Patna High Court - Orders
Binoy Kumar Singh @ Vinay Kumar Singh & ... vs The State Of Bihar Through The on 17 September, 2014
Author: Anjana Prakash
Bench: Anjana Prakash
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Criminal Miscellaneous No.29926 of 2011
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1. Binoy Kumar Singh @ Vinay Kumar Singh, son of late Chandrashekhar
Prasad Singh, resident of village-Belhar, P.S.-Belhar, District-Banka,
presently residing at Flat No.11, Golf View Apartment, Behind J. D.
Women‟s College, Bailey Road, P.S.-Shashtri Nagar, District-Patna,
and is presently posted at Regional Office, Patna, as Vice President,
Gammon India Limited &
2. Prabhat Ranjan Singh, son of late Dilip Singh, resident of village-
Jagdishpur, P.S.-Vijaypur, District-Gopalganj, presently posted at
Sherghati Gaya as Project Manager, Gammon India Limited.
.... .... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Department of Vigilance
.... .... Opposite Party/s
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Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Satyavrat Verma, Advocate
For the Opposite Party/s : Mr. Arvind Kumar, Law Officer, Vigilance
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CORAM: HONOURABLE JUSTICE SMT. ANJANA PRAKASH
ORAL ORDER
14/ 17-09-2014This application had been dismissed by order dated 24.07.2014 observing that a reasoned order was to follow later on.
2. The Prosecution case according to the Additional Collector, Special Programme, Gaya, is that a raiding team was constituted after the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police, Gaya, received secret information that some Officers of the Mining Department, by misusing their official powers, are permitting illegal mining and operation of crushers. The raiding team then started to keep watch on the activities of visitors of a local Hotel at Bodh Gaya. On the date of occurrence, it observed that one Shambhu Prasad Sahu, Assistant Director, Mines, along Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 2/21 with one unknown person entered a hotel room. Later on, two other unknown persons also entered the same room after knocking the door which was opened by Shambhu Prasad Sahu, who took them inside. Finding the activities suspicious, the team peeped into the room and attempted to hear the conversation from an opening. They heard the unknown person saying to Shambhu Prasad Sahu that he had been helping them for which they would provide all services and then handed him over an envelope and 2-3 boxes, who inspected the contents of the envelope and kept it in his pocket. Before the raiding team could enter the room, one of the persons had left. The Team then knocked at the door which was opened by an unknown person. On entering inside they made known to Shambhu Prasad Sahu their identity and conducted a search. A Samsung Mobile Phone was recovered from Shambhu Prasad Sahu and a sum of `25,000/- from under the pillow and some files relating to Mining Department were found in the room. When Shambhu Prasad Sahu was asked to explain the three mobile sets, money and the official files being in the room, he did not give any satisfactory reply. On their asking, Shambhu Prasad Sahu disclosed that the person, who had accompanied him and left, was Shyam Narayan Singh, the Mining Inspector, Gaya, and two unknown persons were allegedly the present Petitioners. Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 3/21
3. The Petitioner No.1 is the Vice President of Gammon India Limited, whereas, the Petitioner No.2 is the Project Manager, Gammon India Limited.
4. It has been submitted on behalf of the Petitioners that even though Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter to be referred as "PC Act") would apply to private persons, the present Petitioners cannot be prosecuted under the provision of PC Act in absence of any charge of abetment of conspiracy and without Sanction under Section 19 PC Act. He relies on a decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Anil Kumar & Ors. Vs. M. K. Aiyappa & another [2014(1) PLJR SC 4] and a Division Bench order dated 05.03.2014 of this Court passed in Criminal Writ No.1126 of 2013 [Ahmad Ashfaque Karim Vs. The State of Bihar through Vigilance, Patna and another].
The Counsel further submits that the Prosecution story being absurd and unbelievable the prosecution is fit to be set aside.
