Bombay High Court
Mamta Digvijay Singh vs State Of Maharashtra And Anr. on 23 September, 2025
922.4967.25-wp interim bail.docx
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.4967 OF 2025
Mrs. Mamta Digvijay Singh .. Petitioner
Vs.
State of Maharashtra & Anr. .. Respondents
...
Mr. Aabad Ponda, Senior Advocate a/w Gaurav Parkar,
Vikrant Singh Negi, Mr. Pratik Thakkar, Mr. Parag
Kabra, Mr. Sourab Aroara, Ms. Priyamvada Singhania,
and Ms. Sneha Barange & i/by DSK Legal, Advocates
for the Petitioner.
Mr. K. V. Saste, APP for the Respondent No.1-State.
Mr. Jatin Sehgal a/w Ms. Devna Soni, Mr. Sandeep
Salunke, Mr. Kunal Vaishnav, Shivashish Dwivedi and
Mr. Yash Badkur, Advocates for the Respondent No.2.
Mr. Sandesh Manjrekar, PI, EOW, Unit-7, Mumbai.
...
CORAM : SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, CJ &
GAUTAM A. ANKHAD, J.
Digitally signed by DATE : 23rd SEPTEMBER 2025.
RAMESHWAR
RAMESHWAR LAXMAN
LAXMAN DILWALE
DILWALE Date:
2025.09.24
11:02:05
+0530
Per, Shree Chandrashekhar, CJ :
In the complaint case filed by the respondent no.2 which was numbered as CC No.57/SW/2021, the trial Court passed an order on 6th May 2021 under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for registration of a First Information Report. Pursuant to that order, M.E.C.R. No.1 of 2021 was registered on 8 th May 2021. Later on, the investigation of case was transferred to EOW which re- registered the case vide CR No. 51 of 2025.
2. On several grounds, the petitioner seeks to challenge the registration of C.R.No.51 of 2025 which arises from M.E.C.R. no.1. The said crime has been lodged alleging commission of the offence bgp Page | 1 ::: Uploaded on - 24/09/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:40:31 ::: 922.4967.25-wp interim bail.docx under sections 406, 420, 409, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
3. In this writ petition, the following order was passed on 22nd September 2025:
"The petitioner has made the following prayers :-
A. Issue appropriate writ in the nature of Madamus and/or any other appropriate writ under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 and u/s.528 of the BNSS and/or direction and/or order to quash and set aside order dated 06.05.2021 passed by the Ld. 12th Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Bandra in C.C. No.57/SW/2021 which led to registration of M.E.C.R. No.1 of 2021 dated 08.05.2021 u/s.406, 420, 409, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120(B) read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by Bandra Police Station and all consequent proceedings emanating therefrom, qua the Petitioners.
B. Issue appropriate writ in the nature of Mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 and u/s.528 of the BNSS and/or direction and/or order to quash and set aside C.R. No.51 of 2025 registered by Economic Offences Wing (Unit 7), Mumbai, arising out of M.E.C.R. No.1 of 2021 dated 08.05.2021 u/s.406, 420, 409, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120(B) read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 registered by Bandra Police Station pursuant to order dated 06.05.2021 passed by the Ld. 12th Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Bandra in C.C.No.57/SW/2021 and all consequent proceedings emanating therefrom, qua the Petitioners.
C. Be pleased to direct a stay of investigation and all subsequent proceedings emanating therefrom in relation to C.R. No.51 of 2025 registered by Economic Offences Wing (Unit-7), Mumbai, arising out of M.E.C.R. No.1 of 2021 dated 08.05.2021 u/s.406, 420, 409, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120(B) read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 registered by Bandra Police Station. D. Alternatively, be pleased to direct that no chargesheet shall be filed against the Petitioner in relation to C.R. No.51 of 2025 registered by Economic Offences Wing (Unit-7), Mumbai, arising out of M.E.C.R. No.1 of 2021 dated 08.05.2021 u/s.406, 420, 409, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120(B) read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 registered by Bandra Police Station, pending the hearing and disposal of this Petition. E. Be pleased to pass interim orders for release of the Petitioner from the custody of EOW in relation to C.R. No.51 of 2025 registered by Economic Offences Wing (Unit-7), Mumbai, arising out of M.E.C.R. No.1 of 2021 dated 08.05.2021 u/s.406, 420, 409, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120(B) read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 registered by Bandra Police Station, pending the hearing and disposal of this Petition. F. Interim Order and Ad-Interim including Ex-Parte order in terms of prayers A to D above.
