Orissa High Court
Narayan Chandra Nayak vs State Of Odisha ....... Opposite Party on 10 April, 2025
THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No.3237 of 2017
CRLMC No. 937 of 2018
CRLA No.532 of 2016
(In the matter of applications under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973)
CRLMC No.3237 of 2017
Narayan Chandra Nayak ....... Petitioner
-Versus-
State of Odisha ....... Opposite Party
For the Petitioner : Mr. Suresh Chandra Tripathy, Advocate
For the Opposite Party : Mr. Bibekananda Bhuyan,
Senior Advocate for OPID
CRLMC No.937 of 2018
M/s. Umamani Homes
Creation Private Limited &
another ....... Petitioners
-Versus-
State of Odisha &
another ....... Opposite Parties
For the Petitioners : Mr. Suresh Chandra Tripathy, Advocate
For the Opposite Party : Mr. Bibekananda Bhuyan,
Senior Advocate for OPID
Page 1 of 23
CRLA No.532 of 2016
Narayan Chandra Nayak ....... Petitioner/Appellant
-Versus-
State of Odisha &
others ....... Opp. Party(s)/Respondents
For the Petitioner : Mr. Suresh Chandra Tripathy, Advocate
For the Opposite Parties : Mr. Bibekananda Bhuyan,
Senior Advocate for OPID
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA
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Date of Hearing: 05.02.2025 Date of Judgment: 10.04.2025
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S.S. Mishra, J.
CRLMC No.3237 of 2017
The CRLMC No.3237 of 2017 has been filed by Shri Narayan Chandra Nayak seeking quashing of the entire criminal proceeding in Bhubaneswar EOW P.S. Case No.18 of 2013 corresponding to C.T. Case No.2133 of 2013 pending in the court of the learned Presiding Officer, Designated Court under the OPID Act, Cuttack.
Page 2 of 23 CRLMC No.937 of 2018 The CRLMC No. 937 of 2018 has been filed by M/s. Umamani Home Creation Private Limited and Mrs. Sunita Narendra Singh Director of accused M/s. Umamani Homes Creation Private Limited, seeking quashing of the entire criminal proceeding in Bhubaneswar EOW P.S. Case No.18 of 2013, corresponding to C.T. Case No.2133 of 2013 (C.T. Case No.04 of 2015), pending in the Court of the learned Presiding Officer, Designated Court under the OPID Act, Cuttack.
CRLA No.532 of 2016 The instant Criminal Appeal has been filed by Shri Narayan Chandra Nayak, challenging the validity of the judgment dated 08.09.2016 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Designated Court under the OPID Act, Cuttack in I.A. No.01 of 2015, whereby the interim attachment order dated 04.12.2014 passed by the Government has been confirmed and made absolute.
Since all three petitions are based on the same factual foundation, therefore, all the petitions have been heard analogously and are being decided by this common judgment.
2. Common factual foundation is that one M/s. Umamani Home Creation Pvt. Ltd. was incorporated on 23.05.2008 under Page 3 of 23 the Companies Act, 1956, with its registered office in Odisha, Cuttack. The company was engaged in real estate business activities and was primarily involved in developing residential plots and housing projects. The Managing Director of the company was Narayan Chandra Nayak (the Petitioner), and Sunita Narendra Singh was one of the Directors. The company advertised various housing projects, including "Chikun Garden," "Prava Paradise," and "Limoon City House Site Complex," through brochures, leaflets, and other promotional materials, attracting a large number of prospective buyers.
3. The case originated from a complaint filed by one Sachidananda Mohapatra, who lodged an FIR on 03.06.2013 at Bhubaneswar Economic Offences Wing (EOW) Police Station. According to the complainant, he came across advertisements by M/s. Umamani Home Creation Pvt. Ltd. regarding its housing project "Chikun Garden" in Bhubaneswar. Persuaded by the promotional materials and representations made by the accused persons, he entered into an agreement to purchase 10 residential plots. On 28.11.2011, he deposited ₹20,00,000 as a booking amount and received a money receipt bearing No. 3531, signed by the Petitioner and his wife.