5. As I understand, the questions posed before this Court in the facts and circumstances of the case are:
(i) The effect of part cognizance in the facts of this case;
(ii) Whether the Court could proceed against the Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 4/21 Petitioners awaiting sanction for prosecution in respect to the Public Servants.
6. Firstly, to deal with the decisions relied upon by the Petitioners, I find that in the case of Anil Kumar & Ors. Vs. M. K. Aiyappa & another [2014(1)PLJR SC 4], the facts of the said case were that the Magistrate had received a Complaint that the Appellant with malafide intention had passed order dated 30.06.2012 in connivance with other Officers and sold valuable lands in favour of a private person which order was subsequently recalled. Alleging that offences punishable under Section(s) 406, 409, 420, 426, 463, 465, 468, 471, 474 read with Section 120-B and 149 Indian Penal Code and Section 8, 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act were made out, a private Complaint was filed under Section 200 Cr. P.C. On receipt of such Complaint, the Special Judge referred the matter under Section 156(3) Cr. P. C. to the Dy. Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore Urban, for investigation. Aggrieved by the said order, the proposed Accused moved the Karnataka High Court in Writ Jurisdiction on the ground that he being a Public Servant, a private Complaint could not be entertained against him without an order of Sanction. The High Court accepting the submissions proceeded to quash the order.
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-20145/21
7. The Complainant then moved the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, which looked into various decisions on the point of sanction thereafter in paragraph 9, it formulated a question as to "whether the order directing investigation under Section 156(3) Cr. P. C. would amount to taking cognizance of the offence, since a contention was raised that expression "cognizance" appearing in Section 19(1) P C Act will have to be construed as post- cognizance stage, not pre-cognizance stage."
8. It accepted the definition of „Cognizance‟ as explained in the case of State of West Bengal and another Vs. Mohd. Khalid and others (1995)1 SCC 684 that the stage of pre- cognizance is not the same as issuance of process and while cognizance was the initial stage, issuance of process was a stage subsequent when the Court decides to proceed against the offender after considering the materials placed before it and thereafter held that:
"When a Special Judge refers a complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., obviously, he has not taken cognizance of the offence and, therefore, it is a pre-cognizance stage and cannot be equated with post-cognizance stage."
9. Further in Paragraph 12, the Apex Court proceeded to examine whether requirement of sanction was a Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 6/21 precondition for ordering investigation under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C. and reproduced the definition of a Public Servant and considered the importance of sanction Under Section 19 PC Act. However, it did not answer as to how or why sanction was required even at pre-cognizance stage while dismissing the Appeal.
10. When I look to the older decisions, I find that the Apex Court has taken a contrary view. In the case of R. R. Chari Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR (38) 1951 Supreme Court 207), facts of the case were that a First Information Report had been instituted against the Petitioner under the provision of Prevention of Corruption Act. On 22.10.1947, the police applied to the Dy. Magistrate, Kanpur, for issuance of warrant of arrest which was issued on the next day and he was arrested on 27.10.1947 but was granted bail. On 26.11.1947, the District Magistrate cancelled his bail as the Magistrate considered sureties were not proper. On 01.12.1947, the Government appointed a Special Magistrate to try offences under the Act and on 01.12.1947, the Petitioner was produced before the Special Magistrate and granted bail. The police continued their investigation. On 06.12.1948 sanction was granted by the Provincial Govt. to prosecute the Petitioner. On 31.01.1949, Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 7/21 sanction was granted by the Central Government. It was contended by the Petitioner that on the date of warrant of arrest i.e. 22.10.1947, the Magistrate had taken cognizance and he having done so without sanction of the Govt., the proceedings were illegal. The Court considered various aspects of granting sanction and the meaning of cognizance and stated that it was only on 25.03.1949 i.e. when the Petitioner was ordered to be put up before the Magistrate to answer the charge-sheet submitted by the Prosecution that cognizance had been taken and refused relief to the Petitioner on such ground.