G. Pass any other order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit bgp Page | 2 ::: Uploaded on - 24/09/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:40:31 ::: 922.4967.25-wp interim bail.docx and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case."
2. We have been taken through the statements made in C.C. No.57/SW/2021, in particular, the allegations in paragraph no.24 starting at page no.106 of the paper-book. We have also been apprised about the list of documents filed by the complainant to support the allegations of commission of offence under sections 406, 420, 409, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120B r/w section 34 of the Indian Penal Code allegedly committed by Mr. Suketu Shah, Mr. Neelkanthan Iyer, Mr. Mangesh Kadam, Mr. Nirmal Jain & his company, Mr. Balaji Raghavan, Mrs. Mamta Singh and Mr. Mohammed Sahid i.e. respondent nos.3 to 9 and other unknown persons. In the course of the hearing, this Court has been apprised that the accused persons, namely, Mr. Suketu Shah, Mr. Nilkanthan Iyer, Mr. Nirmal Jain, Mr. Balaji Raghavan and Mr. Mohammed Sahid have no protection granted by any Court. It is stated at the Bar that Mr. Mangesh Kadam and Mrs. Mamta Singh were arrested on 10th September 2025.
3. The Investigating Officer of the case is present in the Court with the case diary. He shall remain present tomorrow along with the case diary. He shall apprise the Court about notice issued to other persons and/or inquiries made from them prior to 10 th September 2025.
4. Mr. Jatin Sehgal, the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 has raised a preliminary objection to maintainability of this writ petition on the ground that an order passed under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now section 175 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) can be challenged only by way of a revision.
5. Mr. Aabad Ponda, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has, however, referred to a decision in "Arun P. Gidh v. Chandraprakash Singh & Ors." 2024 SCC OnLine Bom. 1028 to support maintainability of this writ petition.
6. At the request of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, post the matter on 23rd September 2025."
4. Two compilations of judgments are tendered in the Court by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 which are taken record.
5. A preliminary objection to the maintainability of this writ petition has been taken on behalf of the respondent no.2 who is the complainant in CC No.57/SW/2021, on the ground that the remedy for the aggrieved petitioner to challenge the order dated 6 th May 2021 passed under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 lies in revision under section 397(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and not by filing a writ petition. To support this plea, the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 referred to the decision in "Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi)" in Special Leave bgp Page | 3 ::: Uploaded on - 24/09/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:40:31 ::: 922.4967.25-wp interim bail.docx Petition (Criminal) No.18084 of 2024, and a Full Bench judgment of this Court in "Arun P. Gidh v. Chandraprakash Singh & Ors." 2024 SCC OnLine Bom.1028. The learned counsel for the respondent no.2 strenuously argued that in a case where the order passed under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure discloses application of mind by the Magistrate, the High Court shall not go into the merits of the matter by examining the materials on record and would stay its hands from any interference with the order passed by the Magistrate. The learned counsel for the respondent no.2 endeavored to take this Court to the discussions in "Arun P. Gidh" to submit that the appropriate remedy for the petitioner to challenge the order dated 6th May 2021 in CC No.57/SW/2021 is to file a revision petition. In "Anurag Bhatnagar", the informant did not approach the Officer In-charge of the police station or the Superintendent of Police and had directly gone to the Magistrate under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it was held that for that reason the order passed by the Magistrate under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not become without jurisdiction. On facts, it was held that the Magistrate had not only heard the matter, perused the documents and considered the case law, and then he had recorded his opinion that the information disclosed a cognizable offence. The learned APP has also opposed this writ petition. However, in our opinion, while the proposition in the cases cited on behalf of the respondent no.2 may be considered when the order dated 6 th May 2021 in CC No.57/SW/2021 is examined on merits, these decisions cannot be interpreted as creating a bar to entertain the present writ petition seeking multiple prayers.
