against the plaintiff the adverse opinions or CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 10 of 19 feelings of other persons. The statement is judged by the standard of opinion which prevails among ordinary, right-thinking members of society, reasonable people of time and place, and not the opinion which prevailed in another time, or in another country or among a special class or abnormally constituted people. Hence, the test is an objective one, and it is no defence to any that the statement was not intended to be defamatory, or uttered by way of a joke. As lightly said: "No one can cast about firebrands and death, and then escape from being responsible by saying he was in sport."
16. A wrong of defamation, as such, consists in the publication of a false and defamatory statement concerning another person without lawful justification.
17. The word 'defamation' is the generic name for the wrong; libel and slander are particular forms of it. Defamation, therefore, is of two kinds, namely, libel and slander. In libel the defamatory statement is made in some permanent and visible form in writing or otherwise recorded, such as, printing, typing, pictures, photographs, caricatures, effigies. In slander the defamatory statement or representation is expressed by speech or its equivalents, that is, in some other transitory form, whether visible or audible, such as, a nod, wink, smile, hissing, the finger-language of the deaf and dumb, gestures or inarticulate but significant sounds.
18. The actions of libel and slander are thus private legal remedies, the object of which is to make reparation or the private injury done by wrongful publication to a third person or persons of defamatory statements concerning the plaintiff. The defendant in these actions may prove the truth of the defamatory matter and thus show that the plaintiff has received no injury. For though there may be damage accruing from the publication, yet, if the facts published ace true, the law gives no remedy by action.
19. We are here concerned with an action for libel. In an action for libel the plaintiff should prove that the statement complained of (1) refers to him; (2) is in writing, (3) is defamatory, and, (4) was published by the defendant to a third person or persons. A man publishes defamatory statements at his peril. An action for libel, therefore, lies on mere proof of publication, even though the plaintiff does not prove that he has sutured any special damage, that is, the loss of some definite temporal advantage.
20. On proof of the above facts, the plaintiff makes out his case, and, then it is for the defendant to establish one of the defences recognised by law.
21. It may, however, be mentioned that, although both in England and in India, it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove the following facts, it has been customary to allege them in the plaintiff's pleading; (a) Falsity of the statement. It is for the defendant to prove that it is true; (b) Malice of the defendant. The plaintiff has to prove malice to rebut the defence of privilege or fair comment, but otherwise it is not necessary in order to make out the plaintiffs case. The allegation of malice means nothing more than that the defendant CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 11 of 19 published a defamatory statement without lawful excuse; and (c) damage to plaintiff's reputation. The law presumes it from the defamatory tendency of the words. The above points the plaintiff need not prove.
22. Besides the general defences applicable to all actions in torts, such as, limitation, consent, accord and satisfaction, previous judgment, etc., the three special defences available in an action for defamation, under the common law, are (1) justification (or truth), or (2) privilege, absolute or qualified, and, (3) fair comment. In England there is a statutory defence in actions for libel against newspapers, viz., apology.
23. We are here concerned with the first two defences, that is, Justification and Privilege.
24. The defence of justification is the plea of truth of the words or statements published by the defendant. The form of the plea is that "the words complained of are true in substance and in tact". Truth is a defence in a Civil action, "For the law will not permit a man to recover damages in respect of an injury to a character which he either does not or ought not to possess." No action, therefore, will lie for the publication of a defamatory statement if the defendant pleads and proves that it is true.
This is so even though the defendant is proved to have been actuated by malicious and improper motives. In a civil action the defendant has to plead and prove the truth of the defamatory words, and not merely his belief in their truth, though honest. Therefore, if the words, or the statements, complained of, are true, he escapes liability, however improper his motives may have been. If, however, the word or statement turns out not to be true, he is liable, however honestly and carefully he may have acted and however inevitable his mistake, the liability is almost absolute.
