Bombay High Court
Ratnakar Tanbaji Itankar vs Union Of India on 27 September, 1993
Equivalent citations: 1994ACJ762, AIR1994BOM132
ORDER H. W. Dhabe, J.
1. This is appeal against the judgment of the Railway Claims Tribunal in Appeal No. 16/E/RCT/NGP/92 decided on 16-3-1992 by which the Railway Claims Tribunal, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur (for short, "The Claims Tribunal") has held that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the application preferred by the appellant in regard to the claim made by him before it.
2. Briefly, the facts are that the appellant is the husband of the deceased Shakuntalabai who was travelling from Wardha to Shegaon on 3-4-1990 by 7384 UP Maharashtra Express along with the appellant and the other relations. According to the appellant, when the train reached Badnera, the Railway Conductor insisted that Shakuntalabai and her companion passengers should leave the bogie in which they were sitting and should sit in some other bogie. They were thus required to leave the said bogie and hurriedly enter another bogie in which there was a great rush. After they had entered another bogie just at the time when the train was about to leave Badnera Station, because of rush, they were all pushed out of the bogie. Shakuntalabai unfortunately fell down and was caught in the space between the train and the platform. It is the case of the appellant that his wife Shakuntalabai suffered serious fatal injuries in the above accident, as a result of which she died on the spot. The appellant thereafter filed the application before the Claims Tribunal under Section 109 of the Railways Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the "new Railways Act) claiming compensation for the death of his wife Shakuntalabai whe she was travelling in 7384 UP Maharashtra Express from Wardha to Shegaon on 3-4-1990. The appellant had also filed an application under Section 17(2) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the "Claims Tribunal Act") read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay in lodging the claim before the Claims Tribunal.
3. The Registrar of the Claims Tribunal scrutinised the said application filed by the applicant under Rule 11 of the Railway Claims Tribunal(Procedure) Rules, 1989 (for short the "Procedure Rules). On scrutiny of the said application, the Registrar, exercising the power under Rule 11 (4), rejected the said application on the ground that the claim made by the appellant was not maintainable before the Claims Tribunal. Against the aforesaid order of the Registrar, the appellant filed an appeal under Rule 11(5) of the Procedure Rules. The said appeal was heard and decided by the Nagpur Bench of the Claims Tribunal consisting of a Judicial Member and a Technical Member. It was, however, dismissed by it as it held that the claim made by the appellant was not maintainable before it. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the instant appeal in this Court.
4. The principal question which arises for consideration before us is whether the claim made by the appellant before the Claims Tribunal is maintainable before it in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Claims Tribunal Act and the new Railways Act. The facts in the instant case are not in dispute. The case of the appellant is that his wife Shakuntalabai was pushed out of the train when it left Badnera and was thus caught in the space between the platform and the running train as a result of which, she received serious fatal injuries and died on the spot. In deciding the question of jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal, what we have to consider is whether the claim made for compensation by the appellant in respect of such an accident lies before the Claims Tribunal or not. The above question of jurisdiction calls for consideration and interpretation of the provisions of the Claims Tribunal Act, the new Railways Act and the Railways Act, 1890, hereinafter referred to as the "Old Railways Act".
5. At the outset, it may be stated that originally, the Old Railways Act dealt with the responsibilities of Railways as administrators and carriers in respect of railway accidents and claims arising therefrom. The new Railways Act came into force with effect from 1-7-1990 governing inter alia the above substantive matters. It is, however, pertinent to see that the Claims Tribunal Act had already come into force with effect from 8-11-1989 and a Claims Tribunal as defined in Section 2(c) of the said Act was already established under Section 3 of the said Act. Thus, with effect from the said date i.e. 8-11-1989, the Claims Tribunal was empowered to exercise jurisdiction, power and authority in respect of matters specified in S. 13(1) of the Claims Tribunal Act which jurisdiction, power and authority, prior to its enactment, was exercised by a Civil Court or a Claims Commissioner appointed under the old Railways Act. It is therefore principally necessary to determine the scope and ambit of Section 13(1) of the Claims Tribunal Act so as to find out whether the claim made by the appellant in his claim petition before the Claims Tribunal falls within its jurisdiction or not.