6. On the other hand, Mr. Aabad Ponda, the learned senior bgp Page | 4 ::: Uploaded on - 24/09/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:40:31 ::: 922.4967.25-wp interim bail.docx counsel for the petitioner gave the factual background in which the decision in "Arun P. Gidh" has been rendered by a Full Bench of this Court. The learned senior counsel submits that the decision in "Avinash Trimbakrao Dhondage v. State of Maharashtra and Anr." 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 5197 which held that the aggrieved accused can file a petition before the revisional Court and a petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to challenge the order passed by the Magistrate under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure may not be entertained, was not followed by another Division Bench of this Court in "Kailash Dattatraya Jadhav & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Another" 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 5030 wherein another Division Bench of this Court held that the remedy of revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure to challenge an order passed under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall not be an efficacious remedy "at all". The learned senior counsel submitted that it was in the light of the discordant views taken by two coordinate Benches of this Court that the matter was referred to a Larger Bench in "Arun P. Gidh".
7. Having considered the rival submissions, this Court is not inclined to hold that this writ petition is not maintainable because the order passed under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been put to challenge by the petitioner. Long back, Lord Halsbury observed in "Quinn v. Leathem" (1901) AC 495 that it is determination by the Court that alone forms the decision of the Court. In "Ambica Quarry Works & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Ors." (1987) 1 SCC 213, the Hon'ble Supreme Court made a reference to Quinn v. Leathem" to observe that a decision is an authority for what it decides and every observation made in the decision is not ratio decidendi which shall have a binding precedent. We may also bgp Page | 5 ::: Uploaded on - 24/09/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:40:31 ::: 922.4967.25-wp interim bail.docx observe that a judgment is not to be read as a statute or an Act of the Parliament. In "P. S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd" (2004) 11 SCC 672, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that a decision should not be read as a statute. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that a judgment must be read in its entirety and the Court should not pick out a word from any sentence of the judgment de- hors the context in which the said judgment was rendered.
8. What we find on a glance at the Full Bench decision in "Arun P. Gidh" is that the Full Bench approved and affirmed the decision in "Kailash Dattatraya Jadhav" which held that the remedy of revision for the aggrieved accused against whom First Information Report has been lodged by virtue of an order passed under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not an efficacious remedy, and further held that it is the correct proposition in law. In "Arun P. Gidh" a Full Bench of this Court held as under :
"128. The conspectus of aforesaid discussion is that in our view, the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Kailash Dattatraya Jadhav (supra), that in a case where on the basis of an order under sub-Section (3) of Section 156 of the code, FIR is registered, the remedy of revision under the Code, is not an efficacious remedy, lays down the correct position in law."
9. There is another reason to hold that this writ petition is maintainable and the reason is that there are other prayers made in this writ petition seeking invocation of the extraordinary and plenary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner has also invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. We would only indicate that the jurisdiction under Article 226 is not fettered by any technicality and in the appropriate cases the writ Court must exercise its powers and jurisdiction to remedy the situation. In view of the powers vested in this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution read bgp Page | 6 ::: Uploaded on - 24/09/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:40:31 ::: 922.4967.25-wp interim bail.docx with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we hold that this writ petition is maintainable.
10. Issue notice to the respondents.
11. Mr. K. V. Saste, the learned APP appears and waives service of notice to respondent No.1 - State. Mr. Jatin Sehgal, the learned counsel appears and waives service of notice to respondent no.2.
12. In compliance of the order dated 22 nd September 2025, the "Note" prepared by Mr. K. V. Saste, the learned APP with the assistance of Mr. Sandesh Manjrekar, PI, EOW, Unit-7, Mumbai who is the Investigating Officer, containing six pages is tendered in the Court which is taken on record to be attached at appropriate place.