25. 'Privilege' is used here in the sense of an excuse or immunity conferred by law on statements or communications made on certain occasions called 'privileged occasions'. A privileged statement, therefore, is one which is made in such circumstances as to be exempt from the rule that a man attacks the reputation of another at his peril, that is, at his own risk. In other words privilege includes those exceptional cases in which it is not enough, in order to create liability, to prove that the defendant has published a false and defamatory statement. The defendant being privileged, is not responsible for this alone; he is either wholly free from responsibility or is liable only on proof that he was animated by a malicious motive, and not by any genuine intention to use his privilege for the purpose for which the law gave it to him,
26. 'Privilege' is of two kinds: (1) absolute and (2) qualified.
27. Absolute Privilege: A statement is said to be absolutely privileged when it is of such a nature that no action will lie for it, however false and defamatory it may be, and even though it is made maliciously, that is to say, from some improper motive. These cases are at the opposite extreme from the ordinary cases of unprivileged CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 12 of 19 defamation. When a statement is not privileged, it is actionable, however honest its publication may have been; but if it is absolutely privileged it is not actionable, however dishonest its publication may have been.
On such occasions the interest of society requires that a man should speak out his mind fully and frankly without thought of fear or consequences. The general good of the commonwealth requires that there should be absolute freedom of speech and that no restraint should be laid upon it. On such an occasion irce speech wholly prevails over the right or reputation. This rests on the ground of public interest or the due administration of justice. The real doctrine, of what is called 'Doctrine of absolute privilege', is that in the public interest it is not desirable to enquire whether the words or acts of certain persons are malicious or not.
It is not that there is any privilege to be malicious. The reason for the doctrine is that it is desirable that persons who occupy certain positions, for example, Judge, Advocates, and witnesses, in the course of legal proceedings, should be permitted to express themselves with complete freedom; and to secure their independence, absolute privilege is given to their acts and words, so that they should not be brought before other Courts for inquiry merely on the allegation that they were malicious. It is a striking instance of the subordination of the individual's interest to that of the community.......
55. Qualified Privilege : In order, however, to decide the question of qualified privilege, raised by the appellants, it would be useful, at this very stage, also to know, what is a qualified privilege? what are its essentials? and, in what respect does qualified privilege differ from an absolute privilege?
56. Privilege is qualified where the defendant is entitled to make the statement, even if it is false, but only if he makes it honestly with respect to what he states and carefully with respect to the means by which he states it. Qualified privilege exists when the defendant is exempted from the rule of strict liability for defamation not absolutely, but only conditionally on the absence of malice. When, therefore, an occasion of qualified privilege exists a person, provided he is not actuated by malice, is entitled to make defamatory statements about another.
On such an occasion, no doubt the right of freedom of speech prevails over the right of reputation, but only to a limited extent, that is, only when the statement is made honestly and without any indirect or improper motive and is not actuated by any malice. Qualified privilege, therefore, is an intermediate case between total absence of privilege and the presence of absolute privilege.
57. The principle, which determines whether any particular occasion is privileged, was expounded by Parke B. in Toogond v. Spyring, (1834) 1 Cr. M. and Rule 181, at p. 193, thus:
"The statement is protected if it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 13 of 19 concerned. If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, such communications are protected for the common convenience and welfare of the society; and the law has not restricted the right to make them within any narrow limits."
Amongst the chief instances of qualified privilege, which are relevant tor our purpose, are also the following two:
(1) Statements made in the performance of a duty; whether legal, moral, or social; such as, Police investigating a crime; and, (2) Statements made in the protection of some lawful interest, which include statements in self-protection -- protection of oneself or of one's property, and statements made to the proper authorities in order to procure the redress of public grievances.
58. A statement, therefore, is conditionally privileged, if the person who makes the communication has an interest or a duty, legal, social or moral, to make it to the person to whom it is made, and, the person to whom it is so made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. This reciprocity is essential; per Lord Atkinson, in Adam v. Ward, (1917) AC 309, H. L. at p. 334. The privilege extends only to a communication upon the subject with respect to which privilege exists, and, does not extend to anything that is not relevant and pertinent to the discharge of the duty, or, the exercise of the right, or, the safeguarding of the interest which creates the privilege.