6. For a proper construction of Section 13(1) of the Claims Tribunal Act, we shall examine the scheme of the said Act including its preamble to determine the setting in which the said section was enacted and its object and purpose. The preamble of the said Act shows that it is an Act passed to provide for the establishment of a Railway Claims Tribunal for inquiring into and determining claims against a railway administration for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or nondelivery of animals or goods entrusted to it to be carried by railway or for the refund of fares or freight or for compensation for death or injury to passengers occurring as a result of railway accident and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
7. Actually, the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Claims Tribunal is dealt with under Section 13(1) of the Act. The said Section 13(1) is therefore reproduced below for ready reference :
13.(1). "The Claims Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority, as were exercisable immediately before that day by any Civil Court or a Claims Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Railways Act :--
(a) relating to the responsibility of the railway administrations as carriers under Chapter VII of the Railways Act in respect of claims for--
(i) compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration for carriage by railway;
(ii) compensation payable under Section 82-A of the Railways Act or the rules made thereunder; and
(b) in respect of the claims for refund of fares or part thereof for refund of any freight paid in respect of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration to be carried by railway."
8. Section 15 of the Act which is material for our purpose, relates to bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The said Section is also therefore reproduced below for ready reference:
15. "On and from the appointed day, no court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to the matters referred to in sub-section (1) of S. 13."
9. It is primarily the construction of the above two sections of the Claims Tribunal Act which would decide the question as to whether the claim application of the appellant is maintainable before the Claims Tribunal under the aforesaid Act or not.
10. In Section 13(1) of the Claims Tribunal Act, what is material to be seen for the purpose of this appeal in its clause (a). Perusal of clause (a) of Section 13(1) of the aforesaid Act shows that the Claims Tribunal is empowered to exercise jurisdiction, power and authority in respect of two types of claims envisaged thereunder by sub-clauses (i) and
(ii) thereof. Sub-clause (i) relates to compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration for carriage by railway. Sub-clause (ii) thereof relates to compensation payable under Section 82-A of the old Railways Act or the rules made thereunder. Section 82-A of the old Railways Act corresponds to Section 124 of the new Railways Act. Section 15 of the Claims Tribunal Act then clearly shows that from the day the Claims Tribunals are established, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred in relation to mattters which are covered by Section 13(1) of the said Act.
11. Turning to S. 13(1), we shall first deal with sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) thereof. The subject-matter comprehended therein is compensation payable under S. 82-A of the old Railways Act. The said S. 82-A is reproduced below for ready reference :
"82-A: Liability of railway administration in respect of accidents to trains carrying passengers.-- (1) When in the course of working a railway an accident occurs, being either a collision between trains of which one is a train carrying passengers, or the derailment of or other accidents to a train or any part of a train carrying passengers, then, whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration such as would entitle a person who has been injured or has suffered loss to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the railway administration shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, be liable to pay compensation to the extent set out in sub-section (2) and to that extent only for loss occasioned by the death of a passenger dying as a result of such accident, and for personal injury and loss, destruction or deterioration of animals or goods owned by the passenger and accompanying the passenger in his compartment or on the trial sustained as a result of such accident.
(2) The liability of a railway administration under this section shall in no case exceed rupees one lac in respect of any person."
12. Perusal of the said Section 82-A shows that it contemplates liability of railway administration in respect of accidents to trains carrying passengers. In particular, it shows that the accident contemplated therein is an accident which has occurred due to either collision between trains of which one is a train carrying passengers, or the derailment of or other accidents to a train or any part of a train carrying passengers. The emphasis in Section 82-A is upon the accident to the train. If there is an accident to the train as contemplated therein, then notwithstanding the fact that there has been no wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration, any passenger in such a train who has been injured or who has suffered loss in such accident to the train, is entitled to maintain an action and recover compensation from the railway administration concerned, in respect of the injury or loss suffered by him. We may state that in the new Railways Act, the provisions in this regard are made in Section 124 thereof. The said new Section 124 is thus pari materia with old Section 82-A. As regards the scope and ambit of Section 82-A of the old Railways Act, and hence of pari materia Section 124 of the new Railways Act, the said question is no more res integra in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Sunil Kumar Ghosh .