13. Mr. Aabad Ponda, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner pressing the interim relief under clause (E) submitted that the writ Court is not denuded of its powers to grant interim bail in a case like this which discloses sheer abuse and misuse of the power of arrest. The learned senior counsel referred to the discussions in paragraph 68 in "Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Arnab" (2021) 2 SCC 427 to submit that deprivation of the liberty even for a single day is one day too many. In "Arnab Manoranjan Goswami", the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with the argument on the hierarcy of Courts held as under:
"68. Mr Kapil Sibal, Mr Amit Desai and Mr Chander Uday Singh are undoubtedly right in submitting that the procedural hierarchy of courts in matters concerning the grant of bail needs to be respected. However, there was a failure of the High Court to discharge its adjudicatory function at two levels--first in declining to evaluate prima facie at the interim stage in a petition for quashing the FIR as to whether an arguable case has been made out, and secondly, in declining interim bail, as a consequence of its failure to render a prima facie opinion on the first. The High Court did have the power to protect the citizen by an interim order in a petition invoking Article
226. Where the High Court has failed to do so, this Court would be abdicating its role and functions as a constitutional court if it refuses to interfere, despite the parameters for such interference being met. The doors of this Court cannot be closed to a citizen who is able to bgp Page | 7 ::: Uploaded on - 24/09/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:40:31 ::: 922.4967.25-wp interim bail.docx establish prima facie that the instrumentality of the State is being weaponised for using the force of criminal law. Our courts must ensure that they continue to remain the first line of defence against the deprivation of the liberty of citizens. Deprivation of liberty even for a single day is one day too many. We must always be mindful of the deeper systemic implications of our decisions."
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held as under:
It would be apposite to extract the observations made, albeit in a dissenting opinion, by one of us (Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.) in a decision of a three-Judge Bench in Romila Thapar v. Union of India [Romila Thapar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 753 : (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 638] : (SCC p. 796, para 79) "79. ...[T]he basic entitlement of every citizen who is faced with allegations of criminal wrongdoing, is that the investigative process should be fair. This is an integral component of the guarantee against arbitrariness under Article 14 and of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. If this Court were not to stand by the principles which we have formulated, we may witness a soulful requiem to liberty."
The decision was a dissent in the facts of the case. The view of the leading majority judgment is undoubtedly the view of the Court, which binds us. However, the principle quoted above is in line with the precedents of this Court.
70. More than four decades ago, in a celebrated judgment in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand [State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 594] , Krishna Iyer, J. pithily reminded us that the basic rule of our criminal justice system is "bail, not jail"
[ These words of Krishna Iyer, J. are not isolated silos in our jurisprudence, but have been consistently followed in judgments of this Court for decades. Some of these judgments are : State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1960 (2) and Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26 :
(2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 397] . The High Courts and courts in the district judiciary of India must enforce this principle in practice, and not forego that duty, leaving this Court to intervene at all times. We must in particular also emphasise the role of the district judiciary, which provides the first point of interface to the citizen. Our district judiciary is wrongly referred to as the "subordinate judiciary". It may be subordinate in hierarchy but it is not subordinate in terms of its importance in the lives of citizens or in terms of the duty to render justice to them. High Courts get burdened when courts of first instance decline to grant anticipatory bail or bail in deserving cases.
This continues in the Supreme Court as well, when High Courts do not grant bail or anticipatory bail in cases falling within the parameters of the law. The consequence for those who suffer incarceration are serious. Common citizens without the means or resources to move the High Courts or this Court languish as undertrials. Courts must be alive to the situation as it prevails on the ground-in the jails and police stations where human dignity has no protector. As Judges, we would do well to remind ourselves that it is bgp Page | 8 ::: Uploaded on - 24/09/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:40:31 ::: 922.4967.25-wp interim bail.docx through the instrumentality of bail that our criminal justice system's primordial interest in preserving the presumption of innocence finds its most eloquent expression. The remedy of bail is the "solemn expression of the humaneness of the justice system" [Arghya Sengupta and Ritvika Sharma, 'Saharashri and the Supremes', (The Wire, 23-06-2015)<https://thewire.in/economy/saharashri-and-the- supremes>available at Tasked as we are with the primary responsibility of preserving the liberty of all citizens, we cannot countenance an approach that has the consequence of applying this basic rule in an inverted form. We have given expression to our anguish in a case where a citizen has approached this Court. We have done so in order to reiterate principles which must govern countless other faces whose voices should not go unheard.
15. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 submitted that this writ petition cannot be converted into a bail petition and there is no challenge to the remand orders passed by the Court concerned. It is further submitted that the trial Magistrate applied its mind to the facts of the case and approved the remand of the petitioner to judicial custody and, therefore, no interference in this writ petition is possible to grant relief as per the prayer clause (E). The learned counsel for the respondent no.2 referred to the decision in "Savitri Goenka v. Kusum Lata Damani & Ors." (2007) 14 SCC 373 to submit that the Hon'ble Supreme Court criticized the practice of converting the applications filed under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to one for bail in terms of section 438 or 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned counsel also referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Panful Nessa v. Mohd. Miraj Ali" (2008) 7 SCC 759 and "Hamida v. Rashid"
(2008) 1 SCC 474 to submit that the inherent powers of the Court should be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases and, that too, when miscarriage of justice has occasioned. The learned counsel for the respondent no.2 made a specific reference to the observations in "Panful Nessa" in paragraph no.9 which reads as under: -
"9. The impugned directions as contained in the impugned order bgp Page | 9 ::: Uploaded on - 24/09/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:40:31 ::: 922.4967.25-wp interim bail.docx read as follows:
"Considering, therefore, the matter in its entirety and in the interest of justice, GR Case No. 444 of 1999 is hereby transferred to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Darrang. The accused-petitioners are hereby directed to appear in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Darrang, Mangaldai, on or before 23-8-2006 and if, on their appearance in the learned court below, the petitioners apply for bail they shall be allowed to go on bail of Rs.10,000 each with two local sureties, each of the like amount, subject to the satisfaction of the learned court below. This direction for bail is further subject to the condition that the petitioners shall keep appearing in the learned court below as may hereafter be directed by it."
{ It is clear that the High Court has not considered the merits of the case. It completely overlooked the fact that Respondents 1 to 9 have filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code. Even if the High Court found that there was some lapse on the part of the learned SDJM in dealing with the matter, as noted by the High Court that could not have been a ground for directing release of the respondents on bail, that too in a petition under Section 482 of the Code. It was not even a case under Section 438. Even if it was so, the impugned directions could not have been given for releasing Respondents 1 to 9 in the manner done. The jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code cannot be extended to grant bail in the manner done. There was not even consideration of the merits of the case. The High Court was clearly in error by holding that there was no material to show that Respondents 1 to 9 were absconders. By so observing, the High Court completely lost sight of the fact that in the charge-sheet filed Respondents 1 to 9 were shown as absconders. Similarly, in the orders dated 1-6-2004 the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and the learned SDJM had clearly mentioned that 11 accused persons were absconders. This was obviously with reference to the charge-sheet filed."
16. The consideration of the impugned order in that case in the aforementioned paragraph no.9 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court starts with an observation that the High Court did not consider the merits of the case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further made an observation on merits that it was not even a case under section
438. On the factual score, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the High Court was clearly in error by holding that there was no material to show that the accused-respondents were absconders. In"Hamida", the accused was found to have committed the offence under section 302 read with 34 of the bgp Page | 10 ::: Uploaded on - 24/09/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:40:31 ::: 922.4967.25-wp interim bail.docx Indian Penal Code and a charge was framed for commission of such offence. It was in that context that the Hon'ble Supreme Court made an observation that the powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. In a catena of judgments the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the observation made in a judgment should not be read in isolation out of the context. The learned counsel for the respondent no.2 referred to "State v. Navjot Sandhu" (2003) 6 SCC 641 but in that case also the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the inherent powers of the Court can be exercised where there is an abuse of the process of the Court.
17. In the Note prepared by the learned APP, the grounds of arrest of the petitioner have been stated. It is stated that at the time of arrest also the grounds of arrest were mentioned in the remand application. According to the investigating officer, the investigation carried out so far reveals that forged documents are required to be recovered from the petitioner and this petitioner with Mangesh Kadam are prime accused who were involved in making multiple letters, resolutions and transferring forged shares. It is further stated in this Note that it is critical to unveil the modus operandi adopted by the petitioner regarding the manner and making of forged documents and effecting the transfer of JLS Realty Private Limited (in short, JLS) shares without physical shares. It is further stated in the Note that it is important to uncover who is the ultimate beneficiary of the entire transaction and on whose instructions the accused persons were working.