59. It would be useful to know the distinction between absolute privilege and qualified privilege. The points of distinction between absolute privilege and qualified privilege are the following:
"(i) In absolute privilege, it is the occasion which is privileged, and when once the nature of the occasion is shown, it follows, as a necessary inference, that every communication on that occasion is protected; in qualified privilege, the occasion is, not privileged, until the defendant has shown how that occasion was used. It is not enough to have an interest or a duty in making a statement, the necessity of the existence of an interest of duty in making the statement complained of, must also be shown:
(ii) In absolute privilege, the defendant gets absolute exemption from liability; in qualified privilege, the defendant gets a conditional exemption from liability:
(iii) In absolute privilege, the defendant is exempted from liability even when there is malice on his part; in qualified privilege, the defendant is exempted from liability only when there is no make On his part:
(iv) In absolute privilege, statements are protected in all circumstances, irrespective of the presence of good or bad motives;
in qualified privilege, even after a case of qualified privilege has been established by the defendant, it may be met by the plaintiff proving in reply improper or evil motive on the part of the defendant, in which case the defence of qualified privilege vanishes, and the plaintiff succeeds; and,
(v) In Absolute Privilege as well as in Qualified Privilege, the CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 14 of 19 defendant has to prove his plea of privilege, but with this difference that in Absolute Privilege the defence is absolute and irrebuttable by plaintiff, whereas in Qualified Privilege the defence is not absolute but rebutable by the plaintiff.
In the case in which it is sought to rely on a defence of qualified privilege, it is for the defendant to prove the facts and circumstances which establish that the occasion was privileged. If he does so, the burden of showing actual or express malice rests upon the plaintiff, and, if this is shown, communications made even on a privileged occasion, can no longer be regarded as privileged communications. If the Court rules that the occasion was not privileged, the plaintiff is not called upon to prove actual malice. In such a case the law implies malice from the falsity of the statement.
60. A statement made in the performance of a duty is conditionally privileged if it is made in the performance of any legal or moral duty imposed upon the person making it, provided that the person to whom the statement is made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. This is not to say that both parties must have a duty, or both an interest: One may have an interest and the other a duty. A statement made in the protection of an interest, even when there is no duty to make the statement, is nevertheless privileged if it is made in the protection of some lawful interest of the person making it; for example, if it is made in the defence of his own property or reputation. But hare also there must be reciprocity. There must be aa interest to be protected on one side and a duty to protect it on the other,
61. In order, therefore, to make out a communication to be privileged the defendant should prove (a) that there was a privileged occasion, i.e., an occasion in which he had a duty or interest in making the communication to a person or persons who had a corresponding duty or interest to receive it; and, (b) that the communication was relevant or pertinent to the occasion. It is then for the plaintiff to prove malice of the defendant in making the statement; it is not enough for the defendant to prove that he honestly believed in the duty or interest in himself or the other person, or in the relevancy of what he said : it is necessary that the Court be satisfied that a reasonable person would have done so........"
(emphasis supplied)
30.A bare perusal of the aforesaid judgment elucidates the law of defamation. In the said case, a defamatory letter was written to Superintendent of Police and an action was brought against the author of the said letter seeking damages. While dealing with the said case, the Hon'ble Patna High Court has eloquently reiterated the law CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 15 of 19 of defamation and has even explained the ingredients and the defences available in a civil action for defamation.
31.As in the said case, in this case also, a complaint has been made to the police by D-1 claiming that D-3's husband has illicit relationship with his bhabhi.
32.Now, it has come in the cross-examination of DW-1/D-3 that she has never lodged any police complaint against any such illicit relationships and she does not have any documentary evidence in support of her said allegation. Even though, she claims in her cross- examination that she has seen plaintiff and her husband in compromising position, the date qua the said incident is not stated by her. She does not even say so in her written statement. This would mean that she does not have any cogent evidence to prove on record that her said allegation qua illicit relationship between her husband and plaintiff are true. Thus, the first defence against a defamatory statement is not proved on record by defendants.
