Madhya Pradesh High Court
Bablu @ Manoj Luwariya vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 25 March, 2026
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
1
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8353
I N T H E H I G H C O U R T O F M A D H YA P R A D E S H
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 25th MARCH, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No.36182 of 2023
BABLU @ MANOJ LUWARIYA
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Shadab Khan, Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Rahul Solani, Govt. Advocate for the respondent/State.
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ORDER
1. Heard on IA No.4529 of 2024, which is an application for taking additional documents on record.
2. On due consideration, the same is allowed and the proposed documents are taken on record.
3. This petition has been preferred by the petitioner - Bablu @ Manoj Luwariya under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of FIR dated 21.09.2020 registered at Crime No.480 of 2020, Police Station - Staion Road, Ratlam, District Ratlam for offence punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.
4. The exposition of facts, in brief, giving rise to the present petition, is as under :
Signature Not Verified Signed by: PREETHA NAIR Signing time: 28-03-2026 17:10:01 2NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8353 The Food Security Officer, Ratlam(M.P.) submitted a written complaint that a secret information was received on 20.09.2020 regarding misbranding and repacking of expiry food products - Pillsbury Mini Cookies and Cakes. Accordingly, a raid was conducted at the Godown of Ameen Serani. It was found that Sohail and others were changing the expiry date on the wrappers of Pillsbury Mini Cookies and Cakes by affixing new label showing expiry of year 2020. On such allegations, Sohail was arrested. Sohail informed that Ameen Serani is his associate. They were forging the expiry date on wrappers the product. In further investigation, Aashiq Khan and Ameen Serani were arrested. Ameen Serani informed that he had procured the expiry date food products from Raju and got the new expiry date wrappers printed from petitioner Bablu @ Manoj Luwariya, proprietor of Santosh Graphics. The forged wrappers were recovered from the house and Godown of Ameen Serani and Sohail. Ameen Serani led the police force upto the shop of Santosh Graphics, but no one was found there. The petitioner was arrested on 30.09.2021, but no incriminating material was seized from the petitioner during investigation. The supplementary final report was submitted against the petitioner for offence punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC on 29.11.2021. The trial is underway. The evidence for prosecution is being recorded.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in addition to the grounds mentioned in the petition, contends that the petitioner is falsely implicated in this matter merely on the basis of information given by co-accused Ameen Serani in police custody and his own incriminating statement before the police, which is not admissible in evidence in view of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. No incriminating material, much less, the forged labels were recovered at the Signature Not Verified Signed by: PREETHA NAIR Signing time: 28-03-2026 17:10:01 3 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8353 instance of or from the possession of the petitioner during investigation. There is no material to substantiate the complicity of the petitioner in the alleged offence. In absence of any incriminating evidence, the trial against the petitioner would be travesty of justice. Therefore, impugned FIR deserves to be quashed.
6. Per Contra, learned counsel for the State opposes the petition and submits that the main accused Ameen Serani had informed that the petitioner has prepared and printed the wrappers/labels for misbranding the food products. Ameen Serani guided the police upto shop of petitioner Bablu @ Manoj in name of Santosh Graphics. Therefore, complicity of the petitioner in the alleged offence is prima-facie made out. The impugned FIR clearly makes out the alleged offence. The petition is meritless.
7. In reply, leanred counsel for the petitioner submits that there is no material to show that the petitioner is owner, proprietor or operator of the shop in name of Santosh Graphics.
8. Heard both the parties and perused the case diary as also the record.
9. The Supreme Court, in case of State of Haryana & Others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Others, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 after an elaborate consideration of the matter and referring to various earlier decisions, has observed in para 102 as under:-
''102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above,we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should Signature Not Verified Signed by: PREETHA NAIR Signing time: 28-03-2026 17:10:01 4 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8353 be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on accusd theaccused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.''
10. In the case of Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia Vs Sambhajirao ChanrojiraoAngrereported in 1988 (1) SCC 692, the Supreme Court has held as under:
"The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into considerations any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage."Signature Not Verified Signed by: PREETHA NAIR Signing time: 28-03-2026 17:10:01 5
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8353
11. In case of Surinder Kumar Khanna v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, reported in (2018) 8 SCC 271, it was observed that-
10. In Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275 : 1952 SCR 526 : AIR 1952 SC 159 , this Court relied upon the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC 12 : (1948-49) 76 IA 147 at p. 155 and laid down as under: (AIR p. 160, paras 8-10) "8. Gurubachan's confession has played an important part in implicating the appellant, and the question at once arises, how far and in what way the confession of an accused person can be used against a co-accused? It is evident that it is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the term because, as the Privy Council say in Bhuboni Sahu v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC 12 : (1948-49) 76 IA 147 at p. 155. '...It does not indeed come within the definition of "evidence" contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination.' Their Lordships also point out that it is 'obviously evidence of a very weak type. ... It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities'.