13. Perusal of the above judgment of the Supreme Court shows that the facts therein were more or less similar to the facts in the instant case because the concerned passenger travelling in his capacity as a bona fide passenger by the train in question in the said case, had suffered injury because he accidentally fell down from the train near the water column at the end of the platform and had suffered severe injury because his right hand was crushed by that part of the train which was being shunted. The accident to the passenger had thus occurred in the above case while the bogie in which the passenger was travelling was being shunted at the railway platform. The question in the said case therefore, was whether the claim for compensation lodged by the passenger in question in the said case in the Civil Court, was covered by Section 82-A of the old Railways Act. The Supreme Court held that Section 82-A of the old Railways Act contemplated accidents to the train and therefore, the above accident was not covered thereunder. Since the accident in the instant case is also not an accident to the train, but has occurred because the wife of the appellant had fallen down from the bogie and was caught between the platfrom and the running train, the said accident is also not covered by Section 82-A of the old Railways Act as also by the corresponding Section 124 of the new Railways Act, since it is not accident to the train within the meaning of the said provisions. The instant case is not thus covered by sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of Section 13(1) of the Act.
14. The next question to be considered is whether the instant case is covered by subsection (1) of clause (a) of Section 13(1) of the Claims Tribunal Act. A plain reading of that sub-clause would show that it contemplates a claim for compensation on account of loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or nondelivery of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration for carriage by railway. In this regard, it is pertinent to see that in the old Railways Act, the responsibility of railway administration as carriers is consider-ed in Chapter VII commencing from S. 72 of the said Act. In particular S. 73 and S. 74 deal with the question of general responsibility of a railway administration as a carrier of animals and goods. Perusal of the other provisions of the said chapter would show that they deal in detail with the responsibility of railway administration at various stages and also with the question of burden of proof in the suits for compensation.
14A. Read in the light of the provisions in Chapter VII commencing from S. 72 of the old Railways Act, it is clear that sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of S. 13(1) of the Claims Tribunal Act provides for compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or nondelivery of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration for carriage by railway and not for compensation for loss of human lives. It is clear that if there is any negligence on the part of the railway, or the railway fails to deliver the goods or the animals to the proper destination, the claim for compensation in that regard is intended to be brought within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal by enactment of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 13(1) of the aforesaid Act. Although it is sought to be urged that loss of human life during the journey by railway, by reason of accident as alleged in the instant case, is sought to be covered by sub-clause (i) of clause (a), a plain reading of the said provision does not warrant such a meaning.
15. It is, however, sought to be urged before us that sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of Section 13(1) of the Act should be read in the light of Section 33 of the Claims Tribunal Act or at any rate, it should be held that the said Section 80 of the old Railways Act confers jurisdiction upon the Claims Tribunal to entertain claim for compensation for loss of human life which occurs due to accident, other than accident to the train contemplated by Section 82-A of the old Railways Act. It is, therefore, necessary to peruse the provisions of Section 33 of the Claims Tribunal Act. It is clear from the said S. 33 that it seeks to substitute in place of the old S. 80 of the Old Railways Act, a new S. 80. Comparison of the old and new S. 80, however shows that the only change made in the new S. 80 is about the forum because prior to the enactment of the Claims Tribunal Act, the Claims for compensation in regard to the matters referred to in S. 80 could be filed in the Civil Court by institution of a Civil suit. However, after its enactment, since the jurisdiction in regard to such claims was conferred upon the Claims Tribunal, a suitable change was made in the old S. 80 by introducing the words "an application to the Claims Tribunal" in place of the word "Suit" used therein. However, what is material to be seen is that what S. 80 of the Old Railways Act which corresponds to Ss. 107, 109 of the New Railways Act provides for is against which railway administration, the claim for compensation can be filed by the aggrieved person.
16. The emphasis on behalf of the appellant is, however, upon the nature of Claims referred to in Section 80 of the Old Railways Act inserted therein by Section 33 of the Claims Tribunal Act. Its perusal shows that an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal may contain the claim for loss of life, or personal injury to, a passenger or for loss, destruction, damage deteriorations or non-delvery of animals or goods. The submission on behalf of the appellant thus is that the scope of Section 80 is wider in the sense that for loss of life or personal injury to a passenger, which expression is not restricted to the railway accident as contemplated by Section 82-A of the Old Railways Act, due to any accident in the journey by Railway, an application for compensation can lie before the claims Tribunal.
17. In appreciating the above submission, it has first to be seen that Section 33 of the Claims Tribunal Act is not a Section which deals with jurisdiction, power and authority of the Claims Tribunal under the said Act. It may then be seen that the scope of Section 80 of the old Railways Act is very limited as it is merely intended to indicate the Railway administration i.e. the defendant against which the various claims for compensation can be instituted. When the Claims Tribunal Act was enacted and the Claims Tribunals were established to entertain and decide certain claims made against the Railway administration, Section 33 of the aforesaid Act made suitable changes in the old Section 80 by substituting the words "suits for compensation" by the words "Application to the Claims Tribunal for compensation". The effect of the above substitution is that now Section 80 indicates the non-applicant railway administration against whom, the various claims for compensation against the Railways can be made in the application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal.