33.With respect to the other defence of privilege, defendants have not set up the said plea in their written statement. They have also not led any evidence in this regard. It is not the case of the defendants that D-1 was under any moral or legal duty to have made such a statement (either on his own or on the instance of his daughter D-3) to police. As noted in the aforesaid judgment, for the defendant to set up a defence of privilege, it is necessary for the defendant to show that when the said statement was made/published, there was a CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 16 of 19 privileged occasion i.e. an occasion in which he had a duty or interest in making the communication to a person who had a corresponding duty or interest to receive it and that the communication was relevant or pertinent to the occasion.
34.In the present case, no plea has been set up by the defendants to show that the complaint made to the police on 19.06.2017 Ex.PW1/4 was a privileged occasion which casted a duty or gave interest to D-1/D-3 in alleging that D-3's husband was having an illicit relationship with his bhabhi. They have not claimed in their pleadings or evidence that making of such a statement was relevant or pertinent to the occasion.
35.If that be the case, it transpires from the record that the said defence of qualified privilege is thus, not available in this case to the defendants and at least D-1/D-3 together are liable for making a defamatory claim against plaintiff.
36.Since the said complaint is not made by D-2, he cannot be liable for making the said complaint.
37.But, it is pertinent to note that before any damages can be awarded to the plaintiff, in law, a duty is cast upon the court to see as to whether the claim made before the court is within the period of limitation. This is in light of section 3 of Limitation Act, 1963 which specifically lays that although limitation has not been set up as a defence, a suit, which has been instituted after the prescribed period of limitation shall be dismissed.
CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 17 of 19
38.Now, I may note that the police complaint dated 19.06.2017 Ex.PW1/4 is the defamatory statement for which period of limitation shall have to be seen before any damages can be awarded to plaintiff. But, it may be noted that the present suit has been instituted on 26.07.2018.
39.This is after the period of limitation of one year provided in Article 75 of the Limitation Act which provides that a suit for compensation for libel is required to be brought in within a period of one year from the date of publication of libel.
40.It is nobody's case that the said complaint Ex.PW1/4 was not made on 19.06.2017 and if the same is taken as correct, the publication of the defamatory statement took place on the said date. Thus, any action qua the said statement could have been taken by the plaintiff within a period of one year from the date of said publication as per Article 75 of Limitation Act, 1963. For the said statement, the suit has been instituted only on 26.07.2018, the claim on the basis of said statement is beyond limitation and therefore, no damages can be awarded to the plaintiff on that count.
41.It can be argued that the said statement came in the hands of plaintiff after her brother-in-law/Sanjay Sharma/D-3's husband applied by way of an application to the concerned authorities for copy of the said statement and thus, only thereafter, she became aware of such statement.
CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 18 of 19
42.The said argument, if made, was liable to fail as the period of limitation under Article 75 of Limitation Act does not begin to run from the date of knowledge of the publication of defamatory statement and it begins to run from the date of publication itself. If that be the case, the aforesaid argument that plaintiff laid hands on the said defamatory statements only after receipt of copy of the statement (some time in May, 2018) cannot be accepted.
43.Thus, the case of plaintiff, to the extent of being dependent on the said police complaint Ex.PW1/4, is beyond the period of limitation.
44.Thus, on none of the three counts noted above, plaintiff is entitled to receive any damages or any interest thereupon. Thus, she has failed to discharge the onus of all the issues under consideration and thus, all the issues in this case are decided against the plaintiff and in favour of defendants.
Conclusion
45.In view of the findings on the aforesaid issues, the suit of the plaintiff is liable to fail. It is ordered accordingly. Thus, the present suit is dismissed.
46.Let a decree sheet be prepared accordingly. No order as to cost.
Digitally signed by AASHISH 47.File be consigned to Record Room. AASHISH GUPTA Date: GUPTA 2025.07.29 16:55:08 Announced in the Aashish Gupta +0530 open Court on 29.07.2025 District Judge-01, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi CS No. 194/18 Kshama Sharma Vs. Narayan Prasad Sharma & Ors. 19 of 19