Page 4 of 23
4. Despite multiple requests, the Petitioner and his company neither registered the plots in the complainant‟s name nor refunded the full amount. Initially, Rs.4,00,000/- was refunded in cash, and the remaining amount was promised through cheques. However, upon presenting the cheques, the complainant found that the company had insufficient funds in the bank, leading to their dishonor. Upon further inquiry, the complainant discovered that several other buyers were in a similar situation, as they had also paid significant sums for plots that were never delivered.
5. The Economic Offences Wing (EOW) initiated an investigation into the allegations, during which several investors and witnesses were examined. Documents such as agreement papers, money receipts, brochures, computer hard disks, and other related records were seized. The investigation revealed that the Petitioner and his company had entered into multiple agreements with intending buyers despite knowing that they did not possess clear, marketable, or transferable ownership rights over the land in question and therefore, Section 6 of Odisha Protection of Interests of Depositors Act, 2011 was added besides other panel of offences in the course of Investigation. Additionally, financial records Page 5 of 23 showed that as of 31.03.2013, the company owed Rs.13,10,89,455/- to 998 investors. It was also found that the company required approximately 45.83 acres of land to fulfill its commitments but possessed only 8.82 acres across all its projects.
6. The investigation further revealed that a significant portion of the funds collected from investors had been diverted to the Odia film industry and other non-real estate-related activities. A total of Rs.47,77,960/- was found in 23 bank accounts operated by the company and its Directors, which were subsequently frozen. Additionally, the Petitioner had availed a loan of Rs.43,74,700/- from Odisha Gramya Bank.
7. Based on the findings, the Investigating Officer submitted a charge sheet on 04.05.2015, implicating the Petitioner and his wife under Sections 420 (cheating), 406 (criminal breach of trust), 467 (forgery), 468 (forgery for the purpose of cheating), 471 (using forged documents as genuine), 506 (criminal intimidation) and 120-B (criminal conspiracy) of the Indian Penal Code, along with Section 6 of the Odisha Protection of Interests of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 2011.
8. The learned Presiding Officer of the Designated Court under Page 6 of 23 the OPID Act, Cuttack, took cognizance of the offences and framed charges against the accused. The prosecution examined 19 charge-sheeted witnesses, including 14 investors and the Investigating Officer, all of whom provided evidence linking the Petitioner to the alleged fraud. Additionally, the movable and immovable properties of the Petitioner and the company were attached under Section 3 of the OPID Act.
9. Heard Mr. Suresh Chandra Tripathy, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Bibekananda Bhuyan, learned Senior Counsel for the OPID.
10. Mr. Tripathy, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the Odisha Protection of Interests of Depositors (OPID) Act, 2011, came into force on 17.08.2013, whereas the transactions in question took place prior to that date. Since the alleged acts of fraud and misrepresentation occurred before the enactment of the OPID Act, the Petitioners contended that the law could not be applied retrospectively to their case. He also submits that any liability should be examined under the laws applicable at the time of the transactions, and not under a statute that came into effect later.
Page 7 of 23
11. It was further submitted by Mr. Tripathy, that M/s. Umamani Home Creation Pvt. Ltd. was engaged in the real estate business and was not a "financial establishment" as defined under Section 2(d) of the O.P.I.D. Act. He contended that the company did not accept deposits from the public for financial investment purposes but merely received consideration for the sale of land under agreements for sale. Since the business involved real estate transactions and not deposit-taking activities, the provisions of the OPID Act were not applicable. He further argued that the amount received from the complainant and other investors did not constitute a „deposit‟ under Section 2(b) of the OPID Act. The payments were made under agreements for sale of residential plots, which were contractual transactions under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and not deposit-taking activities. It was submitted that the complainant had voluntarily entered into agreements and were well aware that they were making payments for acquiring immovable property. Therefore, the Petitioners contended that the case did not attract the provisions of the OPID Act.