18. The genesis of the present controversy involving the petitioner seems to be in her induction as non-Executive Director in the JLS. There are litigations between the parties and the allegations and bgp Page | 11 ::: Uploaded on - 24/09/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:40:31 ::: 922.4967.25-wp interim bail.docx counter allegations have been made by them against each other, but insofar as the present petitioner is concerned, her appointment as a non-Executive Director in the JLS on 24 th February 2021 seems to have been made the center of controversy making serious allegations against her. Mr. Jatin Sehgal, the learned Counsel for the respondent no.2 submits that it was the petitioner who forged the shares and converted and created Demat form. According to the respondent no.2, everything happened only after the present petitioner was inducted as a Director.
19. The Note tendered by the learned APP records that the petitioner did not appear before the Investigating Officer when a notice was issued to her on 14 th May 2025. She appeared on 29 th May 2025 and her statement was recorded on the same day. It is further indicated that pursuant to the notice dated 13 th June 2025 she was required to appear on 17 th June 2025 but did not appear on that day. Subsequently, she appeared on 18 th June 2025 when her statement was recorded by the Investigating Officer. The details of the notices issued to other accused persons and their appearance/non appearance before the Investigating Officer have also been given in this Note, which are reproduced hereinbelow:
I. ACCUSED MAMTA DIGVIJAY SINGH Accused Name Date of Notice To join on Remarks MAMTA DIGVIJAY 14.05.2025 17.05.2025 Did not appear.
SINGH 26.05.202529.05.2025 Appeared. Statement recorded on 29.05.2025.
13.06.2025 17.06.2025 Did not appear.
Appeared on 18.06.2025.
Statement recorded.
ACCUSED ARRESTED ON 10.09.2025
II. ACCUSED MANGESH PANDURANG KADAM
Accused Name Date of Notice To join on Remarks
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MANGESH 12.05.2025 14.05.2025 Did not appear.
PANDURANG
KADAM
15.05.2025 22.05.2025 Appeared - Statement recorded on 22.05.2025.
Request to Appeared on 27.05.2025 -
Attend on Statement recorded.
27.05.2025 Request to Appeared on 03.06.2025 Attend on Statement recorded.
30.05.2025 13.06.2025 18.06.2025 Appeared on 18.06.2025 Statement recorded.
14.08.2025 18.08.2025 Did not appear.
ARRESTED ON 10.09.2025
III. ACCUSED NEELKANTHAN IYER
Accused Name Date of Notice To join on Remarks
NEELKANTHAN IYER 12.05.2025 14.05.2025 Did not appear.
15.05.2025 22.05.2025 Appeared on 22.05.2025 -
Statement recorded.
27.05.2025 30.05.2025 Did not appear.
Appeared on 03.06.2025 -
Statement recorded.
13.06.2025 18.06.2025 Appeared on 18.06.2025 -
Statement recorded.
25.07.2025 29.07.2025 Did not appear.
29.07.2025 04.08.2025 Appeared on 04.08.2025. Left due to health reasons.
IV. ACCUSED SUKETU SHAH
Accused Name Date of Notice To join on Remarks
SUKETU SHAH 04.07.2025 08.07.2025 Did not appear.
11.07.2025 15.07.2025 Did not appear.
16.07.2025 21.07.2025 Appeared on 21.07.2025 -
Statement recorded. Left due to health reasons.
29.07.2025 31.07.2025 Did not appear.
V. ACCUSED MOHMMAD SHAHID
Accused Name Date of Notice To join on Remarks
MOHMMAD SHAHID 14.05.2025 22.05.2025 Did not appear.
Address could not be
located.
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VI. ACCUSED BALAJI RAGHAVAN
Accused Name Date of Notice To join on Remarks
BALAJI RAGHAVAN 13.09.2025 15.09.2025 Appeared - Statement
recorded on
15.09.2025
17.09.2025 18.09.2025 Appeared - Statement
recorded on
18.09.2025.