11. In AIR 1971 SC 2372 (Darshan Singh Ram Kishan Vs. the State of Maharashtra), the Apex Court considered the following facts: On 31.10.1963, one Jivansingh Uttamsingh obtained a British Passport and on its basis travelled to India with his family where he died. According to the Prosecution, the Passport fell in the hands of the Appellant. One Bakshi Singh desired to go to United Kingdom, who had no Passport and, so, the Appellant prepared a Visa in the name of Bakshi Singh and substituted the photograph of Bakshi Singh on the passport of Jivansingh Uttamsingh. On the strength of the same, he journeyed to United Kingdom. The British authorities suspected the Passport and repatriated Bakshi Singh to India after which a substantive Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 8/21 case was filed and both Bakshi Singh and Darshan Singh Ram Kishan were charge-sheeted. At the stage of committal, the Magistrate did not examine any witness and on the basis of charge-sheet he framed charges and committed the case to the Court of Sessions. Since he had also framed charge under Section 120-B Indian Penal Code which required consent under Section 196-A (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the order was challenged before the Bombay High Court on such ground which matter went up to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
The Apex Court on the facts held that since it was not at the stage of cognizance, but at the stage of charge that the Magistrate deemed it essential to add Section 120-B Indian Penal Code which required sanction, bar under Section 196-A (2) Cr. P. C. did not apply. The Supreme Court, thus, differentiated the two stages and held that even if cognizance was taken without sanction when the Court had proceeded to the stage of framing of charge, sanction would not be essential. Paragraph 12 is quoted below:
12. It is clear from the charge-sheet submitted to the magistrate that the offence of criminal conspiracy was not even referred to. The offence "primarily and essentially" alleged therein was one of abetment of forgery under sections 468 and 471 and of false impersonation under sec.
419 read with sec. 109; Assuming that the Magistrate before taking cognizance had perused the statements of witnesses Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 9/21 recorded by the police during investigation, it was conceded by counsel after he himself had gone through them from the record, that none of the witnesses had alleged therein either directly or indirectly of the appellant having entered into a criminal conspiracy with Bakshi Singh for forging the passport. It cannot be disputed that the charge-sheet also prima facie disclosed the offence of abetment. That being so, it is impossible to sustain the argument that the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under sec.
120B, and therefore, consent under sec.
196A (2) was required as a condition precedent or that the committal order and the proceedings for committal which he took were vitiated for want of such consent."
12. In the case of Ahmad Ashfaque Karim Vs. The State of Bihar through Vigilance Patna and another [Criminal Writ No.1126 of 2013] decided by Division Bench of this Court, relied upon by the Petitioners, I find the facts of the case were that a Charge sheet was submitted in the Court of the Special Judge, CBI, for offences punishable under Section(s) 384, 353, 406, 420, 467, 468, 469, 471 read with Section 120-B Indian Penal Code and also under Section 10 of Bihar Conduct of Examination Act, 1981, coupled with Sections 25(1-B)A, 26 and 30 of the Arms Act, 1959 and further under Section(s) 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.The Special Judge then passed the following order:
"Perused the record, case diary, evidence available on record, charge sheet and all the Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 10/21 documents, on perusal, it is evident that sufficient evidence is available for taking cognizance against the accused persons, namely, Ahmad Ashfaque Karim and Tanveer Alam named in the charge sheet. Hence, cognizance is taken against the accused persons, namely, Ahmad Ashfaque Karim and Tanveer Alam, under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 469, 471, 120 B, 384, 353 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 7 read with Sections 13 (1) (d) and 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Section 10 of the Bihar Conduct of Examination Act and Sections 25 (1-B) (a), 26 and 30 of the Arms Act. The sanction order under the Prevention of Corruption Act has not been received as yet. It will be considered after receiving the sanction order."