12. Mr. Tripathy, learned counsel for the petitioners further Page 8 of 23 submitted that the case was purely civil in nature and did not constitute criminal offences under Sections 420/406/467/468/ 471/506/120-B of the I.P.C. It was contended that there was no dishonest intention (mens rea) from the beginning, as the company had genuinely intended to provide the plots. The Petitioners maintained that financial difficulties and legal impediments in land acquisition had caused the delay in delivering the plots. He further submitted that the partial refund of Rs.4,00,000/- to the complainant showed bona fide efforts to resolve the matter.
13. Mr. Tripathy, learned counsel for the Petitioners further contended that the criminal proceedings were initiated with mala fide intent to harass him and the charge sheet was filed mechanically without proper judicial application of mind. Since the company‟s activities were already regulated under civil and contractual laws, criminal liability should not be imposed. Therefore, the Petitioners are seeking quashing of the entire criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC, arguing that continuation of the case would result in a gross miscarriage of justice.
14. Mr. Bhuyan, learned Senior Counsel for the OPID on Page 9 of 23 contrary submitted that the Petitioners and his associates had fraudulently collected substantial sums from investors by falsely promising to provide land. Despite repeated assurances, neither the land was allotted nor the full amount was refunded, establishing a prima facie case under the OPID Act and relevant I.P.C. provisions. He further submitted that the accused had a dishonest intent from the outset, as they induced investors with misleading representations while lacking the resources to fulfill their commitments. The failure to return the full amount despite persistent demands further substantiated this claim.
15. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the Petitioners that engaged in forgery and fraudulent documentation to deceive investors, attracting offenses under Sections 467, 468, and 471 of IPC. The investigation revealed bank transactions, investor complaints, and documentary evidence confirming the fraudulent nature of the scheme. The prosecution emphasized that a partial refund of Rs.4,00,000/- could not absolve the Petitioners to the criminal liability, as the wrongful gain was much higher, and mere repayment did not negate the fraudulent conduct.
16. Mr. Bhuyan, learned Senior Counsel also defended the Page 10 of 23 legality of the investigation and subsequent charge sheet, asserting that the Economic Offences Wing (EOW) had gathered strong evidence justifying the prosecution. The attachment of properties under Section 3 of the OPID Act was necessary to safeguard investors‟ interest. Given the scale of the fraud, the authorities acted well within their jurisdiction in prosecuting the Petitioners.
17. In conclusion, learned counsel for the OPID argued that the petition seeking quashing of proceedings was baseless, as sufficient material existed for trial. Premature interference by the court would frustrate the objectives of the OPID Act, which aims to protect depositors from financial fraud. Therefore, he prayed for the dismissal of the petition, allowing the trial to proceed in the interest of justice.
18. Dealing with the contentions with regards to penal offences, as raised on behalf of the Petitioners, it can be safely held that the same cannot be entertained at this stage by invoking inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. as that would amount to appreciation of evidence in the midst of on-going trial. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in catena of judgements have time and again reminded that the inherent jurisdiction of High Courts enshrined Page 11 of 23 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to be exercised very sparingly and should not be invoked for the purpose of venturing into appreciation and qualitative evaluation of evidence relied upon by the prosecution, particularly when the trial has proceeded substantially, as the same would amount to interference in trial which is in sole domain of the learned trial Court. Abruptly shutting trial at the belated stage of proceeding is completely forbidden by law under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
19. This Court finds merit with the arguments advanced on behalf of the prosecution that the trial has already proceeded substantially, with 19 witnesses having been examined including 14 investors and the Investigating Officer and any intervention by this Court at this stage would not meet the end of justice.
20. Thus, the contentions and the grounds agitated on behalf of the Petitioners with regard to probative value of the evidence and allegations made in the charge-sheet cannot be gone into at this stage by this Court. Hence, this Court will refrain from commenting upon the qualitative and evidentiary value of the evidence that has been collected in course of investigation and leave the same to be tested and evaluated by the learned trial Page 12 of 23 Court, independently, in course of the trial.