18. Keeping in mind the above limited scope of Section 80 of the Old Railway Act, it is clear that the expression "an application to the Claims Tribunal for compensation for loss of life or personal injury to a passenger" in Section 80 of the Old Railways Act has to be understood in the light of Section 13(1)(a)(ii) of the Claims Tribunal Act which alone deals with the question of jurisdiction, power and authority of the claims Tribunal in this regard read with Section 82A of the Old Railways Act and not vice-versa, although it is true that left to itself the said expression used in Section 80 gives an impression that it is wider in scope and covers all types of claims for compensation against the Railways for loss of life or personal injury to a passenger.
19. As hereinbefore pointed out, it is only I Section 13(1)(a)(ii) of the Claims Tribunal Act which deals with the question of conferring jurisdiction upon the claims Tribunal in regard to the claims for compensation for either loss of life or personal injury to a passenger. Its perusal shows that it incorporates only those claims for compensation which are engisaged by Section 82-A of the Old Railways Act which corresponds to Section 124 of the New Railways Act. Section 82-A as discussed above, deals with the liability of the Railway Administration in respect of accidents to trains carrying passengers, the emphasis being upon train accidents as envisaged therein and as interpreted by the Supreme Court also in the Judgment cited supra. It is thus in the case of loss of life or personal injury to a passenger in a train accident that a claim for compensation is cognisable by the Claims Tribunal under Section 13(1)(a)(ii) of the Claims Tribunal Act.
20. The expression "loss of life" or personal injury to a passager" occurring in Section 80 of the Old Railways Act has therefore to be understood in the above sense for the purpose of making an application to the Claims Tribunal for compensation upon the said ground against the Railway Administration concerned as shown therein. If it was intended that any claim for compensation due to any accident to a passenger travelling in a train should be cognisable by the Claims Tribunal, there was no reason for the framers of the claims Tribunal Act to restrict the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to the Claims for compensation payable under Section 82-A of the Old Railways Act only. It is further necessary to see that it is only in regard to such claims which are expressly referred to in Section 13(1) of the Claims Tribunal Act that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in sought to be ousted under Section 15 of the said Act. It is, not therefore, possible for us to accept the submission made on behalf of the appellant that by reason fo the provisions of Section 80 as substituted in the Old Railways Act by Section 33 of the Claims Tribunal Act, we should hold that the Claims Tibunal has jurisdiction to entertain the claims made by the appellant in the instant case.
21. The learned Counsel for the appellant has referred us to several canons of construction of statute by reading extensively from the book on "Interpretation of Statutes" by Jagdish Swamp, all of which are not relevant in interpreting the statutory provisions under consideration. He has also relied upon some decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his construction that we should read Section 33 of the Claims Tribunal Act in its Section 13(1) for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal. We have already shown how the scope and object of Section 13 of the aforesaid Act is different from the scope and object of Section 33 thereof Moreover, the plain reading of Section 13(1) of the aforesaid Act shows that its language is clear and unambiguous and does not admit of reading therein Section 33 of the aforesaid Act. There is, therefore, no necessity to invoke any of the canons of construction which the learned Counsel for the apellant has sought to press into service in support of this construction.
21A. When the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous i.e. they are susceptible of only one meaning, it is well settled that the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. See para 40 of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Council of Homeopathic System of Medicine, Punjab v. Suchintan, (1993) 3 JT (SC) 172 in which the relevant pasage from the Maxwell on "Interpretation of Statutes" 12th Edition page 29 is quoted with approval. Tindal C. J. in Sussex Peerage Case, (1844) 11 Cl and Fin 85, p. 143 has observed as follows:
"If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the law giver".