13. The Division Bench set aside the order dated 11.09.2013 and subsequent orders of remand on the ground that Sanction was essential and fact of the matter was that the Special Judge had not taken cognizance of the offences punishable under the PC Act even though he had said so, because he had awaited the order of Sanction being conscious that he could not take cognizance without receipt of the same. Further, being a special Judge empowered to „try‟ special cases he could not even take cognizance unless he had firstly taken cognizance of the offences punishable under the provisions of the special Act. The Division Bench while arriving at this conclusion examined the scheme the Act and Section(s) 3 and 4 PC Act and the effect of omission of Sanction and allowed the Writ Application.
14. In my understanding the issue of Sanction is Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 11/21 no longer res integra as is evident from the latest decision of the Apex Court which has considered the earlier decisions on the point of sanction in State of Bihar and others Vs. Rajmangal Ram reported in 2014 CRI LJ 2300. The issue before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court was sustainability of the orders dated 23.03.2012 and 03.03.2011 passed by the High Court of Patna, the effect of which was that the criminal proceedings instituted against the Respondents under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code as well as the P C Act, 1988, had been interdicted on the ground of an invalid Sanction.
15. It proceeded to take note of the provisions of Section 19 PC Act and 465 Cr. P. C. and relying on earlier decisions concluded as follows:
"7. In a situation where under both the enactments any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction, which would also include the competence of the authority to grant sanction, does not vitiate the eventual conclusion in the trial including the conviction and sentence, unless of course a failure of justice has occurred, it is difficult to see how at the intermediary stage a criminal prosecution can be nullified or interdicted on account of any such error, omission or irregularity in the sanction order without arriving at the satisfaction that a failure of justice has also been occasioned. This is what was decided by this Court in State by Police Inspector V. T. Venkatesh Murthy wherein it has been inter alia observed Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 12/21 that, "14..... Merely because there is any omission, error or irregularity in the matter of according sanction, that does not affect the validity of the proceeding unless the court records the satisfaction that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in failure of justice"
8. The above view also found reiteration in Prakash Singh Badal and another V. State of Punjab and others wherein it was, inter alia, held that mere omission, error or irregularity in sanction is not to be considered fatal unless it has resulted in failure of justice. In Prakash Singh Badal (supra) it was further held that Section 19(1) of the PC Act is a matter of procedure and does not go to the root of jurisdiction. On the same line is the decision of this Court in R. Venkatkrishnan V. Central Bureau of Investigation. In fact, a three Judge Bench in State of Madhya Pradesh V. Virender Kumar Tripathi while considering an identical issue, namely, the validity of the grant of sanction by the Additional Secretary of the Department of Law and Legislative Affairs of the Government of Madhya Pradesh instead of the authority in the parent department, this Court held that in view of Section 19(3) of the PC Act, interdicting a criminal proceeding mid-course on ground of invalidity of the sanction order will not be appropriate unless the court can also reach the conclusion that failure of justice had been occasioned by any such error, omission or irregularity in the sanction. It was further held that failure of justice can be established not at the stage of framing of charge but only after the trial has commenced and evidence is led. (Para 10 of the Report).
9. There is a contrary view of this Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 13/21 Court in State of Goa v. Babu Thomas holding that an error in grant of sanction goes to the root of the prosecution. But the decision in Babu Thomas (supra) has to be necessarily understood in the facts thereof, namely, that the authority itself had admitted the invalidity of the initial sanction by issuing a second sanction with retrospective effect to validate the cognizance already taken on the basis of the initial sanction order. Even otherwise, the position has been clarified by the larger bench in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Virender Kumar Tripathi (supra).
10. In the instant cases the High Court had interdicted the criminal proceedings on the ground that the Law department was not the competent authority to accord sanction for the prosecution of the respondents. Even assuming that the Law Department was not competent, it was still necessary for the High Court to reach the conclusion that a failure of justice has been occasioned. Such a finding is conspicuously absent rendering it difficult to sustain the impugned orders of the High Court."