21. The O.P.I.D. Act has been brought into force on 17.08.2013, while the F.I.R. in the present case has been lodged on 03.06.2013 with regard to acts of commissions of crime, alleged to have been committed prior to the date of F.I.R. Therefore, at the first glance, it seems that, this is a case, where there has been retrospective invocation of criminal and penal statutes. However, little scratching on the surface would reveal that this argument is not valid. The offence punishable under Section 6 of the OPID Act does not get completed by simply taking deposits from the general public, rather it is the very beginning and starting point of commission of the said offence and offence continuous as long as the investors do not get their promised return. In other words, offence punishable under Section 6 of the O.P.I.D. Act is a continuing offence, which continues till the point the investors get back their promised returns.
22. In the present case, charge-sheet reveals that as far as the informant is concerned a balance of INR 16,00,000/- is still outstanding against the accused person after alleged return of cash of Rs.4,00,000/-. However, the charge-sheet reveals that as on Page 13 of 23 31.03.2013, total outstanding dues towards 998 intending buyers and against the Petitioners is about INR 13,10,89,445/-, which by any stretch of imagination is a huge amount of public money. Therefore, contention raised on behalf of the Petitioners that the OPID Act, despite being penal provisions have been invoked retrospectively does not hold merit and deserves to be rejected. Specifically noting the fact that the accused persons have been alleged to have entered into large number of agreements with the innocent buyers and collected deposit of more than Fourteen Crores Rupees from such innocent buyers, despite the fact that the accused persons did not own sufficient land with legally marketable ownership or title. Over and above the allegation of funds having been diverted to business other than real estate is also to be looked into.
23. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in case of State Of Bihar vs Deokaran Nenshi, reported in (1972) 2 SCC 890 has lucidly differentiated the difference between and instantaneous offence in following terms:-
"A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its Page 14 of 23 requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance, occurs and recurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues and therefore. constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all."
A few illustrative cases would help to bring out the distinction between the two types of offences. In England the Trade Union Act, 1871 by S.12 provided that if any officer, member or other person being or representing himself to be a member of a trade union, by false representation or imposition obtained possession of any moneys books etc. of such trade union, or, having the same in his possession wilfully withheld or fraudulently misapplied the same, a court of summary jurisdiction would order such person to be imprisoned. The offence of withholding the money referred to in this section was' held to be a continuing offence, presumably because every day that the moneys were wilfully withheld an offence within the meaning of s. 12 was committed. (Best v. Butler and Fitzgibbon(1)]."
24. Relying upon the aforesaid judgment in the case of Deokaran Nenshi (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. vs Dundayya Gurushiddaiah Hiremath and Ors. 1991 (2) SCC 141 has held that as long as the property of a company is wrongfully retained by the officer or employee of a company, the offence under Section 630 of the Companies Act would continue. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment in the case of Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. (supra.) is extracted herein below:-
Page 15 of 23
"Applying the law enunciated above to the provisions of section 630 of the Companies Act, we are of the view that the offence under this section is not such as can be said to have consummated once for all. Wrongful withholding, or wrongfully obtaining possession and wrongful application of the company's property, that is, for purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles of the company and authorised by the Company Act, cannot be said to be terminated by a single act or fact but would subsist for the period until the property in the offender's possession is delivered up or refunded. It is an offence committed over a span of time and the last act of the offence will control the commencement of the period of limitation and need be alleged. The offence consists of a course of conduct arising from a singleness of thought, purpose of refusal to deliver up or refund which may be deemed a single impulse. Considered from another angle, it consists of a continuous series of acts which endures after the period of consummation on refusal to deliver up or refund the property. It is not an instantaneous offence and limitation begins with the cessation of the criminal act, i.e. with the delivering up or refund of the property It will be a recurring or continuing offence until the wrongful possession, wrongful withholding or wrongful application is vacated or put an end to. The offence continues until the property wrongfully obtained or wrongfully withheld or knowingly mis-applied is delivered up or refunded to the company. For failure to do so sub- section (2) prescribes the punishment. This, in our view, is sufficient ground for holding that the offence under section 630 of the Companies Act is not one time but a continuing offence and the period of limitation must be computed accordingly, and when so done, the instant complaints could not be said to have been barred by limitation. The submission that when the first respondent upon his retirement failed to vacate and deliver possession of the company's quarter to the company the offence must be taken to have been complete, has, therefore, to be rejected."
25. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in their judgment in Bhagirath Kanoria & Ors. Etc vs State Of M.P. & Ors. Etc., reported in 1984 (4) SCC 222, has specifically pointed out that while deciding as to whether any offence is a "continuing offence" the object and Page 16 of 23 purpose of the provision has to be looked into. In this case, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that withholding the employer‟s contribution to the provident fund of the employee, is a continuing offence as long as the same is withhold by the employer, the relevant postulation of law is extracted herein below:-
"The question whether a particular offence is a continuing offence must necessarily depend upon the language of the statute which creates that offence, the nature of the offence and, above all, the purpose which is intended to be achieved by constituting the particular act as an offence. Turning to the matters before us, the offence of which the appellants are charged is the failure to pay the employer's contribution before the due date. Considering the object and purpose of this provision, which is to ensure the welfare of workers, we find it impossible to hold that the offence is not of a continuing nature. The appellants were unquestionably liable to pay their contribution to the Provident Fund before the due date and it was within their power to pay it, as soon after the due date had expired as they willed. The late payment could not have absolved them of their original guilt but it would have snapped the recurrence. Each day that they failed to comply with the obligation to pay their contribution to the fund, they committed a fresh offence. It is putting an incredible premium on lack of concern for the welfare of workers to hold that the employer who has not paid contribution or the contribution of the employees to the Provident Fund can successfully evade the penal consequences of his act by pleading the law of limitation. Such offences must be regarded as continuing offences, to which the law of limitation cannot apply."
26. In the light of aforesaid authorities of law, rendered by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, the purpose and object of the OPID Act and the intent of the legislature behind the enactment has to be considered. The object and purpose of the OPID Act is to secure and protect the interest of innocent depositors, who are Page 17 of 23 fraudulently entrapped by financial institutions by making false promise. In this regard the Section 7 of the OPID Act acquires significance which makes the offence punishable under Section 6 of the O.P.I.D. Act, compoundable on payment of entire amount due to the depositors with or without interest. Moreover, under the scheme of the OPID Act, the purpose of attachment and sale of the attached property of the accused person is to restore the losses of the depositors in equitable manner. Conjoint reading of Section 3, Section 6 and Section 7 of the OPID Act leaves no room for speculation that purpose and object of the OPID Act is two folds, first to protect the interest of depositors prior to commission of offence and second to restore the losses of the depositors at hands of defaulting institutions in equitable manner.
27. Thus, it is crystal clear that considering the object and purpose of the OPID Act and the legislative intent behind the enactment, the offence punishable under Section 6 of the OPID Act is a continuing offence as long as the defaulter financial institution is withholding the deposits of the investors.
28. Learned counsel for the Petitioners has relied upon the ratio of law laid down in the case of Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai V. Page 18 of 23 State of Gujurat & Ors, by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No.533/1991 wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court has held that the offence punishable under Section 304-B of I.P.C. cannot be invoked when the dowry death had occurred, prior to the insertion of Section 304-B in the statute book and therefore, presumption against the accused under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be drawn. The aforesaid ratio laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court does not have any application in the facts of the present case, simply for the reason that offence punishable U/s.304-B of IPC is not a continuing offence and the same is completed as soon as the deceased takes her last breath, in contrast offence punishable under Section 6 of the OPID Act continues until the investor is paid back the promised returns.
29. To buttress his argument, Mr. Tripathy, learned counsel for the petitioners have further relied upon the judgement of High Court of Delhi in the case of Mahanivesh oils & food Pvt Ltd V. Directorate of Enforcement, wherein the learned Single Bench has held that offence of money laundering cannot penalise the acts of commission of schedule offence under the PMLA Act prior to 01.07.2005 i.e. when the PMLA was brought in force. The said relied upon judgement is under challenge before the Division Page 19 of 23 Bench of High Court of Delhi, in LPA 144 of 2016 and the learned Division Bench in the interrogation has passed the following orders:-
"Re-notify on 16.03.2017 under the same caption for hearing.
We have observed that while allowing the writ petition by the order under appeal certain findings were recorded by the Ld. Single Judge with regard to enforcement of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 on interpretation of the provisions of the said Act.