20. This is quite amazing that after recording a statement of the petitioner on 18th June 2025 she has been arrested by the Investigating Officer on 10th September 2025. As stated in the Note, if this is the stand of the Investigating Officer that the petitioner was evasive and did not cooperate on 29 th May 2025 and 18th June 2025, it is not explained what was the compelling reason that she was arrested about three months thereafter. It is also not indicated by the Investigating Officer as to why further notice was not given to the petitioner as has been issued to Mangesh Kadam, Neelkanthan Iyer and Suketu Shah as late as on 18 th August 2025 and she was arrested at 18.05 pm. on 10th September 2025 when she was organising birthday party of her specially-abled child. The failure to give reasons raises a question on the conduct of the investigation as reasons are live-link between the mind of the decision decision- maker and the decision taken by him. The stand taken by the learned APP that forged documents are to be recovered from the petitioner is also a false stand taken on behalf of the Investigating Officer in asmuch as he cannot recover a thing from a person in judicial custody; the police remand of the petitioner was either not taken or refused. The Investigating Officer does not also inform the Court that he conducted any search in the premises of the petitioner. It seems and prima facie appears that the Investigating Officer conducted the investigation in a most biased manner. The bgp Page | 14 ::: Uploaded on - 24/09/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:40:31 ::: 922.4967.25-wp interim bail.docx arrest of the petitioner is in teeth of the guidelines issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar" and "Satender Kumar Antil vs Central Bureau Of Investigation" (2021) 10 SCC 73 and its sequels.
21. The power of arrest vested in the Investigating Officer comes with a corresponding duty to apply his mind and make arrest when the case falls under such category of cases in the statutory regime or the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which permit arrest. The power of arrest is not unbridled and it must be prima-facie shown that the Police Officer had followed the procedure under section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and was satisfied that the arrest was necessary to prevent the person sought to be arrested from committing any further offence or for proper investigation of the offence or to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence or to prevent the accused from influencing the potential witnesses or where it is not possible to ensure his presence without arresting him. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 that the registration of a case is only a step in the direction of moving the machinery of law in motion as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P. & Ors." (2014) 2 SCC 1 and while so, no interference is permissible in this case is liable to be rejected. The registration of a criminal case is a serious matter and that affects the liberty of a person when it is prima-facie shown that the First Information Report was lodged with oblique motive or the allegations in the complaint do not disclose commission of a cognizable offence. In "Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar" (2014) 8 SCC 273, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:
bgp Page | 15 ::: Uploaded on - 24/09/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:40:31 ::: 922.4967.25-wp interim bail.docx "6. Law Commissions, Police Commissions and this Court in a large number of judgments emphasised the need to maintain a balance between individual liberty and societal order while exercising the power of arrest. Police officers make arrest as they believe that they possess the power to do so. As the arrest curtails freedom, brings humiliation and casts scars forever, we feel differently. We believe that no arrest should be made only because the offence is non-bailable and cognizable and therefore, lawful for the police officers to do so. The existence of the power to arrest is one thing, the justification for the exercise of it is quite another. Apart from the power to arrest, the police officers must be able to justify the reasons thereof. No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence made against a person. It would be prudent and wise for a police officer that no arrest is made without a reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as to the genuineness of the allegation. Despite this legal position, the legislature did not find any improvement. Numbers of arrest have not decreased. Ultimately, Parliament had to intervene and on the recommendation of the 177th Report of the Law Commission submitted in the year 2001, Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "CrPC"), in the present form came to be enacted. It is interesting to note that such a recommendation was made by the Law Commission in its 152nd and 154th Report submitted as back in the year 1994. The value of the proportionality permeates the amendment relating to arrest."
22. In "Mohd. Zubair v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr" (2023) 16 SCC 764, after referring to the decision in "Arnab Manoranjan Goswami"
and "Arnesh Kumar", the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that a person must not be punished solely on the basis of allegations and, that too, without a fair trial. We have seen the statements made in the complaint case vide CP/57/SW/2021 and find that except making a statement in paragraph no.24 that the petitioner and Mohmmad Shahid were inducted in the company through the Annual General Meeting held on 24 th February 2021, there appears no specific allegation against the petitioner and that is the reason we are not inclined to write the whole history of litigation as narrated in the complaint case. We have also glanced at the list of documents appended with the complaint case and put questions to the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 regarding those documents. Prima- facie, we gather that those documents also do not indicate complicity of the petitioner in the alleged crime.