16. Here it would be useful to have a look at section 19(3) PC Act 1988 once again which is quoted below :
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) ----
(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby;Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 14/21
17. On a plain reading of the Section it is clear that the legislature in no uncertain terms and unambiguously prohibits interference by a Superior Court, unless in its opinion, there was failure of justice. Hence whenever a Court enters into the terrain of examining the point of sanction, its opinion, based on judicial discretion, is of paramount importance. This is the pivot on which the bar rests. Hence, even though it may be open to challenge in the superior courts as sufficiently serious, but keeping the social objective in mind, the requirement is to give such a finding in every circumstance. At this point it would be essential to look to the development of this particular provision.
18. The old Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 comprised of merely 8 Sections but Section 6 spelt out the necessity of Sanction before cognizance. To supplement this Act, The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1952 was enacted in order to speed up trials which introduced the system of having Special Courts.
19. There were similar provisions as to the bar of cognizance without sanction in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, vide Section 197 which remained in Section 197 in the Cr. P.C. of 1974, with periodical amendments, but the essence has remained the same. In the process of enacting Prevention of Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 15/21 Corruption Act 1988, the law to control corruption has undergone a major overhaul and now it has become more explicit and comprehensive. The most important change in my view is introduction of Section 19(3) reproduced above.
20. Here I may point out that Cr. P.C has a similar provision, relevant portion of which is reproduced below.
"465. Finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error, omission or irregularity.---
or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby."
21. We thus find that one major difference between Sections 19(3) P C Act and 465 Cr. P.C. is that whereas even absence of sanction is not amenable to challenge for prosecuting a Public Servant under the PC Act, Section 465 Cr. P.C. does not condone the same, but the similarity in both the Sections is that the issue of Sanction cannot be attacked unless in the opinion of the Court failure of justice has occasioned.
22. Before I proceed any further I would like to briefly recapitulate the history of „failure of justice‟. Chapter XLV of the old Cr. P.C. Act, 1898, contained Sections 529 and 530 which expressly spelt out two stark situations when the proceedings being irregular vitiated the trial and those which did Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 16/21 not. There was yet another and third category mentioned in Sections 531 (proceedings held in wrong territorial jurisdiction), Section 535 (when no charge was framed), Section 537 (errors, omissions, irregularities in charge). The present Cr. P.C. 1974 also dedicates Chapter XXXV to such situations. Sections 460 and 461 are similar to Sections 529 and 530 of the Old Act and Section 462 is similar to Section 531 and 464 combines Sections 535 and 537. Section 465(part quoted above) becomes more comprehensive when it includes almost the entire procedure of a trial and also introduces the effect of lapses in Sanction.
23. Importantly, this third category of cases is open to challenge only when there has been a "failure of justice" which words are common to all the above Sections as also Section 19(3) PC Act. Thus, as I would look at it, failure of justice would mean non adherence to the established principle of law or/and procedure, which would result in prejudice to a party. As also, prejudice has to be so grave that it will necessarily be implied and described as illegality. As commonly understood, if repugnancy is to law, the same can be examined at any stage but the position in cases of prejudice on account of not following procedure one has to examine its effect. "If the seriousness of the omission is of a lesser degree, it will be an irregularity and prejudice by way of Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 17/21 failure of justice will have to be established." (See Willie William Slaney v. State of M.P. AIR 1956 SC 116). Hence, prejudice on account of procedural irregularity being a question of fact it would naturally have to be determined only at the end of trial and there cannot be a speculation to its effect even before the parties have had an opportunity to plead its case.
24. At this stage, I am tempted to quote from the same very illuminating and relevant judgment of Willie William Slaney v State of MP (supra) where a five Judges Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had been constituted to reconcile two apparently differing views on effects of irregularities in charge, the question of failure of justice and prejudice on account of it. While examining the issue from various standpoints, including prejudice, it discussed various hypothetical situations and how prejudice could only be a question of fact. It discussed the scheme of the Chapter XLV Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and Section 537 in the context of Sections 225, 232, 535, and 537 i.e. errors, omissions and irregularities in charge. It very nicely reminded the Courts that:
"It is the substance that we must seek. Courts have to administer justice and justice includes the punishment of guilt just as much as the protection of innocence. Neither can be done if the shadow is mistaken for the substance and the goal is Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 18/21 lost in a labyrinth of unsubstantial technicalities. Broad vision is required, a nice balancing of the rights of the State and the protection of society in general against protection from harassment to the individual and the risks of unjust conviction."