They stated in addition that such a confession cannot be made the foundation of a conviction and can only be used in "support of other evidence". In view of these remarks, it would be pointless to cover the same ground, but we feel it is necessary to expound this further as misapprehension still exists. The question is, in what way can it be used in support of other evidence? Can it be used to fill in missing gaps? Can it be used to corroborate an accomplice or, as in the present case, a witness who, though not an accomplice, is placed in the same category regarding credibility because the Judge refuses to believe him except insofar as he is corroborated?
9.In our opinion, the matter was put succinctly by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty[Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty, ILR (1911) 38 Cal 559 at p. 588.] where he said that such a confession can only be used to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused "or, to put it in another way, as Reilly, J. did in PeriaswamiMoopan, In re , 1930 SCC OnLine Mad 86 : ILR (1931) 54 Mad 75 at p. 77. : (SCC OnLine Mad) '...the provision goes no further than this--where there is evidence against the co- accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in Section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence.'
10. Translating these observations into concrete terms they come to this. The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first, to marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept."
11. The law laid down in Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275 :
1952 SCR 526 : AIR 1952 SC 159, was approved by a Constitution Bench of this Signature Not Verified Signed by: PREETHA NAIR Signing time: 28-03-2026 17:10:01 6 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8353 Court in Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, (1964) 6 SCR 623 at pp. 631-633 :
AIR 1964 SC 1184, wherein it was observed:
"12. As we have already indicated, this question has been considered on several occasions by judicial decisions and it has been consistently held that a confession cannot be treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against a co-accused person. In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused person against another accused person, the proper approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an accused person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right. As was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty, ILR (1911) 38 Cal 559 at p. 588. a confession can only be used to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused". In PeriaswamiMoopan, In re, 1930 SCC OnLine Mad 86 : ILR (1931) 54 Mad 75 at p. 77. Reilly, J., observed that the provision of Section 30 goes not further than this: (SCC OnLine Mad) '...where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in Section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence.'
12. Later, in case of Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat reported in (2019) 16 SCC 547, it was held that-
24. Undoubtedly, this Court has in Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337, taken the view that confession by a co-accused containing incriminating matter against a person would not by itself suffice to frame charge against it. We may incidentally note that the Court has relied upon the judgment of this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275 : 1952 SCR 526 : AIR 1952 SC 159, We notice that the observations, which have been relied upon, were made in the context of an appeal which arose from the conviction of the appellant therein after a trial. The same view has been followed undoubtedly in other cases where the question arose in the context of a conviction and an appeal therefrom. However, in Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337, the Court has proceeded to take the view that only on the basis of the statement of the co-accused, no case is made out, even for framing a charge.
30. In Law of Evidence by M. Monir, 17th Edn., p. 555, we notice the following discussion regarding the distinction between Section 25 on the one hand and Section 26 on the other hand:
"... The section deals with confessions which are made not to Police Officers but to persons other than Police Officers, e.g., to a fellow prisoner, a doctor or a visitor, and makes such confessions inadmissible if they were made whilst the accused was in the custody of a Police Officer. In Section 25 the criterion for excluding a confession is the answer to the question. "To whom was the confession made?" If the answer is that it was made to a Police Officer, the confession is absolutely excluded from evidence. On the other hand, the criterion adopted in Section 26 for excluding a confession is the answer to the question. "Under what circumstances was the confession made?" If the answer is that it was made whilst the accused was in the custody of a Police Officer, the law Signature Not Verified Signed by: PREETHA NAIR Signing time: 28-03-2026 17:10:01 7 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8353 lays down that such confession shall be excluded from evidence, unless it was made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate."
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42. A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in Mahabir Mandal v. State of Bihar, (1972) 1 SCC 748 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 454 : AIR 1972 SC 1331, had this to say:
"46. Coming to the case of Kasim, we find that there is no reliable evidence as may show that Kasim was present at the house of Mahabir on the night of occurrence and took part in the disposal of the dead body of Indira. Reliance was placed by the prosecution upon the statement alleged to have been made by Kasim and Mahadeo accused at the police station in the presence of Baijnath PW after Baijnath had lodged report at the police station. Such statements are legally not admissible in evidence and cannot be used as substantive evidence. According to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation shall be signed by the person making it or used for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made. The only exception to the above rule is mentioned in the proviso to that section. According to the proviso, when any witness is called for the prosecution in the enquiry or trial, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused and with the permission of the court by the prosecution, to contradict such witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the reexamination of such witness for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination. The above rule is, however, not applicable to statements falling within the provisions of Clause 1 of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act or to affect the provisions of Section 27 of that Act. It is also well established that the bar of inadmissibility operates not only on statements of witnesses but also on those of the accused (see Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor, 1939 SCC OnLine PC 1 : (1938-39) 66 IA 66 : AIR 1939 PC 47] ). Lord Atkin, in that case, while dealing with Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure observed:
'Then follows the section in question which is drawn in the same general way relating to "any person". That the words in their ordinary meaning would include any person though he may thereafter be accused seems plain. Investigation into crime often includes the examination of a number or persons none of whom or all of whom may be suspected at the time. The first words of the section prohibiting the statement, if recorded, from being signed must apply to all the statements made at the time and must therefore apply to a statement made by a person possibly not then even suspected but eventually accused....'