22. Since the language of Section 13(1) of the Claims Tribunal Act dealing with the jurisdiction, power and authority of the Claims Tribunal is plain and unambiguous and does not admit of reading Section 33 thereof in the same, it is not open to us to enlarge the scope and jurisdiction of the claims Tribunal by doing, so apart from the fact that even otherwise it cannot be done because the scope and object of the said Section 33 is different. It is well settled that a Court has no power to reframe legislation (See State of Kerala v. Mathai Verhese, ) or to read words in an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. See Grunwick Processing Laboratories Ltd. v. Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service, (1978) 1 All ER 338 (HL) p. 368 and Director General, telecommunication v. T. N. Peethambaram, . We cannot therefore, accept the submission made on behalf of the appellant that we should, read Section 13(1) of the Claims Tribunal Act in the light of its Section 33. We have no manner of doubt that under Section 13(1) the Claim of the type made by the appellant in the instant case cannot fall. It is, thus clear that the claim arising out of the alleged accident in the instant case has to be made by the appellant before the Civil Court by filing a proper Civil Suit in that regard.
23. It is, however urged on behalf of the appellant that a Civil Court cannot entertain such a claim because a Special Tribunal i.e. the Claims Tribunal which is constituted for deciding the claims for compensation against the railways has exclusive jurisdiction in regard to the same. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel for the appellant has relied upon the propositions enunciated by the Supreme Court in the well known case of N. P. Ponnuswami v. Re-turning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, Namakkal, Salem Dist. . The said propositions are also well set out by Willes J. in the following terms in Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford, (1859) 6 CB (NS) 336 at page 356 of the report :
"There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon statute. One is, where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law; there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the common law remedy, the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of remedy : there, the party can only proceed by action at common law. But there is a third class, viz., where as liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. The remedy provided by the statute must be followed and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable in cases of the second class."
It is clear that in the third class of cases the statute is a self-contained Code and the jurisdiction of the civil Court or the remedy at common law is barred.
24, In appreciating the submission made on behalf of the appellant regarding the question of exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to entertain the claims for compensation against the railways, it is necessary to see that the fallacy in the above submission lies in the fact that it is assumed that the remedy provided before the Claims Tribunal is a general remedy. In fact, it is just otherwise. The Claims Tribnunal under the Claims Tribunals Act is a Tribunal of limited and specified jurisdiction. It can exercise jurisdiction and power as conferred upon it under the said Act only. It is well settled that the Civil Courts are the Courts of general jurisdiction and unless therefore, the remedy in regard to the enforcement of a particular right is expressly or by necessary implication barred, the people have a right to insist upon free access to the Courts of general jurisdiction of the State to enforce their rights : See the observations of Romer L.J. in__Lee v. Showmen's Guild of Great Britain, (1952) 1 All ER 1175 (CA) at p. 1188. See also the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Madhav-rao Scindia y. Union of India, and Ram Prasad v. State of Bihar, .
25. Since the Civil Courts are courts of general jurisdiction, it is a fundamental rule that the exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts should not be readily inferred and such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. See the followings cases. Magiti-Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi, ; Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar v. State of Bombay, , Ramswarup v. Shikharchand, ; Pabbojan Tea Company v. Dy. Commr. Lakhimpur, ; Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., . As the ouster of the jurisidiction of the Civil Court cannot be readily inferred, the provisions relating to its ouster need to be strictly construed. See Bhagwatsingh v. State of Rajasthan, ; Raichand v. Union of India, and Abdul v. Bhawani, . The existence of the jurisdiction in the Civil Court to decide disputes of Civil nature being thus a general rule and its exclusion an exception the burden of proof to show that its jurisdiction is ousted is upon the person who claims its ouster. See Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. I. Pattabhairami, .
26. In view of the above principles relating to the ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, what has to be seen in the instant case is not whether the claim lies before the Civil Court or not, but whether the claim can lie before the Claims Tribunal or not. As hereinbefore pointed out, Section 13(1) of the Claims Tribunal Act provides for jurisdiction, power and authority of the Claims tribunal and by virtue of the express provisions contained in Section 15 thereof the jurisdiction of the Civil Court or any other authority is barred in regard to the matters specified in the said Section 13(1) of the said Act thus making the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal exclusive upon the said matters under Section 13(1) of the said Act. Therefore, in regard to the matters other than matters covered by Section 13(1) of the said Act, the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to entertain a Civil Suit. It cannot, therefore be said that a Civil Suit cannot lie for a claim for compensation which is made in the instant case. It cannot thus be held that the Civil Court will not have any jurisdiction in the matter covered by the instant case, because a Claims Tribunal is constituted under the Claims Tribunal Act. The above submission made on behalf of the appellant therefore, deserves to be rejected.
27. We thus agreee with the view taken by the Claims Tribunal that the claim made by the appellant in the instant case cannot lie before it under Section 13(1) of the Claims Tribunal Act.
28. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.