25. Moreover, now it is also settled that:
"The word „cognizance‟ indicates the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons. It has, thus, reference to the hearing and determination of the case in connection with an offence. State of W.B. Vs. Mohd. Khalid, (1995) 1 SCC 684, 696, 697 (SC)"
[Underlining mine] And that it is merely becoming „aware‟ AIR 1963 SC 765 (Ajit Kumar Palit vs. State of WB) or a stage of taking „judicial notice‟ by a Court AIR 2002 SC 2784 (Dharmesh Vs State of Gujarat). Taking cognizance does not mean that any judicial proceedings have started.
26. In the context of the above when we see the scheme of PC Act we find that Section 3 empowers a special Judge to try a certain category of cases specified therein. Further Section 4(3) permits joint trial and thus incorporates the provisions of Sections 219, 220 and 223 Cr. P.C i.e. joinder of charges in Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 19/21 certain eventualities. Section 4(3) is reproduced below;
"4. Cases triable by Special Judges---
(1)..................... (2) ..................... (3) When trying any case, a Special Judge may also try any offence, other than an offence specified in section 3, with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), be charged at the same trial." (Underlining mine)
27. As we can see the words „trying‟, „try‟ qualifies the word „Charge‟ which is a stage not only distinct from cognizance but also comes much later after the Court has given an opportunity of hearing to an accused as to why his guilt be not determined. If at this stage the Court feels that some persons or offences be clubbed together he is permitted to do so in terms of Section 4(3) PC Act. No doubt cognizance is a pre-condition but then Section 19 is controlled by Section 19(3) PC Act.
28. Further, it cannot be in dispute that part charge- sheet is permissible in law as a result of which a Magistrate staggers proceeding against different accused at different stages. In some situation, he may wait for the order of sanction so as to proceed against the Public Servant. It may also happen that between the time of submission of charge-sheet, its perusal by the Magistrate, and awaiting the communication of Sanction, the Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-2014 20/21 Public Servant may retire, in which case no sanction would be required. In such a situation like the above, if the Court sets aside the order of cognizance on the ground as pleaded in the present case, it would be grossly premature and derail the cause of Justice. One should keep in mind that Penal Statute has been enacted to bring an Accused to book and not to let him off without considering the object of law. Also Criminal Jurisprudence is not plain mathematical deductions of two plus two. It is a complex branch of law which keeps in mind the collective aspirations of a Civil Society within a Political State. Therefore, a Court has to tread very carefully through treacherous paths so as to ensure justice to all parties, without rushing in, or slanting in favour of any particular party. It has to keep in mind the ultimate effect of each of its order and final outcome of the same.
29. So much for the point of law. Whereas, facts are concerned, since it is premature to go into absurdity or otherwise of the Prosecution Case without giving the Prosecution an opportunity to prove the same during trial and any finding on it at this stage may cause prejudice, this Court would not wish to discuss the same.
30. In the result, the application is dismissed as recorded earlier.
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.29926 of 2011 (14) dt.17-09-201421/21
31. Call for a report from the Secretary, Mines & Geology, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, with regard to sanction of prosecution of two mining officials accused in the present case.
32. Put up on 15.10.2014 under the "To Be Mentioned" with the report.
33. Let this order be communicated to the Secretary, Mines & Geology, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, through FAX at the cost of the State/ the special Judge, Vigilance, 1st Patna, in connection with Special Case No.20 of 2011 arising out of Bodh Gaya P.S. Case No.75 of 2011.
(Anjana Prakash, J) J. Alam/-
AFR
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