47. Reference may also be made to Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, according to which no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved against such person. There is nothing in the present case to show that the statements which were made by Kasim and Mahadeo accused on 18-9-1963, at the police station in the presence of Baijnath resulted in the discovery of any incriminating material as may make Signature Not Verified Signed by: PREETHA NAIR Signing time: 28-03-2026 17:10:01 8 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8353 them admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. As such, the aforesaid statements must be excluded from consideration."
44. Such a person viz. person who is named in the FIR, and therefore, the accused in the eye of the law, can indeed be questioned and the statement is taken by the police officer. A confession, which is made to a police officer, would be inadmissible having regard to Section 25 of the Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated under Section 24 of the Evidence Act would also be inadmissible. A confession unless it fulfils the test laid down in Pakala Narayana Swami and as accepted by this Court, may still be used as an admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This, however, is subject to the bar of admissibility of a statement under Section 161 CrPC. Therefore, even if a statement contains admission, the statement being one under Section 161, it would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 CrPC.
45. Bar under Section 162 CrPC, no doubt, operates in regard to the statement made to a police officer in between two points of time viz. from the beginning of the investigation till the termination of the same. In a case where statement containing not a confession but admission, which is otherwise relevant and which is made before the investigation commences, may be admissible. We need not, however, say anything more.
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50. From the statement of the law contained in CBI v. V.C. Shukla, (1998) 3 SCC 410, it becomes clear as to what constitutes confession and how if it does not constitute confession, it may still be an admission. Being an admission, it may be admissible under the Evidence Act provided that it meets the requirements of admission as defined in Section 17 of the Evidence Act. However, even if it is an admission, if it is made in the course of investigation under the CrPC to a police officer, then, it will not be admissible under Section 162 CrPC as it clearly prohibits the use of statement made to a police officer under Section 161 CrPC except for the purpose which is mentioned therein. Statement given under Section 161, even if relevant, as it contains an admission, would not be admissible, though an admission falling short of a confession which may be made otherwise, may become substantive evidence.
51. A confession made to a police officer is clearly inadmissible. The statement relied on by the respondent is dated 11-4-1996 and the appellant was arrested on 11-4-1996. This is pursuant to the FIR registered on 10-4-1996. The statement dated 11-4-1996 is made to a police officer. This is clear from the statement as also the letter dated 10-8- 1996 (Annexure R-6) produced by the respondent. It is clearly during the course of the investigation. Even if it does contain admissions by virtue of Section 162 and as interpreted by this Court in V.C. Shukla, such admissions are clearly inadmissible.
52. If the statement made by the appellant on 11-4-1996 is inadmissible, then, there will only be the statement of the co-accused available to be considered in deciding whether the charge has to be framed against the appellant or not. It is here that the law laid down by this Court in Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337 becomes applicable.
13. The material on record is examined in the light of aforestated propositions of law.
14. Apparently, the petitioner is implicated in the alleged offence on the basis of statement of information given by co-accused Ameen Serani in police Signature Not Verified Signed by: PREETHA NAIR Signing time: 28-03-2026 17:10:01 9 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8353 custody and his own incriminating statement before the police, which are not admissible in evidence in view of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. No incriminating material, connecting the petitioner with the alleged offence was seized during investigation at his own instance or instance of any other co- accused. There is no material on case diary that the petitioner/ accused had printed the labels / wrappers which were used by the co-accused. Further, there is lack of incrimnating material to show that petitioner is proprietor or operator of M/s. Santosh Graphics and the labels/ wrappers were printed at Santosh Graphics shop. There is no call detail report or money trail suggesting complicity of the petitioner in the alleged offence. Thus, the material on record is not sufficient even to frame charge against the petitioner in view of the law laid down in the case of Suresh Budharmal Kalani, Surinder Kumar Khanna, Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel (supra). The continuation of prosecution against the petitioner would be an abuse of process of law and wastage of precious time of Court. Therefore, in view of law laid down in the case of Ch. Bhajan Lal&Others and Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that FIR and the subsequent proceedings deserve to be quashed in exercise of inherent power u/S. 482 of Cr.P.C.
15. Consequently, the impugned FIR at Crime No.480 of 2020 registered by the Police Station, Station Road Ratlam, District - Ratlam for offence punishable under Section(s) 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, so far as the same relates to the petitioner - Bablu @ Manoj Luwariya is quashed alongwith all consequential proceedings.
16. The petition is allowed, accordingly.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR) JUDGE pn Signature Not Verified Signed by: PREETHA NAIR Signing time: 28-03-2026 17:10:01