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23. In "Mohd. Zubair v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr" the Hon'ble Supreme Court granted bail to the said applicant in the First Information Reports lodged against him in a petition filed by him under Article 32 of the Constitution. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court made the following pertinent observations in paragraph 29 to 31 of the reported judgment which read as under:
"29. Police officers are vested with the power to arrest individuals at various stages of the criminal justice process, including during the course of investigation. However, this power is not unbridled. In terms of Section 41(1)(b)(ii)CrPC, the police officer in question must be satisfied that such arrest is necessary to prevent the person sought to be arrested from committing any further offence, for proper investigation of the offence, to prevent the arrestee from tampering with or destroying evidence, to prevent them from influencing or intimidating potential witnesses, or when it is not possible to ensure their presence in court without arresting them."
"30. Police officers have a duty to apply their mind to the case before them and ensure that the condition(s) in Section 41 are met before they conduct an arrest. This Court has time and again, reiterated the importance of doing so, including in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar [Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273 :
(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 449] , where the Court observed : (SCC p. 277, para 6) "6. ... The existence of the power to arrest is one thing, the justification for the exercise of it is quite another. Apart from power to arrest, the police officers must be able to justify the reasons thereof. No arrest can be made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence made against a person."
31. We once again have occasion to reiterate that the guidelines laid down in Arnesh Kumar [Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 449] must be followed, without exception. The raison d'être of the powers of arrest in relation to cognizable offences is laid down in Section 41. Arrest is not meant to be and must not be used as a punitive tool because it results in one of the gravest possible consequences emanating from criminal law : the loss of personal liberty. Individuals must not be punished solely on the basis of allegations, and without a fair trial. When the power to arrest is exercised without application of mind and without due regard to the law, it amounts to an abuse of power. The criminal law and its processes ought not to be instrumentalised as a tool of harassment. Section 41CrPC as well as the safeguards in criminal law exist in recognition of the reality that any criminal proceeding almost inevitably involves the might of the State, with unlimited resources at its disposal, against a lone individual."
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24. In "Arnab Manoranjan Goswami", the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the factors which emerge from the precedent case law for grant of bail in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution (in paragraph 64). The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that the principles regarding grant of bail which have evolved over a period of time are equally applicable to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 when the Court is called upon to secure the liberty of the accused. In our opinion, the decision in "Arnab Manoranjan Goswami" clearly lays down that the only limitation on the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to grant bail is that the High Court should exercise such power with caution and circumspection, cognizant of the fact that this jurisdiction is not a ready substitute for recourse to the remedy for bail under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Having this in mind that the main matter is yet to be finally decided, we would simply observe that this is the case of that kind which requires exercise of power by the High Court to grant interim bail to the petitioner. Therefore, the prayer at clause (E) is granted.
25. We may indicate that we have not heard Mr.Jatin Sehgal, learned counsel for the respondent no.2 on the merits of the main matter and, on his request, we have granted two weeks' time to the respondent no.2 to file reply. We may also clarify that the observations made in this order are prima facie opinion expressed by the Court only in respect of the petitioner. Such prima facie opinion, we are required to record in view of the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties so as to form an opinion whether this is a case for 'Notice' and grant of "interim bail to the petitioner"
and these observations shall not prejudice the case of the prosecution or the respondent no.2 in any manner whatsoever in bgp Page | 18 ::: Uploaded on - 24/09/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 24/09/2025 21:40:31 ::: 922.4967.25-wp interim bail.docx any other proceedings taken out by or against them.
26. On production of a copy of this order, the Court concerned shall release the petitioner who has been arrested in connection with C.R.No.51 of 2025, on interim bail, on furnishing two sureties of the like amount to the tune of Rs.50,000/- (Rs. Fifty Thousand only) each to the satisfaction of the Court concerned. The Court concerned may put additional conditions, besides the conditions incorporated under section 480 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
27. On the request of the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2, post this matter on 14th October 2025 under the heading "Final Disposal".
28. The parties may act on a copy of this order.
29. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Director General of Police, State of Maharashtra.
30. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the concerned Court and the jail Authority.
[GAUTAM A. ANKHAD, J.] [CHIEF JUSTICE]
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