We make it clear that the findings so recorded by the Ld. Single Judge shall not be construed as conclusive and binding precedent until further orders"
Thus, the ratio laid down by the learned Single bench does not enure to the benefit of Petitioners. Moreover, factually the ratio is very much distinguishable with the facts of the present case and cannot be applied in facts scenario of present case.
30. Learned counsel for the Petitioners have also contended that in view of stipulations made in Section 3 of the OPID Act, more than one complainant is required for the purpose of invocation of Section 6 of the OPID Act. This contention of the Petitioners is nothing but a misplaced confidence as during the course of investigation names of as many as 998 intending buyers, who have either not been sold the land or have not been returned their Page 20 of 23 deposits, have come into light and many of the intending buyers have also made statements before the I.O. disclosing that how they have been cheated by the accused persons. Therefore, it is not a single instance of commission of offence punishable under Section 6 of the OPID Act. Hence, this ground also deserves rejection.
31. The petitioners have challenged the invocation of Section 6 of the OPID Act on the ground that real estate transactions have already been declared to be beyond the purview of the OPID Act vide judgement of the coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Rashmita Patra V. State of Odisha & Ors. CRLMC No.1296 of 2021. However, Mr. Bhuyan on behalf of respondent-State, has strongly opposed the contention of the petitioners and has relied upon the judgment of another co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Dusmanta Kumar Muduli v. State of Odisha, to submit that the judgment passed in the case of Rashmita Patra (supra) has been held to be per-incuriam. Mr. Bhuyan has strenuously relied upon the following observation of the co- ordinate bench in the case of Dusmanta Kumar Muduli (supra) in support of his contention:-
"8. Referring to the Apex Court decision in Ripa Sharma (supra) and other decisions cited herein above laying down the principles of binding precedence and that if a conflicting view is taken by a Co-ordinate Bench of the Page 21 of 23 same Court in ignorance of earlier decisions, it shall have no binding effect and said to be a judgment per incuriam, Mr. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the OPID State submits that the earlier view of the Benches of equal strength was to be followed by the subsequent Bench of co-equal strength while dealing with similar matter. It is claimed that since the Co-ordinate Benches of this Court confirmed the orders of charge and initiation of criminal proceeding, the subsequent judgment in CRLMC No.1296 of 2021 without taking note of said decisions has lost its binding effect. However, it is argued by Mr. Das, learned Senior Advocate that the judgment in CRLMC No.2781 of 2019 is a non-speaking one which simply followed the judgment in CRLA No.32 of 2020 which was related to an order under Section 239 Cr.P.C. seeking discharge. It is contended by Mr. Das that RERA governs the field which is a complete Code in itself and therefore, the doctrine of occupied field squarely applies. On a reading of the judgment in CRLA No.32 of 2020, it is made to understand that the charge under Section 6 of the OPID Act was under challenge therein and the same did not find favour with this Court which was also followed in CRLMC No.2781 of 2019 and therefore, the only option which is now left open to conclude that the prosecution against the petitioner for the said offence shall have to continue, however, its fate being dependent on the final decision of the Apex Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 2107 of 2022 and SLP (Crl.) No.4910 of 2022 and as a necessary corollary, the decision in CRLMC No. 1296 of 2021 has to be held as a judgment per incuriam. Whether for other IPC offences, a prima facie case is made out against the petitioner or otherwise, in the considered view of the Court, it should be left for the decision of the learned court below during enquiry."
32. In that view of the matter, the ratio laid down in the case of Rashmita Patra (supra) does not come to rescue the accused/ Petitioners. Hence, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the Petitioners that real estate transactions are beyond the purview of the OPID Act is not sustainable.
33. In the light of discussions and analysis made in the Page 22 of 23 preceding paragraphs, all the three petitions fail and accordingly, CRLA No.532 of 2016, CRLMC No.3237 of 2017 and CRLMC No.937 of 2018 stand dismissed.
(S.S. Mishra) Judge The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack The 10th day of April, 2025/Swarna Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SWARNAPRAVA DASH Designation: Senior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa Date: 17-Apr-2025 13:43:09 Page 23 of 23